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Foreword
since the seven other goals are equally vital to 
improving the human condition.
The other targets and goals are crucial 
to human well-being, and they reinforce 
improvements in other areas. For example, 
providing access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation, part of MDG 7, is essential 
if people are to be healthy enough to complete 
school and join the job market. Improved 
sanitary conditions and better education help 
reduce infant and maternal mortality. In all 
of these areas, women play a key role, and 
ensuring equal opportunities for women is 
absolutely essential.
Yet, continued progress toward the MDGs 
will be increasingly difficult to achieve with-
out far better stewardship of the environ-
ment. Pollution can get in the way of people’s 
health and thus their productivity, whether 
on the farm or in cities. Poor people are the 
least able to protect their children from the 
effects of pollution on health and educational 
outcomes, which can in turn mean setbacks 
once they reach adulthood. Climate change is 
intensifying, putting the prosperity of future 
generations at risk and imperiling hard-won 
development achievements. 
Global partnerships for development, 
which are enshrined in MDG 8, are necessary 
to tackle everything from supplying afford-
able essential drugs in poor countries to help-
Global Monitoring Report (GMR) 2013 
gauges progress toward the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) through the lens 
of the changing urban-rural landscape. The 
goals encompass and promote a universal 
standard of being free from grinding poverty, 
being educated and healthy, and having ready 
access to clean water and sanitation. Urban-
ization has helped reduce poverty through the 
creation of new income opportunities, and has 
increased both access to and quality of ser-
vices. However, the number of people living in 
urban slums is also rising, and cities often con-
tribute to environmental degradation. At the 
same time, three quarters of the poor still live 
in rural areas, and better provision of basic 
services in those areas is essential to open up 
opportunities for the rural population. With 
this in mind, GMR 2013 calls for complemen-
tary rural-urban development policies and an 
integrated strategy of planning, connecting, 
and financing. 
Against the backdrop of this changing 
urban-rural landscape and the macroeconomic 
growth that it has generated, success in reduc-
ing the proportion of people whose income 
is under $1.25 a day is a signal achievement. 
This proportion fell from 43.1 percent in 1990 
to 20.6 percent in 2010. However, that still 
leaves 1.2 billion people in extreme poverty. 
This stark reality is only part of the story, 
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ing landlocked and small island developing 
states. To ensure that such partnerships can be 
deployed effectively, the international commu-
nity needs to do a better job of facilitating joint 
public-private partnerships and harnessing 
technology to solve today’s development chal-
lenges. For example, we need more dynamic 
innovation and more systematic sharing of 
lessons of experience. Also, resources matter. 
Enduring development solutions can only be 
realized if donors deliver on their pledges and, 
through improved effectiveness, help coun-
tries absorb aid more productively. 
With fewer than 1,000 days remaining until 
the current set of MDGs expire, it is imperative 
that all of us, wherever we are, make a greater 
effort to help more people escape poverty and 
improve their overall well-being. Accelerating 
progress toward the MDGs and maintaining 
that momentum beyond 2015 is not only the 
right thing to do, it is also in the best economic 
interests of nations. 
This report has been prepared jointly by the 
staffs of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In preparing the report, 
staffs have collaborated closely with partner 
institutions—the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Cities Alliance, and various nongov-
ernmental institutions, such as SlumDwellers 
International (SDI) and Centre for Urban and 
Regional Excellence (CURE), India. The coop-
eration and support of these institutions are 
gratefully acknowledged.
Jos Verbeek was the lead author and man-
ager of the report. Lynge Nielsen led the team 
from the IMF. The principal authors and con-
tributors to the various parts of the report 
include Vandana Chandra, Shaohua Chen, 
Jorge Coarasa, William Cobbett, Uwe Deich-
mann, Amir Fouad, Jonas Frank, Yoichiro 
Ishihara, Somik Lall, Peter Lanjouw, Hans 
Lofgren, Mariem Malouche, Eugenia Suarez 
Moran, Siobhan Murray, Prem Sangraula, 
Rachel K. Sebudde, Forhad Shilpi, Gayatri 
Singh, Eric V. Swanson, and Quentin Wodon 
(World Bank) and Sibrabrata Das, Nisreen 
Farhan, Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu, Svitlana 
Maslova, Chris Papageorgiou, and Nicolo 
Spatafora (IMF). Amy Guatam was the prin-
ciple editor of the text, and Kristina Tan Mer-
cado and Hazel Macadangdang assisted with 
the overall preparation of the report. The work 
was carried out under the general guidance of 
Kaushik Basu and Hans Timmer at the World 
Bank. Supervision at the IMF was provided by 
Hugh Bredenkamp and Brad McDonald. 
A number of other staff and consultants 
made valuable contributions, including the fol-
lowing from the World Bank: Shaida Badiee, 
Judy L. Baker, Grant Cameron, Asli Demirgüç-
Kunt, Neil Fantom, Juan Feng, Deon Filmer, 
Cecile Fruman, Ejaz Ghani, Delfin Sia Go, 
Masako Hiraga, Vivian Hon, Sergio Kurlat, 
Jeffrey Lecksell, Xiao Li, Dennis Linders, 
Johan Mistiaen, Zia Qureshi, Israel Osorio-
Rodarte, Martin Ravallion, and Saurabh 
Shome. 
Contributors from other institutions include 
Suzanne Steensen and Andrzej Suchodloski 
(OECD), Josefina J. Balane, Debra Kertzman, 
Noriko Ogawa, Hong Wei (ADB), Amy M. 
Lewis, Luis Diaz, Marcos Robles, Federico 
Scodelaro Bilbao, Caroline Sipp, and Horacio 
Cristian Terraza (IADB), Murat Jadraliyev 
and Anita Taci (EBRD), Patricia N. Laverley, 
Nejmudin Bilal, and Lydiah Munyi (AfDB), 
Daniel Schensul and Jose Miguel Guzman 
(United Nations Population Fund).
Guidance received from the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank and the IMF and 
their staffs during discussions of the draft 
report is gratefully acknowledged. The report 
also benefited from many useful comments 
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Overview
potential to inform discussions about the 
post-2015 development framework in which 
urbanization will be a major factor—96 per-
cent of the additional 1.4 billion people in the 
developing world in 2030 will live in urban 
areas. 
Urbanization matters. In the past two 
decades, developing countries have urbanized 
rapidly, with the number of people living in 
urban settlements rising from about 1.5 bil-
lion in 1990 to 3.6 billion (more than half of 
the world’s population) in 2011. The report 
finds that urban poverty rates are significantly 
lower than rural poverty rates and that urban 
populations have far better access to the basic 
public services defined by the MDGs, such 
as access to safe water and sanitation facili-
ties, even though within urban areas asym-
metries in access are large. If the forces of 
urbanization are not managed speedily and 
efficiently, slum growth can overwhelm city 
growth, exacerbate urban poverty, and derail 
MDG achievements. As the GMR points out, 
however, people are located along a continu-
ous rural-urban spectrum, and large cities 
are not necessarily places where the urban 
poor are concentrated. Smaller towns matter 
greatly for urban poverty reduction and ser-
vice delivery. As urban centers continue their 
The Global Monitoring Report (GMR), 
jointly produced by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), is an 
annual report card on the world’s progress 
toward the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Now in its 10th edition, the GMR 
also outlines prospects for the attainment of 
the MDGs and assesses the support of the 
international community. Achieving as many 
MDGs as possible before 2015 remains an 
urgent endeavor for the development com-
munity. This GMR highlights those MDGs 
that are lagging in progress and consequently 
need additional attention, while pointing out 
that accelerating toward attainment of one 
MDG will likely provide positive spillovers to 
the attainment of others. The Report shows 
that official development assistance (ODA) 
and progress with aid effectiveness have been 
less than stellar.
Each annual report has a thematic focus, 
an aspect of the development agenda on 
which the GMR provides a more in-depth 
assessment. The theme of GMR 2013 is 
rural-urban disparities in development and 
ways urbanization can better help achieve 
the MDGs. Not only is the theme highly rel-
evant for assessing progress within the cur-
rent MDG framework, but it also has the 
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Four MDG targets have been met: MDG 1.a (halving extreme 
poverty), two parts of MDG 7 (access to safe water and improved 
lives of slum dwellers, and part of MDG 3.a (gender parity in primary 
education). Progress on the remaining MDGs is limited, except for 
MDG 3.a (gender parity in primary and secondary education), which 
is close to being on target. 
The MDGs reflect the basic needs of all citizens, and governments 
should aim to meet them fully in both urban and rural areas. 
But resources are scarce, and priorities must be set. Much of the 
sequencing will depend on local conditions regarding degree of 
urbanization and rural-urban differences in MDG outcomes. 
Populations are typically seen as being spatially bipolar. In reality, 
people and poverty are located along a spectrum from rural to 
urban, with many types of settlements from small to large towns.  
The experience is that the smaller the town, the higher the poverty 
rate, with less access to MDG-related services. 
Urbanization by itself is no guarantee for success. If unregulated  
and poorly planned, urbanization can lead to disproportionate 
increases in slums. GMR 2013 calls for an integrated strategy to 
better manage the planning-connecting-financing formula of 
urbanization. 
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inexorable growth over the next decades, 
GMR 2013 calls for an integrated strategy 
to better manage the planning-connecting-
financing formula of urbanization. 
Notwithstanding the importance of 
urbanization in poverty reduction and MDG 
attainment, rural areas remain a huge chal-
lenge—one that underscores the importance 
of being vigilant regarding policies that aim 
to improve agricultural productivity; if suc-
cessful, these policies can provide positive 
synergies for farm incomes and nonfarm 
employment. GMR 2012 highlighted the pro-
motion of increased yields through research, 
extension, and improved water management, 
improvements in the functioning of land mar-
kets, and increased integration of domestic 
markets with world markets as a possible set 
of policies that would positively contribute 
to increased productivity in the agricultural 
sector. In addition, closing the gender gap in 
education can boost rural women’s empow-
erment by increasing agricultural incomes; 
relative to male farmers, female farmers have 
lower productivity, which is directly related to 
their educational attainment. With 75 percent 
of the world’s poor residing in rural areas, 
the challenge of effective rural development 
remains daunting but achievable with com-
plementary rural-urban development policies 
and actions. 
Progress toward achieving the 
MDGs: The report card
With the 2015 deadline set by the interna-
tional development community to attain the 
MDGs just over two years away, only 4 of 
the 21 MDG targets or subtargets have been 
met worldwide (figure O.1). New estimates 
confirm the 2012 reports that MDG 1.a —
reducing the $1.25-a-day poverty rate (2005 
purchasing power parity)—was reached in 
2010,  falling below half of its 1990 value 
(box O.1). As reported in GMR 2012, the 
world also met part of MDG 7.c to halve the 
proportion of people without safe access to 
drinking water. MDG 7.d—to have achieved 
a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020— 
was also achieved.1 Finally, the first part of 
MDG 3.a—to eliminate gender disparity in 
primary education—was accomplished in 
2010. Global progress on the full MDG 3.a (to 
eliminate gender disparity in primary and sec-
ondary education) is close to being on track. 
Overall, global progress on the remaining 
MDGs has been less than stellar, however, 
Developing countries, percent of total required progress between 1990 and 2015, as achieved in 2010 or 2011



































































































FIGURE O.1 Global progress toward achieving the MDGs
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
Note: Intermediate targets were calculated using a linear progression over 25 years, resulting in a needed progress of 4 percent a year. Note that the corresponding target for 2010 
would equal 80 percent, and for 2011, 84 percent, to be on track to attain the MDG by 2015. Any value above those intermediate targets indicates that the world is ahead of the 
required pace to meet the MDG. A value of 100 percent means that the MDG has been met. PPP = purchasing power parity.
BOX O.1 MDG 1 for extreme poverty
New poverty projections for 2015 are the result of 
various updates of new and more recent household 
surveys and a new forecast of per capita consump-
tion growth. Sufficient data do not exist to estimate 
progress on reducing extreme poverty in 36 develop-
ing countries. Consequently, the forecasts for these 
countries are based on changes in income poverty in 
the surveys of similar countries. 
Updated economic projections for developing 
countries by the World Bank indicate that an esti-
mated 970 million people will continue in 2015 to 
live below $1.25 a day, equivalent to 15.5 percent 
of the population in the developing world. That is 
lower than the previous estimate of 1 billion people 
(16.3 percent) done in 2012. New survey informa-
tion on household budgets, used to estimate the 
2010 figures, shows additional improvements in all 
regions except Sub-Saharan Africa compared with 
the 2012 extreme poverty estimates. Note that 
because new and more complete surveys for Sub-
Saharan Africa have become available this year, even 
the 2008 poverty number had to be revised upward 
from the 47.5 percent estimate last year to 49.2 per-
cent this year. This new estimate adversely affected 
the projection of extreme poverty by 2015 for the 
region, which is now estimated at 42.3 percent, com-
pared to 41.2 percent at the time of last year’s GMR. 
The total projection of 970 million extremely poor 
people in 2015 is significantly lower than the 1.9 bil-
lion people living in extreme poverty in 1990 (43.1 
percent). 
Except for Sub-Saharan Africa, which had the 
worst starting position, all regions are expected to 
achieve the MDG 1.a target of halving extreme pov-
erty by 2015. The poverty reduction in the East Asia 
and Pacific region has been spectacular as the rate of 
extreme poverty was reduced from 56.2 in 1990 to 
12.5 in 2010.
TABLE BO.1.1 Poverty by region
Share of population below $1.25 a day (2005 PPP)
Region 1990 2005 2008 2010 2015 (forecast)
East Asia and Pacific 56.2 16.8 14.3 12.5 5.5
Europe and Central Asia 1.9 1.3 0.5 .07 0.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 12.2 8.7 6.5 5.5 4.9
Middle East and North Africa 5.8 3.5 2.7 2.4 2.6
South Asia 53.8 39.4 36.0 31.0 23.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 56.5 52.3 49.2 48.5 42.3
Total 43.1 25.0 22.7 20.6 15.5
Millions of people below $1.25 a day (2005 PPP)
Region 1990 2005 2008 2010 2015
East Asia and Pacific 926.4 332.1 284.4 250.9 114.5
Europe and Central Asia 8.9 6.3 2.2 3.1 1.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 53.4 47.6 36.9 32.3 30.0
Middle East and North Africa 13.0 10.5 8.6 8.0 9.3
South Asia 617.3 598.3 570.7 506.8 406.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 289.7 394.9 399.3 413.8 408.0
Total 1,908.6 1,389.6 1,302.8 1,214.9 970.2
Source: World Bank staff calculations from PovcalNet database. See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm for additional information and data.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
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sector. In addition, closing the gender gap in 
education can boost rural women’s empow-
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relative to male farmers, female farmers have 
lower productivity, which is directly related to 
their educational attainment. With 75 percent 
of the world’s poor residing in rural areas, 
the challenge of effective rural development 
remains daunting but achievable with com-
plementary rural-urban development policies 
and actions. 
Progress toward achieving the 
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With the 2015 deadline set by the interna-
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MDGs just over two years away, only 4 of 
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world also met part of MDG 7.c to halve the 
proportion of people without safe access to 
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a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020— 
was also achieved.1 Finally, the first part of 
MDG 3.a—to eliminate gender disparity in 
primary education—was accomplished in 
2010. Global progress on the full MDG 3.a (to 
eliminate gender disparity in primary and sec-
ondary education) is close to being on track. 
Overall, global progress on the remaining 
MDGs has been less than stellar, however, 
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Source: World Bank staff estimates.
Note: Intermediate targets were calculated using a linear progression over 25 years, resulting in a needed progress of 4 percent a year. Note that the corresponding target for 2010 
would equal 80 percent, and for 2011, 84 percent, to be on track to attain the MDG by 2015. Any value above those intermediate targets indicates that the world is ahead of the 
required pace to meet the MDG. A value of 100 percent means that the MDG has been met. PPP = purchasing power parity.
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progress on reducing extreme poverty in 36 develop-
ing countries. Consequently, the forecasts for these 
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lower than the previous estimate of 1 billion people 
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2010 figures, shows additional improvements in all 
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the 2012 extreme poverty estimates. Note that 
because new and more complete surveys for Sub-
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the 2008 poverty number had to be revised upward 
from the 47.5 percent estimate last year to 49.2 per-
cent this year. This new estimate adversely affected 
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particularly on those related to education 
(MDG 2.a) and health (MDG 4.a and 5.a), 
and a vast acceleration of progress is needed 
to achieve all of the goals by 2015. Acceler-
ating progress toward attainment of these 
MDGs is not only intrinsically desirable 
but can produce positive spillovers between 
different development objectives. Reduc-
ing infant mortality and improving mater-
nal health can pay additional dividends by 
increasing the returns to subsequent invest-
ments in human capital. A vast literature 
demonstrates that human capital formation 
is a cumulative process and that the first few 
years in a child’s development are critical, as 
noted in GMR 2012. In addition, the accom-
plishment of the extreme poverty MDG 
bodes well for achievement of other MDGs, 
given the interrelationship between reduction 
of extreme (income) poverty and progress 
toward the various nonpoverty MDGs. For 
MDG 2.a (ensuring that, by 2015, children 
everywhere will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling), it is probably 
already too late, because completion rates 
depend on net enrollment rates, which have 
not reached 100 percent: in 2011, the net 
enrollment rate in primary education stood 
at only 88.8 percent globally. 
Regional progress toward achieving the 
MDGs is more diverse. At one end of the 
spectrum, the East Asia and Pacific region is 
on target to meet most if not all of the MDGs, 
while at the other end, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
off target on most MDGs. Those regions still 
lagging started from positions that required 
the most absolute progress, however, and 
they have made significant progress in abso-
lute terms, particularly on those MDGs that 
the world as a whole is struggling to meet. 
The relative nature by which many of the 
MDGs are defined masks to a large extent 
these accomplishments.
Evaluating progress toward attainment of 
the MDGs at the country level shows even 
further diversity (figure O.2). Sufficient prog-
ress toward MDG 3.a is most prevalent, with 
72 countries on track, while only 18 coun-
tries are on track to meet MDG 4.a (reduc-
ing infant mortality). However, an additional 
20 countries are projected to meet this MDG 
between 2015 and 2020. With a significant 
acceleration of effort, these countries could 
achieve MDG 4.a by 2015 or shortly there-
after. The same holds for the reduction in 
under-five mortality: 22 countries have made 
progress but require an additional push to 
achieve the target by or close to 2015. 
Global growth and its 
implications for the MDGs
The global economy is expected to recover, 
but only very gradually. While the road to 
recovery in advanced economies will remain 
bumpy, downside risks to the global outlook 
have eased as policy intentions in developed 
economies have become clearer and com-
modity price volatility has abated. Although, 
important short- and medium-term down-
side risks remain—including adjustment 
fatigue in advanced economies and over-
investment and high asset prices in emerg-
ing market and developing countries—such 
risks are now more symmetric. A broadly 
appropriate current policy stance in emerg-
ing market and developing countries is sup-
porting continued strong growth in these 
countries. Commodity prices trended down 
through most of 2012 and are expected to 
remain stable in 2013, providing room for a 
flexible implementation of monetary policy, 
particularly in emerging market and devel-
oping countries. 
Were the downside risk of a protracted 
global slowdown extending through 2015 to 
materialize, it would have a significantly neg-
ative impact on growth in low-income coun-
tries and their ability to attain the MDGs. 
Despite sustained economic growth, progress 
in rebuilding policy buffers in low-income 
countries has been modest. Indeed, with pol-
icy buffers not yet restored to levels preced-
ing the 2009 crisis and against the backdrop 
of reduced traditional sources of financing, 
most low-income countries would likely need 
to undertake adjustments in the face of such a 
shock. Differences across countries are large, 
however. Still-high international commodity 
prices are providing commodity exporters 
with relatively larger buffers than commod-
ity-importing countries.
Aid flows and effectiveness 
The international development finance archi-
tecture has changed markedly since the Mil-
lennium Declaration in 2000. In particular, 
the relative importance of ODA as a financ-
ing instrument for development has declined. 
The main drivers of that change are the 
increasing role of developing countries in the 
global economy, with a massive expansion 
of net private flows to those countries, and 
the emergence of middle-income countries as 
growth poles and important sources of non-
ODA development finance. 
Even though tough economic challenges 
have emerged in the developed world over 
the past few years, it is important that the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donors live up 
to earlier promises to maintain and expand 
aid flows and improve their aid effective-
ness to strengthen the impact of that aid. 
Especially when the size of ODA flows rela-
tive to other financial flows is declining, 
the quality of aid flows and changes in the 
effectiveness of domestic policies that it can 
support become paramount. With improved 
policies in developing countries, the potential 
effectiveness of aid has increased. But if this 
potential is to be fully exploited, donors will 
have to follow up on aid effectiveness agree-
ments and deliver on their pledges. 
At the Gleneagles summit in 2005, DAC 
donors agreed to increase ODA by $50 billion 
between 2004 and 2010, with at least half of 
the increase designated for Africa—both Sub-
Saharan Africa and North Africa. The prom-
ised increase of $50 billion made in 2004 



































































































FIGURE O.2 Extent of progress toward MDGs, by number of countries
Source: Estimates based on World Development Indicators database. 
Note: Progress is based on extrapolation of the latest five-year annual growth rates for each country, except for MDG 5, which uses the last seven years. Sufficient progress indicates that 
an extrapolation of the last observed data point with the growth rate over the last observable five-year period shows that the MDG can be attained. Insufficient progress is defined as 
being able to meet the MDG between 2016 and 2020. Moderately off target indicates that the MDG can be met between 2020 and 2030. Seriously off target indicates that the MDG will 
not even be met by 2030. Insufficient data points to a lack of enough data points to estimate progress or that the MDG’s starting value is missing (except for MDG 2 and MDG 3). 
*   Includes 11 countries for which the extreme poverty rate is below 2 percent. Measuring changes in poverty rates at such low levels (< 2 percent) cannot be disentangled from mea-
surement errors.
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particularly on those related to education 
(MDG 2.a) and health (MDG 4.a and 5.a), 
and a vast acceleration of progress is needed 
to achieve all of the goals by 2015. Acceler-
ating progress toward attainment of these 
MDGs is not only intrinsically desirable 
but can produce positive spillovers between 
different development objectives. Reduc-
ing infant mortality and improving mater-
nal health can pay additional dividends by 
increasing the returns to subsequent invest-
ments in human capital. A vast literature 
demonstrates that human capital formation 
is a cumulative process and that the first few 
years in a child’s development are critical, as 
noted in GMR 2012. In addition, the accom-
plishment of the extreme poverty MDG 
bodes well for achievement of other MDGs, 
given the interrelationship between reduction 
of extreme (income) poverty and progress 
toward the various nonpoverty MDGs. For 
MDG 2.a (ensuring that, by 2015, children 
everywhere will be able to complete a full 
course of primary schooling), it is probably 
already too late, because completion rates 
depend on net enrollment rates, which have 
not reached 100 percent: in 2011, the net 
enrollment rate in primary education stood 
at only 88.8 percent globally. 
Regional progress toward achieving the 
MDGs is more diverse. At one end of the 
spectrum, the East Asia and Pacific region is 
on target to meet most if not all of the MDGs, 
while at the other end, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
off target on most MDGs. Those regions still 
lagging started from positions that required 
the most absolute progress, however, and 
they have made significant progress in abso-
lute terms, particularly on those MDGs that 
the world as a whole is struggling to meet. 
The relative nature by which many of the 
MDGs are defined masks to a large extent 
these accomplishments.
Evaluating progress toward attainment of 
the MDGs at the country level shows even 
further diversity (figure O.2). Sufficient prog-
ress toward MDG 3.a is most prevalent, with 
72 countries on track, while only 18 coun-
tries are on track to meet MDG 4.a (reduc-
ing infant mortality). However, an additional 
20 countries are projected to meet this MDG 
between 2015 and 2020. With a significant 
acceleration of effort, these countries could 
achieve MDG 4.a by 2015 or shortly there-
after. The same holds for the reduction in 
under-five mortality: 22 countries have made 
progress but require an additional push to 
achieve the target by or close to 2015. 
Global growth and its 
implications for the MDGs
The global economy is expected to recover, 
but only very gradually. While the road to 
recovery in advanced economies will remain 
bumpy, downside risks to the global outlook 
have eased as policy intentions in developed 
economies have become clearer and com-
modity price volatility has abated. Although, 
important short- and medium-term down-
side risks remain—including adjustment 
fatigue in advanced economies and over-
investment and high asset prices in emerg-
ing market and developing countries—such 
risks are now more symmetric. A broadly 
appropriate current policy stance in emerg-
ing market and developing countries is sup-
porting continued strong growth in these 
countries. Commodity prices trended down 
through most of 2012 and are expected to 
remain stable in 2013, providing room for a 
flexible implementation of monetary policy, 
particularly in emerging market and devel-
oping countries. 
Were the downside risk of a protracted 
global slowdown extending through 2015 to 
materialize, it would have a significantly neg-
ative impact on growth in low-income coun-
tries and their ability to attain the MDGs. 
Despite sustained economic growth, progress 
in rebuilding policy buffers in low-income 
countries has been modest. Indeed, with pol-
icy buffers not yet restored to levels preced-
ing the 2009 crisis and against the backdrop 
of reduced traditional sources of financing, 
most low-income countries would likely need 
to undertake adjustments in the face of such a 
shock. Differences across countries are large, 
however. Still-high international commodity 
prices are providing commodity exporters 
with relatively larger buffers than commod-
ity-importing countries.
Aid flows and effectiveness 
The international development finance archi-
tecture has changed markedly since the Mil-
lennium Declaration in 2000. In particular, 
the relative importance of ODA as a financ-
ing instrument for development has declined. 
The main drivers of that change are the 
increasing role of developing countries in the 
global economy, with a massive expansion 
of net private flows to those countries, and 
the emergence of middle-income countries as 
growth poles and important sources of non-
ODA development finance. 
Even though tough economic challenges 
have emerged in the developed world over 
the past few years, it is important that the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donors live up 
to earlier promises to maintain and expand 
aid flows and improve their aid effective-
ness to strengthen the impact of that aid. 
Especially when the size of ODA flows rela-
tive to other financial flows is declining, 
the quality of aid flows and changes in the 
effectiveness of domestic policies that it can 
support become paramount. With improved 
policies in developing countries, the potential 
effectiveness of aid has increased. But if this 
potential is to be fully exploited, donors will 
have to follow up on aid effectiveness agree-
ments and deliver on their pledges. 
At the Gleneagles summit in 2005, DAC 
donors agreed to increase ODA by $50 billion 
between 2004 and 2010, with at least half of 
the increase designated for Africa—both Sub-
Saharan Africa and North Africa. The prom-
ised increase of $50 billion made in 2004 



































































































FIGURE O.2 Extent of progress toward MDGs, by number of countries
Source: Estimates based on World Development Indicators database. 
Note: Progress is based on extrapolation of the latest five-year annual growth rates for each country, except for MDG 5, which uses the last seven years. Sufficient progress indicates that 
an extrapolation of the last observed data point with the growth rate over the last observable five-year period shows that the MDG can be attained. Insufficient progress is defined as 
being able to meet the MDG between 2016 and 2020. Moderately off target indicates that the MDG can be met between 2020 and 2030. Seriously off target indicates that the MDG will 
not even be met by 2030. Insufficient data points to a lack of enough data points to estimate progress or that the MDG’s starting value is missing (except for MDG 2 and MDG 3). 
*   Includes 11 countries for which the extreme poverty rate is below 2 percent. Measuring changes in poverty rates at such low levels (< 2 percent) cannot be disentangled from mea-
surement errors.
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prices and exchange rates would equal an 
increase in ODA to a level of $152.2 billion 
in 2010 prices and exchange rates. In reality, 
disbursements were only $128.5 billion in 
2010, leaving a gap between initial pledges 
and actual disbursements of more than $25 
billion. Africa received an additional $11.8 
billion, well short of the pledged $25 billion. 
In its 2012 annual ODA report, the DAC 
estimated that only about $1.2 billion of the 
shortfall could be attributed to lower-than-
expected gross national income levels caused 
by the recent global economic crisis. 
Improving aid effectiveness could make up 
for some of the shortfalls, but bilateral and 
multilateral DAC donors have been unable 
to reach the ambitious targets set out in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Col-
lectively, the multilateral development banks 
have reached only one of the thirteen targets 
established in Paris (to strengthen capacity 
by coordinated support). Disaggregating the 
data by the various multilateral development 
banks and other international organizations, 
such as institutions of the United Nations 
(UN) and the European Union (EU), yields 
a more nuanced picture. For example, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has 
met four of the eight aid effectiveness indi-
cators for which disaggregated data exist, 
the World Bank three, and the EU institu-
tions two. All other multilateral development 
banks have met one indicator.2 
The new Global Partnership for Effective 
Development, agreed upon in the Fourth 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011, represents 
a window of opportunity for a more bal-
anced international dialogue among all devel-
opment partners, including traditional DAC 
and non-DAC donors such as the BRICS 
(Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, 
and South Africa). The partnership provides 
space for these partners to agree on more 
realistic targets for aid effectiveness and to 
establish mutual accountability to implement 
agreed-upon actions. To date, more than 160 
countries and 45 organizations from around 
the world have endorsed this partnership.
Notwithstanding these emerging trends in 
development finance and the aid effectiveness 
of DAC donors, development partners, 
including international financial institutions, 
continue to play an important role in assist-
ing developing countries to implement poli-
cies and programs that help improve progress 
on the MDGs and other development out-
comes, particularly in fragile states.
Rural-urban disparities, 
urbanization, and the MDGs
Economic aspects of agglomeration are most 
often looked at from a microeconomic per-
spective, but broad-based changes in where 
people work and live obviously also have 
profound macroeconomic consequences—
for example, with regard to economic struc-
tural changes. Using an agglomeration index 
developed for World Development Report 
2009: Reshaping Economic Geography 
(WDR 2009),3 evidence suggests that returns 
to agglomeration are relatively higher on the 
lower rungs of development. Recent research 
at the IMF suggests that greater economic 
diversification is associated with improved 
macroeconomic performance. Another strand 
of research that has benchmarked Africa’s 
transformation with that of Asia’s provides 
some optimism with regard to Africa’s eco-
nomic prospects. 
Poverty is lower in urban areas 
Cities and towns are hubs of prosperity—more 
than 80 percent of global economic activity 
is produced in cities by just over half of the 
world’s population. Economic agglomeration 
increases productivity, which in turn attracts 
more firms and creates better-paying jobs. 
Urbanization provides higher incomes for 
workers than they would earn on a farm, and it 
generates further opportunities to move up the 
income ladder. Between 1990 and 2008, rural 
poverty rates were, without exception, higher 
than urban poverty rates (table O.1). Indeed, 
more-urbanized countries have had greater suc-
cess in attaining the MDGs than less-urbanized 
ones: countries with a degree of urbanization 
above 60 percent are expected to achieve 50 
percent more MDGs than those with a degree 
of urbanization of 40 percent or less.
Urban poverty rates not only have been 
relatively low but have also declined in all 
regions between 1990 and 2008. East Asia’s 
success in reducing urban and rural poverty 
has been spectacular, driven to a large extent 
by China’s achievement. East Asia in 1980 
had an urbanization level similar to that in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa but the 
highest poverty rate of all six regions. Its suc-
cess in poverty reduction over the past three 
decades was linked to its rapid urbanization 
rate, which more than doubled from 21.5 
percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 2010. In 
1980, urbanization rates in South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa were slightly above those 
in East Asia; by 2010 they had increased to 
only 37 percent. Urbanization by itself is no 
guarantee of success, however. If unregulated 
and poorly planned, rapid urbanization can 
lead to disproportionate increases in slums. 
The challenge of poverty reduction, how-
ever, remains largely in rural areas and is con-
centrated in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
2008, 46 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
rural population—but only 34 percent of its 
urban population—lived on less than $1.25 
a day. In South Asia, the share of the poor 
in the population was 38 percent in rural 
areas and 30 percent in urban areas in 2008. 
Three-quarters of the poor in South Asia live 
in rural areas. Even in East Asia, the share 
of rural poor was approximately five times 
higher than in urban areas in 2008.
Services are better in urban areas
Apart from creating better-paying jobs, cit-
ies also make, through their density, public 
services more accessible. For example, on 
average, the cost of providing piped water is 
$0.70–$0.80 per cubic meter in urban areas 
compared with $2 in sparsely populated 
areas. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
have the largest rural-urban disparities in all 
service delivery indicators. The poor often pay 
the highest price for the water they consume 
while having the lowest consumption levels. 
For example, in Niger, the average price per 
cubic meter of water is CFAF 182 for piped 
water from a network, CFAF 534 from a pub-
lic fountain, and CFAF 926 from a vendor. 
And poor access to basic infrastructure dis-
proportionately affects rural women, because 
they perform most of the domestic chores and 
often walk long distances to reach clean water. 
Even in the poorest of countries, people 
have higher expectations for service delivery 
in cities: that water will flow when a tap is 
turned on; that one will have access to a toi-
let; or that one will find a doctor when a child 
has malaria. In 2010, 96 percent of the urban 
population but 81 percent of the rural popu-
lation in developing countries had access to 
safe drinking water. Disparities in access to 
basic sanitation were greater: 80 percent of 
urban residents but only 50 percent of rural 
residents had access to a toilet. 
Schooling and health care can also be 
delivered with economies of scale in dense 
environments, close to where people actually 
live. Urban citizens in rich and poor countries 
have better access than rural citizens to basic 
services, including those associated with the 
attainment of the MDGs. Quite often, both 
access to and quality of services are better in 
urban areas.
TABLE O.1 Poverty rates are falling in both urban and rural areas but are lower in urban areas 
Share of the population below $1.25/day
  1990 1996 2002 2008
  Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
East Asia and Pacific 67.5 24.4 45.9 13.0 39.2  6.9 20.4  4.3
Europe and Central Asia  2.2  0.9  6.3  2.8  4.4  1.1  1.2  0.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 21.0  7.4 20.3  6.3 20.3  8.3 13.2  3.1
Middle East and North Africa  9.1  1.9  5.6  0.9  7.5  1.2  4.1  0.8
South Asia 50.5 40.1 46.1 35.2 45.1 35.2 38.0 29.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 55.0 41.5 56.8 40.6 52.3 41.4 47.1 33.6
Total 52.5 20.5 43.0 17.0 39.5 15.1 29.4 11.6
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
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prices and exchange rates would equal an 
increase in ODA to a level of $152.2 billion 
in 2010 prices and exchange rates. In reality, 
disbursements were only $128.5 billion in 
2010, leaving a gap between initial pledges 
and actual disbursements of more than $25 
billion. Africa received an additional $11.8 
billion, well short of the pledged $25 billion. 
In its 2012 annual ODA report, the DAC 
estimated that only about $1.2 billion of the 
shortfall could be attributed to lower-than-
expected gross national income levels caused 
by the recent global economic crisis. 
Improving aid effectiveness could make up 
for some of the shortfalls, but bilateral and 
multilateral DAC donors have been unable 
to reach the ambitious targets set out in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Col-
lectively, the multilateral development banks 
have reached only one of the thirteen targets 
established in Paris (to strengthen capacity 
by coordinated support). Disaggregating the 
data by the various multilateral development 
banks and other international organizations, 
such as institutions of the United Nations 
(UN) and the European Union (EU), yields 
a more nuanced picture. For example, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has 
met four of the eight aid effectiveness indi-
cators for which disaggregated data exist, 
the World Bank three, and the EU institu-
tions two. All other multilateral development 
banks have met one indicator.2 
The new Global Partnership for Effective 
Development, agreed upon in the Fourth 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011, represents 
a window of opportunity for a more bal-
anced international dialogue among all devel-
opment partners, including traditional DAC 
and non-DAC donors such as the BRICS 
(Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, 
and South Africa). The partnership provides 
space for these partners to agree on more 
realistic targets for aid effectiveness and to 
establish mutual accountability to implement 
agreed-upon actions. To date, more than 160 
countries and 45 organizations from around 
the world have endorsed this partnership.
Notwithstanding these emerging trends in 
development finance and the aid effectiveness 
of DAC donors, development partners, 
including international financial institutions, 
continue to play an important role in assist-
ing developing countries to implement poli-
cies and programs that help improve progress 
on the MDGs and other development out-
comes, particularly in fragile states.
Rural-urban disparities, 
urbanization, and the MDGs
Economic aspects of agglomeration are most 
often looked at from a microeconomic per-
spective, but broad-based changes in where 
people work and live obviously also have 
profound macroeconomic consequences—
for example, with regard to economic struc-
tural changes. Using an agglomeration index 
developed for World Development Report 
2009: Reshaping Economic Geography 
(WDR 2009),3 evidence suggests that returns 
to agglomeration are relatively higher on the 
lower rungs of development. Recent research 
at the IMF suggests that greater economic 
diversification is associated with improved 
macroeconomic performance. Another strand 
of research that has benchmarked Africa’s 
transformation with that of Asia’s provides 
some optimism with regard to Africa’s eco-
nomic prospects. 
Poverty is lower in urban areas 
Cities and towns are hubs of prosperity—more 
than 80 percent of global economic activity 
is produced in cities by just over half of the 
world’s population. Economic agglomeration 
increases productivity, which in turn attracts 
more firms and creates better-paying jobs. 
Urbanization provides higher incomes for 
workers than they would earn on a farm, and it 
generates further opportunities to move up the 
income ladder. Between 1990 and 2008, rural 
poverty rates were, without exception, higher 
than urban poverty rates (table O.1). Indeed, 
more-urbanized countries have had greater suc-
cess in attaining the MDGs than less-urbanized 
ones: countries with a degree of urbanization 
above 60 percent are expected to achieve 50 
percent more MDGs than those with a degree 
of urbanization of 40 percent or less.
Urban poverty rates not only have been 
relatively low but have also declined in all 
regions between 1990 and 2008. East Asia’s 
success in reducing urban and rural poverty 
has been spectacular, driven to a large extent 
by China’s achievement. East Asia in 1980 
had an urbanization level similar to that in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa but the 
highest poverty rate of all six regions. Its suc-
cess in poverty reduction over the past three 
decades was linked to its rapid urbanization 
rate, which more than doubled from 21.5 
percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 2010. In 
1980, urbanization rates in South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa were slightly above those 
in East Asia; by 2010 they had increased to 
only 37 percent. Urbanization by itself is no 
guarantee of success, however. If unregulated 
and poorly planned, rapid urbanization can 
lead to disproportionate increases in slums. 
The challenge of poverty reduction, how-
ever, remains largely in rural areas and is con-
centrated in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
2008, 46 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
rural population—but only 34 percent of its 
urban population—lived on less than $1.25 
a day. In South Asia, the share of the poor 
in the population was 38 percent in rural 
areas and 30 percent in urban areas in 2008. 
Three-quarters of the poor in South Asia live 
in rural areas. Even in East Asia, the share 
of rural poor was approximately five times 
higher than in urban areas in 2008.
Services are better in urban areas
Apart from creating better-paying jobs, cit-
ies also make, through their density, public 
services more accessible. For example, on 
average, the cost of providing piped water is 
$0.70–$0.80 per cubic meter in urban areas 
compared with $2 in sparsely populated 
areas. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
have the largest rural-urban disparities in all 
service delivery indicators. The poor often pay 
the highest price for the water they consume 
while having the lowest consumption levels. 
For example, in Niger, the average price per 
cubic meter of water is CFAF 182 for piped 
water from a network, CFAF 534 from a pub-
lic fountain, and CFAF 926 from a vendor. 
And poor access to basic infrastructure dis-
proportionately affects rural women, because 
they perform most of the domestic chores and 
often walk long distances to reach clean water. 
Even in the poorest of countries, people 
have higher expectations for service delivery 
in cities: that water will flow when a tap is 
turned on; that one will have access to a toi-
let; or that one will find a doctor when a child 
has malaria. In 2010, 96 percent of the urban 
population but 81 percent of the rural popu-
lation in developing countries had access to 
safe drinking water. Disparities in access to 
basic sanitation were greater: 80 percent of 
urban residents but only 50 percent of rural 
residents had access to a toilet. 
Schooling and health care can also be 
delivered with economies of scale in dense 
environments, close to where people actually 
live. Urban citizens in rich and poor countries 
have better access than rural citizens to basic 
services, including those associated with the 
attainment of the MDGs. Quite often, both 
access to and quality of services are better in 
urban areas.
TABLE O.1 Poverty rates are falling in both urban and rural areas but are lower in urban areas 
Share of the population below $1.25/day
  1990 1996 2002 2008
  Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
East Asia and Pacific 67.5 24.4 45.9 13.0 39.2  6.9 20.4  4.3
Europe and Central Asia  2.2  0.9  6.3  2.8  4.4  1.1  1.2  0.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 21.0  7.4 20.3  6.3 20.3  8.3 13.2  3.1
Middle East and North Africa  9.1  1.9  5.6  0.9  7.5  1.2  4.1  0.8
South Asia 50.5 40.1 46.1 35.2 45.1 35.2 38.0 29.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 55.0 41.5 56.8 40.6 52.3 41.4 47.1 33.6
Total 52.5 20.5 43.0 17.0 39.5 15.1 29.4 11.6
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
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While good outcomes in nutrition, health, 
and education are development goals in 
themselves, they also combine to form 
human skills and abilities that are strongly 
linked to productivity growth and poverty 
reduction. Rural children are disadvantaged 
because they have access to services of lower 
quality than do urban children. The inability 
to attract teachers to rural schools is only one 
of the reasons for the poor quality of school-
ing in rural areas. 
The spectrum of urbanization is wide
Along the spectrum from rural to urban lie 
many types of settlements from small towns 
to small cities and peri-urban areas to large 
cities. In many middle-income countries, such 
as India and Vietnam, the urban population 
is concentrated in the largest cities, but the 
urban poor are dispersed along a continuum 
of medium, smaller, and very small towns, 
demonstrating that urban poverty is not just 
a large-city phenomenon. Research in India, 
for example, indicates that while poverty is 
primarily a rural phenomenon at the aggre-
gate level, urban poverty is becoming a larger 
problem. The poverty rate for rural areas in 
India was 28 percent in 2004–05, compared 
with 26 percent in urban areas. Among urban 
areas, poverty rates were highest in small 
towns (population less than 50,000), at 30 per-
cent, compared with 15 percent in large cities 
(population of 1 million or more). The urban 
spectrum is less pronounced in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where many countries are small and 
sparsely populated and where urbanization is 
still in its early stages. Urban poverty there is 
thus more concentrated in capital cities. 
Small rural towns often have high con-
centrations of poor people. Some poor 
want to migrate to cities to escape poverty 
but are reluctant to dispose of their rural 
assets. In Nepal, for example, where pov-
erty is extreme, migrants prefer not to move 
too far from their rural residence but value 
proximity to paved roads and areas with 
higher housing premiums. Many want to 
maintain links with their farms, while others 
fear losing their land if they migrate too far. 
Remaining close to one’s land is an impor-
tant factor in migration in the absence of effi-
cient land markets. 
Well-designed urbanization is needed 
to achieve the MDGs
As long as rural-urban disparities in income 
and service delivery persist, rural-to-urban 
migration will ensue. Nearly 50 percent of the 
population in developing countries was urban 
in 2011, compared with less than 30 percent 
in the 1980s. Urban dwellers are expected to 
double between 2000 and 2030, from 2 bil-
lion to 4 billion people, and the number of 
Chinese urban dwellers will increase from 
more than 622 million today to over 1 billion 
in 2030. This trend is not unique to develop-
ing countries—today’s high-income countries 
underwent the same transformation in the 
20th century. In fact, virtually no country 
has graduated to a high-income status with-
out urbanizing, and urbanization rates above 
70 percent are typically found in high-income 
countries. 
For every ten people lifted out of poverty 
in the East Asia and Pacific region, two were 
facilitated by the urbanization process alone. 
Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, half of the 
decline in poverty originated in urban areas 
and through the urbanization process. Look-
ing at the impact of urbanization on service 
delivery provides even stronger evidence of 
the importance of the process of urbanization 
itself: close to 30 percent of the improvement 
in the MDG on sanitation results from the 
process of urbanization, that is, the migra-
tion of people and the expansion of urban 
areas. 
Policies to foster migration are impor-
tant to enable the poor to move from lag-
ging to leading areas, and governments can 
help reduce rural poverty by making migra-
tion more efficient. Equipping citizens with 
human capital assets while they are still in a 
rural area will increase the chance that their 
job search in the city is successful. Many 
developing countries have instituted land 
market policies in rural areas that discourage 
migration to urban areas. Restrictions in the 
land market are not only detrimental to agri-
cultural productivity growth but also hinder 
diversification into nonfarm activities that 
have higher returns. They should be relaxed. 
However important facilitating the urban-
ization process is, it is not enough for suc-
cessful development. Governments must also 
improve access to basic services in rural areas 
to achieve development goals, and they face 
important trade-offs in doing so. Priorities 
are not easily set, and financing local services 
is not straightforward. Moreover, govern-
ments must address the problem of slums in 
urban areas and mitigate the negative side 
effects of urbanization in the form of pollu-
tion caused by congestion or urban sprawl. 
To benefit fully from urbanization, smart 
planning of existing and new urban areas is 
needed. 
Services in rural areas need 
improvement
Even as numerous towns emerge in rural 
areas and many poor people migrate to cit-
ies to seek better jobs and services, the preva-
lence of a large majority of the poor in rural 
areas remains of great concern. Rural areas 
need focused policies that help raise farm 
productivity and connect rural villages to 
input and output markets. Diversification of 
employment into nonagricultural activities 
can also reduce rural poverty. Growth of 
nonfarm activities is often driven by growth 
in agricultural productivity, at least at the 
initial stage of development. Roads and the 
provision of electricity are needed to improve 
connectivity to markets and increase agricul-
tural productivity. 
Because the MDGs reflect the basic needs 
of all citizens, governments should aim to 
attain them fully in both urban and rural 
areas. Given scarce resources, however, 
priorities must be set. Consequently, it is 
important that decision makers take country-
specific circumstances into account when 
allocating resources.
For example, if the prime source of urban-
ization is domestic migration, then a strategy 
that focuses on MDG-related services that 
are portable (such as health and education) 
and that facilitate the integration of migrants 
seeking better opportunities in cities might 
have a higher payoff than one that indis-
criminately tries to equalize MDG-related 
services across urban and rural areas. Early 
investments in education and health in rural 
areas will prove useful to those who seek jobs 
in cities but can also contribute to higher 
farm and nonfarm incomes for those who 
never migrate. Such a payoff seems particu-
larly relevant for sparsely populated countries 
with both low urbanization and agglomera-
tion rates, as in Sub-Saharan Africa.
If the prime source of urbanization is grad-
ual thickening of population density, then the 
countrywide equalization of MDG-related 
services is more appropriate. This seems most 
relevant for countries with a low urbanization 
rate but an elevated level of agglomeration, as 
is the case in various countries in South Asia 
and those countries with a high urbanization 
rate and low expected migration. 
If people get stuck in small towns, with 
little prospect of moving on to large cities, 
then policies should focus on improving con-
nectivity with other urban centers. Poverty in 
small towns is often high, and the quantity 
and quality of services there differ little from 
those in rural areas and lag behind those in 
more mature urban settlements. Measures 
to better connect the activities in those small 
towns with economies of larger cities are 
then paramount. 
In all cases, the challenges should not be 
underestimated. Many developing countries 
have been unable to provide a coordinated 
package of physical infrastructure and social 
services in rural areas. In part, that is because 
the financing of public goods in poor areas is 
a daunting task, a point about which more is 
said below. 
New forms of service delivery are 
required in slums
Although poverty rates in cities are rela-
tively low and declining, poverty in many 
countries is increasingly becoming an urban 
phenomenon as more and more people live 
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While good outcomes in nutrition, health, 
and education are development goals in 
themselves, they also combine to form 
human skills and abilities that are strongly 
linked to productivity growth and poverty 
reduction. Rural children are disadvantaged 
because they have access to services of lower 
quality than do urban children. The inability 
to attract teachers to rural schools is only one 
of the reasons for the poor quality of school-
ing in rural areas. 
The spectrum of urbanization is wide
Along the spectrum from rural to urban lie 
many types of settlements from small towns 
to small cities and peri-urban areas to large 
cities. In many middle-income countries, such 
as India and Vietnam, the urban population 
is concentrated in the largest cities, but the 
urban poor are dispersed along a continuum 
of medium, smaller, and very small towns, 
demonstrating that urban poverty is not just 
a large-city phenomenon. Research in India, 
for example, indicates that while poverty is 
primarily a rural phenomenon at the aggre-
gate level, urban poverty is becoming a larger 
problem. The poverty rate for rural areas in 
India was 28 percent in 2004–05, compared 
with 26 percent in urban areas. Among urban 
areas, poverty rates were highest in small 
towns (population less than 50,000), at 30 per-
cent, compared with 15 percent in large cities 
(population of 1 million or more). The urban 
spectrum is less pronounced in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where many countries are small and 
sparsely populated and where urbanization is 
still in its early stages. Urban poverty there is 
thus more concentrated in capital cities. 
Small rural towns often have high con-
centrations of poor people. Some poor 
want to migrate to cities to escape poverty 
but are reluctant to dispose of their rural 
assets. In Nepal, for example, where pov-
erty is extreme, migrants prefer not to move 
too far from their rural residence but value 
proximity to paved roads and areas with 
higher housing premiums. Many want to 
maintain links with their farms, while others 
fear losing their land if they migrate too far. 
Remaining close to one’s land is an impor-
tant factor in migration in the absence of effi-
cient land markets. 
Well-designed urbanization is needed 
to achieve the MDGs
As long as rural-urban disparities in income 
and service delivery persist, rural-to-urban 
migration will ensue. Nearly 50 percent of the 
population in developing countries was urban 
in 2011, compared with less than 30 percent 
in the 1980s. Urban dwellers are expected to 
double between 2000 and 2030, from 2 bil-
lion to 4 billion people, and the number of 
Chinese urban dwellers will increase from 
more than 622 million today to over 1 billion 
in 2030. This trend is not unique to develop-
ing countries—today’s high-income countries 
underwent the same transformation in the 
20th century. In fact, virtually no country 
has graduated to a high-income status with-
out urbanizing, and urbanization rates above 
70 percent are typically found in high-income 
countries. 
For every ten people lifted out of poverty 
in the East Asia and Pacific region, two were 
facilitated by the urbanization process alone. 
Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, half of the 
decline in poverty originated in urban areas 
and through the urbanization process. Look-
ing at the impact of urbanization on service 
delivery provides even stronger evidence of 
the importance of the process of urbanization 
itself: close to 30 percent of the improvement 
in the MDG on sanitation results from the 
process of urbanization, that is, the migra-
tion of people and the expansion of urban 
areas. 
Policies to foster migration are impor-
tant to enable the poor to move from lag-
ging to leading areas, and governments can 
help reduce rural poverty by making migra-
tion more efficient. Equipping citizens with 
human capital assets while they are still in a 
rural area will increase the chance that their 
job search in the city is successful. Many 
developing countries have instituted land 
market policies in rural areas that discourage 
migration to urban areas. Restrictions in the 
land market are not only detrimental to agri-
cultural productivity growth but also hinder 
diversification into nonfarm activities that 
have higher returns. They should be relaxed. 
However important facilitating the urban-
ization process is, it is not enough for suc-
cessful development. Governments must also 
improve access to basic services in rural areas 
to achieve development goals, and they face 
important trade-offs in doing so. Priorities 
are not easily set, and financing local services 
is not straightforward. Moreover, govern-
ments must address the problem of slums in 
urban areas and mitigate the negative side 
effects of urbanization in the form of pollu-
tion caused by congestion or urban sprawl. 
To benefit fully from urbanization, smart 
planning of existing and new urban areas is 
needed. 
Services in rural areas need 
improvement
Even as numerous towns emerge in rural 
areas and many poor people migrate to cit-
ies to seek better jobs and services, the preva-
lence of a large majority of the poor in rural 
areas remains of great concern. Rural areas 
need focused policies that help raise farm 
productivity and connect rural villages to 
input and output markets. Diversification of 
employment into nonagricultural activities 
can also reduce rural poverty. Growth of 
nonfarm activities is often driven by growth 
in agricultural productivity, at least at the 
initial stage of development. Roads and the 
provision of electricity are needed to improve 
connectivity to markets and increase agricul-
tural productivity. 
Because the MDGs reflect the basic needs 
of all citizens, governments should aim to 
attain them fully in both urban and rural 
areas. Given scarce resources, however, 
priorities must be set. Consequently, it is 
important that decision makers take country-
specific circumstances into account when 
allocating resources.
For example, if the prime source of urban-
ization is domestic migration, then a strategy 
that focuses on MDG-related services that 
are portable (such as health and education) 
and that facilitate the integration of migrants 
seeking better opportunities in cities might 
have a higher payoff than one that indis-
criminately tries to equalize MDG-related 
services across urban and rural areas. Early 
investments in education and health in rural 
areas will prove useful to those who seek jobs 
in cities but can also contribute to higher 
farm and nonfarm incomes for those who 
never migrate. Such a payoff seems particu-
larly relevant for sparsely populated countries 
with both low urbanization and agglomera-
tion rates, as in Sub-Saharan Africa.
If the prime source of urbanization is grad-
ual thickening of population density, then the 
countrywide equalization of MDG-related 
services is more appropriate. This seems most 
relevant for countries with a low urbanization 
rate but an elevated level of agglomeration, as 
is the case in various countries in South Asia 
and those countries with a high urbanization 
rate and low expected migration. 
If people get stuck in small towns, with 
little prospect of moving on to large cities, 
then policies should focus on improving con-
nectivity with other urban centers. Poverty in 
small towns is often high, and the quantity 
and quality of services there differ little from 
those in rural areas and lag behind those in 
more mature urban settlements. Measures 
to better connect the activities in those small 
towns with economies of larger cities are 
then paramount. 
In all cases, the challenges should not be 
underestimated. Many developing countries 
have been unable to provide a coordinated 
package of physical infrastructure and social 
services in rural areas. In part, that is because 
the financing of public goods in poor areas is 
a daunting task, a point about which more is 
said below. 
New forms of service delivery are 
required in slums
Although poverty rates in cities are rela-
tively low and declining, poverty in many 
countries is increasingly becoming an urban 
phenomenon as more and more people live 
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in cities. Slums are the urban face of poverty 
and emerge when cities are unable to meet 
the demand for basic services and to supply 
the expected jobs. A likely 1 billion people 
live in urban slums in developing countries, 
and their numbers are projected to grow by 
nearly 500 million between now and 2020. 
Slums are growing the fastest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, southeastern Asia, and western Asia. 
Currently, 62 percent of Africa’s urban pop-
ulation lives in slums. Women and children 
bear a disproportionate burden of improper 
sanitation and poor health care in slums. The 
lack of urban planning by governments has 
implications for the urban poor, especially in 
Asia and Africa. Qualitative research, com-
munity surveys, and studies by nongovern-
mental organizations show that the actions 
taken by the urban poor in response to inad-
equate urban institutional support can pro-
duce severe indirect impacts.4 
The absence of land tenure is a key factor. 
According to the UN’s MDG Report 2012, 
slum evictions without due legal process are 
the most visible violation of housing rights 
confronting the urban poor. Household sur-
veys carried out in a range of cities around 
the globe found that slum dwellers reported 
insecurity regarding possible eviction was 
high, ranging from 20 percent in São Paolo 
to nearly 45 percent in Lagos. Insecure tenure 
in slum settlements means that governments 
are unwilling or unable to provide basic ser-
vices to these areas. In the absence of basic 
services, one coping strategy for the urban 
poor is dependence on informal provid-
ers, who offer low-quality services, often at 
higher costs than those paid by the nonpoor 
with access to formal services. This practice 
not only places higher economic costs on the 
urban poor but also leads to increased health 
costs, especially in the form of child morbid-
ity from unclean water. Similarly, the lack of 
adequate sanitation facilities in low-income 
settlements can lower the school attendance 
of adolescent girls and eventually increase 
their dropout rates. This problem has been 
specifically detected in Kenya’s urban slums, 
where qualitative and quantitative data show 
that girls in grades four through eight who 
have reached puberty miss six learning weeks 
a year on average. 
Combined with their informal employ-
ment, the inability of migrants living in slums 
to produce water or electricity bills or a for-
mal rental lease to prove urban residence puts 
them in an even more precarious situation. 
In some countries, proof of urban residence 
is needed to access basic services, as is the 
case with health services in Kyrgyzstan, and 
can sometimes lead to reverse migration. For 
example, when the quality of health services 
is dismal or when a migrant is excluded for 
lack of required documentation, an illness 
can push a migrant back to a rural area. 
Additionally, the inability to provide required 
identification and proof of urban residence 
excludes the urban poor from accessing 
financial services, leaving them with little 
means of saving for future investment or 
insurance in the event of economic shocks. In 
a detailed qualitative study of 176 rickshaw 
pullers in Delhi, only 1 percent had bank 
accounts, although 95 percent consciously 
saved daily or periodically. 
The most common coping strategies 
for saving in the absence of bank accounts 
include depositing money with a local shop-
keeper or a relative or friend (with the risk of 
being cheated); carrying savings on one’s per-
son at all times; and burying small amounts 
in the ground or hiding money in perceived 
safe spots within one’s residence. Savings 
handled in these ways are vulnerable to theft. 
In the event of economic shocks from peri-
ods of unemployment or illness, the absence 
of savings can lead to discontinuation of chil-
dren’s education, especially that of girls, and 
to interruption in remittances. Remittances 
are also affected by the high cost of send-
ing money by informal means, given the lack 
of access to banking by both the urban and 
rural poor. 
Impermanent, unsafe housing and the 
lack of basic services in slums force some 
migrants to maintain split households (sep-
arating spouses and leaving children with 
grandparents in rural areas), thus introducing 
instability into the urban transition. This con-
tinued dependence on rural areas has several 
negative implications, including the increased 
burden of child care on aging grandparents, 
the inability of migrants’ children to access 
better-quality primary education and health 
services, and numerous other harmful psy-
chological and health consequences. Several 
studies from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
have documented the adverse effects arising 
from split households.
The key message is that governments 
should not discriminate between slum dwell-
ers and the rural or urban poor. Slum dwell-
ers should be provided access to basic ser-
vices just like the poor in rural areas or cities, 
although the modalities may be different. 
Where land tenure issues are pervasive, and 
services cannot be or are not connected to 
informal dwellings, public connections may 
be more appropriate. Alongside increased 
instances of slum evictions and slum clear-
ance in the past decade, a growing number 
of success stories of slum service provision 
and upgrades are beginning to be noticed. 
For example, in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, the government had never given 
land on a long-term lease to a low-income 
squatter community until recently, when two 
government projects did so, thus regularizing 
people’s status on public land they already 
occupied. In Vinh, Vietnam, government has 
moved to provide slums with better services 
by adjusting existing planning standards to 
make them more realistic and to lower costs 
and make it easier for the urban poor to 
develop housing that matches their needs. 
Uncoordinated urbanization can lead to 
pollution, sprawl, and congestion
Urbanization is largely a natural process, 
driven by the opportunities cities offer. 
Unregulated markets are unlikely to get 
densities right, however, and spontaneous 
development of cities can create negative 
side effects such as congestion or, alterna-
tively, excessive sprawl. The consequences 
are pollution and inefficiencies. Without 
coordinated actions, cities will lack the 
proper investments to benefit from positive 
externalities generated by increased density. 
Higher-quality construction material and 
more sophisticated buildings are required to 
support greater densities, but if these higher 
costs must be fully internalized by firms and 
households, underinvestment is the result. In 
addition, complementary physical infrastruc-
ture is critical: roads, drainage, street light-
ing, electricity, water, and sewerage, together 
with policing, waste disposal, and health 
care. While a market-driven process could 
possibly gradually increase densities through 
shifting land values over time, the long-lived 
and lumpy nature of urban investment often 
inhibits such a process. A city’s physical 
structures, once established, may remain in 
place for more than 150 years. 
Under current trends, the expected 
increases in the urban population in the 
developing world will be accompanied 
by a tripling in the built-up area of cities, 
from 200,000 to 600,000 square kilome-
ters. As an example, consider Shanghai, 
which has rapidly expanded over the past 
20 years (map O.1). Such rapid popula-
tion growth accompanied by an even faster 
spatial expansion of cities is likely to lead 
to low-density development dominated by 
individual-vehicle transportation—a largely 
irreversible pattern that runs the risk of 
dampening density-induced productivity 
and service delivery efficiencies. An addi-
tional consequence of rapid urban growth is 
worsening air quality. A recent study of the 
189 largest cities using satellite data found 
that air quality worsened between 2002 
and 2010, particularly in the largest cities 
of the Indian subcontinent, parts of Africa, 
the Middle East, and north China—places 
experiencing rapid urban growth.
Emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 
include fine particulate matter (PM10 and 
PM2.5), carbon monoxide, nitric oxides, and 
sulfur dioxide, which can cause allergies, 
respiratory problems, cardiovascular disease, 
and cognitive deficits. The impacts are sig-
nificant. In Russia, a conservative estimate 
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in cities. Slums are the urban face of poverty 
and emerge when cities are unable to meet 
the demand for basic services and to supply 
the expected jobs. A likely 1 billion people 
live in urban slums in developing countries, 
and their numbers are projected to grow by 
nearly 500 million between now and 2020. 
Slums are growing the fastest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, southeastern Asia, and western Asia. 
Currently, 62 percent of Africa’s urban pop-
ulation lives in slums. Women and children 
bear a disproportionate burden of improper 
sanitation and poor health care in slums. The 
lack of urban planning by governments has 
implications for the urban poor, especially in 
Asia and Africa. Qualitative research, com-
munity surveys, and studies by nongovern-
mental organizations show that the actions 
taken by the urban poor in response to inad-
equate urban institutional support can pro-
duce severe indirect impacts.4 
The absence of land tenure is a key factor. 
According to the UN’s MDG Report 2012, 
slum evictions without due legal process are 
the most visible violation of housing rights 
confronting the urban poor. Household sur-
veys carried out in a range of cities around 
the globe found that slum dwellers reported 
insecurity regarding possible eviction was 
high, ranging from 20 percent in São Paolo 
to nearly 45 percent in Lagos. Insecure tenure 
in slum settlements means that governments 
are unwilling or unable to provide basic ser-
vices to these areas. In the absence of basic 
services, one coping strategy for the urban 
poor is dependence on informal provid-
ers, who offer low-quality services, often at 
higher costs than those paid by the nonpoor 
with access to formal services. This practice 
not only places higher economic costs on the 
urban poor but also leads to increased health 
costs, especially in the form of child morbid-
ity from unclean water. Similarly, the lack of 
adequate sanitation facilities in low-income 
settlements can lower the school attendance 
of adolescent girls and eventually increase 
their dropout rates. This problem has been 
specifically detected in Kenya’s urban slums, 
where qualitative and quantitative data show 
that girls in grades four through eight who 
have reached puberty miss six learning weeks 
a year on average. 
Combined with their informal employ-
ment, the inability of migrants living in slums 
to produce water or electricity bills or a for-
mal rental lease to prove urban residence puts 
them in an even more precarious situation. 
In some countries, proof of urban residence 
is needed to access basic services, as is the 
case with health services in Kyrgyzstan, and 
can sometimes lead to reverse migration. For 
example, when the quality of health services 
is dismal or when a migrant is excluded for 
lack of required documentation, an illness 
can push a migrant back to a rural area. 
Additionally, the inability to provide required 
identification and proof of urban residence 
excludes the urban poor from accessing 
financial services, leaving them with little 
means of saving for future investment or 
insurance in the event of economic shocks. In 
a detailed qualitative study of 176 rickshaw 
pullers in Delhi, only 1 percent had bank 
accounts, although 95 percent consciously 
saved daily or periodically. 
The most common coping strategies 
for saving in the absence of bank accounts 
include depositing money with a local shop-
keeper or a relative or friend (with the risk of 
being cheated); carrying savings on one’s per-
son at all times; and burying small amounts 
in the ground or hiding money in perceived 
safe spots within one’s residence. Savings 
handled in these ways are vulnerable to theft. 
In the event of economic shocks from peri-
ods of unemployment or illness, the absence 
of savings can lead to discontinuation of chil-
dren’s education, especially that of girls, and 
to interruption in remittances. Remittances 
are also affected by the high cost of send-
ing money by informal means, given the lack 
of access to banking by both the urban and 
rural poor. 
Impermanent, unsafe housing and the 
lack of basic services in slums force some 
migrants to maintain split households (sep-
arating spouses and leaving children with 
grandparents in rural areas), thus introducing 
instability into the urban transition. This con-
tinued dependence on rural areas has several 
negative implications, including the increased 
burden of child care on aging grandparents, 
the inability of migrants’ children to access 
better-quality primary education and health 
services, and numerous other harmful psy-
chological and health consequences. Several 
studies from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
have documented the adverse effects arising 
from split households.
The key message is that governments 
should not discriminate between slum dwell-
ers and the rural or urban poor. Slum dwell-
ers should be provided access to basic ser-
vices just like the poor in rural areas or cities, 
although the modalities may be different. 
Where land tenure issues are pervasive, and 
services cannot be or are not connected to 
informal dwellings, public connections may 
be more appropriate. Alongside increased 
instances of slum evictions and slum clear-
ance in the past decade, a growing number 
of success stories of slum service provision 
and upgrades are beginning to be noticed. 
For example, in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, the government had never given 
land on a long-term lease to a low-income 
squatter community until recently, when two 
government projects did so, thus regularizing 
people’s status on public land they already 
occupied. In Vinh, Vietnam, government has 
moved to provide slums with better services 
by adjusting existing planning standards to 
make them more realistic and to lower costs 
and make it easier for the urban poor to 
develop housing that matches their needs. 
Uncoordinated urbanization can lead to 
pollution, sprawl, and congestion
Urbanization is largely a natural process, 
driven by the opportunities cities offer. 
Unregulated markets are unlikely to get 
densities right, however, and spontaneous 
development of cities can create negative 
side effects such as congestion or, alterna-
tively, excessive sprawl. The consequences 
are pollution and inefficiencies. Without 
coordinated actions, cities will lack the 
proper investments to benefit from positive 
externalities generated by increased density. 
Higher-quality construction material and 
more sophisticated buildings are required to 
support greater densities, but if these higher 
costs must be fully internalized by firms and 
households, underinvestment is the result. In 
addition, complementary physical infrastruc-
ture is critical: roads, drainage, street light-
ing, electricity, water, and sewerage, together 
with policing, waste disposal, and health 
care. While a market-driven process could 
possibly gradually increase densities through 
shifting land values over time, the long-lived 
and lumpy nature of urban investment often 
inhibits such a process. A city’s physical 
structures, once established, may remain in 
place for more than 150 years. 
Under current trends, the expected 
increases in the urban population in the 
developing world will be accompanied 
by a tripling in the built-up area of cities, 
from 200,000 to 600,000 square kilome-
ters. As an example, consider Shanghai, 
which has rapidly expanded over the past 
20 years (map O.1). Such rapid popula-
tion growth accompanied by an even faster 
spatial expansion of cities is likely to lead 
to low-density development dominated by 
individual-vehicle transportation—a largely 
irreversible pattern that runs the risk of 
dampening density-induced productivity 
and service delivery efficiencies. An addi-
tional consequence of rapid urban growth is 
worsening air quality. A recent study of the 
189 largest cities using satellite data found 
that air quality worsened between 2002 
and 2010, particularly in the largest cities 
of the Indian subcontinent, parts of Africa, 
the Middle East, and north China—places 
experiencing rapid urban growth.
Emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 
include fine particulate matter (PM10 and 
PM2.5), carbon monoxide, nitric oxides, and 
sulfur dioxide, which can cause allergies, 
respiratory problems, cardiovascular disease, 
and cognitive deficits. The impacts are sig-
nificant. In Russia, a conservative estimate 
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suggests that annual health damage from 
fossil-fuel burning amount to $6 billion. The 
social cost of transport in Beijing is equiva-
lent to 7.5–15.0 percent of its gross domestic 
product, with about half of that stemming 
from air pollution, including carbon emis-
sions. The largest share of these costs comes 
from increased mortality. 
Globally, acute respiratory infections asso-
ciated with air pollution cause about 20 per-
cent of all under-five deaths. In the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a country 
of about 2 million people, air pollution is the 
cause of an estimated 1,300 premature deaths 
annually. Beijing, Cairo, Delhi, Dhaka, and 
Karachi each see an estimated 3,500 to 7,000 
premature deaths annually from cardiovascu-
lar disease caused by air pollution. Manag-
ing environmental quality while enhancing 
urban productivity is critical. 
An integrated strategy
Three interrelated dimensions of urban devel-
opment triangulate the coordinated approach 
needed to enable a country to take advantage 
of its urbanization process: planning, con-
necting, and financing. 
•   Planning—charting a course for cit-
ies by setting the terms of urbanization, 
especially policies for using urban land and 
expanding basic infrastructure and public 
services.
•   Connecting—making a city’s markets 
(labor, goods, and services) accessible to 
other neighborhoods in the city, to other 
cities, and to outside export markets.
•   Financing—finding sources for large capi-
tal outlays needed to provide infrastruc-
ture and services as cities grow and urban-
ization picks up speed.
These are terms that policy makers use on a 
daily basis, but they often focus on financ-
ing first without fully considering the other 
two dimensions. Of the three, planning for 
land use and basic services is the most impor-
tant. In fact, the key challenge for countries 
at all stages of urbanization is strengthening 
the institutions for land management. Yet 
because planning must allow for people and 
products to be mobile, it must be coordinated 
with and connected to all stages of a city’s 
growth. Financing should be city leaders’ last 
concern rather than their first.
In designing policies to manage the pro-
cess of urbanization, it is paramount to 
enhance women’s empowerment and to 
close the gender gap in earnings, largely by 
improving women’s access to education. 
World Development Report 2012: Gender 
Equality and Development (WDR 2012) 
details that the emergence of agglomeration 
economies can have disproportionate benefits 
for women with basic education through job 
opportunities in light manufacturing. Hence, 
in addition to the importance of getting 
polices right regarding planning, connecting, 
and financing, a priority is reducing gender 
gaps in human capital, specifically those that 
address women’s education. 
Urbanization should start with planning
Planning is fundamental to agglomeration 
economies in three ways. First, land use 
requires effective systems for land valuation. 
Second, land use must be allocated in a way 
that allows for infrastructure improvements 
as the city grows. Third, the most basic infra-
structure services—water, energy, sanitation, 
and solid waste management—need to be 
provided for all residents, urban, peri-urban, 
and rural alike; natural market mechanisms 
are unlikely to provide those.
Lack of early planning often imposes 
very difficult corrective measures later on. 
Measures that could have worked well at an 
early stage are much less effective once city 
structures have been locked in. For example, 
to manage slum formation and reduce the 
hazards faced by slum dwellers, policy mak-
ers often try to move people to safe environ-
ments or provide better housing elsewhere. 
Initiatives include urban upgrades, such as 
community and household infrastructure 
projects; resettlement to new housing devel-
opments; housing subsidies; and land titling. 
But many of these policies do not work 
because people do not always willingly trade 
a good location for a better home with more 
modern utilities. People choose neighbor-
hoods for their affordable services and ame-
nities—but also for their proximity to jobs. 
In many developing countries’ cities, it can 
be difficult to live near one’s job. One con-
sequence of failed land markets and restric-
tive regulations is that the formal housing 
supply is low. But it may also be difficult and 
costly to commute to work, because trans-
port infrastructure fails to connect urban 
neighborhoods. In many African cities, com-
muting by public transit costs more than half 
of a poor household’s income. In Harare, the 
poor spend more than a fourth of their dis-
posable income on transport. In Kampala, 
the figure is 50 percent. 
To foster better living conditions, policy 
makers need to coordinate land market rules 
with urban infrastructure development. 
Hanoi has been able to grow without the 
formation of large slums because the govern-
ment set prudent rules for land markets and 
infrastructure. It allowed the densification of 
former village areas. It pushed to modern-
ize road networks just outside the city, yet 
it mostly avoided demolishing older houses. 
These roads have opened new land for for-
mal developers while improving connections 
between existing village areas and the city. 
The village areas were allowed to grow and 
were integrated into the urban economy.
Policy makers in Bogotá similarly suc-
ceeded by coordinating land use with infra-
structure development. The Programa de 
Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios aimed to 
improve mobility and living conditions in 
26 of the poorest city areas, called Unidades 
de Planificacion Zonal. The Unidades com-
prised 107 neighborhoods of informal origin, 
with 1,440 informal settlements, 300,000 
plots not formally titled, and about 500,000 
structurally substandard dwellings. The pro-
gram legalized homes and neighborhoods; it 
expanded infrastructure with roads, rainwa-
ter traps, and sanitary and aqueduct trunk 
networks; and it added urban facilities (stairs, 
parks, community rooms). Living conditions 
improved for about 650,000 people. Comple-
mentary improvements in communication 
and interregional transport can make it easier 
to integrate neighboring peri-urban and rural 
areas with urban economies.
Integrating planning, connecting, and 
financing is also key to the “greening” of 
growth and getting urbanization right. While 
there is a perceived trade-off between “build-
ing more cities” to accommodate rapid urban 
growth and “building cities right” to enhance 
social and environmental outcomes, com-
pelling evidence shows that “building cities 
MAP O.1 Shanghai’s spatial expansion as shown by average nighttime light intensity
Source: China Data Center at University of Michigan. 
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suggests that annual health damage from 
fossil-fuel burning amount to $6 billion. The 
social cost of transport in Beijing is equiva-
lent to 7.5–15.0 percent of its gross domestic 
product, with about half of that stemming 
from air pollution, including carbon emis-
sions. The largest share of these costs comes 
from increased mortality. 
Globally, acute respiratory infections asso-
ciated with air pollution cause about 20 per-
cent of all under-five deaths. In the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a country 
of about 2 million people, air pollution is the 
cause of an estimated 1,300 premature deaths 
annually. Beijing, Cairo, Delhi, Dhaka, and 
Karachi each see an estimated 3,500 to 7,000 
premature deaths annually from cardiovascu-
lar disease caused by air pollution. Manag-
ing environmental quality while enhancing 
urban productivity is critical. 
An integrated strategy
Three interrelated dimensions of urban devel-
opment triangulate the coordinated approach 
needed to enable a country to take advantage 
of its urbanization process: planning, con-
necting, and financing. 
•   Planning—charting a course for cit-
ies by setting the terms of urbanization, 
especially policies for using urban land and 
expanding basic infrastructure and public 
services.
•   Connecting—making a city’s markets 
(labor, goods, and services) accessible to 
other neighborhoods in the city, to other 
cities, and to outside export markets.
•   Financing—finding sources for large capi-
tal outlays needed to provide infrastruc-
ture and services as cities grow and urban-
ization picks up speed.
These are terms that policy makers use on a 
daily basis, but they often focus on financ-
ing first without fully considering the other 
two dimensions. Of the three, planning for 
land use and basic services is the most impor-
tant. In fact, the key challenge for countries 
at all stages of urbanization is strengthening 
the institutions for land management. Yet 
because planning must allow for people and 
products to be mobile, it must be coordinated 
with and connected to all stages of a city’s 
growth. Financing should be city leaders’ last 
concern rather than their first.
In designing policies to manage the pro-
cess of urbanization, it is paramount to 
enhance women’s empowerment and to 
close the gender gap in earnings, largely by 
improving women’s access to education. 
World Development Report 2012: Gender 
Equality and Development (WDR 2012) 
details that the emergence of agglomeration 
economies can have disproportionate benefits 
for women with basic education through job 
opportunities in light manufacturing. Hence, 
in addition to the importance of getting 
polices right regarding planning, connecting, 
and financing, a priority is reducing gender 
gaps in human capital, specifically those that 
address women’s education. 
Urbanization should start with planning
Planning is fundamental to agglomeration 
economies in three ways. First, land use 
requires effective systems for land valuation. 
Second, land use must be allocated in a way 
that allows for infrastructure improvements 
as the city grows. Third, the most basic infra-
structure services—water, energy, sanitation, 
and solid waste management—need to be 
provided for all residents, urban, peri-urban, 
and rural alike; natural market mechanisms 
are unlikely to provide those.
Lack of early planning often imposes 
very difficult corrective measures later on. 
Measures that could have worked well at an 
early stage are much less effective once city 
structures have been locked in. For example, 
to manage slum formation and reduce the 
hazards faced by slum dwellers, policy mak-
ers often try to move people to safe environ-
ments or provide better housing elsewhere. 
Initiatives include urban upgrades, such as 
community and household infrastructure 
projects; resettlement to new housing devel-
opments; housing subsidies; and land titling. 
But many of these policies do not work 
because people do not always willingly trade 
a good location for a better home with more 
modern utilities. People choose neighbor-
hoods for their affordable services and ame-
nities—but also for their proximity to jobs. 
In many developing countries’ cities, it can 
be difficult to live near one’s job. One con-
sequence of failed land markets and restric-
tive regulations is that the formal housing 
supply is low. But it may also be difficult and 
costly to commute to work, because trans-
port infrastructure fails to connect urban 
neighborhoods. In many African cities, com-
muting by public transit costs more than half 
of a poor household’s income. In Harare, the 
poor spend more than a fourth of their dis-
posable income on transport. In Kampala, 
the figure is 50 percent. 
To foster better living conditions, policy 
makers need to coordinate land market rules 
with urban infrastructure development. 
Hanoi has been able to grow without the 
formation of large slums because the govern-
ment set prudent rules for land markets and 
infrastructure. It allowed the densification of 
former village areas. It pushed to modern-
ize road networks just outside the city, yet 
it mostly avoided demolishing older houses. 
These roads have opened new land for for-
mal developers while improving connections 
between existing village areas and the city. 
The village areas were allowed to grow and 
were integrated into the urban economy.
Policy makers in Bogotá similarly suc-
ceeded by coordinating land use with infra-
structure development. The Programa de 
Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios aimed to 
improve mobility and living conditions in 
26 of the poorest city areas, called Unidades 
de Planificacion Zonal. The Unidades com-
prised 107 neighborhoods of informal origin, 
with 1,440 informal settlements, 300,000 
plots not formally titled, and about 500,000 
structurally substandard dwellings. The pro-
gram legalized homes and neighborhoods; it 
expanded infrastructure with roads, rainwa-
ter traps, and sanitary and aqueduct trunk 
networks; and it added urban facilities (stairs, 
parks, community rooms). Living conditions 
improved for about 650,000 people. Comple-
mentary improvements in communication 
and interregional transport can make it easier 
to integrate neighboring peri-urban and rural 
areas with urban economies.
Integrating planning, connecting, and 
financing is also key to the “greening” of 
growth and getting urbanization right. While 
there is a perceived trade-off between “build-
ing more cities” to accommodate rapid urban 
growth and “building cities right” to enhance 
social and environmental outcomes, com-
pelling evidence shows that “building cities 
MAP O.1 Shanghai’s spatial expansion as shown by average nighttime light intensity
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right” generates co-benefits in the near term 
and reduces the prohibitive costs of address-
ing sprawl, congestion, pollution, and climate 
change later. Integrating land use and trans-
port plans effectively allows public transport 
(with its lower energy consumption and emis-
sions) to be a major mode of transport in loca-
tions zoned for high density. The Brazilian 
city of Curitiba has managed to concentrate 
its population around public transportation 
lines and hubs, making it possible to maxi-
mize the share of trips with low-energy-con-
sumption modes of transportation. Copenha-
gen redesigned its urban transport network 
to follow a transit-oriented and bike-friendly 
approach: it started with a “finger plan”—
the identification of few priority development 
areas—and then invested in five-axis transit 
radials and corridors of new, satellite, rail-
served towns.
Connectivity depends on more than 
infrastructure
To benefit from the opportunities that cities 
offer, commuting costs need to be low. More-
over, if connections with the surrounding 
areas are well developed, urban densities can 
also have a positive impact on rural areas. 
Research in India has shown a growing link 
between urban development and a reduction 
of rural poverty; higher demand for rural 
products and more options for rural nonfarm 
diversification followed India’s economic lib-
eralization in the early 1990s.
Connections, both between and within cit-
ies, benefit producers and consumers, both in 
urban and rural areas. Connections give pro-
ducers access to input (including labor) and 
output markets. They give consumers options 
and, in many cases, better prices. And con-
nections expose cities and rural areas to new 
economic opportunities. But policy makers 
who envision better transport connections 
for cities and neighborhoods face difficult 
choices. With limited resources, they cannot 
invest in everything. It is hard to know which 
new or improved connections will yield the 
highest returns over time. Setting priorities 
for connective investment means picking 
winners and losers in the short run—but in 
the long run, thinking about priorities can 
make a vast difference for cities, surrounding 
rural areas, and even countries. 
More than building and fixing, efforts to 
improve intercity connections are about the 
economics of the transport sector, which 
has a tendency toward natural monopolies. 
If the market structure for transport service 
provision does not promote competitive pric-
ing, any cost reductions stemming from net-
work investments will be absorbed as profit 
by monopolistic providers. The government 
regulates in large part to induce healthy 
competition, limiting monopolistic behavior 
but also limiting the number, or behavior, 
of competitors where required. Investments 
in infrastructure are more successful when 
bundled with regulatory reforms that pro-
mote competitive pricing while also ensuring 
compliance with safety standards. 
In Uganda, as in many other African coun-
tries, a large gap between transport costs 
and prices attests to monopolistic behavior. 
Along the Uganda stretch of the Kampala–
Mombasa corridor, home to most of Ugan-
da’s industrial production, transport prices 
average $2.22 a kilometer—double the aver-
age price in the United States—even though 
transport costs are about $0.35 a kilometer. 
According to trucker surveys, 86 percent 
of the corridor is in good condition. So the 
fact that providers are making more than 85 
percent profit suggests a need for competi-
tion, which can be induced most effectively 
through policy measures and regulation.
Within many cities, the poorest residents 
are often deprived of affordable transport 
services. An extreme example is Mumbai, 
where, according to a study published in 
2007, transport expenditures represented at 
least 16 percent of income for riders in the 
lowest income category, even though subsi-
dies covered as much as 30 percent of trans-
port costs. While subsidies have not always 
been successful, some targeted subsidies do 
reach the right groups and increase access 
to jobs. For example, South Africa uses 
highly subsidized weekly coupons, good for 
10 journeys between black townships and 
industrial development areas, to connect 
low-income workers to jobs. Brazil requires 
formal sector employers to provide transit 
tickets to employees through a system called 
vale transporte (VT); firms then deduct the 
VT expenditures from taxable income. The 
VT system—albeit affecting only the formal 
sector—effectively spreads the cost of trans-
port subsidies between employers and the 
government.
Finance is the difficult final part of 
the puzzle
Having identified priorities for planning 
and connecting, policy makers confront 
the problem of financing those investments. 
The main difficulty is the need for money 
up front. Large capital outlays are needed to 
provide infrastructure and services that are 
not fully in demand now but will become 
so as urbanization picks up speed. The large 
capital investments that are needed in the 
construction phase, whether for transport, 
water provision, solid waste management, or 
sewage removal and treatment, are likely to 
far exceed the budget of any city government. 
But financing can become more sustain-
able through taxes realized with increased 
economic growth, and with the ability of 
policy makers to leverage land markets and 
approach local currency debt markets.
More generally, financing of all local ser-
vices is challenging. While services are best 
delivered locally, the local tax base is often 
narrow. That is true not only for cities, but 
for all subnational governments.5 These gov-
ernments are often better suited than agen-
cies of the national government to address 
the challenges of service delivery. They can 
more efficiently detect citizens’ needs given 
their informational advantage. That is par-
ticularly relevant for beneficiary identifica-
tion in poverty programs. Subnational gov-
ernments can direct resources toward these 
needs (allocative efficiency) and can provide 
some services more efficiently than national 
governments (productive efficiency). Decen-
tralized management and execution of public 
investment can also be strengthened by joint 
approaches to address infrastructural gaps. 
Chile, for instance, is coordinating public 
investment through regional investment win-
dows, including cofinancing with municipali-
ties. In addition, political decentralization 
lowers the “barriers to entry” for different 
groups of society, so they can more easily 
and directly participate in decision mak-
ing. An example from Mexico underscores 
the importance of decentralization: because 
of political resistance, federal teachers were 
not decentralized to the states, resulting in a 
parallel hiring process at the state level that 
blurred the lines of accountability.
Local provision of services requires fis-
cal equalization across space to ensure that 
necessary resources flow toward the districts 
most in need of them. No country starts from 
a clean slate, however, and more often than 
not, reforms of intergovernmental transfers 
are done at the margin and incrementally. 
An example is Colombia’s current royalty 
reform, which achieves more equitable distri-
bution of royalty resources. 
The financing challenges are largest in 
rural areas: they are home to the largest 
number of poor people, but, under grow-
ing disparities in fiscal capacity, they are 
increasingly resource constrained. Subna-
tional governments in urban areas have 
higher fiscal capacity and are hence better 
able to influence outcomes through their own 
revenue decisions. Absent any convergence 
effects, fiscal capacity in urban areas will 
increase as agglomeration unfolds, putting 
rural areas at a further disadvantage. Given 
uneven advances and levels of autonomy in 
expenditures, rural governments are more 
constrained in their ability to provide a high-
quality package of services to the poor or to 
target the incidence of spending on direct ser-
vices where they are needed most.
Notes
1.  The original target to improve the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 was 
based on an estimation of close to 100 million 
slum dwellers in the world. Upon measurement 
of slum populations using the internationally 
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right” generates co-benefits in the near term 
and reduces the prohibitive costs of address-
ing sprawl, congestion, pollution, and climate 
change later. Integrating land use and trans-
port plans effectively allows public transport 
(with its lower energy consumption and emis-
sions) to be a major mode of transport in loca-
tions zoned for high density. The Brazilian 
city of Curitiba has managed to concentrate 
its population around public transportation 
lines and hubs, making it possible to maxi-
mize the share of trips with low-energy-con-
sumption modes of transportation. Copenha-
gen redesigned its urban transport network 
to follow a transit-oriented and bike-friendly 
approach: it started with a “finger plan”—
the identification of few priority development 
areas—and then invested in five-axis transit 
radials and corridors of new, satellite, rail-
served towns.
Connectivity depends on more than 
infrastructure
To benefit from the opportunities that cities 
offer, commuting costs need to be low. More-
over, if connections with the surrounding 
areas are well developed, urban densities can 
also have a positive impact on rural areas. 
Research in India has shown a growing link 
between urban development and a reduction 
of rural poverty; higher demand for rural 
products and more options for rural nonfarm 
diversification followed India’s economic lib-
eralization in the early 1990s.
Connections, both between and within cit-
ies, benefit producers and consumers, both in 
urban and rural areas. Connections give pro-
ducers access to input (including labor) and 
output markets. They give consumers options 
and, in many cases, better prices. And con-
nections expose cities and rural areas to new 
economic opportunities. But policy makers 
who envision better transport connections 
for cities and neighborhoods face difficult 
choices. With limited resources, they cannot 
invest in everything. It is hard to know which 
new or improved connections will yield the 
highest returns over time. Setting priorities 
for connective investment means picking 
winners and losers in the short run—but in 
the long run, thinking about priorities can 
make a vast difference for cities, surrounding 
rural areas, and even countries. 
More than building and fixing, efforts to 
improve intercity connections are about the 
economics of the transport sector, which 
has a tendency toward natural monopolies. 
If the market structure for transport service 
provision does not promote competitive pric-
ing, any cost reductions stemming from net-
work investments will be absorbed as profit 
by monopolistic providers. The government 
regulates in large part to induce healthy 
competition, limiting monopolistic behavior 
but also limiting the number, or behavior, 
of competitors where required. Investments 
in infrastructure are more successful when 
bundled with regulatory reforms that pro-
mote competitive pricing while also ensuring 
compliance with safety standards. 
In Uganda, as in many other African coun-
tries, a large gap between transport costs 
and prices attests to monopolistic behavior. 
Along the Uganda stretch of the Kampala–
Mombasa corridor, home to most of Ugan-
da’s industrial production, transport prices 
average $2.22 a kilometer—double the aver-
age price in the United States—even though 
transport costs are about $0.35 a kilometer. 
According to trucker surveys, 86 percent 
of the corridor is in good condition. So the 
fact that providers are making more than 85 
percent profit suggests a need for competi-
tion, which can be induced most effectively 
through policy measures and regulation.
Within many cities, the poorest residents 
are often deprived of affordable transport 
services. An extreme example is Mumbai, 
where, according to a study published in 
2007, transport expenditures represented at 
least 16 percent of income for riders in the 
lowest income category, even though subsi-
dies covered as much as 30 percent of trans-
port costs. While subsidies have not always 
been successful, some targeted subsidies do 
reach the right groups and increase access 
to jobs. For example, South Africa uses 
highly subsidized weekly coupons, good for 
10 journeys between black townships and 
industrial development areas, to connect 
low-income workers to jobs. Brazil requires 
formal sector employers to provide transit 
tickets to employees through a system called 
vale transporte (VT); firms then deduct the 
VT expenditures from taxable income. The 
VT system—albeit affecting only the formal 
sector—effectively spreads the cost of trans-
port subsidies between employers and the 
government.
Finance is the difficult final part of 
the puzzle
Having identified priorities for planning 
and connecting, policy makers confront 
the problem of financing those investments. 
The main difficulty is the need for money 
up front. Large capital outlays are needed to 
provide infrastructure and services that are 
not fully in demand now but will become 
so as urbanization picks up speed. The large 
capital investments that are needed in the 
construction phase, whether for transport, 
water provision, solid waste management, or 
sewage removal and treatment, are likely to 
far exceed the budget of any city government. 
But financing can become more sustain-
able through taxes realized with increased 
economic growth, and with the ability of 
policy makers to leverage land markets and 
approach local currency debt markets.
More generally, financing of all local ser-
vices is challenging. While services are best 
delivered locally, the local tax base is often 
narrow. That is true not only for cities, but 
for all subnational governments.5 These gov-
ernments are often better suited than agen-
cies of the national government to address 
the challenges of service delivery. They can 
more efficiently detect citizens’ needs given 
their informational advantage. That is par-
ticularly relevant for beneficiary identifica-
tion in poverty programs. Subnational gov-
ernments can direct resources toward these 
needs (allocative efficiency) and can provide 
some services more efficiently than national 
governments (productive efficiency). Decen-
tralized management and execution of public 
investment can also be strengthened by joint 
approaches to address infrastructural gaps. 
Chile, for instance, is coordinating public 
investment through regional investment win-
dows, including cofinancing with municipali-
ties. In addition, political decentralization 
lowers the “barriers to entry” for different 
groups of society, so they can more easily 
and directly participate in decision mak-
ing. An example from Mexico underscores 
the importance of decentralization: because 
of political resistance, federal teachers were 
not decentralized to the states, resulting in a 
parallel hiring process at the state level that 
blurred the lines of accountability.
Local provision of services requires fis-
cal equalization across space to ensure that 
necessary resources flow toward the districts 
most in need of them. No country starts from 
a clean slate, however, and more often than 
not, reforms of intergovernmental transfers 
are done at the margin and incrementally. 
An example is Colombia’s current royalty 
reform, which achieves more equitable distri-
bution of royalty resources. 
The financing challenges are largest in 
rural areas: they are home to the largest 
number of poor people, but, under grow-
ing disparities in fiscal capacity, they are 
increasingly resource constrained. Subna-
tional governments in urban areas have 
higher fiscal capacity and are hence better 
able to influence outcomes through their own 
revenue decisions. Absent any convergence 
effects, fiscal capacity in urban areas will 
increase as agglomeration unfolds, putting 
rural areas at a further disadvantage. Given 
uneven advances and levels of autonomy in 
expenditures, rural governments are more 
constrained in their ability to provide a high-
quality package of services to the poor or to 
target the incidence of spending on direct ser-
vices where they are needed most.
Notes
1.  The original target to improve the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 was 
based on an estimation of close to 100 million 
slum dwellers in the world. Upon measurement 
of slum populations using the internationally 
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agreed upon UN-Habitat definition of slums 
following the UN Expert Group Meeting of 
October 2002, it was learned that the global 
estimate of the slum population was in fact 
close to 1 billion (924 million). As a result, 
even though the slum target has been globally 
achieved, and in fact significantly surpassed 10 
years ahead of schedule, there is little room for 
complacency given the existing magnitude of 
populations currently living in slums.
2.  As detailed in the OECD’s report “Aid Effec-
tiveness 2005-10: Progress in Implementing 
the Paris Declaration” (2011).
3.  Many reasons for the occurrence of urban-
ization were discussed in WDR 2009, which 
provided ample evidence of the benefits of 
agglomeration. WDR 2009 developed an 
agglomeration index with a uniform defini-
tion of what constitutes an urban or agglom-
erated area. An urban or agglomerated area 
is defined by population size of a settlement 
(more than 50,000 people), population density 
(more than 150 people per square kilome-
ter), and travel time to the nearest large city 
(60 minutes). 
4.  The report draws upon an in-house desktop 
review of qualitative research, the findings 
of community-level surveys on slum dwell-
ers in cities of developing countries, and fresh 
inputs sought from civil society organizations 
across a range of developing countries. This 
body of research has explored several themes 
affecting the urban poor, especially rural-
urban migrants, and the strategies they apply 
to remain resilient to the challenges posed by 
urban poverty. Data and insights have been 
drawn from countries in Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Latin America, including Bangla-
desh, China, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tan-
zania, Uganda, Zambia, Brazil, and Ecuador.
5.  The term “subnational governments” encom-
passes, among other entities, regional or state 
governments, provinces, and municipalities.
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Global Progress  
on MDGs
1
TARGET 8.A Develop further an open, rule-
based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading 
and financial system (including a commitment 
to good governance, development, and pov-
erty reduction, nationally and internationally)
TARGET 8.B Address the special needs of the 
least-developed countries (including tariff-  
and quota-free access for exports of the least-
developed countries; enhanced debt relief  
for heavily indebted poor countries and  
cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more 
generous official development assistance for 
countries committed to reducing poverty) 
TARGET 8.C Address the special needs of 
landlocked countries and small island  
developing states (through the Programme  
of Action for the Sustainable Development  
of Small Island Developing States and the  
outcome of the 22nd special session of  
the General Assembly) 
TARGET 8.D Deal comprehensively with  
the debt problems of developing countries 
through national and international measures 
to make debt sustainable in the long term 
TARGET 8.E In cooperation with pharmaceuti-
cal companies, provide access to affordable, 
essential drugs in developing countries
TARGET 8.F In cooperation with the private 
sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and 
communications
TARGET 1.A Halve, between 1990 and 2015,  
the proportion of people whose income is  
less than $1.25 a day
TARGET 1.B Achieve full and productive  
employment and decent work for all,  
including women and young people
TARGET 1.C Halve, between 1990 and  
2015, the proportion of people who suffer  
from hunger
TARGET 4.A Reduce by two-thirds,  
between 1990 and 2015, the under- 
five mortality rate
TARGET 5.A Reduce by three- 
quarters, between 1990 and 2015,  
the maternal mortality ratio
TARGET 5.B Achieve by 2015  
universal access to reproductive health
TARGET 2.A Ensure that by 2015,  
children everywhere, boys and girls alike,  
will be able to complete a full course of  
primary schooling
TARGET 6.A Have halted by 2015  
and begun to reverse the spread  
of HIV/AIDS
TARGET 6.B Achieve by 2010 universal 
access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for  
all those who need it 
TARGET 6.C Have halted by 2015  
and begun to reverse the incidence  
of malaria and other major diseases
TARGET 7.A Integrate the principles of  
sustainable development into country  
policies and programs and reverse the  
loss of environmental resources
TARGET 7.B Reduce biodiversity loss, 
achieving by 2010 a significant reduction  
in the rate of loss
TARGET 7.C Halve by 2015 the proportion 
of people without sustainable access  
to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
TARGET 7.D Have achieved a significant 
improvement by 2020 in the lives of at  
least 100 million slum dwellers
TARGET 3.A Eliminate gender disparity  
in primary and secondary education,  
preferably by 2005, and at all levels  
of education no later than 2015
Eradicate extreme  
poverty and hunger
Reduce child  
mortality
Improve maternal  
health
Achieve universal  
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Progress toward the MDGs
Only two years away from the 2015 target set for reaching 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), progress is 
diverse across goals and regions. Global estimates indicate 
that targets such as reduction of extreme poverty (MDG 
1.a), gender equality in primary education (MDG 3.a), 
access to safe drinking water (MDG 7.c), and improved lives 
for at least 100 million slum dwellers (MDG 7.d) have been 
reached. The proportion of people whose income is less 
than $1.25 a day fell from 43.1 percent in 1990 to below 
20.6 percent in 2010, leaving 1.2 billion people in extreme 
poverty. Gender equality in primary school enrollments 
was also achieved in 2010. Similarly, the goal of halving the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water has already been reached.
At the same time, progress on the remaining MDGs has 
been lagging, especially for education- and health-related 
MDGs. Global targets for infant, under-five, and maternal 
mortality (MDGs 4.a and 5.a), and to a lesser extent, access 
to basic sanitation (MDG 7.c) are significantly behind, and 
progress needs to be greatly accelerated if all of the goals 
are to be achieved by 2015. The goal for primary school 
completion should have been within sight by 2011, but 
only half the progress needed has been made. 
Regionally, progress toward the MDGs is more diverse, 
although most regions will likely miss health-related tar-
gets. In East Asia and the Pacific, the targets on extreme 
poverty, gender parity, and access to water and sanitation 
have been reached. The region is still lagging on the 
under-five, infant, and maternal mortality goals. 
In Europe and Central Asia, the goals on poverty and 
water are likely to be met. This region has managed to 
achieve only 63 percent of the progress needed to meet 
the primary completion rate goal, 84 percent of the child 
mortality target, and 72 percent of the maternal mortality 
goal. The region is farthest behind on meeting the target 
for access to basic sanitation. 
Latin America and the Caribbean have already 
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FIGURE 2   Starting position for each MDG by region, 1990   
FIGURE 1  Global progress toward achieving the MDGs   
Developing countries, percent of total required progress between 1990 and 2015, as achieved in 2010 or 2011. 
FIGURE 3  Global progress toward the MDGs achieved, by region
Source: WDI and GMR. 
Note: Weighted by population. PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
Note: Intermediate target calculated using a linear progression over 25 years, resulting in a needed progress of 4 percent per annum. Note that the 
corresponding target for 2010 would equal 80 percent, and for 2011 84 percent, to be on track to attain the MDG by 2015. Any value above those 
intermediate targets indicates that the world is ahead of the required pace to meet the MDG. A value of 100 percent means that the MDG has been met. 
PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: WDI and GMR.  
Note: The corresponding target for 2010, 80 percent, and for 2011, 84 percent. Any value above those corresponding targets indicates that the region 
seems on track to meeting the MDG using a simple linear approximation. A value larger than 100 percent means that more progress has been made 
than is necessary at the year reported. A zero value indicates deterioration. PPP = purchasing power parity.
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achieve only 63 percent of the progress needed to meet 
the primary completion rate goal, 84 percent of the child 
mortality target, and 72 percent of the maternal mortality 
goal. The region is farthest behind on meeting the target 
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seems on track to meeting the MDG using a simple linear approximation. A value larger than 100 percent means that more progress has been made 
than is necessary at the year reported. A zero value indicates deterioration. PPP = purchasing power parity.
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primary completion, and access to safe water. The region 
stagnated on the gender equality target but is very close 
to reaching it. Although the region has achieved more 
than 80 percent of the progress needed to reduce under-
five mortality by two-thirds, progress on maternal mor-
tality has been significantly slower than elsewhere, with 
the region moving only 57 percent of the distance 
needed to meet the goal. 
The Middle East and North Africa region has also 
reached the targets on poverty and access to improved 
sanitation facilities. The region is making progress toward 
achieving universal primary education, gender equality, 
and child mortality. However more effort is needed to 
ensure access to safe drinking water. 
South Asia has reached the target on access to safe 
water and has already achieved nearly 85 percent of the 
24 25
goal to close the gender disparity gap in primary and sec-
ondary education. The region has also made progress on 
primary completion and child mortality rates. Progress on 
poverty reduction and access to basic sanitation has been 
slower, however. Faster progress is required to reduce child 
and maternal mortality and improve access to sanitation 
facilities if the region is to reach these goals by 2015. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is lagging behind other regions 
and on most MDGs. However, this region had the furthest 
to go from the start. Currently, Sub-Saharan Africa has 
achieved more than 40 percent of the progress required 
to reach, by 2015, the targets for gender parity, child mor-
tality, maternal mortality, and access to safe water. 
Most countries need to pay particular attention to 
the health-related MDGs if they are to reach these goals 
by 2015.
Eradicate extreme poverty  
and hunger 
1
The proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day 
fell from 43.1 percent in 1990 to 20.6 percent in 2010, leav-
ing 1.2 billion people in extreme poverty. Although the 
food, fuel, and financial crises over the past five years have 
worsened the plight of vulnerable populations and 
slowed poverty reduction in some countries, global pov-
erty rates have continued to fall. Between 2005 and 2008, 
both the poverty rate and the number of people living in 
extreme poverty fell in all six developing-country regions, 
the first time that all regions had posted declines in 
poverty. Preliminary estimates for 2010 show that the 
extreme poverty rate fell further, reaching the global tar-
get of halving world poverty five years early, as close to 90 
million more people were lifted out of extreme poverty.
Further progress is not only possible but likely before 
the MDGs’ 2015 target date. Current economic forecasts 
suggest that gross domestic product (GDP) in developing 
economies will maintain a growth rate of 5.5–6.0 percent 
over the next three years. Economic growth will be fastest 
in East Asia and South Asia, regions that are home to more 
than half of the world’s poorest people. Growth will be 
slower in Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the 
world, but faster than in preceding years, quickening the 
pace of poverty reduction. According to these forecasts, 
the proportion of people living in extreme poverty will fall 
from 20.6 percent in 2010 to 15.5 percent by 2015, leaving 
slightly more than 1 billion people in extreme poverty. Of 
these, 42 percent will live in South Asia and 42 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
The pace of poverty reduction depends not just on 
the growth of GDP but also on its distribution. A common 
assumption is that growth is “distribution neutral”; that is, 
growth in average income results in similar changes in 
the incomes of everyone, rich or poor. Although that has 
been the general experience over the past 20 years, there 
are notable variations: income distribution has improved 
in some countries, such as Brazil, while worsening in oth-
ers, such as China. To accelerate progress toward the 
elimination of extreme poverty, development strategies 
should attempt to increase not only the mean rate of 
growth but also the share of income going to the poorest 
segment of the population. Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
average incomes are low and the average incomes of 
those below the poverty line are even lower, will face 
great difficulties in bringing its poorest people to an ade-
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FIGURE 4 Number of countries making progress toward the various MDGs 
Source: WDI and GMR team estimates.
Note: Progress is based on extrapolation of latest five-year annual growth rates for each country, except for MDG 5, which uses the last 
seven years. “Sufficient progress” indicates that an extrapolation of the last observed data point with the growth rate over the last 
observable five-year period shows that the MDG can be attained. “Insufficient progress” is defined as being able to meet the MDG between 
2016 and 2020. “Moderately off target” indicates that the MDG can be met between 2020 and 2030. “Seriously off target” indicates that the 
MDG will not even be met by 2030. “Insufficient data” points to the fact that not enough data points are available to estimate progress or 
that the MDG’s starting value is missing (except for MDG 2 and MDG 3). PPP = purchasing power parity.
* In the poverty target, 11 out of the 66 countries that have met the target have less than 2% of people living below $1.25 a day. 
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FIGURE 1b  The decreasing gap in the urban and  
rural poverty headcount by region
FIGURE 1c  Average daily income of the poor by 
region, 2008
FIGURE 1e  Undernourishment prevalence by 
region, 1991–2011
FIGURE 1d  Malnutrition prevalence (weight for 
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The distribution of the poor is notable in the differ-
ences between poverty rates in rural and urban areas. As 
global poverty declined, so did the differential between 
urban and rural poverty. East Asia and the Pacific nar-
rowed the gap by almost half by 2008. In other regions, 
such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Carib-
bean, and South Asia, there was less progress in closing 
this gap. 
Hunger and malnutrition are measured by two differ-
ent MDG indicators. Undernourishment reflects a short-
age of food energy to sustain normal daily activities and is 
affected both by changes in the average amount of food 
available and by its distribution. Undernourishment 
declined steadily in most regions from 1991 to 2005, but 
further improvements have stalled since, leaving 13 per-
cent of the world’s population, almost 900 million people, 
without adequate daily food intake. 
Malnutrition, measured in children by comparing their 
weight with other children of similar age, reflects a short-
fall in food energy, poor feeding practices by mothers, and 
a lack of essential nutrients in their diets. Malnutrition in 
children often begins at birth, when poorly nourished 
mothers give birth to underweight babies. Malnourished 
children develop more slowly, enter school later, and per-
form less well. Based on available data, malnutrition rates 
in developing countries have dropped substantially, from 
28 percent of children under age five in 1990 to 17 percent 
in 2011. Every developing region except Sub-Saharan 
Africa is on track to cut child malnutrition rates in half by 
2015. However, data collection on malnutrition using sur-
veys that directly measure children’s weight and height is 
costly, and many countries lack sufficient information to 
calculate time trends.
FIGURE 1a   Poverty rates (living on $1.25 per day)  
by region 
Source: World Bank Povcalnet.  
Note: Regional poverty rates are measured at US$1.25 a day 
(2005 purchasing power parity), with forecasts to 2015. Surveys 
cover less than half of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa  
in 1990; of South Asia in 1999; and Europe and Central Asia  
in both 2002 and 2008.
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FIGURE 1b  The decreasing gap in the urban and  
rural poverty headcount by region
FIGURE 1c  Average daily income of the poor by 
region, 2008
FIGURE 1e  Undernourishment prevalence by 
region, 1991–2011
FIGURE 1d  Malnutrition prevalence (weight for 
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Achieve universal  
primary education 
2
The commitment to provide primary education to every 
child is the oldest of the MDGs, having been set in 1990 at 
the first Education for All conference, in Jomtien, Thailand. 
Achieving this goal has often seemed tantalizingly near, 
but it has been reached only in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, although Europe and Central Asia is close. (This 
goal had been reached at the outset by East Asia and the 
Pacific; then there was some backtracking, but the region 
is now close to reaching the goal again.) Progress among 
the poorest countries, slow in the 1990s, has accelerated 
since 2000, particularly in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but full enrollment remains elusive. Many children 
start school but drop out before completing the primary 
stage, discouraged by cost, distance, physical danger, and 
failure to progress. Even as countries approach the MDG 
target, the education demands of modern economies 
are expanding. In the 21st century, more than ever before, 
primary education is a critical stepping stone in building 
the human skills necessary for continued growth and 
prosperity. 
In most developing regions, school enrollment rates 
picked up after the MDGs were promulgated in 2000, 
when the completion rate was 80 percent. By 2009, that 
rate had climbed to nearly 90 percent but has stalled since. 
FIGURE 2a  Progress toward achieving complete 
primary education by region
FIGURE 2b  More girls than boys remain out of  
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Completion rates in the Middle East and North Africa have 
stayed at 90 percent since 2008. Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, which started out farthest behind, have made 
substantial progress in absolute terms: South Asia has 
reached 88 percent but progress has been slow, while 
Sub-Saharan Africa lags far behind, at 70 percent. Even if 
schools in these regions were to begin now to enroll every 
eligible child in the first grade, those children would not 
be able to achieve a full course of primary education by 
2015. But they would at least be on their way. 
Many children enroll in primary school but attend 
intermittently or drop out entirely. This is particularly true 
for girls. Almost all school systems with low enrollment 
rates show underenrollment of girls in primary school. 
In rural areas, the work of children of both sexes may be 
needed during planting and harvest. Other obstacles, 
including school fees, lack of suitable facilities, and 
absence of teachers, discourage parents from sending 
their children to school. The problem is worst in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 48 million 
children of primary school age are not in school.
Urban and rural primary completion rates are very 
similar in many countries around the world. The quality of 
primary education, however, differs more substantially, as 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics and World Development Indicators database. 
Note: Dotted lines show path to goal.
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics and World Development 
Indicators database.
Note: Progress assessment in East Asia and Pacific does not include 
China, which is believed to have completion rates close to 100 percent. 




evidenced by the notable differences in the percentage 
of pupils reaching competency levels in reading in urban 
versus rural areas. 
In Ghana, for example, enrollment in basic education 
nearly doubled by 2011, to 7 million pupils, and govern-
ment expenditures on basic education more than tripled 
in real terms. More children are accessing basic educa-
tion, graduating from junior high school, and enrolling 
in senior high school than at any time in Ghana’s history. 
Despite these achievements in access to basic edu-
cation, inequity remains a persistent feature of Ghana’s 
education service delivery and its most critical challenge. 
The primary net enrollment ratio has remained close to 
80 percent over the past five years, meaning that nearly 
1 million primary school-age children are not in school. 
These students are disproportionately from poor house-
holds and rural or marginalized areas or language groups 
(including the three northern regions) or are living in fos-
ter situations. Instead of compensating for deprivation, 
public expenditures appear to exacerbate the inequal-
ity by allocating fewer resources per child to the regions 
with the majority of deprived districts. Such a system 
perpetuates poverty and inequality. 
This picture of inequity is mirrored in data on Gha-
naian children’s primary learning outcomes, primary 
completion rates, and access to senior high school. Nota-
bly, although the Ministry of Education has introduced 
several equity-improving initiatives, challenges with pro-
gram design, targeting, and implementation have not 
been overcome, and the initiatives disproportionately 
benefit individuals from wealthier populations. Hence, 
Ghana’s scores in the Trends in International Mathemat-
ics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2003 were lower than any 
other African country evaluated, including Botswana, the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Tuni-
sia. Ghana’s scores on the TIMSS 2007 were better but 
still among the lowest among African countries whose 
students took the tests. 
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FIGURE 2c  Urban and rural primary completion 
rates are not very different worldwide
FIGURE 2d   Reading competency levels (4-8) in 
urban and rural areas, 2007
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys; World Bank 2012; and 
staff calculations.
Achieve universal  
primary education 
2
The commitment to provide primary education to every 
child is the oldest of the MDGs, having been set in 1990 at 
the first Education for All conference, in Jomtien, Thailand. 
Achieving this goal has often seemed tantalizingly near, 
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FIGURE 2a  Progress toward achieving complete 
primary education by region
FIGURE 2b  More girls than boys remain out of  
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Completion rates in the Middle East and North Africa have 
stayed at 90 percent since 2008. Sub-Saharan Africa and 
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absence of teachers, discourage parents from sending 
their children to school. The problem is worst in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 48 million 
children of primary school age are not in school.
Urban and rural primary completion rates are very 
similar in many countries around the world. The quality of 
primary education, however, differs more substantially, as 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics and World Development Indicators database. 
Note: Dotted lines show path to goal.
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics and World Development 
Indicators database.
Note: Progress assessment in East Asia and Pacific does not include 
China, which is believed to have completion rates close to 100 percent. 
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Women make important contributions to economic and 
social development. Expanding opportunities for them in 
the public and private sectors is a core development strat-
egy. Education is the starting point. By enrolling and stay-
ing in school, girls gain the skills they need to enter the 
labor market, care for families, and make decisions for 
themselves. Achieving gender equity in education is an 
important demonstration that young women are full, con-
tributing members of society. 
Girls have made substantial gains in primary and sec-
ondary school enrollment. In 1990, the primary school 
enrollment rate of girls in developing countries was only 
86 percent that of boys. By 2011, the average was 97 per-
cent.1 Similar improvements have been made in second-
ary schooling, where girls’ enrollments have risen from 78 
percent to 96 percent of that of boys. Progress has been 
greatest in richer countries. In countries classified by the 
World Bank as upper-middle-income, girls’ enrollments in 
primary and secondary schools now exceed those of 
FIGURE 3a  Gender parity in primary, secondary, and  
 tertiary education by region, 2011 FIGURE 3b  Gap in male-female enrollment ratios
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boys. But averages can obscure large differences between 
countries: overenrollment of girls in one country does not 
counterbalance underenrollment in another. At the end of 
the 2011 school year, 31 upper-middle-income countries 
and 23 lower-middle-income countries had reached or 
exceeded equal enrollment of girls in primary and second-
ary education, but only 9 low-income countries had done 
so. Two regions lag behind: South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The differences are also notable for urban-rural 
areas. For several African countries, the gap between male 
and female enrollment remains large, especially for sec-
ondary enrollment. Only a few countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have higher enrollment rates for girls (Niger, 
Rwanda, and Senegal in urban areas). However, most of 
the countries included in figure 3b show that boys have 
higher enrollment rates compared with girls.
More women are participating in public life at the 
highest levels. The proportion of parliamentary seats held 
by women continues to increase. The Latin America and 
Caribbean region, where women now hold 23 percent of 
all parliamentary seats, remains in the lead. The most 
impressive gains have been made in South Asia, where 
the number of seats held by women more than tripled 
between 1999 and 2010. In Nepal, women held one-third 
of parliamentary seats in 2011. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Rwanda leads the way: since 2008, 56 percent of its parlia-
mentary seats have been held by women. The Middle East 
and North Africa lag far behind.
Full economic empowerment of women remains a 
distant goal. While many women work long hours and 
make important contributions to their families’ welfare, 
they often work in the informal sector, typically as unpaid 
family workers. Women’s share in paid employment in the 
nonagricultural sector has risen marginally but remains 
less than 20 percent in South Asia and in the Middle East 
and North Africa. The largest proportion of working 
women is found in Europe and Central Asia, where in 
recent years, 47–48 percent of nonagricultural wage 
employees were women.Source:  UNESCO Institute of Statistics and World Development Indicators 
database. Source:  World Development Indicators database. 
MDG
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1.  The ratio between the enrollment rate of girls and boys (gender parity ratio) increased from 91 in 1999 to 97 in 2010 for the developing 
regions as a whole—falling within the plus-or-minus 3-point margin of 100 percent that is the accepted measure for parity.
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Caribbean region, where women now hold 23 percent of 
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of parliamentary seats in 2011. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Rwanda leads the way: since 2008, 56 percent of its parlia-
mentary seats have been held by women. The Middle East 
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Full economic empowerment of women remains a 
distant goal. While many women work long hours and 
make important contributions to their families’ welfare, 
they often work in the informal sector, typically as unpaid 
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and North Africa. The largest proportion of working 
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In most countries around the world, most children’s 
deaths occur in the first year. In developing countries, the 
under-five mortality rate fell from 87 per 1,000 live births in 
1990 to 51 in 2011. This progress is not sufficient to meet 
the health-related MDG target of a two-thirds reduction 
by 2015. Only 25 countries have achieved this target, and 
only an additional 26 have made enough progress to be 
able to meet the target by 2015. 
For the infant mortality rate, the numbers are worse: 
only 5 countries met the target of reducing the infant 
mortality rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015, and 
only 13 countries are making enough progress to reach it 
by 2015. More than 120 countries still have not made suffi-
cient progress to meet the goal on time. Overall, the MDG 
health indicators have seen the least progress of all the 
MDGs. 
As a country urbanizes, children in urban areas tend to 
have access to better health services and thus lower rates of 
child mortality than children in rural areas. In addition, as 
countries become more urbanized, the proportion of chil-
dren in rural areas declines, further narrowing the difference 
between the mortality rates of rural and urban children. 
Notably, the highest rates of child mortality are in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, whose countries are the least urbanized. 
The disparities between urban and rural infant mortal-
ity rates display a similar pattern. Higher infant mortality 
rates in rural areas are in part attributable to the disadvan-
tages faced by rural households, such as lack of access to a 
safe source of drinking water and electricity. As discussed 
in chapter 2 of the Global Monitoring Report (GMR), govern-
ments need to provide basic services in rural areas as well 
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FIGURE 4a Urban versus rural child mortality gap   
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
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Reduce child mortality
4
In most countries around the world, most children’s 
deaths occur in the first year. In developing countries, the 
under-five mortality rate fell from 87 per 1,000 live births in 
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ments need to provide basic services in rural areas as well 
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Reduce maternal mortality 
5
MDG 5 centers on improving maternal health, with a 
target of reducing the maternal mortality ratio by three-
quarters between 1990 and 2015. With only two years 
remaining before the target date, progress on maternal 
health is still lagging. Despite some notable exceptions 
such as Sri Lanka and Malaysia, the level of maternal mor-
tality remains high in much of the developing world. 
Although on the aggregate the rate of progress has dou-
bled across the globe from 2005 to 2010, it is unlikely that 
this MDG will be achieved by 2015. 
South Asia is the only region on track to reach the tar-
get for reducing maternal mortality, assuming the region 
continues at the same rate of progress made from 2005 
to 2010. The Middle East and North Africa might also be 
able to reach the MDG target if it doubles the effort it 
made from 2005 to 2010. The starting point in the level 
of maternal mortality obviously affects progress made in 
achieving the target but is not the only factor. Europe and 
Central Asia started with 70 maternal deaths per 100,000 
live births in 1990, while Sub-Saharan Africa started with 
850. However, if Sub-Saharan Africa doubles the progress 
made during 2005 to 2010, it will be able to reach its goal 
by 2016—just a year past the target, while Europe and 
Central Asia would need to more than double its effort to 
meet the goal in 2015. 
The starting point for the maternal mortality ratio in 
middle-income countries in 1990 was nearly half that of 
low-income countries (370 deaths per 100,000 live births 
compared to 810). However, neither group of countries is 
close to achieving the goal on time . Although they will 
miss the 2015 target date, middle-income countries could 
reach the maternal mortality goal by 2016 if they doubled 
their effort. The low-income group will need even longer 
Despite this bad news, there are some bright spots. 
Fragile states as a group started with a similar number 
of maternal deaths to Sub-Saharan Africa (780 deaths 
per 100,000 live births in 1990), but several of them 
have managed, or are on track, to achieve this particu-
lar MDG. Nepal reduced its maternal mortality rate from 
770 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 170 in 2010, 
earning it the MDG Millennium Award in 2010. Nepal has 
also made extraordinary progress in reducing its propor-
tion of poor people in recent years. Other fragile states 
such as Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea, Timor-Leste, and the 
Republic of Yemen are still on track to meet the MDG, 
some with acceleration, and others following their cur-
rent growth trend. 
The issue of teenage pregnancy still requires signifi-
cant attention, especially in rural areas, where the rate of 
teen pregnancy is higher than in urban areas.
FIGURE 5a  Expected year when maternal  
mortality goal will be met, by region
FIGURE 5c  The percentage of teenagers who had children or are currently pregnant is  
higher in rural areas than in urban ones
FIGURE 5b   Expected year when maternal mortality  
goal will be met, by  income level and  
by fragile and small states
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Source:  Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
Source: World Development Indicators database, 2013.
a. Developing countries only.
Source: World Development Indicators database, 2013.
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Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria,  
and other diseases 
6
Epidemic diseases exact a huge toll in human suffering 
and lost opportunities for development. Poverty, armed 
conflict, and natural disasters contribute to the spread of 
disease and are made worse by it. In Africa, the spread of 
HIV/AIDS has reversed decades of improvement in life 
expectancy and left millions of children orphaned. It is 
draining the supply of teachers and eroding the quality 
of education. Malaria takes a large toll on young children 
and weakens adults at great cost to their productivity. 
Tuberculosis caused the deaths of some 1 million peo-
ple in 2011, most of them aged 15–45, and sickened mil-
lions more. Tuberculosis is one of the principal causes of 
adult death from a single infectious agent in developing 
countries.
Some 34 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in 
2011, and 2.5 million people acquired the disease during 
the year. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the center of the 
epidemic, but the proportion of adults living with AIDS 
has begun to fall as the survival rate of those with access 
to antiretroviral drugs has increased. By the end of 2010, 
6.5 million people worldwide were receiving anti- 
retroviral drugs. That represented the largest one-year 
increase in coverage but fell far short of the target of 
universal access. In Africa, 58 percent of adults with HIV/
AIDS are women; among youth aged 15–24, the preva-
lence rate among women is more than twice that of 
men. The second highest prevalence rate is in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, where 0.5 percent of adults 
are infected.
The prevalence of HIV infection in urban and rural 
areas varies significantly from country to country. For 
most Sub-Saharan Africa countries, the rates of HIV 
infection are higher in urban areas than in rural ones. 
Because evidence from health surveys confirms that a 
prominent decline in prevalence is associated with 
higher education, increased condom use, and a reduced 
number of sexual partners, most of the effort to prevent 
HIV/AIDS should continue to be concentrated in urban 
areas. 
In 2011, 8.7 million people were newly diagnosed 
with tuberculosis, but its incidence, prevalence, and 
death rates are all falling. The global incidence rate 
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FIGURE 6c  Millions of people still afflicted  
with HIV/AIDS 
FIGURE 6d  Urban versus rural children under age 5 who  
sleep under insecticide-treated bed nets  
FIGURE 6b  Tuberculosis-infected population in 






























































































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Urban
Rural
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
Source:  UNICEF and World Development Indicators database.
FIGURE 6a  Population infected with HIV, ages 14-49 
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death rates are all falling. The global incidence rate 
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FIGURE 6c  Millions of people still afflicted  
with HIV/AIDS 
FIGURE 6d  Urban versus rural children under age 5 who  
sleep under insecticide-treated bed nets  
FIGURE 6b  Tuberculosis-infected population in 
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FIGURE 6a  Population infected with HIV, ages 14-49 
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peaked in 2002; the prevalence rate—the proportion of 
people living with the disease—began to fall in 1997. If 
these trends are sustained, the world could achieve the 
target of halting and reversing the spread of tuberculo-
sis by 2015. People living with HIV/AIDS, which reduces 
resistance to tuberculosis, are particularly vulnerable, as 
are refugees, displaced persons, and prisoners living in 
close quarters and unsanitary conditions. Well-managed 
medical intervention using appropriate drug therapy is 
the key to stopping the spread of tuberculosis.
There are 300 million–500 million cases of malaria 
each year, leading to more than 1 million deaths. 
Encouraging progress against the disease is being 
made. In 2011, Armenia was added to the list of coun-
tries certified free of the disease. Malaria, a disease of 
poverty, occurs in all regions, but Sub-Saharan Africa, 
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most abundant, is the epicenter. Prevention and control 
measures, such as the use of insecticide-treated mos-
quito bed nets, have proven effective and their use is 
spreading. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the use of treated nets 
is  estimated to have grown from 2 percent in 2000 to 39 
percent in 2010. Better testing and the use of combina-
tion therapies with artemisinin-based drugs are improv-
ing the treatment of at-risk populations. But malaria is a 
difficult disease to control. Emerging resistance to arte-
misinins and to the pyrethroid insecticides used to treat 
mosquito nets has been detected.
The differences in the rate of use of treated mosquito 
nets between rural and urban areas are minor. The cost 
of distributing nets is lower in urban areas thanks to 
agglomeration effects, likely contributing to the typically 
higher usage there.
FIGURE 6e  Children under age 5 who use insecticide-treated bed nets
FIGURE 7a   Access to water by region, 1990 and 2010
Sources: UNICEF and World Development Indicators database.




As part of the MDGs, most countries have agreed on the 
principles of sustainable development, and there is interna-
tional consensus to protect the environment. To this end, 
MDG 7 includes a target of halving the proportion of the 
population without access to improved sanitation and 
water sources by 2015. For many people in developing 
countries, however, access to safe water and sanitation 
remains a problem. 
Fifty-six countries have still not made enough progress 
to reach the target of improved water sources on time; 
moreover, 20 countries do not have enough data to mea-
sure their progress on this target. Sub-Saharan Africa is lag-
ging the most, although it has improved access to clean 
water in rural areas from 35 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 
2010; access in urban areas has not changed and remains at 
83 percent. East Asia and Pacific made impressive improve-
ments in rural areas, from a starting position of only 58 per-
cent in 1990 to 84 percent in 2010; in urban areas access was 
nearing 100 percent. In general, the other regions have 
already managed to reach access rates of more than 80 per-
cent in urban and rural areas. 
Poor sanitation causes millions of people worldwide 
to contract illnesses. Around 1.7 million people die each 
year because of unsafe water and sanitation, and 90 per-
cent of those are children under age five. Almost 
all sanitation-related deaths occur in the rural areas of 
developing countries, where sanitation problems are 
more severe (and access to adequate health care is less 
available). Some regions have made more progress than 
others, but even though most regions have improved 
access to sanitation by more than 20 percentage points, 
dif ferences between urban and rural areas are 
considerable.
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are the only regions 
where progress has not been significant, with an increase in 
access of only 17 percentage points in South Asia and 4 per-
centage points in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2010. 
These regions also had the worst starting positions. 
The increase in access to improved sanitation has not 
been impressive in urban areas either. The biggest advance 
came in the East Asia and Pacific region, where access 
increased about 22 percent during 1990–2010.
Although the gap between urban and rural access to 
sanitation is still wide, it has decreased in all regions. 
Between 1990 and 2010, for example, the gap narrowed 
from 42 percent to 25 percent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and from 44 percent to 31 percent in South Asia. 
Most striking, in Europe and Central Asia, the gap narrowed 
from 20 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 2010, suggesting 
that even though progress is slow, it does reach under-
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FIGURE 7c Urban-rural gap in access to sanitation by region
FIGURE 7b  Access to sanitation by region, 1990 and 2010
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8MDG
Develop a global partnership  
for development 
The use of information and communication technology 
(ICT) for economic development is part of the MDG 8 
indicator, which focuses on the deepening of a global 
partnership for development. A specific description of 
this specific target was chosen and indicators identi-
fied. Target 8.F states that, in cooperation with the pri-
vate sector, the benefits of new technologies, especially 
those related to information and communications, will 
be made available. The indicators measuring this prog-
ress are the number of fixed telephone lines, cellular sub-
scribers, and Internet users.
These indicators show that mobile phone subscrip-
tions have risen impressively across the world, while 
the growth in the number of fixed telephone lines has 
stagnated. Remarkable increases have also taken place in 
Internet usage, although here progress is more diverse, 
with stronger growth in high-income countries than in 
low- and middle-income countries. Even though access 
challenges remain, particularly in low-income countries, 
the spectacular rise in mobile phone penetration has led 
to the emergence of a variety of innovations that allow 
citizens, governments, and international organizations to 
be more engaged and better informed, and that enable 
aid providers to identify and communicate more directly 
with beneficiaries. 
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Improving the measurement of 
development goals
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide a 
yardstick against which to measure development 
outcomes. They have also stimulated demand for better 
statistics and new programs to increase the capacity of 
developing countries to produce and use statistics. The 
United Nations and its specialized agencies, including the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment responded to these demands by creating new part-
nerships and mobilizing additional resources to provide 
support for statistics in developing countries. The result 
has been a marked improvement in the quality and avail-
ability of statistics on core development outcomes: poverty 
and income distribution, school enrollments, mortality and 
morbidity rates, and environmental conditions. 
The MDGs posed three challenges: the selection of 
appropriate targets and indicators with which to monitor 
them; the construction of an international database to 
use for global monitoring; and the need for significant 
improvements in the quality, frequency, and availability 
of the relevant statistics, especially at the national level. 
The selection of goals and targets was determined by 
the Millennium Declaration adopted unanimously by the 
member states of the United Nations. Building the data-
base and strengthening the statistic systems of develop-
ing countries has required the efforts of many partners 
over many years. When countries produce statistics to 
monitor their own development programs, differences 
in definition and methodology often limit comparability 
across countries. Whether monitored at the national, 
regional, or global level, international monitoring of the 
MDGs requires indicators that are comparable across 
countries and over time. 
To produce harmonized statistics suitable for interna-
tional comparisons, agencies often revise national data 
or recompile data using different reference periods or 
standards, such as the “dollar a day” poverty indicator. 
They may also impute values for missing data or use sta-
tistical models to combine multiple estimates. Inter-
agency efforts such as these have been very important 
for filling the gaps in child and maternal mortality series. 
However, they inevitably result in data series that differ 
from nationally reported data and international assess-
ments of country progress that differ from those pro-
duced by the countries. 
When the MDGs were adopted, few developing 
countries had the capacity or resources to produce sta-
tistics of the requisite quality or frequency. Many coun-
tries had not conducted a recent census or a household 
survey capable of producing information on income, 
consumption, or health status. Values for many indicators 
disseminated by international agencies were based on 
unverified reports from national authorities. Statistical 
activities sponsored by bilateral donors and multilateral 
agencies often focused narrowly on securing data of 
interest to them but doing little to increase the capacity 
of the national statistical system to serve the needs of 
local decision makers or citizens.
The early efforts to monitor the MDGs revealed large 
gaps in both the international database and in many 
national databases. In 2003–04, the Partnership in Statis-
tics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21) con-
ducted six case studies of developing-country statistical 
systems. The studies found that the countries generally 
had very limited capacity to manage their own statistical 
programs.
Although the developing world has made some 
headway in improving its data collection and reporting, 
the systems are characterized by underfunding, reliance 
on donor support, particularly for household surveys, 
and very weak administrative data systems. The basic 
demographic information needed to underpin key indi-
cators is out of date in some countries, and funding for 
major activities, such as population censuses, is particu-
larly difficult to secure. Overall, there continues to be a 
shortfall in funding for core statistical systems required 
to provide information both for economic management 
and for monitoring the MDGs. 
The proportion of countries with two or more data 
points (the bare minimum needed for assessing trends) 
for selected MDG indicators in 2005 and 2013 is shown in 
table 1. For some indicators, the improvement has been 
much more dramatic. But for other less prominent indica-
tors, progress has been slower. 
Despite the progress made in the past decade, 
national systems face immense difficulties on many fronts 
including funding, sectoral shortcomings, and poor data 
access, and the development of skills needed to use statis-
tics effectively in planning and management. In 2011, the 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness meeting in Busan, 
Republic of Korea, endorsed a new action plan for statis-
tics. Several statistical domains have been identified as 
priorities for international action because of large deficits 
TABLE 1 Proportion of countries with two or more observations
 2005 database 2013 database  
Selected MDG indicators with two or more Number of Number of Population Population Number of Number of Population Population 
observations in period show countries countries covered (%) covered (%) countries countries covered (%) covered (%)  
 1990–2000 2001–12 1990–2000 2001–12 1990–2000 2001–12 1990–2000 2001–12
MDG 1.a Extreme poverty (% of population below  63   —     40.9    —     67   75   65.7   85.8 
   $1.25 a day, 2005 PPP )   
MDG 1.c Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age  77   —     88.9    —     77   72   83.6   61.5 
   (% of children under age 5)  
MDG 2.a Primary completion rate (% of relevant  111   83   88.5   54.6   110   123   86.1   70.9 
   age group)   
MDG 3.a Ratio of girls to boys in primary and  105   62   86.3   17.7   116   126   89.5   95.5 
   secondary education (%)
MDG 4.a Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)  135   2   99.0   0.3   141   141   99.9   99.9 
MDG 4.a Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000)  135   1   99.0   0.2   141   141   99.9   99.9 
MDG 5.b Births attended by skilled health staff  86   1   63.4   4.2   108   119   90.6   94.8 
   (% of total)   
MDG 6.c Immunization, measles (% of children,   134   135   99.5   99.6   137   139   99.7   99.7 
   ages 12–23 months)  
MDG 7.c Improved sanitation facilities (% of  —     —     —      —     136   138   99.6   99.8  
   population with access)  
MDG 7.c Improved water source (% of population  —    —      —     —     138   137   99.8   99.6 
   with access)     
Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: — = not available; PPP = purchasing power parity.
in data quality and availability. The high-priority domains 
include agricultural statistics, poverty statistics and house-
hold surveys, gender statistics, labor force statistics, envi-
ronmental accounting and the system of national 
accounts, and vital registration systems. The Busan Action 
Plan for Statistics provides an agreed framework for 
addressing capacity limitations in developing countries 
and work is already under way in some domains. 
Resources are limited, however, and even with greater 
resources, capacity building is a slow, deliberate process. 
The MDGs have contributed to the development of a sta-
tistical infrastructure that is increasingly capable of pro-
ducing reliable statistics on a variety of topics. 
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Macroeconomic, Trade, 
and Aid Developments in 
Developing Countries
Despite sustained economic growth, 
progress in rebuilding policy buffers in low-
income countries has been modest. There are 
large differences across countries, however. 
Still-high international commodity prices are 
providing commodity exporters with rela-
tively larger buffers than commodity-import-
ing countries. The downside risk of a pro-
tracted global growth slowdown extending 
through 2015 would have a significantly neg-
ative impact on growth in low-income coun-
tries. With policy buffers not yet restored to 
levels preceding the 2009 crisis and against 
the backdrop of reduced traditional sources 
of financing, most low-income countries 
would likely need to undertake adjustments 
in the face of such a shock.
This year’s Global Monitoring Report 
(GMR) focuses on agglomeration as an 
important driver of development. As fac-
tors of production agglomerate, they become 
more productive because it becomes easier 
to exploit economies of scale and scope. 
These economic aspects of agglomeration 
are most often looked at from a microeco-
nomic perspective, but broad-based changes 
in where people work and live also have pro-
found macroeconomic consequences. Using a 
World Bank agglomeration index, evidence 
Growth and macroeconomic 
adjustment in developing 
countries
The global economy is expected to recover, 
but only very gradually. While the road to 
recovery in advanced economies will remain 
bumpy, downside risks to the outlook have 
eased as policy intentions in advanced econo-
mies have become clearer and commodity 
price volatility has abated. Although impor-
tant downside risks remain—including 
adjustment fatigue in advanced economies 
and overinvestment and high asset prices in 
emerging market and developing countries—
overall risks are now more symmetric. In 
emerging market and developing countries, 
economic activity is picking up. A broadly 
appropriate current policy stance in emerging 
market and developing countries is support-
ing continued strong growth in these coun-
tries, but some tightening of the policy stance 
appears appropriate over the medium term, 
beginning with monetary policy and pru-
dential measures. Commodity prices trended 
down through most of 2012 and are expected 
to remain stable in 2013, providing room for 
a flexible implementation of monetary policy, 
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eased as policy intentions in advanced econo-
mies have become clearer and commodity 
price volatility has abated. Although impor-
tant downside risks remain—including 
adjustment fatigue in advanced economies 
and overinvestment and high asset prices in 
emerging market and developing countries—
overall risks are now more symmetric. In 
emerging market and developing countries, 
economic activity is picking up. A broadly 
appropriate current policy stance in emerging 
market and developing countries is support-
ing continued strong growth in these coun-
tries, but some tightening of the policy stance 
appears appropriate over the medium term, 
beginning with monetary policy and pru-
dential measures. Commodity prices trended 
down through most of 2012 and are expected 
to remain stable in 2013, providing room for 
a flexible implementation of monetary policy, 
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is presented below suggesting that there are 
relatively higher returns to agglomeration 
on the lower rungs of development. Recent 
research at the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) suggests that greater economic diver-
sification is associated with improved mac-
roeconomic performance. Another strand of 
research, which has benchmarked structural 
transformation in Africa with that of Asia’s, 
provides some optimism with regard to Afri-
ca’s economic prospects. 
Growth should rebound by 2014, 
but risks remain
Global economic growth continued to slow 
in 2012 to 3.2 percent, from 4.0 percent in 
2011 (table 1.1). Growth slowed in advanced 
economies as well as in emerging market and 
developing countries, but the former group 
of countries grew significantly less than the 
latter group (1.2 percent and 5.1 percent 
respectively). The growth slowdown in 2012 
was more pronounced than foreseen in GMR 
2012. Importantly, however, the two coun-
try groupings most challenged in meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—
low-income countries and fragile states—
both grew broadly as expected (5.5 and 5.8 
percent, respectively).1 The low and falling 
growth in the global economy was accompa-
nied by low consumer price inflation in most 
countries. 
There were large regional differences in 
growth performance across emerging mar-
ket and developing countries in 2012. The 
recession in the euro area weighed heavily on 
central and eastern European countries. With 
Poland and Turkey tightening policies and 
several southeastern European countries fall-
ing back into recession, growth in this region 
fell to just 1.6 percent. As in previous years, 
growth in emerging market and developing 
countries was led by those in Asia (6.6 per-
cent). Growth in the Middle East and North 
Africa countries recovered to 4.8 percent 
(from 4.0 percent in 2011), as these countries 
progressed in their political and social tran-
sitions, in particular in Libya, where gross 
domestic product (GDP) more than doubled 
after the economic collapse the year before. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, robust growth contin-
ued in 2012, but the average growth rate of 
4.8 percent masks large cross-country differ-
ences. Whereas conflicts negatively affected 
growth in Guinea-Bissau and Mali, growth 
in Côte d’Ivoire rebounded following elec-
tion-related disturbances in 2011. Despite the 
weaker overall economic outcome, per capita 
incomes rose in most countries (figure 1.1). 
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook proj-
ects 3.3 percent global growth in 2013. The 
expected growth is subdued as the underly-
ing fragilities that caused the slowdown in 
2012 take time to unwind. The ongoing fiscal 
consolidation and financial sector deleverag-
ing will continue to weigh on the euro area, 
and its economy is projected to contract for a 
second year in a row. Other advanced econo-
mies are projected to expand, but growth 
will be held back by headwinds that include 
subdued external demand in, and financial 
spillover effects from, the euro area, and fis-
cal consolidation (for example, in the United 
States). Overall, advanced economies are pro-
jected to grow 1.2 percent as in 2012.
In the emerging market and developing 
countries, prospects are for a strengthening 
of growth to 5.3 percent in 2013. Growth 
is being supported by appropriate policies 
for the most part, but held back by weak 
demand in advanced economies. Lower 
commodity prices will also lead to terms-
of-trade losses for commodity exporters, 
with knock-on effects on growth. Dimin-
ished policy space, policy uncertainty, and 
supply bottlenecks hamper growth in some 
countries (for example, India). As in 2012, 
the countries in central and eastern Europe 
and the Asian countries would be the slowest 
and fastest growing groups of countries (pro-
jected to grow by 2.2 and 7.1 percent respec-
tively). The countries in central and eastern 
Europe—with their deep trade and financial 
links to western Europe—will continue to 
be negatively affected by spillovers from the 
euro area, while the strong growth in Asia is 
predicated on continued expansion in China 
and a strong recovery in India. Growth in 
the Middle East and North Africa will be 
modest, reflecting ongoing political transi-
tions and a slowdown among the region’s 
oil exporters. Notwithstanding a somewhat 
weaker outlook for commodity prices, Sub-
Saharan African economies are expected to 
expand by 5.6 percent.
Strong domestic government revenue 
mobilization is key to emerging market and 
developing countries having the resources 
needed to address their development chal-
lenges, including enhancing infrastructure 
provision and achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In that regard, 
the 2009 global crisis was a major setback as 
the crisis led to a drop in revenues of 3 per-
centage points of GDP. Since then, revenues 
have recovered somewhat, but not fully, and 
are expected to remain below pre-crisis levels 
through 2015 (table 1.2).
Global current account imbalances—
which widened in the run-up to the crisis—
narrowed as the crisis hit and have since 
remained broadly stable (figure 1.2). Robust 
net financial flows to emerging market and 
developing countries have also remained 
fairly constant from 2009 onward, with pros-
pects of no major changes for 2013 (table 1.3). 
Emerging market countries receive on average 
about 8 percent of GDP in net financial flows, 
with most of these flows being private sector 
financial flows (including transfers). Relative 
to GDP, low-income countries receive net 
financial inflows that are about twice as high, 
averaging 14 percent of GDP in recent years. 
Relative to emerging market countries, low-
income countries receive more private capital 
flows and private transfers, but the main fac-
tor behind the higher inflows to low-income 
TABLE 1.1 Global output 
Annual % change
       Projections
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
World 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.3 4.0 4.4
Advanced economies 3.0 1.6 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.6
Emerging market and developing countries 7.6 6.4 5.1 5.3 5.7 6.0
Central and Eastern Europe 4.6 5.2 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.3
Commonwealth of Independent States 4.9 4.8 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.0
Developing Asia 9.9 8.1 6.6 7.1 7.3 7.6
Middle East and North Africa 5.5 4.0 4.8 3.1 3.7 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.4 5.3 4.8 5.6 6.1 5.9
Western Hemisphere 6.1 4.6 3.0 3.4 3.9 3.9
Low-income countriesa 6.4 5.7 5.5 6.0 6.2 6.6
Emerging market countriesb 7.7 6.4 5.0 5.2 5.7 5.9
Fragile statesc 5.0 3.6 5.8 6.4 6.8 7.3
Source: World Economic Outlook.
a. Low-income countries are those eligible for financial assistance under IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and Zimbabwe. 
b.  Emerging market countries are emerging market and developing countries that are not low-income countries.
c. A subset of emerging market and developing countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. 
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is presented below suggesting that there are 
relatively higher returns to agglomeration 
on the lower rungs of development. Recent 
research at the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) suggests that greater economic diver-
sification is associated with improved mac-
roeconomic performance. Another strand of 
research, which has benchmarked structural 
transformation in Africa with that of Asia’s, 
provides some optimism with regard to Afri-
ca’s economic prospects. 
Growth should rebound by 2014, 
but risks remain
Global economic growth continued to slow 
in 2012 to 3.2 percent, from 4.0 percent in 
2011 (table 1.1). Growth slowed in advanced 
economies as well as in emerging market and 
developing countries, but the former group 
of countries grew significantly less than the 
latter group (1.2 percent and 5.1 percent 
respectively). The growth slowdown in 2012 
was more pronounced than foreseen in GMR 
2012. Importantly, however, the two coun-
try groupings most challenged in meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—
low-income countries and fragile states—
both grew broadly as expected (5.5 and 5.8 
percent, respectively).1 The low and falling 
growth in the global economy was accompa-
nied by low consumer price inflation in most 
countries. 
There were large regional differences in 
growth performance across emerging mar-
ket and developing countries in 2012. The 
recession in the euro area weighed heavily on 
central and eastern European countries. With 
Poland and Turkey tightening policies and 
several southeastern European countries fall-
ing back into recession, growth in this region 
fell to just 1.6 percent. As in previous years, 
growth in emerging market and developing 
countries was led by those in Asia (6.6 per-
cent). Growth in the Middle East and North 
Africa countries recovered to 4.8 percent 
(from 4.0 percent in 2011), as these countries 
progressed in their political and social tran-
sitions, in particular in Libya, where gross 
domestic product (GDP) more than doubled 
after the economic collapse the year before. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, robust growth contin-
ued in 2012, but the average growth rate of 
4.8 percent masks large cross-country differ-
ences. Whereas conflicts negatively affected 
growth in Guinea-Bissau and Mali, growth 
in Côte d’Ivoire rebounded following elec-
tion-related disturbances in 2011. Despite the 
weaker overall economic outcome, per capita 
incomes rose in most countries (figure 1.1). 
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook proj-
ects 3.3 percent global growth in 2013. The 
expected growth is subdued as the underly-
ing fragilities that caused the slowdown in 
2012 take time to unwind. The ongoing fiscal 
consolidation and financial sector deleverag-
ing will continue to weigh on the euro area, 
and its economy is projected to contract for a 
second year in a row. Other advanced econo-
mies are projected to expand, but growth 
will be held back by headwinds that include 
subdued external demand in, and financial 
spillover effects from, the euro area, and fis-
cal consolidation (for example, in the United 
States). Overall, advanced economies are pro-
jected to grow 1.2 percent as in 2012.
In the emerging market and developing 
countries, prospects are for a strengthening 
of growth to 5.3 percent in 2013. Growth 
is being supported by appropriate policies 
for the most part, but held back by weak 
demand in advanced economies. Lower 
commodity prices will also lead to terms-
of-trade losses for commodity exporters, 
with knock-on effects on growth. Dimin-
ished policy space, policy uncertainty, and 
supply bottlenecks hamper growth in some 
countries (for example, India). As in 2012, 
the countries in central and eastern Europe 
and the Asian countries would be the slowest 
and fastest growing groups of countries (pro-
jected to grow by 2.2 and 7.1 percent respec-
tively). The countries in central and eastern 
Europe—with their deep trade and financial 
links to western Europe—will continue to 
be negatively affected by spillovers from the 
euro area, while the strong growth in Asia is 
predicated on continued expansion in China 
and a strong recovery in India. Growth in 
the Middle East and North Africa will be 
modest, reflecting ongoing political transi-
tions and a slowdown among the region’s 
oil exporters. Notwithstanding a somewhat 
weaker outlook for commodity prices, Sub-
Saharan African economies are expected to 
expand by 5.6 percent.
Strong domestic government revenue 
mobilization is key to emerging market and 
developing countries having the resources 
needed to address their development chal-
lenges, including enhancing infrastructure 
provision and achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In that regard, 
the 2009 global crisis was a major setback as 
the crisis led to a drop in revenues of 3 per-
centage points of GDP. Since then, revenues 
have recovered somewhat, but not fully, and 
are expected to remain below pre-crisis levels 
through 2015 (table 1.2).
Global current account imbalances—
which widened in the run-up to the crisis—
narrowed as the crisis hit and have since 
remained broadly stable (figure 1.2). Robust 
net financial flows to emerging market and 
developing countries have also remained 
fairly constant from 2009 onward, with pros-
pects of no major changes for 2013 (table 1.3). 
Emerging market countries receive on average 
about 8 percent of GDP in net financial flows, 
with most of these flows being private sector 
financial flows (including transfers). Relative 
to GDP, low-income countries receive net 
financial inflows that are about twice as high, 
averaging 14 percent of GDP in recent years. 
Relative to emerging market countries, low-
income countries receive more private capital 
flows and private transfers, but the main fac-
tor behind the higher inflows to low-income 
TABLE 1.1 Global output 
Annual % change
       Projections
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
World 5.2 4.0 3.2 3.3 4.0 4.4
Advanced economies 3.0 1.6 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.6
Emerging market and developing countries 7.6 6.4 5.1 5.3 5.7 6.0
Central and Eastern Europe 4.6 5.2 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.3
Commonwealth of Independent States 4.9 4.8 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.0
Developing Asia 9.9 8.1 6.6 7.1 7.3 7.6
Middle East and North Africa 5.5 4.0 4.8 3.1 3.7 4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.4 5.3 4.8 5.6 6.1 5.9
Western Hemisphere 6.1 4.6 3.0 3.4 3.9 3.9
Low-income countriesa 6.4 5.7 5.5 6.0 6.2 6.6
Emerging market countriesb 7.7 6.4 5.0 5.2 5.7 5.9
Fragile statesc 5.0 3.6 5.8 6.4 6.8 7.3
Source: World Economic Outlook.
a. Low-income countries are those eligible for financial assistance under IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and Zimbabwe. 
b.  Emerging market countries are emerging market and developing countries that are not low-income countries.
c. A subset of emerging market and developing countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. 
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countries is the significantly higher level of 
official inflows (capital and transfers). Fragile 
states receive significantly higher net inflows 
(relative to their GDP). In 2012, fragile states 
received net inflows that averaged 16 percent 
of GDP and the prospects are for a similar 
level of inflows in 2013.
World trade was stagnant in 2012, reflect-
ing weak import demand in advanced econo-
mies and relatively stable international com-
modity prices. Trade in emerging market and 
developing countries expanded by 4 percent, 
down sharply from 25 percent the previous 
year (in nominal U.S. dollars). In contrast, 
advanced economies’ trade contracted by 2 
percent. The typical low-income country is 
highly integrated into the world economy 
with import and export shares of GDP of 
about 50 and 30 percent, respectively (figure 
1.3). The current account deficits (including 
foreign direct investments) in these coun-
tries remain higher than before the 2009 
crisis and little change is expected for 2013. 
Official reserves, in months of imports—a 
standard measure of reserve adequacy for an 
emerging market or low-income country—
changed little in 2012, reflecting modest 
increases in both imports and reserve accu-
mulation (figure 1.4). About a quarter of all 
emerging market and developing countries 
maintain reserves of less than three months 
imports.
Macroeconomic policies
In 2012, the continuing challenge for policy 
makers in most advanced economies was how 
concurrently to support a feeble recovery and 
address concerns about medium-term fiscal 
sustainability. With inflation expectations 
well-anchored, monetary policy continued 
to remain supportive, while firm expendi-
ture controls allowed room for a narrowing 
of fiscal deficits. Food and other commodity 
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: General government.
a. Low-income countries are those eligible for financial assistance under IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and Zimbabwe.  
b. A subset of low-income countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.
c. Emerging market countries are emerging and developing countries that are not low-income countries.
TABLE 1.2 Government revenue excluding grants 
Weighted averages, % of GDP
           Projections
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Emerging market and developing countries 29 26 27 28 28 28 27 27
Central and Eastern Europe 36 35 35 37 37 37 37 36
Commonwealth of Independent States 39 35 35 37 37 36 35 34
Developing Asia 20 20 20 21 22 21 21 22
Middle East and North Africa 43 33 34 38 38 37 37 35
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 23 24 28 27 26 26 25
Western Hemisphere 30 28 30 30 31 31 31 30
Low-income countriesa 24 19 21 23 23 23 22 22
 Of which: Fragile statesb 22 17 19 20 20 21 20 20
Emerging market countriesc 30 26 27 28 28 28 28 27
FIGURE 1.2 Global current account imbalances
Source: World Economic Outlook.
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TABLE 1.3 Net financial flows 
% of GDP a
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2013        
Projected
Emerging market countries 9.6 7.3 7.7 7.3 7.0 7.0
Private capital flows, net 6.0 1.4 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.6
Of which: private direct investment 5.1 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0
Private portfolio flows –1.2 –1.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Private current transfers 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.3
       
Official capital flows and transfers (net) 0.1 2.5 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.1
       
Memorandum item:       
Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –1.7 –2.8 –2.0 –1.2 –0.6 –1.0
       
Low-income countries 14.9 13.6 12.4 14.7 13.2 13.1
Private capital flows, net 4.7 2.7 3.4 4.0 2.3 2.4
Of which: private direct investment 6.6 5.2 5.9 6.7 5.7 5.4
Private portfolio flows –1.0 –1.2 –1.0 –0.7 –0.9 –0.9
Private current transfers 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.5
       
Official capital flows and transfers (net) 5.2 6.3 4.5 6.1 6.0 6.2
       
Memorandum item:       
Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –2.1 –1.9 –1.9 –1.9 –1.2 –1.2
       
Fragile statesb 16.3 13.0 9.9 19.0 15.9 16.6
Private capital flows, net 6.3 2.3 3.0 5.3 2.4 4.5
Of which: private direct investment 4.4 3.3 3.7 5.4 4.5 4.3
Private portfolio flows 0.1 –0.3 –0.1 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5
Private current transfers 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.9 5.3
       
Official capital flows and transfers (net) 4.4 4.9 1.4 8.1 7.6 6.8
       
Memorandum item:       
Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –1.6 –1.7 –1.8 –2.1 –0.3 –1.1
Source: World Economic Outlook.            
a. Equally weighted.            
b. A subset of emerging market and developing countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.   
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countries is the significantly higher level of 
official inflows (capital and transfers). Fragile 
states receive significantly higher net inflows 
(relative to their GDP). In 2012, fragile states 
received net inflows that averaged 16 percent 
of GDP and the prospects are for a similar 
level of inflows in 2013.
World trade was stagnant in 2012, reflect-
ing weak import demand in advanced econo-
mies and relatively stable international com-
modity prices. Trade in emerging market and 
developing countries expanded by 4 percent, 
down sharply from 25 percent the previous 
year (in nominal U.S. dollars). In contrast, 
advanced economies’ trade contracted by 2 
percent. The typical low-income country is 
highly integrated into the world economy 
with import and export shares of GDP of 
about 50 and 30 percent, respectively (figure 
1.3). The current account deficits (including 
foreign direct investments) in these coun-
tries remain higher than before the 2009 
crisis and little change is expected for 2013. 
Official reserves, in months of imports—a 
standard measure of reserve adequacy for an 
emerging market or low-income country—
changed little in 2012, reflecting modest 
increases in both imports and reserve accu-
mulation (figure 1.4). About a quarter of all 
emerging market and developing countries 
maintain reserves of less than three months 
imports.
Macroeconomic policies
In 2012, the continuing challenge for policy 
makers in most advanced economies was how 
concurrently to support a feeble recovery and 
address concerns about medium-term fiscal 
sustainability. With inflation expectations 
well-anchored, monetary policy continued 
to remain supportive, while firm expendi-
ture controls allowed room for a narrowing 
of fiscal deficits. Food and other commodity 
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: General government.
a. Low-income countries are those eligible for financial assistance under IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and Zimbabwe.  
b. A subset of low-income countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.
c. Emerging market countries are emerging and developing countries that are not low-income countries.
TABLE 1.2 Government revenue excluding grants 
Weighted averages, % of GDP
           Projections
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Emerging market and developing countries 29 26 27 28 28 28 27 27
Central and Eastern Europe 36 35 35 37 37 37 37 36
Commonwealth of Independent States 39 35 35 37 37 36 35 34
Developing Asia 20 20 20 21 22 21 21 22
Middle East and North Africa 43 33 34 38 38 37 37 35
Sub-Saharan Africa 28 23 24 28 27 26 26 25
Western Hemisphere 30 28 30 30 31 31 31 30
Low-income countriesa 24 19 21 23 23 23 22 22
 Of which: Fragile statesb 22 17 19 20 20 21 20 20
Emerging market countriesc 30 26 27 28 28 28 28 27
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TABLE 1.3 Net financial flows 
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  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Projected
Emerging market countries 9.6 7.3 7.7 7.3 7.0 7.0
Private capital flows, net 6.0 1.4 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.6
Of which: private direct investment 5.1 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0
Private portfolio flows –1.2 –1.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Private current transfers 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.3
       
Official capital flows and transfers (net) 0.1 2.5 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.1
       
Memorandum item:       
Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –1.7 –2.8 –2.0 –1.2 –0.6 –1.0
       
Low-income countries 14.9 13.6 12.4 14.7 13.2 13.1
Private capital flows, net 4.7 2.7 3.4 4.0 2.3 2.4
Of which: private direct investment 6.6 5.2 5.9 6.7 5.7 5.4
Private portfolio flows –1.0 –1.2 –1.0 –0.7 –0.9 –0.9
Private current transfers 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.5
       
Official capital flows and transfers (net) 5.2 6.3 4.5 6.1 6.0 6.2
       
Memorandum item:       
Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –2.1 –1.9 –1.9 –1.9 –1.2 –1.2
       
Fragile statesb 16.3 13.0 9.9 19.0 15.9 16.6
Private capital flows, net 6.3 2.3 3.0 5.3 2.4 4.5
Of which: private direct investment 4.4 3.3 3.7 5.4 4.5 4.3
Private portfolio flows 0.1 –0.3 –0.1 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5
Private current transfers 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.9 5.3
       
Official capital flows and transfers (net) 4.4 4.9 1.4 8.1 7.6 6.8
       
Memorandum item:       
Change in reserve assets (–, accumulation) –1.6 –1.7 –1.8 –2.1 –0.3 –1.1
Source: World Economic Outlook.            
a. Equally weighted.            
b. A subset of emerging market and developing countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.   
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prices in global markets rose sharply from 
late 2010 to late 2011, followed by some 
pull-back through most of 2012 (figures 1.5 
and 1.6). In emerging market and develop-
ing countries, commodity price movements 
impact consumer prices, terms of trade, and 
income to a larger extent than in advanced 
economies. For that reason, commodity price 
volatility complicates macroeconomic policy 
making in emerging market and developing 
countries.
Fiscal deficits in 2012 remained broadly 
stable in both emerging market and low-
income countries (figure 1.7). Thus, the trend 
toward reinforcing fiscal buffers has stalled. 
In the 2009 crisis, large buffers made pos-
sible an unprecedented countercyclical fiscal 
response on the order of about 3 percent-
age points of GDP, but three years after the 
crisis, less than half of this buffer has been 
reconstituted.
Slightly more than half of all emerging 
market countries continued to tighten mon-
etary policy in 2012 (figure 1.8). Among the 
countries that loosened monetary policy, the 
loosening took the form of reduced nominal 
short-term interest rates and depreciation of 
the currency in about equal measure. In low-
income countries, a significant majority of 
countries loosened monetary policy in 2012, 
in sharp contrast to 2011. In these countries, 
the monetary loosening mostly took the form 
of currency depreciation although the number 
of countries using the interest rate instrument 
increased significantly from 2011 to 2012. 
Against this background, growth in monetary 
aggregates relative to GDP in emerging mar-
ket countries broadly reverted to trends pre-
vailing before the 2009 crisis (figure 1.9).
The macroeconomic policy mix varied 
sharply across emerging market countries 
and low-income countries in 2012; the mix 
also changed appreciably from 2011 to 2012 
(figure 1.10). Among emerging market coun-
tries, twice as many countries (close to 40 
percent) loosened both monetary and fiscal 
policy than tightened both policies. Among 
low-income countries, more countries tight-
ened than loosened both type of policies. 
Emerging market countries shifted markedly 
toward relaxing fiscal policy in 2012, with 
an offsetting tightening of monetary policy. 
In low-income countries, the trend was in the 
opposite direction. 
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FIGURE 1.4 Official reserves
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: Bars represent the range between the 25th and 75th percentiles.
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FIGURE 1.5 Commodity price indexes
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: Indexes are in U.S. dollars.
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FIGURE 1.6 Changes in commodity prices and changes in GDP per capita, terms of trade, and inflation
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: Bars represent the range between the 25th and 75th percentiles.
a. Annual changes in percent; for 2007–08 and 2010–11, it is the average of annual changes in percent.
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prices in global markets rose sharply from 
late 2010 to late 2011, followed by some 
pull-back through most of 2012 (figures 1.5 
and 1.6). In emerging market and develop-
ing countries, commodity price movements 
impact consumer prices, terms of trade, and 
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assessed through annual surveys of IMF 
country desks.2 Over the years, significant 
progress has been made in several areas of 
economic policy. Low-income countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have registered relatively 
higher improvements. The number of coun-
tries with unsatisfactory policies has declined 
substantially since 2005 in most categories. 
However, the quality of policies differs con-
siderably across the different policy areas, 
with concerns typically focusing on fiscal 
issues (figure 1.11). In 2012, the share of 
countries rated positively on the composition 
of public spending—an important driver for 
the attainment of the MDGs—reversed some 
of the modest gains achieved since 2005. In 
fiscal transparency, a number of relatively 
strong-performing countries scored higher in 
2012 than they did in 2011, while the num-
ber of countries with unsatisfactory policies 
relating to governance in the public sector 
declined. Monetary policy and governance in 
monetary and financial institutions continue 
to remain relatively strong areas of macroeco-
nomic policies. The assessment of consistency 
of macroeconomic policies remains mixed. 
From 2011 to 2012, the number of countries 
with unsatisfactory policies increased slightly 
while the number of relatively strong-per-
forming countries fell. 
Managing macroeconomic risks in  
low-income countries 
Most low-income countries recovered quickly 
from the 2009 crisis and have experienced 
strong growth since early 2010.3 The con-
tinuing recovery was helped by deepening 
FIGURE 1.7 Fiscal deficit
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: General government balance (net lending/net borrowing) as defined in IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Manual 2001.



















Emerging market countries Low-income countries
Source: International Financial Statistics.
Note: The money gap is the difference between year-on-year growth rates of the money supply (M2) and nominal GDP. The sample includes emerging market 
economies that have data on both for the whole sample period shown.
FIGURE 1.8 Monetary policy loosening
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: Monetary policy loosening is based on Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) calculations. MCI is a linear combination of nominal short-term interest rates 
and the nominal effective exchange rate (with a one-third weight for the latter).
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FIGURE 1.9 Average year-on-year growth in money and the money gap in emerging market countries
Source: International Financial Statistics.
Note: Fiscal conditions are defined based on annual change in the government balance (net lending/net borrowing) as a percent of GDP in 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, and 2012. Monetary conditions are based on the change in the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI); changes are calculated Q4 over Q4. MCI is a 
linear combination of nominal short-term interest rates and the nominal effective exchange rate (with a one-third weight for the latter).
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links with emerging markets, which com-
plemented traditional export demand from 
advanced economies. In addition to the tradi-
tional trade channels, low-income countries 
have become linked to emerging markets 
though remittances and financial linkages 
(IMF 2011). 
Despite sustained economic growth, how-
ever, the recent progress in rebuilding policy 
buffers has been modest for most low-income 
countries and has been partially reversed 
in some others over the past two years. 
The situation varies widely across different 
country groups (figure 1.12). For example, 
commodity-exporting countries have relatively 
high external and fiscal buffers, while small 
countries seem to be in a somewhat worse 
position than the rest.4 Greater emphasis on 
rebuilding buffers would position low-income 
countries better to protect spending levels and 
growth in the event of future shocks. At the 
same time, the rebuilding of buffers has to be 
balanced with the need to maintain adequate 
space for development-enhancing expendi-
tures, particularly for infrastructure and other 
expenditures aimed at achieving the MDGs.
An analytical framework developed by 
the IMF that assesses low-income countries’ 
vulnerabilities to global risks was used to 
simulate the impact of a protracted growth 
downturn—a low probability event driven by 
a slowdown in potential growth in advanced 
and emerging markets (IMF 2012a). Under 
this scenario, global growth is assumed to be 
lower than the baseline projection by 0.5 per-
centage point in 2013, 1.7 percentage points 
in 2014, and 2.0 percentage points in 2015. 
The weaker global growth is assumed to lead 
to weaker demand for commodities, which 
would depress oil and non-oil commodity 
prices.
The protracted global growth slowdown 
scenario is estimated to have a large negative 
impact on growth in low-income countries, 
which would get progressively worse over 
time. The impact stems from below-trend 
demand for low-income-country exports, 
as well as a reduction in remittances and 
inflows of foreign direct investment to low-
income countries, particularly from emerging 
markets. The cumulative output loss in 
2013–15 in the median low-income coun-
try could reach 3.2 percentage points, with 
output losses ranging from 1.9 to 5.7 points 
across all low-income countries.5
Under such a scenario, and before tak-
ing account of potential policy responses, 
fiscal and external buffers in low-income 
countries would progressively weaken as 
the permanent output loss accumulates over 
time (figure 1.13). The cumulative widening 
in fiscal balances in 2013–15 in the median 
low-income country could increase by 1.9 
percentage points of GDP. This in turn could 
lead to significant public debt accumula-
tion, compared to the gradual improvement 
in debt ratios projected in the baseline over 
the same period. Also, the cumulative dete-
rioration in external balances would increase 
by 5.1 percentage points of GDP, resulting 
in sharp declines in reserve coverage across 
many low-income countries. Such imbalances 
could not be financed indefinitely. Additional 
cumulative financing needs could be as large 
as $26 billion by the end of 2014, and about 
$61 billion by the end of 2015. This comes 
against the backdrop of reduced access to 
traditional sources of financing, reflect-
ing budgetary pressures in donor countries. 
Therefore, most low-income countries would 
most likely need to undertake medium-term 
adjustment in the face of such a protracted 
shock to global growth, while at the same 
time the IMF would likely be called upon to 
provide additional financial assistance.
If the risk of a protracted global downturn 
materializes, the appropriate policy response 
would need to reflect the permanent nature 
of the shock and the existing magnitude of 
policy buffers:
•   The  magnitude  of  the  required  fiscal 
adjustment would depend on available 
fiscal space and debt sustainability. Frag-
ile low-income countries and those in 
Latin America and the Caribbean—espe-
cially small states that suffer from high 
debt and little, if any, fiscal space—may 
not have room for accommodative fiscal 
policy. Low-income countries in Asia and 
FIGURE 1.11 Quality of macroeconomic policies in low-income countries
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: IMF staff have assessed each low-income country according to a common set of criteria. Policies are assessed as unsatisfactory, adequate, and good for this purpose. For 
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the Pacific would have room for a small 
increase in deficits to accommodate the 




Countries with strong cyclical positions 
(high growth) but weaker macroeconomic 
positions would benefit from immediate 
adjustment. In contrast, a more gradual 
adjustment would be desirable in countries 
with a weak cyclical position (low growth), 
because rapid consolidation could depress 





sures. Strengthening tax administration 
and avoiding ad hoc tax reductions would 
help limit the burden of adjustment fall-
ing excessively on the expenditure side and 
protect high-priority expenditures (such as 
infrastructure and social sector spending). 
Making budgetary spending more growth 
friendly (by reallocating spending from 
untargeted subsidies to productive invest-
ments, for example) would improve the 
quality of adjustment and support domes-
tic demand.
Optimally, fiscal adjustment should also 
be complemented by adjustment in monetary 
and exchange rate policies and include some 
important structural measures. The major-
ity of low-income countries would have suf-
ficient policy space to reduce interest rates 
in response to a protracted global growth 
FIGURE 1.12 Selected macroeconomic indicators for low-income countries, 2007–13
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment.
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(projected) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(projected) 
Commodities exporters All low-income countries
Non-commodities exporters
Floating exchange rate All low-income countries
Fixed exchange rate
Net oil exporters All low-income countries
Net oil importers
Small economies All low-income countries
Low-income countries, excluding small economies
Net oil exporters All low-income countries
Net oil importers
Fixed exchange rate All low-income countries
Floating exchange rate
FIGURE 1.13  Low-income countries: Impact of a protracted slowdown in global growth
Source: World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment.
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slowdown, because weaker domestic demand 
and commodity prices would lead to modera-
tion in inflation. Some external adjustment 
could be also implemented, in particular in 
countries with overvalued exchange rates. In 
addition, some adjustment in private sector 
behavior would help to partially offset the 
impact of lower external demand by reducing 
imports consistent with the new weaker eco-
nomic growth path and lower relative prices. 
The implementation of structural reforms 
could include measures to deepen the finan-
cial sector and develop domestic debt mar-
kets, coupled with strengthening the super-
visory framework, as well as better-targeted 
investments in infrastructure to increase pro-
ductivity and living standards. 
Economic diversification and 
structural transformation
The theme of this year’s GMR is “Rural-
Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals.” Agglomeration is an impor-
tant driver of development: as factors of 
production agglomerate—that is, become geo-
graphically more concentrated—they become 
more productive because it becomes easier to 
exploit economies of scale and scope (Com-
mission on Growth and Development 2008). 
Network effects and other positive externali-
ties in turn also positively impact productivity 
and economic growth. While agglomeration 
can be immensely beneficial, there are con-
straints: increasing congestion costs can pro-
vide a powerful check on productivity gains. 
Agglomeration is part of a broader set 
of changes—including, for example, the 
demographic transition—that together con-
stitute the transformation of traditional 
low-productivity economies into modern high- 
productivity economies. This transformation 
also typically encompasses the structural 
shift to manufacturing and service activi-
ties from agriculture. This section includes 
three different takes on the agglomeration 
process through a macroeconomic prism. 
The first explores to what extent differences 
in the degree of agglomeration across coun-
tries can provide insights into differences in 
macro economic outcomes such as growth. 
The  latter two address economic diversifica-
tion in low-income countries and structural 
transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Macroeconomic performance and 
agglomeration
For World  Development  Report  2009: 
Reshaping  Economic Geography  (WDR 
2009), Bank staff developed an index that 
measures on a uniform basis country-specific 
levels of agglomeration.7 A recent update of 
the index provides a snapshot of the degree 
of agglomeration in 162 countries in 2010. 
The combined population of the countries 
for which data are available is 6.8 billion (98 
percent of the world’s population). The index 
ranges from a 7 percent urban population 
share in Papua New Guinea to a 100 percent 
urban population share in Singapore. The 
population-weighted average urban popula-
tion share is 54 percent.8
The distribution of the degree of agglom-
eration across countries is highly uneven, but 
less so than that of income because the share 
of population living in urban areas cannot 
exceed 100 percent whereas there is no upper 
limit to income levels (figure 1.14). As would 
be expected, there is a positive and statisti-
cally significant correlation between the 
degree of agglomeration and the level of per 
capita income. The Pearson and Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients between the two 
variables are 0.52 and 0.72 respectively (both 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level). 
This positive correlation should, of course, 
not be interpreted to mean that there is a 
causal link from agglomeration to income (or 
vice versa), but rather that a broader under-
lying development process impacts both 
agglomeration and income outcomes.
To further explore the interrelationship 
between countries’ level of agglomeration 
and level of income, countries are divided 
into low-, medium-, and high-agglomeration/
income countries using the methodology of 
Nielsen (2011 and forthcoming).9 Countries 
with an agglomeration share of 40 percent or 
lower (64 percent or higher) are designated 
as low-agglomeration (high-agglomeration) 
countries. Medium-agglomeration coun-
tries are those with an agglomeration share 
between 40 percent and 64 percent. Using 
the same method, countries with a per  capita 
income of $6,500 or lower ($27,000 or 
higher) are designated as low-income (high-
income) countries. Medium-income countries 
are those with a per capita income between 
$6,500 and $27,000 (map 1.1).
There is a large degree of overlap between 
the categorization of countries as low-, 
medium-, and high-agglomeration countries 
and the analytical country categorization of 
low-income, emerging market, and advanced 
economies (table 1.4).10 Most low-income 
countries are low-agglomeration countries 
and most advanced economies are high-
agglomeration economies. Among emerging 
market countries about half are medium-
agglomeration countries. The correlation 
between the two country classification sys-
tems is statistically significant.11 Per capita 
income increases with the level of agglom-
eration for both low-income and emerging 
market countries, but the relative increases 
are more pronounced for low-income coun-
tries. Among advanced economies, there is 
no “return” to agglomeration (the higher 
per capita income level of the small group 
of medium-agglomeration advanced econo-
mies is because most Nordic countries are 
included here). These findings suggest that 
the positive correlation between agglomera-
tion and development is more strongly felt in 
the poorer countries that are most challenged 
in attaining the MDGs. 
Looking at economic growth over the 
last 10 years through the prism of agglom-
eration, growth in medium-agglomeration 
countries has outpaced that of both low- and 
high-agglomeration countries (table 1.5). 
Given the large degree of overlap between 
countries categorized according to their level 
of agglomeration or development, this is not 
a surprising result (compare table 1.5 with 
table 1.1 and figure 1.1).
Of more interest, therefore, is a com-
parison of macroeconomic outcomes across 
levels of agglomeration within different 
geographical areas. For example, growth in 
low- and medium-agglomeration emerging 
market and developing countries in Europe 
and Asia has been higher than growth in 
FIGURE 1.14 Agglomeration and income distribution, 2010
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: The Lorenz-curves show the same colors as in Map 1.1.
a. Agglomeration shares are calculated from World Bank agglomeration index data.


































Low-agglomeration countries 44 13 0 57
Medium-agglomeration countries 20 42 9 71
High-agglomeration countries 9 28 23 60
Total 73 83 32 188
Population (in millions)     
Low-agglomeration countries 710 104 0 815
Medium-agglomeration countries 525 3,917 57 4,499
High-agglomeration countries 33 477 962 1,473
Total 1,268 4,499 1,019 6,787
     
GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)     
Low-agglomeration countries 1,083 6,020 0 1,954
Medium-agglomeration countries 1,415 6,957 43,516 10,263
High-agglomeration countries 4,491 15,258 39,409 23,171
Total 1,608 9,984 40,529 12,306
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Note: Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.
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impact of lower external demand by reducing 
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nomic growth path and lower relative prices. 
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cial sector and develop domestic debt mar-
kets, coupled with strengthening the super-
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income of $6,500 or lower ($27,000 or 
higher) are designated as low-income (high-
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high-agglomeration countries in Europe and 
Asia. For emerging market and developing 
countries in Africa and the Middle-East, the 
opposite result holds. In these regions, high-
growth countries were for the most part 
high-agglomeration countries. 
Turning to low-income countries, average 
annual per capita economic growth in 2003–
12 in high-agglomeration countries was 5.6 
percent annually, compared with 3.0 per-
cent and 2.8 percent respectively in low- and 
medium-agglomeration countries. The large 
differences in growth outcomes between 
high-agglomeration low-income countries, 
on the one hand, and low- and medium-
agglomeration low-income countries, on the 
other hand, are statistically significant (table 
1.6). In contrast, the difference in growth 
outcomes between low- and medium-agglom-
eration low-income countries (0.2 percent) is 
not statistically significant.
Agglomeration is an important aspect of 
development, but it is usually looked at from 
a microeconomic perspective. Looking at 
agglomeration differences across countries, 
however, can provide additional insights into 
macroeconomic performance. The evidence 
presented here suggests that there are high 
returns to agglomeration, particularly for 
countries on the lower rung of development. 
For countries on higher rungs, the relative 
benefits and costs of concentrating people 
and other economic factors of production in 
urban settings is less clear.
Economic diversification in  
low-income countries
Limited diversification in production is 
an underlying characteristic of many low-
income countries. As countries grow, their 
economies often become more diverse, but 
only up to a point: at higher income levels 
economies again become less diverse. Low 
levels of diversity in low-income economies 








World 3.0 3.5 2.4 3.0
Advanced economies n.a. 1.2 1.3 1.2
Emerging and developing countries 3.0 3.9 3.2 3.4
Central and Eastern Europe n.a. 3.8 3.0 3.7
Commonwealth of Independent States n.a. 6.5 6.5 6.5
Developing Asia 4.7 5.7 3.2 5.0
Middle East and North Africa 0.7 2.5 3.4 2.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 2.0 3.6 2.5
Western Hemisphere 1.5 3.1 2.3 2.6
Low-income countriesa 3.0 2.8 5.6 3.1
Of which: Fragile statesb 1.8 0.7 n.a. 1.7
Emerging market countriesc 3.2 4.5 3.0 3.8
Source: World Economic Outlook. 
Note: For 162 countries for which data on the agglomeration index are available.
n.a. = Not applicable.
a. Low-income countries are those eligible for financial assistance under IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and Zimbabwe. 
b. A subset of low-income countries included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.
c. Emerging market countries are emerging market and developing countries that are not low-income countries.
TABLE 1.6 Statistical tests for mean differences










Low/high-agglomeration countries S N n.a. N
Low/medium-agglomeration countries N N n.a. N
High/medium-agglomeration countries S S N S
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: n.a. = Not applicable.
S = statistically significant; N = not statistically significant.
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high-agglomeration countries in Europe and 
Asia. For emerging market and developing 
countries in Africa and the Middle-East, the 
opposite result holds. In these regions, high-
growth countries were for the most part 
high-agglomeration countries. 
Turning to low-income countries, average 
annual per capita economic growth in 2003–
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percent annually, compared with 3.0 per-
cent and 2.8 percent respectively in low- and 
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differences in growth outcomes between 
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agglomeration low-income countries, on the 
other hand, are statistically significant (table 
1.6). In contrast, the difference in growth 
outcomes between low- and medium-agglom-
eration low-income countries (0.2 percent) is 
not statistically significant.
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can reflect a broad range of market and gov-
ernment failures, and the result can be con-
centration in sectors with limited scope for 
productivity growth and quality upgrading, 
such as primary commodities. In turn, this 
can lead to less broad-based and sustain-
able growth, as well as increased exposure to 
adverse external shocks and macroeconomic 
instability.
A recent IMF Staff  Discussion  Note 
(Papageorgiou and Spatafora 2012) sheds 
more light on the role of diversification in the 
macroeconomic performance of low-income 
countries, examining diversification not 
just in trade but also in the broader domes-
tic economy. Using existing data, as well as 
a new IMF cross-country dataset covering 
output in 12 sectors and several new country 
case studies, this work reviews and extends 
the evidence pointing to diversification as a 
crucial aspect of the development process.
For an extended period, many low-income 
countries enjoyed little success in diversify-
ing exports and production. The situation 
broadly improved after the mid-1990s, with 
significant changes in both the type and qual-
ity of goods produced and exported. Regions 
and countries differed greatly, however, in 
the degree to which they succeeded in carry-
ing out this economic transformation. In 
particular, Sub-Saharan Africa is far less 
diversified and produces relatively lower-
quality goods than Asia.
Greater diversification is associated with 
improved macroeconomic performance, 
including both lower volatility and higher 
growth. “Diversification spurts,” that is, epi-
sodes of rapid, sustained diversification, are 
associated with a 17 percent average reduc-
tion in the volatility of output growth in 
emerging market and developing countries, 
and a 30 percent decrease in output volatility 
in low-income countries.
Analogously, diversification spurts are 
associated with sharp subsequent accelera-
tions in growth. This is especially true for 
nonfragile low-income countries (figure 1.15). 
More broadly, initial diversification is, on 
average, positively associated with subsequent 
growth, although there is much cross-country 
heterogeneity.
These findings raise a key policy ques-
tion: What factors can spur or, alternatively, 
impede diversification? Both policy and insti-
tutional factors can influence the transition 
to more diverse production structures and 
thereby affect the pace at which growth can 
be sustained. For instance, policy barriers 
and structural rigidities in labor and prod-
uct markets, or underdeveloped financial 
systems, may hamper the process of diversi-
fication. Likewise, insufficient or low-quality 
public infrastructure may retard the develop-
ment of those sectors that rely disproportion-
ately upon it; this factor may prove especially 
important in low-income countries, where a 
large portion of investment stems from the 
public sector. 
Case studies provide some tentative evi-
dence in support of findings. First, diversi-
fication and structural transformation are 
often underpinned by reforms and policy 
measures that are general in scope. Macro-
economic stabilization is a clear example. 
But even microeconomic measures are often 
broad-based, focusing on improving the 
quantity and quality of infrastructure or 
essential business services, or on setting up a 
welcoming environment for foreign investors. 
It remains an open issue to what extent 
industry-focused and narrowly targeted mea-
sures have historically helped underpin diver-
sification efforts.
Second, effective policy measures come 
in “waves” and aim at exploiting the evolv-
ing comparative advantages of the economy 
in changing external conditions. The types 
of reforms underpinning diversification and 
structural transformation in the early stages 
of development are different from those 
required at later stages. In general, reforms 
need to be adapted to the external environ-
ment faced by the economy.
Finally, the frequency with which new 
products are introduced and the rate at which 
they grow can point to potential policy-
driven bottlenecks. Little entry may indicate 
that barriers deter firms from exporting or 
experimenting. If survival rates are low, firms 
may face more obstacles than expected. If 
surviving firms cannot expand, they may 
have inadequate access to finance.
Structural transformation in  
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing an 
episode of high growth since the mid-1990s. 
Many of the countries of the region have ben-
efited from relatively high commodity prices. 
One key question is whether higher growth 
has been accompanied by structural transfor-
mation, defined as the pattern of change in 
economic activity across sectors—from the 
primary to secondary and tertiary sectors—
and across space—from rural to urban areas. 
The IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook: 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2012) analyzes one of 
the dimensions of structural transformation, 
namely, whether growth has been accompa-
nied by a shift of workers from low to high 
average productivity activities and sectors. 
Since on average more than half of the labor 
force is employed in agriculture in these econ-
omies, and agriculture accounts for about 
one-third of output, average labor produc-
tivity in the sector is very low. Thus, struc-
tural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
typically involves increasing the productiv-
ity of the agricultural sector, which frees up 
labor, allowing the shift of agricultural work-
ers to industry and services.
Using data from 1995 to 2010 on agricul-
tural output from the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, 
GDP by sector from the IMF, and employ-
ment by sector from household surveys, the 
analysis of average labor productivity and 
the shift of workers across sectors shows that 
most countries in the region have experienced 
some degree of structural transformation, 
although there has been significant variation 
in its speed and type. In particular, trans-
formation in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
slower than that experienced by several coun-
tries in Asia: many of the African countries 
have experienced relatively slow productivity 
growth in agriculture and a less pronounced 
shift from agriculture to services and, to an 
even lesser extent, to manufacturing.
Figure 1.16 compares a sample of Sub-
Saharan African countries (Cameroon, 
Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa, and Tan-
zania) with a group of low- and middle-
income Asian economies that have experi-
enced rapid structural transformation and 
started their growth takeoffs with similar or 
lower levels of GDP per capita than the aver-
age African country at the time. As can be 
seen, Ghana and Tanzania have experienced 
declines in agricultural output and employ-
ment shares over time, with Tanzania match-
ing the experience of the comparator Asian 
economies quite closely. Middle-income 
countries have experienced declining manu-
facturing ratios for the past two decades, 
consistent with the process in more advanced 
Asian countries, where services play an ever-
increasing role in the economy. Relatively few 
low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have been able to raise their manufacturing 
output and employment shares on a sus-
tained basis.
An alternative presentation of the data on 
employment shares shows broad increases in 
employment in sectors with higher produc-
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FIGURE 1.15 Diversification spurts and growth accelerations
Sources: COMTRADE, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates.
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can reflect a broad range of market and gov-
ernment failures, and the result can be con-
centration in sectors with limited scope for 
productivity growth and quality upgrading, 
such as primary commodities. In turn, this 
can lead to less broad-based and sustain-
able growth, as well as increased exposure to 
adverse external shocks and macroeconomic 
instability.
A recent IMF Staff  Discussion  Note 
(Papageorgiou and Spatafora 2012) sheds 
more light on the role of diversification in the 
macroeconomic performance of low-income 
countries, examining diversification not 
just in trade but also in the broader domes-
tic economy. Using existing data, as well as 
a new IMF cross-country dataset covering 
output in 12 sectors and several new country 
case studies, this work reviews and extends 
the evidence pointing to diversification as a 
crucial aspect of the development process.
For an extended period, many low-income 
countries enjoyed little success in diversify-
ing exports and production. The situation 
broadly improved after the mid-1990s, with 
significant changes in both the type and qual-
ity of goods produced and exported. Regions 
and countries differed greatly, however, in 
the degree to which they succeeded in carry-
ing out this economic transformation. In 
particular, Sub-Saharan Africa is far less 
diversified and produces relatively lower-
quality goods than Asia.
Greater diversification is associated with 
improved macroeconomic performance, 
including both lower volatility and higher 
growth. “Diversification spurts,” that is, epi-
sodes of rapid, sustained diversification, are 
associated with a 17 percent average reduc-
tion in the volatility of output growth in 
emerging market and developing countries, 
and a 30 percent decrease in output volatility 
in low-income countries.
Analogously, diversification spurts are 
associated with sharp subsequent accelera-
tions in growth. This is especially true for 
nonfragile low-income countries (figure 1.15). 
More broadly, initial diversification is, on 
average, positively associated with subsequent 
growth, although there is much cross-country 
heterogeneity.
These findings raise a key policy ques-
tion: What factors can spur or, alternatively, 
impede diversification? Both policy and insti-
tutional factors can influence the transition 
to more diverse production structures and 
thereby affect the pace at which growth can 
be sustained. For instance, policy barriers 
and structural rigidities in labor and prod-
uct markets, or underdeveloped financial 
systems, may hamper the process of diversi-
fication. Likewise, insufficient or low-quality 
public infrastructure may retard the develop-
ment of those sectors that rely disproportion-
ately upon it; this factor may prove especially 
important in low-income countries, where a 
large portion of investment stems from the 
public sector. 
Case studies provide some tentative evi-
dence in support of findings. First, diversi-
fication and structural transformation are 
often underpinned by reforms and policy 
measures that are general in scope. Macro-
economic stabilization is a clear example. 
But even microeconomic measures are often 
broad-based, focusing on improving the 
quantity and quality of infrastructure or 
essential business services, or on setting up a 
welcoming environment for foreign investors. 
It remains an open issue to what extent 
industry-focused and narrowly targeted mea-
sures have historically helped underpin diver-
sification efforts.
Second, effective policy measures come 
in “waves” and aim at exploiting the evolv-
ing comparative advantages of the economy 
in changing external conditions. The types 
of reforms underpinning diversification and 
structural transformation in the early stages 
of development are different from those 
required at later stages. In general, reforms 
need to be adapted to the external environ-
ment faced by the economy.
Finally, the frequency with which new 
products are introduced and the rate at which 
they grow can point to potential policy-
driven bottlenecks. Little entry may indicate 
that barriers deter firms from exporting or 
experimenting. If survival rates are low, firms 
may face more obstacles than expected. If 
surviving firms cannot expand, they may 
have inadequate access to finance.
Structural transformation in  
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing an 
episode of high growth since the mid-1990s. 
Many of the countries of the region have ben-
efited from relatively high commodity prices. 
One key question is whether higher growth 
has been accompanied by structural transfor-
mation, defined as the pattern of change in 
economic activity across sectors—from the 
primary to secondary and tertiary sectors—
and across space—from rural to urban areas. 
The IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook: 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2012) analyzes one of 
the dimensions of structural transformation, 
namely, whether growth has been accompa-
nied by a shift of workers from low to high 
average productivity activities and sectors. 
Since on average more than half of the labor 
force is employed in agriculture in these econ-
omies, and agriculture accounts for about 
one-third of output, average labor produc-
tivity in the sector is very low. Thus, struc-
tural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
typically involves increasing the productiv-
ity of the agricultural sector, which frees up 
labor, allowing the shift of agricultural work-
ers to industry and services.
Using data from 1995 to 2010 on agricul-
tural output from the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, 
GDP by sector from the IMF, and employ-
ment by sector from household surveys, the 
analysis of average labor productivity and 
the shift of workers across sectors shows that 
most countries in the region have experienced 
some degree of structural transformation, 
although there has been significant variation 
in its speed and type. In particular, trans-
formation in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
slower than that experienced by several coun-
tries in Asia: many of the African countries 
have experienced relatively slow productivity 
growth in agriculture and a less pronounced 
shift from agriculture to services and, to an 
even lesser extent, to manufacturing.
Figure 1.16 compares a sample of Sub-
Saharan African countries (Cameroon, 
Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa, and Tan-
zania) with a group of low- and middle-
income Asian economies that have experi-
enced rapid structural transformation and 
started their growth takeoffs with similar or 
lower levels of GDP per capita than the aver-
age African country at the time. As can be 
seen, Ghana and Tanzania have experienced 
declines in agricultural output and employ-
ment shares over time, with Tanzania match-
ing the experience of the comparator Asian 
economies quite closely. Middle-income 
countries have experienced declining manu-
facturing ratios for the past two decades, 
consistent with the process in more advanced 
Asian countries, where services play an ever-
increasing role in the economy. Relatively few 
low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have been able to raise their manufacturing 
output and employment shares on a sus-
tained basis.
An alternative presentation of the data on 
employment shares shows broad increases in 
employment in sectors with higher produc-
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FIGURE 1.15 Diversification spurts and growth accelerations
Sources: COMTRADE, World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates.
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changes in employment shares against aver-
age relative productivity levels for agricul-
ture, manufacturing, mining, and the ter-
tiary sector for Sub-Saharan African and 
Southeast Asian countries, respectively.12 
Points in the lower left quadrants indicate 
sectors with below average productivity and 
declining employment shares, while those in 
the upper right quadrants indicate sectors 
with above average productivity and rising 
employment shares.
Structural transformation has taken place 
to the extent that the observations for manu-
facturing and services in most countries are 
located in the upper right quadrant, corre-
sponding to movements from low to high aver-
age labor productivity sectors. In fact, only 
Cameroon and Zambia show change in the 
employment share in the opposite direction, 
namely, from high to low average labor pro-
ductivity sectors. In all the other Sub-Saharan 
African countries, workers have moved out 
of the agricultural sector. This suggests that 
the findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011), 
whose analysis of a smaller subset of coun-
tries through 2005 found workers moving 
into low-productivity sectors, may actually 
FIGURE 1.16 Sub-Saharan Africa: Sectoral output and employment, 1995–2010
Sources: CEIC database and Haver Analytics database.
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be reversed when considering a broader set of 
countries through 2010.
Country groups within Sub-Saharan 
Africa display important differences. Most 
oil exporters, middle-income, and nonfrag-
ile low-income countries have seen sustained 
increases in average labor productivity, often 
underpinned by rising productivity in agri-
culture and resulting in a declining share 
of GDP from that sector. Fragile countries, 
in contrast, have generally experienced low 
and irregular growth, largely as a result of 
conflict; this poor growth is reflected in the 
absence of significant structural transforma-
tion in most of these countries.
Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
that have been growing faster than in the 
past have not experienced an increase in the 
share of manufacturing in employment or 
GDP, in contrast to the experience in Asia. 
This pattern is not necessarily surprising. To 
some extent, it is what would be expected 
given the differences between the two regions 
in resource endowments and in compara-
tive advantage: when Asia started its take-
off, most countries were abundant in labor, 
whereas Sub-Saharan Africa is abundant 
in natural resources. The challenge is that 
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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FIGURE 1.18 South East Asia: Labor productivity 
and change in employment shares, 1995–2010
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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many of those natural resource sectors, such 
as mining, are capital intensive and will not 
provide the jobs needed to accommodate the 
rapidly growing working-age population in 
the region.
The recent growth in real wage levels in 
China, together with Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
demographic dividend—implying declining 
dependency ratios in the future—suggest that 
manufacturing in Sub-Saharan Africa could 
become increasingly competitive. But irre-
spective of whether economies grow through 
strengthening the manufacturing sector 
(Mozambique, Tanzania) or services (Kenya, 
Mauritius), it is unlikely that they can do so 
without first experiencing a major accelera-
tion of agricultural productivity growth. 
Update on trade trends and 
trade policy developments
Post-crisis recovery in trade has been 
uneven 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis over 
four years ago, global interdependency has 
been underscored by the largely synchronized 
nature of trade trends between high-income 
and developing countries. As of November 
2012, neither the United States nor the Euro-
pean Union had surpassed pre-crisis levels 
of imports, although their combined share 
of world imports remains sizable, at roughly 
one-quarter of the total. On the other hand, 
Japan and large emerging economies like 
Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, 
and South Africa (BRICS) have seen their 
import levels rise steadily above pre-crisis lev-
els, a trend that began in early 2009 (figure 
1.19). These divergent recovery trends have 
translated into weak trade performance in 
regions that have traditionally relied on U.S. 
and EU markets. Exports from Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Carib-
bean, and Sub-Saharan Africa all hover only 
slightly above pre-crisis levels. The situation 
is especially dire for countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa that are not members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council; in these 
nonmember countries, political developments 
combined with external economic factors 
have led to a steady decline in exports since 
late 2011. Meanwhile, other regions have 
adjusted with more success. The East Asia 
and Pacific region has experienced steady 
positive real export growth, fueled not only 
by China, but also by smaller economies such 
as Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic. In South 
Asia, positive real export growth in Ban-
gladesh and India helped the region experi-
ence the strongest export recovery, peaking 
in December 2010 at a level one and a half 
times higher than pre-crisis levels. Since then, 
however, South Asia’s export performance 
has been lackluster.
Global trade in 2012 was hampered by 
a mid-year slump in global imports and 
steadily contracting import demand on 
the part of high income countries, with the 
Euro area at the epicenter. Growth rates for 
world imports of industrial goods during 
the first half of 2012, year-over-year, were 
negative (World Bank 2013). At the same 
time, increased import demand in develop-
ing countries helped mitigate the dearth of 
demand in high income economies. Devel-
oping countries’ real exports also fluctuated 
considerably in 2012, with differences across 
countries and regions. 
Protectionist outbreak avoided despite 
uncertain future for global economy 
According to the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) monitoring of trade protectionist 
measures, 190 new trade-restrictive measures 
were introduced by Group of 20 (G-20) coun-
tries between mid-October 2011 and mid-
October 2012 (figure 1.20). While this rep-
resents a slowdown compared with previous 
years, the new measures add to the stock of 
restrictions put in place since the outbreak of 
the crisis. The growing accumulation of trade 
restrictions is of concern not only because it 
undermines the benefits of trade openness, 
but it also exacerbates the combined effects of 
the new measures with pre-crisis restrictions 
and distortions, such as agriculture subsidies 
and tariff peaks. Nevertheless, in the five 
months leading up to October 2012, the pace 
of removal of previous measures was better 
trade-restrictive measures, now account for 
an increasing share of those measures: 74 
percent in 2012, up from 60 percent in 2009 
according to the Global Trade Alert (GTA),13 
which provides broader coverage than the 
WTO in terms of both countries and policy 
measures included in the database. Argen-
tina, Brazil, the European Union, India, and 
Russia are among the countries that have 
implemented the highest number. Globally, 
the most frequently used trade-restrictive 
measures are state aids and antidumping, 
followed by import tariff increases and non-
tariff measures. Initially, restrictive measures 
were seen as policy responses to mitigate the 
temporary effects of the global financial cri-
sis. However, recent measures appear to be 
more embedded in national industrial plans, 
and hence longer term in nature (World Bank 
2013). G-20 countries are simultaneously 
responsible for a majority (66 percent) of all 
trade-liberalizing measures. However, trade-
liberalizing measures represent only a quarter 
of all measures enacted to date (figure 1.21).
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FIGURE 1.20 G-20’s new trade-restrictive 
measures
Source: World Trade Organization.
Note: Different methods of codification may lead to small discrepancies 
between these and other tallies of trade-restrictive measures.
than in previous periods (21 percent overall 
have been removed since October 2008).
G-20 countries, which have repeat-
edly committed to refrain from adopting 
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the region.
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dependency ratios in the future—suggest that 
manufacturing in Sub-Saharan Africa could 
become increasingly competitive. But irre-
spective of whether economies grow through 
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(Mozambique, Tanzania) or services (Kenya, 
Mauritius), it is unlikely that they can do so 
without first experiencing a major accelera-
tion of agricultural productivity growth. 
Update on trade trends and 
trade policy developments
Post-crisis recovery in trade has been 
uneven 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis over 
four years ago, global interdependency has 
been underscored by the largely synchronized 
nature of trade trends between high-income 
and developing countries. As of November 
2012, neither the United States nor the Euro-
pean Union had surpassed pre-crisis levels 
of imports, although their combined share 
of world imports remains sizable, at roughly 
one-quarter of the total. On the other hand, 
Japan and large emerging economies like 
Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, 
and South Africa (BRICS) have seen their 
import levels rise steadily above pre-crisis lev-
els, a trend that began in early 2009 (figure 
1.19). These divergent recovery trends have 
translated into weak trade performance in 
regions that have traditionally relied on U.S. 
and EU markets. Exports from Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Carib-
bean, and Sub-Saharan Africa all hover only 
slightly above pre-crisis levels. The situation 
is especially dire for countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa that are not members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council; in these 
nonmember countries, political developments 
combined with external economic factors 
have led to a steady decline in exports since 
late 2011. Meanwhile, other regions have 
adjusted with more success. The East Asia 
and Pacific region has experienced steady 
positive real export growth, fueled not only 
by China, but also by smaller economies such 
as Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic. In South 
Asia, positive real export growth in Ban-
gladesh and India helped the region experi-
ence the strongest export recovery, peaking 
in December 2010 at a level one and a half 
times higher than pre-crisis levels. Since then, 
however, South Asia’s export performance 
has been lackluster.
Global trade in 2012 was hampered by 
a mid-year slump in global imports and 
steadily contracting import demand on 
the part of high income countries, with the 
Euro area at the epicenter. Growth rates for 
world imports of industrial goods during 
the first half of 2012, year-over-year, were 
negative (World Bank 2013). At the same 
time, increased import demand in develop-
ing countries helped mitigate the dearth of 
demand in high income economies. Devel-
oping countries’ real exports also fluctuated 
considerably in 2012, with differences across 
countries and regions. 
Protectionist outbreak avoided despite 
uncertain future for global economy 
According to the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) monitoring of trade protectionist 
measures, 190 new trade-restrictive measures 
were introduced by Group of 20 (G-20) coun-
tries between mid-October 2011 and mid-
October 2012 (figure 1.20). While this rep-
resents a slowdown compared with previous 
years, the new measures add to the stock of 
restrictions put in place since the outbreak of 
the crisis. The growing accumulation of trade 
restrictions is of concern not only because it 
undermines the benefits of trade openness, 
but it also exacerbates the combined effects of 
the new measures with pre-crisis restrictions 
and distortions, such as agriculture subsidies 
and tariff peaks. Nevertheless, in the five 
months leading up to October 2012, the pace 
of removal of previous measures was better 
trade-restrictive measures, now account for 
an increasing share of those measures: 74 
percent in 2012, up from 60 percent in 2009 
according to the Global Trade Alert (GTA),13 
which provides broader coverage than the 
WTO in terms of both countries and policy 
measures included in the database. Argen-
tina, Brazil, the European Union, India, and 
Russia are among the countries that have 
implemented the highest number. Globally, 
the most frequently used trade-restrictive 
measures are state aids and antidumping, 
followed by import tariff increases and non-
tariff measures. Initially, restrictive measures 
were seen as policy responses to mitigate the 
temporary effects of the global financial cri-
sis. However, recent measures appear to be 
more embedded in national industrial plans, 
and hence longer term in nature (World Bank 
2013). G-20 countries are simultaneously 
responsible for a majority (66 percent) of all 
trade-liberalizing measures. However, trade-
liberalizing measures represent only a quarter 
of all measures enacted to date (figure 1.21).
FIGURE 1.19 Trade developments since 2008






















































M1 M6 M11 M4 M9 M2 M7 M12 M05 M10 M03 M11
2008 2009 2010








M1 M6 M11 M4 M9 M2 M7 M12 M05 M10 M03 M11
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: World Bank Datastream.

























FIGURE 1.20 G-20’s new trade-restrictive 
measures
Source: World Trade Organization.
Note: Different methods of codification may lead to small discrepancies 
between these and other tallies of trade-restrictive measures.
than in previous periods (21 percent overall 
have been removed since October 2008).
G-20 countries, which have repeat-
edly committed to refrain from adopting 
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Limited progress in Doha Round 
negotiations at the WTO
The need for multilateral agreement remains 
critical to mitigate the use of trade restrictive 
measures and promote trade openness. How-
ever, the prospects for successfully concluding 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) nego-
tiations—now entering their twelfth year—
remain dim, with recent reports that WTO 
members have turned their attention in 2013 
to “realistic” deliverables,14 rather than a 
conclusion to the whole round. The deadlock 
is costly. In terms of the market access dimen-
sion of what has been negotiated to date, 
there is a potential global welfare boost of 
some $160 billion at stake (Hoekman 2011). 
But often overlooked is the opportunity cost 
of the WTO not being able to deliver on its 
“legislative” function as an arbiter of new 
rules of the game in policy matters outside 
the framework of the DDA. These include 
“green” industrial policy measures, natural 
resource- and climate-related trade policies 
(such as carbon border adjustments), and 
export restrictions on food products to insu-
late domestic markets. DDA paralysis car-
ries the risk of countries pursuing unilateral, 
potentially damaging, responses to the exter-
nalities of these policies.
According to experts, much could be 
gained if a critical mass of the 15–20 or so 
largest WTO members were to agree to 
reduce applied barriers to trade and bind 
current levels of openness, but currently 
some large countries want more than other 
large countries are willing to offer (Hoek-
man 2011). Over the course of 2012, topics 
including trade facilitation, agriculture, spe-
cial and differential treatment, least devel-
oped country issues, and dispute settlement 
were advanced—according to the chairs of 
the various Doha negotiating groups—while 
others, like services, barely moved at all, and 
are unlikely to move forward in the months 
ahead. Successful negotiations at the upcom-
ing December 2013 ninth ministerial con-
ference in Bali are being viewed as a pivotal 
stepping stone—and necessary precondi-
tion—for ending the Doha Round, though 
there is little optimism that the conference 
itself will end the round (ICTSD 2012). At 
the most recent World Economic Forum in 
Davos, trade ministers from over 20 WTO 
member countries gathered informally and 
imposed an unofficial Easter deadline for 
taking stock of whether “meaningful results” 
in Bali will be possible. They agreed that suc-
cess at the conference would have to include 
gains in the areas of trade facilitation, least-
developed country issues, and agriculture 
(ICTSD 2013). 
FIGURE 1.21 Total number of measures 
implemented and still in force by each G-20 
country, November 2008–December 2012
Source: Global Trade Alert database.
Note: Individual measures may cover a very large portion of trade or just 
one product—these data are therefore not necessarily reflective of trade 
coverage. For example, Mexico reduced tariffs on 5,000 tariff lines, but this 
is reflected in just a few “measures.”
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Aid and international financial 
institutions
Over the past decade, official development 
assistance (ODA) steadily increased, reach-
ing its peak in 2010. The general trend of 
rising annual flows during the 2000s slowed 
only after the global financial crisis at the 
end of 2008, with a 1 percent deceleration 
in growth in 2009. Official development 
assistance continued to be a stable source of 
development financing even after the global 
financial crisis, helping to alleviate the imme-
diate impact of previous financial crises. In 
2011 and 2012, however, as the effects of the 
recession hit donors’ aid budgets, the recipi-
ents of ODA suffered the first two consecu-
tive years of lower aid disbursements since 
1997 (excluding fluctuations affected by 
exceptional debt relief). 
Bilateral and multilateral aid
Members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) disbursed $128.3 billion (in con-
stant 2011 dollars and exchange rates) in 
2012, compared with $133.7 billion the pre-
vious year, a decrease in real terms of 4 per-
cent. In current prices, ODA in 2012 equaled 
$125.5 billion, down from $133.7 billion in 
2011 a decline of 6 percent. As a percentage 
of donors’ combined gross national income 
(GNI), ODA continued to slip from 0.32 per-
cent in 2010 to 0.31 percent in 2011, to end 
up at 0.29 in 2012 (figure 1.22). The current 
situation represents some concern, because 
developing countries have also been affected 
by the crisis. Within total net ODA, the bilat-
eral share of net ODA decreased from 70 per-
cent in 2011 to 65 percent in 2012, indicating 
an increase in the share of multilateral aid to 
close to 35 percent. One of the broad trends 
in the recent international aid architecture is 
the rapid increase of “multi-bilateral” ODA, 
which is defined as bilateral ODA earmarked 
for a specific purpose and channeled through 
the multilateral system. According to OECD 
DAC, multi-bilateral ODA increased from 
$9 billion to $16.7 billion between 2007 and 
2010, representing 12 percent of gross ODA 
excluding debt relief. The World Bank chan-
nels over a quarter of such multi-bilateral 
ODA, becoming the single largest multilat-
eral channel for trust funds.
Gleneagles
At the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Glen-
eagles, Scotland, in 2005, important commit-
ments related to ODA and external debt for-
giveness were made. Indeed, the international 
agreement on debt relief (Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative, or MDRI) canceled $56.5 
billion in loans owed to the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank, and the IMF. 
In addition, DAC donors agreed to increase 
ODA by $50 billion between 2004 and 2010, 
at least half of which would be designated for 
Sub-Saharan and North Africa. This prom-
ised increase was made in 2004 prices and 
exchange rates, and the targeted level of ODA 
in 2010 prices was estimated to be $152.2 
billion. Given the actual amount of $128.5 
billion available, a gap of more than $25 bil-
lion remains. The DAC’s 2012 annual ODA 
report shows that only a little more than $1.2 
billion of the shortfall can be attributed to 
lower than expected GNI levels stemming 
FIGURE 1.22 DAC members’ net ODA disbursements
Sources: OECD DAC and World Bank.
Note: GNI = gross national income; ODA = official development assistance.
Total ODA (left axis)
Total ODA to low-income countries (left axis)
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Limited progress in Doha Round 
negotiations at the WTO
The need for multilateral agreement remains 
critical to mitigate the use of trade restrictive 
measures and promote trade openness. How-
ever, the prospects for successfully concluding 
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) nego-
tiations—now entering their twelfth year—
remain dim, with recent reports that WTO 
members have turned their attention in 2013 
to “realistic” deliverables,14 rather than a 
conclusion to the whole round. The deadlock 
is costly. In terms of the market access dimen-
sion of what has been negotiated to date, 
there is a potential global welfare boost of 
some $160 billion at stake (Hoekman 2011). 
But often overlooked is the opportunity cost 
of the WTO not being able to deliver on its 
“legislative” function as an arbiter of new 
rules of the game in policy matters outside 
the framework of the DDA. These include 
“green” industrial policy measures, natural 
resource- and climate-related trade policies 
(such as carbon border adjustments), and 
export restrictions on food products to insu-
late domestic markets. DDA paralysis car-
ries the risk of countries pursuing unilateral, 
potentially damaging, responses to the exter-
nalities of these policies.
According to experts, much could be 
gained if a critical mass of the 15–20 or so 
largest WTO members were to agree to 
reduce applied barriers to trade and bind 
current levels of openness, but currently 
some large countries want more than other 
large countries are willing to offer (Hoek-
man 2011). Over the course of 2012, topics 
including trade facilitation, agriculture, spe-
cial and differential treatment, least devel-
oped country issues, and dispute settlement 
were advanced—according to the chairs of 
the various Doha negotiating groups—while 
others, like services, barely moved at all, and 
are unlikely to move forward in the months 
ahead. Successful negotiations at the upcom-
ing December 2013 ninth ministerial con-
ference in Bali are being viewed as a pivotal 
stepping stone—and necessary precondi-
tion—for ending the Doha Round, though 
there is little optimism that the conference 
itself will end the round (ICTSD 2012). At 
the most recent World Economic Forum in 
Davos, trade ministers from over 20 WTO 
member countries gathered informally and 
imposed an unofficial Easter deadline for 
taking stock of whether “meaningful results” 
in Bali will be possible. They agreed that suc-
cess at the conference would have to include 
gains in the areas of trade facilitation, least-
developed country issues, and agriculture 
(ICTSD 2013). 
FIGURE 1.21 Total number of measures 
implemented and still in force by each G-20 
country, November 2008–December 2012
Source: Global Trade Alert database.
Note: Individual measures may cover a very large portion of trade or just 
one product—these data are therefore not necessarily reflective of trade 
coverage. For example, Mexico reduced tariffs on 5,000 tariff lines, but this 
is reflected in just a few “measures.”
Liberalizing or transparency improving measures 
Likely to be restrictive and discriminatory against
foreign commercial interests 
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Aid and international financial 
institutions
Over the past decade, official development 
assistance (ODA) steadily increased, reach-
ing its peak in 2010. The general trend of 
rising annual flows during the 2000s slowed 
only after the global financial crisis at the 
end of 2008, with a 1 percent deceleration 
in growth in 2009. Official development 
assistance continued to be a stable source of 
development financing even after the global 
financial crisis, helping to alleviate the imme-
diate impact of previous financial crises. In 
2011 and 2012, however, as the effects of the 
recession hit donors’ aid budgets, the recipi-
ents of ODA suffered the first two consecu-
tive years of lower aid disbursements since 
1997 (excluding fluctuations affected by 
exceptional debt relief). 
Bilateral and multilateral aid
Members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) disbursed $128.3 billion (in con-
stant 2011 dollars and exchange rates) in 
2012, compared with $133.7 billion the pre-
vious year, a decrease in real terms of 4 per-
cent. In current prices, ODA in 2012 equaled 
$125.5 billion, down from $133.7 billion in 
2011 a decline of 6 percent. As a percentage 
of donors’ combined gross national income 
(GNI), ODA continued to slip from 0.32 per-
cent in 2010 to 0.31 percent in 2011, to end 
up at 0.29 in 2012 (figure 1.22). The current 
situation represents some concern, because 
developing countries have also been affected 
by the crisis. Within total net ODA, the bilat-
eral share of net ODA decreased from 70 per-
cent in 2011 to 65 percent in 2012, indicating 
an increase in the share of multilateral aid to 
close to 35 percent. One of the broad trends 
in the recent international aid architecture is 
the rapid increase of “multi-bilateral” ODA, 
which is defined as bilateral ODA earmarked 
for a specific purpose and channeled through 
the multilateral system. According to OECD 
DAC, multi-bilateral ODA increased from 
$9 billion to $16.7 billion between 2007 and 
2010, representing 12 percent of gross ODA 
excluding debt relief. The World Bank chan-
nels over a quarter of such multi-bilateral 
ODA, becoming the single largest multilat-
eral channel for trust funds.
Gleneagles
At the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Glen-
eagles, Scotland, in 2005, important commit-
ments related to ODA and external debt for-
giveness were made. Indeed, the international 
agreement on debt relief (Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative, or MDRI) canceled $56.5 
billion in loans owed to the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank, and the IMF. 
In addition, DAC donors agreed to increase 
ODA by $50 billion between 2004 and 2010, 
at least half of which would be designated for 
Sub-Saharan and North Africa. This prom-
ised increase was made in 2004 prices and 
exchange rates, and the targeted level of ODA 
in 2010 prices was estimated to be $152.2 
billion. Given the actual amount of $128.5 
billion available, a gap of more than $25 bil-
lion remains. The DAC’s 2012 annual ODA 
report shows that only a little more than $1.2 
billion of the shortfall can be attributed to 
lower than expected GNI levels stemming 
FIGURE 1.22 DAC members’ net ODA disbursements
Sources: OECD DAC and World Bank.
Note: GNI = gross national income; ODA = official development assistance.
Total ODA (left axis)
Total ODA to low-income countries (left axis)
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from the economic crisis (OECD 2012b). At 
Gleneagles, the G-8 donors also envisaged an 
increase in total ODA to Africa of $25 billion 
in 2004 prices and exchange rates. In cur-
rent prices and exchange rates, that translates 
into an increase of an estimated $29 billion 
in 2010. Yet estimates show that Africa only 
received an additional $11.8 billion in 2010. 
Given the decline in ODA in 2011 and 2012, 
it is clear that this situation has not improved.
Regional aid
Although ODA disbursements were lower in 
2011 than in 2010, the trend in regional ODA 
remained stable. Aid is mainly concentrated 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, which received 43 
percent of net ODA disbursements in 2011, 
South Asia (21 percent), and the Middle East 
and North Africa (11 percent) (figure 1.23). 
While Sub-Saharan Africa still received 
most of the aid, this region suffered a further 
decrease in 2012, with flows of $26.2 billion, 
or a decline of 7.9 percent in real terms com-
pared with 2011. Europe and Central Asia 
also saw a fall in net bilateral ODA flows of 
17 percent in real terms from 2010; between 
2010 and 2011, the decline was around 6 
percent as the region made strong gains 
toward poverty alleviation. Latin America 
sustained a decrease of 3 percent in 2011, 
while South Asia registered a shortfall of 2 
percent. The only region with an increase in 
net ODA disbursements was the Middle East 
and North Africa, with the revolutions in this 
region triggering more aid.
Special groups
Low-income countries received 3 percent 
more aid in 2011 compared with 2010. 
Middle-income countries, on the other hand, 
suffered a decline of 17.2 percent from 2010. 
For lower-middle-income countries, net ODA 
disbursements decreased 8.9 percent from 
2010, to $5.7 billion (figure 1.24).
When all developing countries are con-
sidered, ODA disbursements per capita have 
increased for countries with no more than 
two of the MDGs achieved (figure 1.25).
Even though aid fell in 2011, the flows 
are still being directed to those countries 
lagging the most (that is, the countries 
furthest from achieving the MDGs). For 
example, the group of countries in a fragile 
situation that have met or are currently on 
track to achieve no more than two MDGs 
received an annual average of $64 per capita 
in 2009–11 (figure 1.26). 
Fragile, small, and heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs) also suffered the conse-
quences of a smaller amount of ODA dis-
bursements from 2010 to 2011 (figure 1.27). 
Fragile states and small states received 6 per-
cent less in ODA disbursements than they did 
in 2010; and the flow to HIPCs decreased by 
4.1 percent. 
Fragile states—those countries often in 
internal conflict or with severe political insta-
bility—are the developing countries most 
challenged in meeting the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. These countries are typically 
characterized by weak institutions and mac-
roeconomic instability. For obvious reasons, 
peace- or state-building activities take prior-
ity over economic policy making. Macroeco-
nomic policy advice and implementation are 
hampered by lack of timely and reliable sta-
tistics. Effective engagement by international 
organizations and development partners 
requires a recognition of the limited capacity 
and large financing needs of these fragile 
countries.
Fragile states are vulnerable countries 
with few if any resources available with 
which to address vulnerabilities. In a possible 
FIGURE 1.23 Net ODA disbursements to 
developing regions





































FIGURE 1.24 Net ODA disbursements to low- 
and middle-income countries










































FIGURE 1.27 Net ODA disbursements to fragile, 
small, and HIPC states
Source: OECD DAC 2012.

































FIGURE 1.26 Net ODA received per capita by 
groups of countries ranked by MDG targets met or 
on track to be met by 2015
0–2 MDG targets met or on track
to be met by 2015 (114 countries) 
3–5 MDG targets met or on track
to be met by 2015 (12 countries) 
6–10 MDG targets met or on track































Source: OECD DAC 2012.
Note: FSC = fragile; SST = small states;
HIPC = Heavily indebted poor countries.
FIGURE 1.25 Net ODA received per capita by 
groups of countries ranked by MDG targets met or 
on track to be met by 2015 (2009–11)
Source: OECD DAC 2012.
Note: FSC = fragile states; SST = small states; HIPC = Heavily indebted 
poor countries.
0–2 MDG targets met or on track to be met
by 2015 (23 countries FSC, 33 SST, 24 HIPC ) 
3–5 MDG targets met or on track to be met
by 2015 (1 country FSC, 1 SST, 4 HIPC) 
6–10 MDG targets met or on track to be met
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from the economic crisis (OECD 2012b). At 
Gleneagles, the G-8 donors also envisaged an 
increase in total ODA to Africa of $25 billion 
in 2004 prices and exchange rates. In cur-
rent prices and exchange rates, that translates 
into an increase of an estimated $29 billion 
in 2010. Yet estimates show that Africa only 
received an additional $11.8 billion in 2010. 
Given the decline in ODA in 2011 and 2012, 
it is clear that this situation has not improved.
Regional aid
Although ODA disbursements were lower in 
2011 than in 2010, the trend in regional ODA 
remained stable. Aid is mainly concentrated 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, which received 43 
percent of net ODA disbursements in 2011, 
South Asia (21 percent), and the Middle East 
and North Africa (11 percent) (figure 1.23). 
While Sub-Saharan Africa still received 
most of the aid, this region suffered a further 
decrease in 2012, with flows of $26.2 billion, 
or a decline of 7.9 percent in real terms com-
pared with 2011. Europe and Central Asia 
also saw a fall in net bilateral ODA flows of 
17 percent in real terms from 2010; between 
2010 and 2011, the decline was around 6 
percent as the region made strong gains 
toward poverty alleviation. Latin America 
sustained a decrease of 3 percent in 2011, 
while South Asia registered a shortfall of 2 
percent. The only region with an increase in 
net ODA disbursements was the Middle East 
and North Africa, with the revolutions in this 
region triggering more aid.
Special groups
Low-income countries received 3 percent 
more aid in 2011 compared with 2010. 
Middle-income countries, on the other hand, 
suffered a decline of 17.2 percent from 2010. 
For lower-middle-income countries, net ODA 
disbursements decreased 8.9 percent from 
2010, to $5.7 billion (figure 1.24).
When all developing countries are con-
sidered, ODA disbursements per capita have 
increased for countries with no more than 
two of the MDGs achieved (figure 1.25).
Even though aid fell in 2011, the flows 
are still being directed to those countries 
lagging the most (that is, the countries 
furthest from achieving the MDGs). For 
example, the group of countries in a fragile 
situation that have met or are currently on 
track to achieve no more than two MDGs 
received an annual average of $64 per capita 
in 2009–11 (figure 1.26). 
Fragile, small, and heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs) also suffered the conse-
quences of a smaller amount of ODA dis-
bursements from 2010 to 2011 (figure 1.27). 
Fragile states and small states received 6 per-
cent less in ODA disbursements than they did 
in 2010; and the flow to HIPCs decreased by 
4.1 percent. 
Fragile states—those countries often in 
internal conflict or with severe political insta-
bility—are the developing countries most 
challenged in meeting the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. These countries are typically 
characterized by weak institutions and mac-
roeconomic instability. For obvious reasons, 
peace- or state-building activities take prior-
ity over economic policy making. Macroeco-
nomic policy advice and implementation are 
hampered by lack of timely and reliable sta-
tistics. Effective engagement by international 
organizations and development partners 
requires a recognition of the limited capacity 
and large financing needs of these fragile 
countries.
Fragile states are vulnerable countries 
with few if any resources available with 
which to address vulnerabilities. In a possible 
FIGURE 1.23 Net ODA disbursements to 
developing regions





































FIGURE 1.24 Net ODA disbursements to low- 
and middle-income countries










































FIGURE 1.27 Net ODA disbursements to fragile, 
small, and HIPC states
Source: OECD DAC 2012.

































FIGURE 1.26 Net ODA received per capita by 
groups of countries ranked by MDG targets met or 
on track to be met by 2015
0–2 MDG targets met or on track
to be met by 2015 (114 countries) 
3–5 MDG targets met or on track
to be met by 2015 (12 countries) 
6–10 MDG targets met or on track































Source: OECD DAC 2012.
Note: FSC = fragile; SST = small states;
HIPC = Heavily indebted poor countries.
FIGURE 1.25 Net ODA received per capita by 
groups of countries ranked by MDG targets met or 
on track to be met by 2015 (2009–11)
Source: OECD DAC 2012.
Note: FSC = fragile states; SST = small states; HIPC = Heavily indebted 
poor countries.
0–2 MDG targets met or on track to be met
by 2015 (23 countries FSC, 33 SST, 24 HIPC ) 
3–5 MDG targets met or on track to be met
by 2015 (1 country FSC, 1 SST, 4 HIPC) 
6–10 MDG targets met or on track to be met
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protracted slowdown of global growth, these 
countries would be hard pressed to coun-
teract the accompanying negative shocks to 
their economies, either by depleting avail-
able policy buffers or adjusting macroeco-
nomic policies. With domestic policy space 
severely limited, these countries would have 
to turn to the international community for 
additional assistance if such a downside risk 
scenario were to materialize. The decline in 
ODA for these countries is thus especially 
worrisome because well-targeted external 
financial aid can be effective in support-
ing countries exiting from fragile situations 
(World Bank 2011). 
BRICS
ODA DAC resources are not the only 
resources that countries can use to attain the 
MDGs; various new donors and philanthro-
pists have become part of the development 
community, providing resources to coun-
tries to use in progressing toward the MDGs 
and for development in general. In particu-
lar, South-South cooperation has become 
increasingly important, with estimates of 
financial aid flows from the so-called BRICS 
to developing countries of up to $4 billion 
in 2009 (Adugna et al. 2011). These aid vol-
umes do not fully capture the significance 
and impact of BRICS on the financial inflows 
of low-income countries, however. For exam-
ple, since 2000, trade between BRICS and 
Sub-Saharan Africa has increased 25 percent 
annually, reaching $206 billion in 2011. 
Trade, foreign direct investment, and 
development aid are often intertwined and 
come as a package based on the idea of South-
South solidarity, shared experiences, and self- 
reliance (based on the meeting in Yamous-
soukro, Côte d’Ivoire, 2008). Even though 
foreign assistance is diverse among BRICS, 
development cooperation focuses on trade 
partners, and consequently, often on neigh-
boring countries and regional integration, to 
stimulate trade, investments, and growth as 
the main vehicles for improvement in develop-
ment outcomes. It also focuses aid on techni-
cal rather than financial assistance (EU 2012). 
Looking forward: ODA flows through 
2015
For the ODA flow to developing countries 
to remain constant in per capita terms, an 
increase in total ODA by 2015 of $6.6 billion 
in 2011 prices and exchange rates is needed. 
Given the ongoing fragility of the economic 
recovery in most of the developed world, this 
increase might be quite a difficult undertak-
ing to accomplish at a time when any addi-
tional assistance to facilitate the attainment 
of the MDGs could prove critical. Continu-
ing at the current level of ODA would result 
in a fall of 1.3 percent annually until 2015. 
Country programmable aid (CPA) is a 
core subset of ODA, representing about 67 
percent of total DAC ODA, with 95 per-
cent of multilateral agencies and 45 percent 
of bilateral aid agencies reporting on their 
programmable aid flows. CPA data provide 
information about the forward spending 
plans by DAC donors on development.15 A 
reliable predictor of actual disbursements, 
CPA had predictability ratios of 103, 95, and 
92 percent in 2009, 2010, and 2011, respec-
tively. A ratio of 92 percent means that, on 
average, donors disbursed 8 percent less than 
planned the year before. 
The 2013 DAC report on predictability 
presents the results of the 2013 DAC survey 
on forward spending plans for 2013 to 2016, 
including the final year by which the current 
set of MDGs should be achieved. The survey 
data indicate that the annual amount of CPA 
in 2013 is anticipated to jump by 9 percent 
in real terms compared with 2012. It is then 
projected to remain constant for the period 
2014–16. The result is a slight decline in per 
capita CPA from $18.18 in 2013 to $17.78 
in 2015 (in 2012 prices and exchange rates). 
The implications of this decline are more 
pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
received $47.70 per capita CPA in 2012 and 
will see its allocation decline to $45.08 per 
capita by 2015. Although the initial recov-
ery bodes well for the availability of ODA to 
assist with the attainment of the MDGs, the 
downturn in the outer years does not.
Aid effectiveness
Since the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 
late 2011, the international community has 
shifted from concentrating on aid effective-
ness to a broader focus on effective develop-
ment cooperation. Although the aid effective-
ness agenda remains important, this shift 
reflects a recent evolution of the development 
landscape that includes:
•   Support for country-led management of 
development with a focus on results, in lieu 
of the traditional discussion focused on 
donor harmonization and alignment.
•   The expanding role in development of new 
partners, such as middle-income coun-
tries, the private sector, and civil society 
organizations. 
•   The  growing  importance  of  aid  as  a 
resource for catalytic change and institu-
tional development.
•   The changing global  financial base  for 
development, with private financing play-
ing a growing developmental role. 
•   The  emergence of  new  technologies  to 
increase global connectivity and transpar-
ency and accountability.
The Busan Partnership for Effective Devel-
opment Co-operation calls for the establish-
ment of a “new, inclusive, and representative 
Global Partnership for Effective Develop-
ment Co-operation to support and ensure 
accountability for the implementation of 
commitments at the political level.” At its 
most recent meeting in June 2012, the Work-
ing Party on Aid Effectiveness (which has led 
the aid effectiveness agenda at the global level 
since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-
ness in 2005) formally agreed to establish this 
Global Partnership. Operational since late 
2012, the Partnership brings together devel-
oping countries, including major providers 
of South-South cooperation such as BRICS, 
together with donor countries, civil society 
organizations, and private funders, serving as 
a forum for knowledge exchange and regular 
monitoring of progress. Its main functions 
are to maintain and strengthen political sup-
port for more effective development coopera-
tion; to monitor the implementation of the 
Busan commitments; to facilitate knowledge 
exchange and lesson learning; and to support 
the implementation of the Busan commit-
ments at the country level (box 1.1) To date, 
more than 160 countries and 45 organiza-
tions from around the world have endorsed 
the Partnership.
Notwithstanding the changes that will 
potentially emerge from the new Global Part-
nership, monitoring of the promised progress 
by the DAC donor community should con-
tinue as a means to improve aid effectiveness 
as set forth in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration, which 
placed country ownership of policies and 
programs at the center of a reform agenda to 
make aid more effective, committed donors 
and developing countries to be mutually 
accountable for implementing the declaration 
through a set of thirteen measurable targets 
(OECD 2012a). By the 2010 deadline, only 
one of the targets had been met: to strengthen 
capacity by coordinated support (target 4). 
Disaggregating the data for the vari-
ous multilateral development banks and 
other international organizations, such as 
the United Nations and the EU institutions, 
yields a more nuanced picture, however (table 
1.7). For example, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank has met four of the eight indi-
cators for which disaggregated data exist, the 
World Bank three (see box 1.2 for additional 
information about World Bank performance 
in development cooperation), and the EU 
institutions two. All other multilateral devel-
opment banks have met one indicator. 
Table 1.7 also shows that individual inter-
national organizations have made progress in 
many areas, but each of them has also fallen 
back on at least one target. The African 
Development Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank show deteriorations in four of the 
eight indicators analyzed. The World Bank 
is closest to reaching all indicators, with 
an average gap of 17 percent remaining on 
five of its unmet indicators, while the Inter-
American Development Bank has an average 
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protracted slowdown of global growth, these 
countries would be hard pressed to coun-
teract the accompanying negative shocks to 
their economies, either by depleting avail-
able policy buffers or adjusting macroeco-
nomic policies. With domestic policy space 
severely limited, these countries would have 
to turn to the international community for 
additional assistance if such a downside risk 
scenario were to materialize. The decline in 
ODA for these countries is thus especially 
worrisome because well-targeted external 
financial aid can be effective in support-
ing countries exiting from fragile situations 
(World Bank 2011). 
BRICS
ODA DAC resources are not the only 
resources that countries can use to attain the 
MDGs; various new donors and philanthro-
pists have become part of the development 
community, providing resources to coun-
tries to use in progressing toward the MDGs 
and for development in general. In particu-
lar, South-South cooperation has become 
increasingly important, with estimates of 
financial aid flows from the so-called BRICS 
to developing countries of up to $4 billion 
in 2009 (Adugna et al. 2011). These aid vol-
umes do not fully capture the significance 
and impact of BRICS on the financial inflows 
of low-income countries, however. For exam-
ple, since 2000, trade between BRICS and 
Sub-Saharan Africa has increased 25 percent 
annually, reaching $206 billion in 2011. 
Trade, foreign direct investment, and 
development aid are often intertwined and 
come as a package based on the idea of South-
South solidarity, shared experiences, and self- 
reliance (based on the meeting in Yamous-
soukro, Côte d’Ivoire, 2008). Even though 
foreign assistance is diverse among BRICS, 
development cooperation focuses on trade 
partners, and consequently, often on neigh-
boring countries and regional integration, to 
stimulate trade, investments, and growth as 
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Aid effectiveness
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ment cooperation. Although the aid effective-
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Global Partnership for Effective Develop-
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accountability for the implementation of 
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since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-
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oping countries, including major providers 
of South-South cooperation such as BRICS, 
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organizations, and private funders, serving as 
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monitoring of progress. Its main functions 
are to maintain and strengthen political sup-
port for more effective development coopera-
tion; to monitor the implementation of the 
Busan commitments; to facilitate knowledge 
exchange and lesson learning; and to support 
the implementation of the Busan commit-
ments at the country level (box 1.1) To date, 
more than 160 countries and 45 organiza-
tions from around the world have endorsed 
the Partnership.
Notwithstanding the changes that will 
potentially emerge from the new Global Part-
nership, monitoring of the promised progress 
by the DAC donor community should con-
tinue as a means to improve aid effectiveness 
as set forth in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration, which 
placed country ownership of policies and 
programs at the center of a reform agenda to 
make aid more effective, committed donors 
and developing countries to be mutually 
accountable for implementing the declaration 
through a set of thirteen measurable targets 
(OECD 2012a). By the 2010 deadline, only 
one of the targets had been met: to strengthen 
capacity by coordinated support (target 4). 
Disaggregating the data for the vari-
ous multilateral development banks and 
other international organizations, such as 
the United Nations and the EU institutions, 
yields a more nuanced picture, however (table 
1.7). For example, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank has met four of the eight indi-
cators for which disaggregated data exist, the 
World Bank three (see box 1.2 for additional 
information about World Bank performance 
in development cooperation), and the EU 
institutions two. All other multilateral devel-
opment banks have met one indicator. 
Table 1.7 also shows that individual inter-
national organizations have made progress in 
many areas, but each of them has also fallen 
back on at least one target. The African 
Development Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank show deteriorations in four of the 
eight indicators analyzed. The World Bank 
is closest to reaching all indicators, with 
an average gap of 17 percent remaining on 
five of its unmet indicators, while the Inter-
American Development Bank has an average 
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remaining gap of well over 60 percent on 
its remaining four indicators. The United 
Nations was only halfway toward reaching 
its remaining targets in 2010.
Acceleration toward the MDGs
Various other mechanisms exist to acceler-
ate progress toward the MDGs in addition 
to improvements in aid effectiveness. For 
example, in 2010, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) developed an 
MDG acceleration framework (MAF) to pro-
vide a systematic way of identifying bottle-
necks and possible high-impact solutions that 
could assist countries to pick up the pace on 
attaining the MDGs. The framework was 
rolled out in 10 countries across a range of 
MDGs in 2010 and has been used since then 
to assist 44 countries across almost all of the 
MDGs. This work has led to concrete plans 
of action with coordinated roles for govern-
ments and all development partners involved 
in achieving countries’ MDG priorities. 
The results from the MAFs completed 
to date are encouraging and have led to 
increased collaboration between the World 
Bank and the UN in this area. The initial les-
sons learned include the importance of strong 
national ownership, facilitation of cross-sec-
toral collaboration, and participation by civil 
service and nongovernmental organizations. 
Of critical importance for the countries them-
selves is actual implementation of the agreed-
upon MDG action plan, which includes 
ensuring that gaps in institutional capacity 
and sector governance are addressed, that the 
MDG action plan is adequately incorporated 
into annual or multiyear partner support 
plans, and that both intermediate and final 
indicators of MDG achievement are regularly 
monitored, all to ensure that efforts are yield-
ing the desired results.
Various other initiatives have been put 
in place to accelerate progress toward the 
MDGs such as the Sanitation and Water 
for All initiative. This is a global partner-
ship between developing countries, donors, 
multi-lateral agencies, civil society, and other 
development partners working together to 
achieve universal and sustainable access to 
sanitation and safe drinking water, with 
an immediate focus on achieving the Mil-
lennium Development Goals in the most 
off-track countries.16 To accelerate progress 
on MDG 1c (reduction of underweight in 
children under five), the Scaling Up Nutri-
tion (SUN) global movement was set up to 
support nutrition sensitive interactions in 33 
SUN countries. Investments are supported 
that are aligned to national nutrition plans 
and contribute directly to the process of 
BOX 1.1 Putting the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation into 
operation
During the Fourth High Level Forum, the interna-
tional community renewed its commitment to mov-
ing the effective development cooperation agenda 
forward while keeping its focus on the unfinished aid 
effectiveness agenda. Three key vehicles used to bring 
these agendas forward are the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation, the Global 
Monitoring Mechanism, and Building Blocks for 
Post-Busan Implementation.
To follow up, the international community estab-
lished the Post-Busan Interim Group, which held sev-
eral meetings in the first half of 2012 and agreed on 
the Global Partnership mandate and the global moni-
toring framework. The Global Partnership mandate 
focuses on maintaining and strengthening political 
momentum for more effective development coopera-
tion; ensuring accountability for implementing the 
Busan commitments; facilitating knowledge exchange 
and sharing lessons learned; and supporting imple-
mentation of the Busan commitments at the country 
level.
The indicators and associated targets of the global 
monitoring framework (successor to the 2005–10 
Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey) intend to pro-
mote international accountability for implementing 
the Busan Global Partnership agreement. Five of the 
indicators are from the Paris Declaration Monitoring 
Survey (such as use of countries’ public financial man-
agement and procurement systems), which ensures 
continuity with the unfinished aid effectiveness 
agenda. The remaining five indicators are new and 
reflect the evolution of the development landscape by 
including civil society and private sector engagement. 
The Building Blocks launched at the Busan forum are 
initiatives to help further progress in eight key areas: 
conflict and fragility; South-South cooperation; the 
private sector; climate finance; transparency; effective 
institutions and policies; results and mutual account-
ability; and management of diversity and reduction of 
fragmentation.
To date, 3 minister-level cochairs and 18 steer-
ing committee members have been appointed from 
partner countries, development partners, the private 
sector, and civil service organizations. The first steer-
ing committee meeting to discuss focus areas of the 
Global Partnership was held in December 2012. The 
global monitoring framework is being finalized. Given 
their voluntary nature, the progress on the Building 
Blocks varies across initiatives. Going forward, a key 
challenge for the Global Partnership is to connect with 
other international forums and initiatives, most nota-
bly the discussion on the post-2015 MDG goals.






Development Banks World Bank African Development Bank Asian Development Bank Inter American Development Bank United Nations EU institutions
% 2010 (%) 2010 (%)
Progress  
since 2005 2010 (%) Gap
Progress  
since 2005 2010 (%) Gap
Progress  
since 2005 2010 (%) Gap
Progress  
since 2005 2010 (%) Gap
Progress  
since 2005 2010 (%) Gap
Progress  
since 2005 2010 (%) Gap
Progress  
since 2005
3 –  Aid flows are aligned with 
national priorities 85 72 36 = 79 7% + 59 31% + 64 25% – 48 44% + 31 64% – 51 40% +
4 –  Strengthen capacity by 
coordinating support 50 58 50 + 73 Met + 69 Met + 44 12% + 65 Met + 67 Met + 50 Met +
5 –  How much aid for the 
government sectors uses  
country systems
55 35 20 + 55 Met + 32 42% – 29 47% – 5 91% + 12 78% + 47 15% +
6 –  Strenghten capacity by 
avoiding parallel PIUs –67 –32 –49 + –80 Met + –65 3% + –95 Met + –7 90% = 1 102% – –71 Met +
7 – Aid is more predictable 71 43 29 – 51 28% – 50 30% + 54 24% – 48 32% – 23 68% + 48 32% +
9 –  Use of common arrangements 
or procedures 66 45 32 + 59 11% + 35 47% – 50 24% + 80 Met – 45 32% + 52 21% +
10.a – Joint missions 40 19 18 + 29 28% + 14 65% – 15 63% + 67 Met + 38 5% + 19 53% –
10.b – Joint country analytical work 66 43 32 = 59 11% + 50 24% – 39 41% – 75 Met + 61 8% = 57 14% +
Source: OECD DAC 2012.
Note: PIU = project implementation unit; + = improvement, – = deterioration.
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plans, and that both intermediate and final 
indicators of MDG achievement are regularly 
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MDGs such as the Sanitation and Water 
for All initiative. This is a global partner-
ship between developing countries, donors, 
multi-lateral agencies, civil society, and other 
development partners working together to 
achieve universal and sustainable access to 
sanitation and safe drinking water, with 
an immediate focus on achieving the Mil-
lennium Development Goals in the most 
off-track countries.16 To accelerate progress 
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achieving high coverage of vulnerable target 
populations (pregnant women and children 
up to age 24 months) with evidence-based 
direct nutrition services.17
Another example of a special focus to 
improve achievement of the MDGs is in this 
case a World Bank initiative. The World 
Bank’s five-year (2010–2015) Reproductive 
Health Action Plan (RHAP) is accelerating 
progress on maternal and child health by tar-
geting 57 high priority countries, mostly in 
Africa and South Asia, with the highest bur-
den of maternal and neonatal deaths, high 
prevalence of sexually transmitted infec-
tions, and high fertility rates. Projects include 
increasing skilled attendance at births, train-
ing health care workers, and expanding girls’ 
education. As of March 2013, more than half 
(56) of the World Bank’s 102 active health 
projects address high fertility and mater-
nal mortality, and 52 projects address child 
health. Focusing on health system strength-
ening and targeting the poor and vulner-
able through innovative mechanisms, such 
as results-based financing, these projects are 
showing promising results. For example, in 
Burundi, support from the Burundi Health 
Sector Development Support Project for the 
nationwide results-based financing (RBF)18 
program has helped to increase utilization of 
maternal and child health services including: 
(a) a rise in births at health facilities by 25 
percent; (b) an increase in prenatal consulta-
tions by 20 percent; (c) a 35 percent increase 
in curative care consultations for pregnant 
women; and (d) a 27 percent increase in 
family planning services obtained through 
health facilities—during the just first year of 
implementation. 
Using ICT to improve the 
effectiveness of projects 
The use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) for economic development 
was recognized when the official list of MDG 
indicators was adopted as part of MDG 8, 
which focuses on the deepening of a global 
BOX 1.2 World Bank performance on development cooperation
The World Bank’s performance on development 
cooperation has continuously improved and is among 
the strongest of all development partners. Evidence 
from international assessments, including the Paris 
Declaration Monitoring Survey, confirms the Bank’s 
sustained commitment to improving its own effective-
ness in support of stronger development outcomes. 
With the Global Partnership for Effective Develop-
ment Co-operation in mind, the Bank focuses on the 
following priorities:
Partner Country Leadership and Ownership. The 
Bank promotes better development cooperation and 




human capital, and strengthening stakeholder own-
ership to facilitate achievement of national develop-
ment goals.
•   Supporting public sector institutions and systems 
through better diagnostic, analytical, and measure-
ment tools. 
•   Enabling stronger government-led management of 
development support and greater integration of aid 
and other support into national budgets. 
•   Strengthening and using  country  systems—for 
budget and project management, procurement, 
financial management, environmental and social 
safeguards, and results measurement—with the 
ultimate objective of transforming development 
support into sustainable results.
Results. The Bank adopts results-orientation imple-
mentation by: 
•   Implementing a Corporate Scorecard, an institu-
tional-level IDA Results Measurement System, and 
an Annual Results Report. 
•   Mainstreaming a results culture with systematic 
results frameworks for all lending projects, pro-
grams, and country assistance strategies, as well 
as adopting new results-oriented financing instru-
ments such as the Program for Results (P4R); and 
increasing impact evaluations and evidence-based 
decision making through the collaborative Bank–
partner country Development Impact Evaluation 
Initiative (DIME). 
•   Supporting country capacity to implement results-
based approaches; building country statistical 
capacity to support enhanced and rigorous moni-
toring and evaluation; and working with regional 
Communities of Practice for cross-country knowl-
edge exchange and capacity development on results 
management. 
•   Using innovative tools such as geo-mapping, benefi-
ciary feedback, third-party monitoring, and other 
mechanisms to enhance social accountability and 
improve service delivery.
Transparency. The Bank has made great strides in the 
area of transparency by: 
•   Launching an Access to Information Policy, the 
Open Data and Open Knowledge initiatives, and 
the Open Access Repository. These initiatives 
encourage public access, help improve accountabil-
ity, and link funding to development outcomes and 
results.
•   Being identified as a global  leader on transpar-
ency by the Aid Transparency Index from Publish 
What You Fund and the transparency component 
of the Center for Global Development’s QuODA 
assessment. 
•   Demonstrating leadership as an active proponent 
and implementer of the International Aid Transpar-
ency Initiative (IATI), which sets a common stan-
dard for all development partners to share aid data. 
•   Supporting recipient country Open Government 
initiatives and efforts to improve budget manage-




a publicly available web-based source of informa-
tion about aid flows that seeks to better inform 
the global conversation about development fund-
ing. AidFlows began as a partnership between 
the OECD-DAC and the World Bank. AidFlows 
provides easy access to country-by-country infor-
mation in an intuitive visual format. The site has 
been well received by a range of users, including 
government officials in donor and recipient coun-
tries, aid agencies, MDBs, NGOs, and civil society 
organizations.
BOX 1.2 World Bank performance on development cooperation (continued)
Development partnerships beyond aid. The Bank 
integrates key themes and opportunities presented by 
the evolving development landscape through: 
•   Partnering with lower- and middle-income devel-
oping countries to facilitate support through 
South-South cooperation, including knowledge 
exchanges, technology transfers, investment, trade, 
and financial support. 
•   Leveraging funding from middle-income countries, 
the private sector, foundations, global funds and 
programs, and other sources that contribute signifi-
cantly to development. 
Countries in fragile and conflict situations face 
complex development challenges and are a special 
area of focus for the Bank. The New Deal for Engage-
ment in Fragile States sets out a collective vision and 
principles for engagement with these fragile and 
conflict-affected countries. The Bank is spearheading 
efforts in several key areas critical to successful imple-
mentation of the New Deal, such as supporting tech-
nical capacity in the g7+ (the country-owned and -led 
global mechanism to monitor, report, and draw atten-
tion to the unique challenges faced by fragile states), 
piloting peace-building and state-building Indicators 
for partner countries, and actively supporting forums 
for strengthening partnerships among partner coun-
tries, donors, MDBs, civil society organizations, and 
the private sector. 
Recognizing that progress on development coop-
eration at the global, institutional, and country levels 
is interlinked, the World Bank continues its engage-
ment and leadership in international platforms, initia-
tives, and partnerships; leads and innovates through 
institutional reforms, policies, and practices; and pro-
motes support for country-led and -owned develop-
ment efforts.
(box continues next page)
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nal mortality, and 52 projects address child 
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which focuses on the deepening of a global 
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from international assessments, including the Paris 
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ness in support of stronger development outcomes. 
With the Global Partnership for Effective Develop-
ment Co-operation in mind, the Bank focuses on the 
following priorities:
Partner Country Leadership and Ownership. The 
Bank promotes better development cooperation and 




human capital, and strengthening stakeholder own-
ership to facilitate achievement of national develop-
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•   Supporting public sector institutions and systems 
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ment tools. 
•   Enabling stronger government-led management of 
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and other support into national budgets. 
•   Strengthening and using  country  systems—for 
budget and project management, procurement, 
financial management, environmental and social 
safeguards, and results measurement—with the 
ultimate objective of transforming development 
support into sustainable results.
Results. The Bank adopts results-orientation imple-
mentation by: 
•   Implementing a Corporate Scorecard, an institu-
tional-level IDA Results Measurement System, and 
an Annual Results Report. 
•   Mainstreaming a results culture with systematic 
results frameworks for all lending projects, pro-
grams, and country assistance strategies, as well 
as adopting new results-oriented financing instru-
ments such as the Program for Results (P4R); and 
increasing impact evaluations and evidence-based 
decision making through the collaborative Bank–
partner country Development Impact Evaluation 
Initiative (DIME). 
•   Supporting country capacity to implement results-
based approaches; building country statistical 
capacity to support enhanced and rigorous moni-
toring and evaluation; and working with regional 
Communities of Practice for cross-country knowl-
edge exchange and capacity development on results 
management. 
•   Using innovative tools such as geo-mapping, benefi-
ciary feedback, third-party monitoring, and other 
mechanisms to enhance social accountability and 
improve service delivery.
Transparency. The Bank has made great strides in the 
area of transparency by: 
•   Launching an Access to Information Policy, the 
Open Data and Open Knowledge initiatives, and 
the Open Access Repository. These initiatives 
encourage public access, help improve accountabil-
ity, and link funding to development outcomes and 
results.
•   Being identified as a global  leader on transpar-
ency by the Aid Transparency Index from Publish 
What You Fund and the transparency component 
of the Center for Global Development’s QuODA 
assessment. 
•   Demonstrating leadership as an active proponent 
and implementer of the International Aid Transpar-
ency Initiative (IATI), which sets a common stan-
dard for all development partners to share aid data. 
•   Supporting recipient country Open Government 
initiatives and efforts to improve budget manage-




a publicly available web-based source of informa-
tion about aid flows that seeks to better inform 
the global conversation about development fund-
ing. AidFlows began as a partnership between 
the OECD-DAC and the World Bank. AidFlows 
provides easy access to country-by-country infor-
mation in an intuitive visual format. The site has 
been well received by a range of users, including 
government officials in donor and recipient coun-
tries, aid agencies, MDBs, NGOs, and civil society 
organizations.
BOX 1.2 World Bank performance on development cooperation (continued)
Development partnerships beyond aid. The Bank 
integrates key themes and opportunities presented by 
the evolving development landscape through: 
•   Partnering with lower- and middle-income devel-
oping countries to facilitate support through 
South-South cooperation, including knowledge 
exchanges, technology transfers, investment, trade, 
and financial support. 
•   Leveraging funding from middle-income countries, 
the private sector, foundations, global funds and 
programs, and other sources that contribute signifi-
cantly to development. 
Countries in fragile and conflict situations face 
complex development challenges and are a special 
area of focus for the Bank. The New Deal for Engage-
ment in Fragile States sets out a collective vision and 
principles for engagement with these fragile and 
conflict-affected countries. The Bank is spearheading 
efforts in several key areas critical to successful imple-
mentation of the New Deal, such as supporting tech-
nical capacity in the g7+ (the country-owned and -led 
global mechanism to monitor, report, and draw atten-
tion to the unique challenges faced by fragile states), 
piloting peace-building and state-building Indicators 
for partner countries, and actively supporting forums 
for strengthening partnerships among partner coun-
tries, donors, MDBs, civil society organizations, and 
the private sector. 
Recognizing that progress on development coop-
eration at the global, institutional, and country levels 
is interlinked, the World Bank continues its engage-
ment and leadership in international platforms, initia-
tives, and partnerships; leads and innovates through 
institutional reforms, policies, and practices; and pro-
motes support for country-led and -owned develop-
ment efforts.
(box continues next page)
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partnership for development. A specific 
description of this sub-MDG was chosen and 
indicators identified. Target 8F states that, 
in cooperation with the private sector, the 
benefits of new technologies, especially those 
related to information and communications, 
will be made available. 
An evaluation of these indicators shows 
that mobile phone subscriptions have risen 
exponentially across the globe, while growth 
in the number of fixed telephone lines has 
stagnated. Impressive increases have also 
taken place in Internet usage, although 
here progress is more diverse, with stron-
ger growth in high-income countries than 
in low- and middle-income countries. Even 
though access challenges remain, particularly 
in low-income countries, the extraordinary 
rise in mobile phone penetration has led to 
the emergence of a variety of innovations 
that allow citizens, governments, and inter-
national organizations to be more engaged 
and better informed, and that enable aid 
providers to identify and communicate more 
directly with beneficiaries. 
In addition to the various business oppor-
tunities it has made possible, the evolution of 
ICT has also opened up a range of opportu-
nities to improve the effectiveness of govern-
ment programs and associated aid financing, 
consequently accelerating attainment of the 
MDGs. Table 1.8 illustrates how mobile tele-
phone technology has assisted countries in 
making progress toward each MDG. Many 
more examples demonstrate how ICT can 
facilitate service delivery. Indeed many gov-
ernments around the globe, in varying stages 
of development, are adopting ICT, particu-
larly mobile communication technologies, to 
assist in this endeavor. At the same time, var-
ious international aid agencies are exploring 
opportunities to deliver aid more effectively 
using ICT (for example, the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation).
What can governments do to foster ICT 
for development?
Numerous studies have found a positive 
relationship between ICT adoption and 
economic development in general. The wide-
spread availability of ICT and mobile phone 
usage has created opportunities for govern-
ments to strengthen service delivery and 
enhance governance. 
An evaluation of initial experiences sug-
gests that the benefits accrue to those coun-
tries that put in place policies and programs 
that not only enable technological transfor-
mation but also support institutional reforms 
and process redesign through which services 
are delivered (World Bank 2012). Fostering 
an accelerated diffusion of ICT in develop-
ing countries requires undertaking country-
specific analysis to take into account local 
conditions and translating these findings 
into policy actions that enable and encour-
age development of the demand and supply 
sides of ICT. On the demand side, afford-
ability of mobile devices and services is a 
concern, while on the supply side, common 
bottlenecks such as spectrum and backbone 
networks must be addressed. 
What can international organizations 
do to foster ICT for aid effectiveness?
International agencies have been increas-
ingly interested in leveraging the rapid spread 
of ICT such as mobile phones to better hear 
the voices of beneficiaries in developing 
countries. By reducing barriers to accessing 
information, technology can facilitate trans-
parency and contribute to accountability. 
Information and communication technology 
can help solicit, provide, and respond to feed-
back regarding projects and programs for 
development. In addition, ICT can also help 
reduce the transaction costs of, for exam-
ple, payment systems and improve access to 
finance. 
Introducing new technologies to improve 
citizens’ feedback has significantly reduced 
the barriers of cost, time, and space that 
have historically constrained direct interac-
tions with citizens (box 1.3). By using these 
ever-evolving tools, governments and inter-
national aid agencies can improve the success 
of feedback mechanisms to increase the effec-
tiveness of development programs. 
TABLE 1.8 Mobile technology and the Millennium Development Goals
 MDG Example
Poverty and  A study of grain traders in Niger found that cell phones improved consumer welfare (Aker and Mbiti
hunger   2008). Access to cell phones allowed traders to obtain better information about grain prices across the 
country without the high cost of having to travel to different markets. On average, grain traders with 
cell phones had 29 percent higher profits than those without cell phones. In Niger, demand for cell 
phones sprang up organically rather than through a specific program.  
Universal  According to a survey of teachers in villages in four African countries, one-quarter reported that the
education   use of mobile phones helped increase student attendance. A main factor was that teachers could 
contact parents to enquire about their child’s whereabouts (Puri et al. n.d.). Mobile phones have also 
been used in Uganda to track school attendance and detect patterns in attendance, for instance 
by village, by day of the week, and by season. Tracking pupils’ attendance also indirectly tracks 
absenteeism among teachers (Twaweza 2010).
Gender equality  A study looking at gender differences in the availability and use of mobile phones in developing 
countries reported that 93 percent of women who had mobile phones felt safer because of having 
the phone, 85 percent felt more independent, and 41 percent had increased income or professional 
opportunities (GSM Association 2011).  
Child health  A program using text messaging to identify malnutrition among rural children in Malawi is notable for 
its impact on the speed and quality of data flows.a Using a system called RapidSMS, health workers in 
rural areas were able to transmit weight and height information in two minutes—it took two months 
with the previous system. The data entry error rate was significantly improved, to just 2.8 percent from 
14.2 percent in the old system. The improved information flow enabled experts to analyze data more 
quickly and accurately, identify children at risk, and provide treatment information to health staff in 
the field. 
Maternal health  One of the earliest uses of mobile technology to improve maternal health took place in rural districts 
of Uganda in the late 1990s. Traditional birth attendants were provided with walkie-talkies, allowing 
them to stay in contact with health centers and obtain advice. An assessment of the program found 
that it cut maternal mortality roughly in half (Musoke 2002). 
HIV/AIDS  In Kenya, weekly text messages were sent to AIDS patients to remind them to take their antiretroviral 
drugs (Lester et al. 2010). Those who received the text messages had significantly higher rates of 
taking the drugs than those who did not. The study noted that text messaging intervention was less 
expensive than in-person community adherence interventions on the basis of travel costs alone and 
could theoretically translate into huge health and economic benefits if scaled up.
Environment  According to one forecast, mobile technology could lower greenhouse gas emissions 2 percent by 
the year 2020 (GSM Association 2009). This reduction could be met, among other ways, through 
widespread adoption of various mobile-enabled technologies such as smart transportation and 
logistics, smart grids and meters, smart buildings, and “dematerialization” (or replacing the physical 
movement of goods and services with online transmission). Mobile phones can also be used as tools 
for environmental monitoring. For example, cab drivers in Accra, Ghana, were outfitted with mobile 
phones with GPS and a tube containing a carbon monoxide sensor to test pollution levels.b
Partnership   MDG target 8F states: “In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications.” Mobile phone penetration in low-
income economies grew from less than one per 100 people in 2000 to almost one per every three in 
2010—largely as a result of private sector investment. Of some 800 telecommunications projects in 
developing countries with private sector participation between 1990 and 2009, almost three-quarters 
involved greenfield operations, primarily in mobile telephony.c
Source: World Bank 2012.
a. “Malawi—Nutritional Surveillance” on the RapidSMS web site: http://www.rapidsms.org/case-studies/malawi-nutritional-surviellence/.
b. http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/vodafone/tech_social_change/Environmental_Conservation_case3.pdf. 
c. World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. http://ppi.worldbank.org. Date: 04/03/2011.
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partnership for development. A specific 
description of this sub-MDG was chosen and 
indicators identified. Target 8F states that, 
in cooperation with the private sector, the 
benefits of new technologies, especially those 
related to information and communications, 
will be made available. 
An evaluation of these indicators shows 
that mobile phone subscriptions have risen 
exponentially across the globe, while growth 
in the number of fixed telephone lines has 
stagnated. Impressive increases have also 
taken place in Internet usage, although 
here progress is more diverse, with stron-
ger growth in high-income countries than 
in low- and middle-income countries. Even 
though access challenges remain, particularly 
in low-income countries, the extraordinary 
rise in mobile phone penetration has led to 
the emergence of a variety of innovations 
that allow citizens, governments, and inter-
national organizations to be more engaged 
and better informed, and that enable aid 
providers to identify and communicate more 
directly with beneficiaries. 
In addition to the various business oppor-
tunities it has made possible, the evolution of 
ICT has also opened up a range of opportu-
nities to improve the effectiveness of govern-
ment programs and associated aid financing, 
consequently accelerating attainment of the 
MDGs. Table 1.8 illustrates how mobile tele-
phone technology has assisted countries in 
making progress toward each MDG. Many 
more examples demonstrate how ICT can 
facilitate service delivery. Indeed many gov-
ernments around the globe, in varying stages 
of development, are adopting ICT, particu-
larly mobile communication technologies, to 
assist in this endeavor. At the same time, var-
ious international aid agencies are exploring 
opportunities to deliver aid more effectively 
using ICT (for example, the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation).
What can governments do to foster ICT 
for development?
Numerous studies have found a positive 
relationship between ICT adoption and 
economic development in general. The wide-
spread availability of ICT and mobile phone 
usage has created opportunities for govern-
ments to strengthen service delivery and 
enhance governance. 
An evaluation of initial experiences sug-
gests that the benefits accrue to those coun-
tries that put in place policies and programs 
that not only enable technological transfor-
mation but also support institutional reforms 
and process redesign through which services 
are delivered (World Bank 2012). Fostering 
an accelerated diffusion of ICT in develop-
ing countries requires undertaking country-
specific analysis to take into account local 
conditions and translating these findings 
into policy actions that enable and encour-
age development of the demand and supply 
sides of ICT. On the demand side, afford-
ability of mobile devices and services is a 
concern, while on the supply side, common 
bottlenecks such as spectrum and backbone 
networks must be addressed. 
What can international organizations 
do to foster ICT for aid effectiveness?
International agencies have been increas-
ingly interested in leveraging the rapid spread 
of ICT such as mobile phones to better hear 
the voices of beneficiaries in developing 
countries. By reducing barriers to accessing 
information, technology can facilitate trans-
parency and contribute to accountability. 
Information and communication technology 
can help solicit, provide, and respond to feed-
back regarding projects and programs for 
development. In addition, ICT can also help 
reduce the transaction costs of, for exam-
ple, payment systems and improve access to 
finance. 
Introducing new technologies to improve 
citizens’ feedback has significantly reduced 
the barriers of cost, time, and space that 
have historically constrained direct interac-
tions with citizens (box 1.3). By using these 
ever-evolving tools, governments and inter-
national aid agencies can improve the success 
of feedback mechanisms to increase the effec-
tiveness of development programs. 
TABLE 1.8 Mobile technology and the Millennium Development Goals
 MDG Example
Poverty and  A study of grain traders in Niger found that cell phones improved consumer welfare (Aker and Mbiti
hunger   2008). Access to cell phones allowed traders to obtain better information about grain prices across the 
country without the high cost of having to travel to different markets. On average, grain traders with 
cell phones had 29 percent higher profits than those without cell phones. In Niger, demand for cell 
phones sprang up organically rather than through a specific program.  
Universal  According to a survey of teachers in villages in four African countries, one-quarter reported that the
education   use of mobile phones helped increase student attendance. A main factor was that teachers could 
contact parents to enquire about their child’s whereabouts (Puri et al. n.d.). Mobile phones have also 
been used in Uganda to track school attendance and detect patterns in attendance, for instance 
by village, by day of the week, and by season. Tracking pupils’ attendance also indirectly tracks 
absenteeism among teachers (Twaweza 2010).
Gender equality  A study looking at gender differences in the availability and use of mobile phones in developing 
countries reported that 93 percent of women who had mobile phones felt safer because of having 
the phone, 85 percent felt more independent, and 41 percent had increased income or professional 
opportunities (GSM Association 2011).  
Child health  A program using text messaging to identify malnutrition among rural children in Malawi is notable for 
its impact on the speed and quality of data flows.a Using a system called RapidSMS, health workers in 
rural areas were able to transmit weight and height information in two minutes—it took two months 
with the previous system. The data entry error rate was significantly improved, to just 2.8 percent from 
14.2 percent in the old system. The improved information flow enabled experts to analyze data more 
quickly and accurately, identify children at risk, and provide treatment information to health staff in 
the field. 
Maternal health  One of the earliest uses of mobile technology to improve maternal health took place in rural districts 
of Uganda in the late 1990s. Traditional birth attendants were provided with walkie-talkies, allowing 
them to stay in contact with health centers and obtain advice. An assessment of the program found 
that it cut maternal mortality roughly in half (Musoke 2002). 
HIV/AIDS  In Kenya, weekly text messages were sent to AIDS patients to remind them to take their antiretroviral 
drugs (Lester et al. 2010). Those who received the text messages had significantly higher rates of 
taking the drugs than those who did not. The study noted that text messaging intervention was less 
expensive than in-person community adherence interventions on the basis of travel costs alone and 
could theoretically translate into huge health and economic benefits if scaled up.
Environment  According to one forecast, mobile technology could lower greenhouse gas emissions 2 percent by 
the year 2020 (GSM Association 2009). This reduction could be met, among other ways, through 
widespread adoption of various mobile-enabled technologies such as smart transportation and 
logistics, smart grids and meters, smart buildings, and “dematerialization” (or replacing the physical 
movement of goods and services with online transmission). Mobile phones can also be used as tools 
for environmental monitoring. For example, cab drivers in Accra, Ghana, were outfitted with mobile 
phones with GPS and a tube containing a carbon monoxide sensor to test pollution levels.b
Partnership   MDG target 8F states: “In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications.” Mobile phone penetration in low-
income economies grew from less than one per 100 people in 2000 to almost one per every three in 
2010—largely as a result of private sector investment. Of some 800 telecommunications projects in 
developing countries with private sector participation between 1990 and 2009, almost three-quarters 
involved greenfield operations, primarily in mobile telephony.c
Source: World Bank 2012.
a. “Malawi—Nutritional Surveillance” on the RapidSMS web site: http://www.rapidsms.org/case-studies/malawi-nutritional-surviellence/.
b. http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/vodafone/tech_social_change/Environmental_Conservation_case3.pdf. 
c. World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project Database. http://ppi.worldbank.org. Date: 04/03/2011.
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Notes
 1.  The classification of countries is the one used 
in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. 
Emerging market and developing countries 
are those countries that are not designated 
as advanced countries. Countries that are eli-
gible for financial assistance under the IMF’s 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust consti-
tute a subset of emerging market and devel-
oping countries; these countries are denoted 
low-income countries although eligibility is 
based on other considerations in addition to 
income levels. Emerging market and develop-
ing countries that are not eligible for financial 
assistance under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Trust are designated as emerging 
market countries. Fragile states are countries 
included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile 
and Conflict-Affected States as of early 2013. 
Appendix table A1.2 includes the list of all 
countries and economies. 
 2.  Each low-income country has been assessed 
according to a common set of criteria. For 
example, a country with a large fiscal defi-
cit and an unsustainable level of public debt 
would be judged to have an unsatisfactory fis-
cal policy stance.
 3.  Somalia and South Sudan have been excluded 
from the IMF’s vulnerability exercise for low-
income countries, because of lack of data.
 4.  Small low-income countries are those with a 
population less than 1.5 million.
 5.  All data under the vulnerability exercise refer 
to the median observation for 72 low-income 
countries, unless otherwise noted.
 6.  Fiscal consolidation would also be needed in 
some resource-rich countries to build buffers 
over time that would help manage challenges 
arising from volatility and exhaustibility of 
natural resources.
 7.  The index uses a globally consistent defi-
nition of settlement concentration based 
on population density, the population of a 
“large” urban center, and travel time to that 
large urban center.
 8.  In comparison, the United Nations World 
Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision, 
(April 2012) estimates the average urban 
population share to be 52 percent in 2010. 
The United Nations database is a more com-
prehensive and detailed data source; however, 
the definition of urbanization is not necessar-
ily the same across countries. 
 9.  The methodology provides a way to construct 
a linear approximation of a Lorenz curve that 
minimizes the difference between the linear 
approximation and the actual Lorenz curve. 
The linear segments represent different cat-
egories of countries. In this application, these 
linear segments represent low-, medium-, and 
high-agglomeration or -income countries. 
10.  World Bank and IMF member countries as of 
early 2013. For the 26 countries for which no 
agglomeration data are available, countries 
were assigned agglomeration status based 
on heuristic comparisons with like countries. 
GDP per capita income estimates exclude ten 
countries owing to lack of data. 
11.  The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 
0.58 (statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level).
12.  The initials appearing in the graphs corre-
spond to the following countries: Bangla-
desh (BGD), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon 
(CMR), Ghana (GHA), Guinea (GIN),  Indo-
nesia (IDN), Mali (MLI), Mauritius (MUS), 
Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), 
Philippines (PHL), Rwanda (RWA), Senegal 
(SEN), South Africa (ZAF), Tanzania (TZA), 
Uganda (UGA), Vietnam (VNM), and Zam-
bia (ZMB).
13.  www.globaltradealert.org 
14.  The realistic deliverables refer to the topics in 
which negotiations saw progress over the past 
12 months, including trade facilitation, agri-
culture, special and differential treatment, 
least-developed country issues, and dispute 
settlement.
15.  Country programmable aid is total ODA cor-
rected for aid that is inherently unpredictable 
(humanitarian and disaster relief aid); that 
entails no flows to the recipient country (such 
as donor administrative cost); and whose 
BOX 1.3 Potential uses of mobile phone surveys
As mobile phone ownership rates have risen dramati-
cally in Africa, interest has increased in using mobile 
telephones as a data collection platform. Face-to-face 
household surveys are usually expensive and time 
consuming, and mobile phone surveys are proving to 
be a cost-effective, flexible, and rapid way to collect 
data on a wide range of topics and over time.
South Sudan and Tanzania have both piloted 
mobile phone surveys, with reasonable success. In 
South Sudan, 1,000 respondents in 10 urban areas 
were given cell phones in 2010 and surveyed on a 
monthly basis. In Tanzania, 550 households were 
administered a baseline survey in 2010, and an adult 
respondent was selected for a weekly mobile phone 
survey (for 25 weeks), later administered every 2 
weeks (for 8 weeks). Both surveys collected informa-
tion on a wide variety of issues, including health, edu-
cation, water, security, nutrition, travel times, prices, 
electricity, and governance. The surveys also asked 
respondents for their perceptions on the most press-
ing problems to be addressed by the city government 
and their opinion about a draft constitution, and col-
lected baseline information for large-scale programs 
on food fortification.
The cost per interview in each round in Tanzania 
ranged between $4.10 and $7.30, or about $0.42 a 
question (plus $50–$150 for a baseline interview). 
Thus for long surveys, face-to-face interviews may 
be more cost-effective. However, the evidence from 
South Sudan and Tanzania suggests that mobile sur-
veys can collect quality data in a timely manner that 
is of use to a wide range of data users. Attrition and 
nonresponse need to be dealt with at implementation, 
but the ability to modify surveys easily in subsequent 
survey rounds is a key benefit. 
Last, the data collected in Tanzania were widely 
disseminated through a dedicated website, with addi-
tional help from a local television journalist who 
ensured that information was widely publicized. 
Accountability for public services has reportedly 
increased, suggesting that results need to be dissemi-
nated systematically to civil society, the media, and 
the government to be fully effective.
Source: Croke et al. 2013.
use is determined through dialogue between 
the donor agency and partner government. 
In addition, loan repayments are netted out 
because they are not normally part of aid allo-
cation decisions by donor governments (OECD 
2010).
16.  See http://www.sanitationandwaterforall.org 
for more information. 
17.  See http://scalingupnutrition.org/ and the 
2012 Global Monitoring Report for more 
information. 
18.  See http://www.rbfhealth.org/ for more 
information. 
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ing countries that are not eligible for financial 
assistance under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Trust are designated as emerging 
market countries. Fragile states are countries 
included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile 
and Conflict-Affected States as of early 2013. 
Appendix table A1.2 includes the list of all 
countries and economies. 
 2.  Each low-income country has been assessed 
according to a common set of criteria. For 
example, a country with a large fiscal defi-
cit and an unsustainable level of public debt 
would be judged to have an unsatisfactory fis-
cal policy stance.
 3.  Somalia and South Sudan have been excluded 
from the IMF’s vulnerability exercise for low-
income countries, because of lack of data.
 4.  Small low-income countries are those with a 
population less than 1.5 million.
 5.  All data under the vulnerability exercise refer 
to the median observation for 72 low-income 
countries, unless otherwise noted.
 6.  Fiscal consolidation would also be needed in 
some resource-rich countries to build buffers 
over time that would help manage challenges 
arising from volatility and exhaustibility of 
natural resources.
 7.  The index uses a globally consistent defi-
nition of settlement concentration based 
on population density, the population of a 
“large” urban center, and travel time to that 
large urban center.
 8.  In comparison, the United Nations World 
Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision, 
(April 2012) estimates the average urban 
population share to be 52 percent in 2010. 
The United Nations database is a more com-
prehensive and detailed data source; however, 
the definition of urbanization is not necessar-
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 9.  The methodology provides a way to construct 
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The linear segments represent different cat-
egories of countries. In this application, these 
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10.  World Bank and IMF member countries as of 
early 2013. For the 26 countries for which no 
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countries owing to lack of data. 
11.  The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 
0.58 (statistically significant at the 5 percent 
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12.  The initials appearing in the graphs corre-
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desh (BGD), Cambodia (KHM), Cameroon 
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Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), 
Philippines (PHL), Rwanda (RWA), Senegal 
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Uganda (UGA), Vietnam (VNM), and Zam-
bia (ZMB).
13.  www.globaltradealert.org 
14.  The realistic deliverables refer to the topics in 
which negotiations saw progress over the past 
12 months, including trade facilitation, agri-
culture, special and differential treatment, 
least-developed country issues, and dispute 
settlement.
15.  Country programmable aid is total ODA cor-
rected for aid that is inherently unpredictable 
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BOX 1.3 Potential uses of mobile phone surveys
As mobile phone ownership rates have risen dramati-
cally in Africa, interest has increased in using mobile 
telephones as a data collection platform. Face-to-face 
household surveys are usually expensive and time 
consuming, and mobile phone surveys are proving to 
be a cost-effective, flexible, and rapid way to collect 
data on a wide range of topics and over time.
South Sudan and Tanzania have both piloted 
mobile phone surveys, with reasonable success. In 
South Sudan, 1,000 respondents in 10 urban areas 
were given cell phones in 2010 and surveyed on a 
monthly basis. In Tanzania, 550 households were 
administered a baseline survey in 2010, and an adult 
respondent was selected for a weekly mobile phone 
survey (for 25 weeks), later administered every 2 
weeks (for 8 weeks). Both surveys collected informa-
tion on a wide variety of issues, including health, edu-
cation, water, security, nutrition, travel times, prices, 
electricity, and governance. The surveys also asked 
respondents for their perceptions on the most press-
ing problems to be addressed by the city government 
and their opinion about a draft constitution, and col-
lected baseline information for large-scale programs 
on food fortification.
The cost per interview in each round in Tanzania 
ranged between $4.10 and $7.30, or about $0.42 a 
question (plus $50–$150 for a baseline interview). 
Thus for long surveys, face-to-face interviews may 
be more cost-effective. However, the evidence from 
South Sudan and Tanzania suggests that mobile sur-
veys can collect quality data in a timely manner that 
is of use to a wide range of data users. Attrition and 
nonresponse need to be dealt with at implementation, 
but the ability to modify surveys easily in subsequent 
survey rounds is a key benefit. 
Last, the data collected in Tanzania were widely 
disseminated through a dedicated website, with addi-
tional help from a local television journalist who 
ensured that information was widely publicized. 
Accountability for public services has reportedly 
increased, suggesting that results need to be dissemi-
nated systematically to civil society, the media, and 
the government to be fully effective.
Source: Croke et al. 2013.
use is determined through dialogue between 
the donor agency and partner government. 
In addition, loan repayments are netted out 
because they are not normally part of aid allo-
cation decisions by donor governments (OECD 
2010).
16.  See http://www.sanitationandwaterforall.org 
for more information. 
17.  See http://scalingupnutrition.org/ and the 
2012 Global Monitoring Report for more 
information. 
18.  See http://www.rbfhealth.org/ for more 
information. 
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According to various estimates, 40 per-
cent of the increase in the urban population 
in developing countries comes from migration 
or reclassification of rural to urban (Chen 
et al. 1998; UN-Habitat 2008). In China 
and Indonesia, however, rural-urban migra-
tion and reclassification of rural and urban 
boundaries are estimated to account for more 
than 70 percent of urban growth in the 1980s 
and about 80 percent in the 1990s.1 These 
migration patterns have vital consequences 
for the effect of urbanization on poverty as 
well as implications for policies that can make 
urbanization a force for poverty reduction.
To better understand these rural-urban 
dynamics, this chapter looks first at the dis-
parities in attaining the MDGs between rural 
and urban areas, including small towns and 
peri-urban areas. The chapter continues with 
an overview of the pace and causes of urban-
ization, the role of rural-to-urban migration 
dynamics, and the consequences for attain-
ment of the eight MDGs discussed in this 
report. 
Trends in rural-urban poverty 
Of the 1.3 billion poor in developing coun-
tries in 2008, 76 percent resided in rural areas 
In 2011, nearly 50 percent of the population 
in developing countries lived in areas classi-
fied as urban, compared with less than 30 
percent in the 1980s (figure 2.1). Urbaniza-
tion has implications for attaining the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs). Man-
aged with care, it can benefit residents of 
both urban and rural areas; managed poorly, 
urbanization can marginalize the poor in 
both areas. Slums are a symptom of the mar-
ginalization of the urban poor. Close to 1 bil-
lion people live in urban slums in developing 
countries, including middle-income countries 
like Brazil and emerging countries like China 
and India (UN-Habitat 2010). 
Location remains important at all stages 
of development, but it matters less in rich 
countries than in poor ones. Estimates from 
more than 100 Living Standard Surveys indi-
cate that households in the most prosperous 
areas of developing countries such as Bra-
zil, Bulgaria, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, 
and Sri Lanka have an average consumption 
almost 75 percent higher than that of simi-
lar households in the lagging areas of these 
countries. In comparison, the disparity is 
less than 25 percent in developed countries 
such as Canada, Japan, and the United States 
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(figure 2.2). In South Asia, which had the 
largest number of poor in 2008, poverty was 
high in rural and urban areas (table 2.1). A ten 
percentage point difference between rural and 
urban poverty rates in 1990 persisted until 
2008. In 1990, East Asia had almost 1 bil-
lion poor and the highest rural poverty rate of 
about 67 percent. Its achievement in reducing 
rural poverty to 20 percent by 2008 is spec-
tacular. East Asia has an equally impressive 
record in eradicating urban poverty from 24 
percent in 1990 to 4 percent in 2008. Sub-
Saharan Africa remains the last frontier in 
the fight to reduce poverty.  Nearly half of the 
rural and one third of the urban population 
lived on less than $1.25 a day in 2008. For 
each poor person in an urban area, there were 
2.5 as many in rural areas. In South Asia, for 
each poor person in an urban area, there were 
three poor ones in rural areas (map 2.1).
Unveiling the face of urban 
poverty 
Urban poverty is not uniformly distributed 
across a country’s cities and towns. Popula-
tions are typically conceptualized as being 
spatially bipolar: people live in either rural 
or urban places. Poverty, too, is typically 
seen from this perspective. In reality, people 
and poverty are located along a continuous 
“settlement” spectrum ranging from sparsely 
populated rural areas, to small towns to 
small cities, to megacities (figure 2.3). In 
2010, some 17.5 percent of the urban popu-
lation in developing countries lived in cities 
of 5 million or more; 31 percent lived in cit-
ies of 0.5 to 5 million, and 51 percent lived 
in smaller towns (table 2.2) (UN 2011). The 
FIGURE 2.2 Overall poverty has declined 

























































Rural (left axis) Urban (left axis)
Number of poor people (right axis)
TABLE 2.1 Poverty rates are falling in both urban and rural areas but are lower in urban areas 
Share of the population below $1.25 a day
  1990 1996 2002 2008
  rural urban rural urban rural urban rural urban
East Asia and Pacific 67.5 24.4 45.9 13.0 39.2  6.9 20.4  4.3
Europe and Central Asia  2.2  0.9  6.3  2.8  4.4  1.1  1.2  0.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 21.0  7.4 20.3  6.3 20.3  8.3 13.2  3.1
Middle East and North Africa  9.1  1.9  5.6  0.9  7.5  1.2  4.1  0.8
South Asia 50.5 40.1 46.1 35.2 45.1 35.2 38.0 29.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 55.0 41.5 56.8 40.6 52.3 41.4 47.1 33.6
Total 52.5 20.5 43.0 17.0 39.5 15.1 29.4 11.6
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
MAP 2.1 Povery is becoming more urban in more urbanized regions
Source: GMR 2013 team.
Note: The agglomeration index was developed by the WDR 2009 team. They define an agglomerated area as having these metrics: a settlement’s population size (more than 50,000 
people); population density (more than 150 people per square kilometer); and travel time to the nearest large city (60 minutes). The graduated circles are roughly proportional to the 
total poor population and show the relative share of rural and urban poor.
distribution of the urban poor follows a simi-
lar pattern, with the smallest share living in 
megacities and larger shares living in medium 
and small towns. Indeed, the large cities are 
not necessarily places where the poor are also 
concentrated (table 2.3). 




















































FIGURE 2.1 The world is becoming more urban
Source: World Bank 2012c.
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FIGURE 2.1 The world is becoming more urban
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With the aid of new analytical techniques 
that combine census and household survey 
data, researchers have constructed  “poverty–
city size gradients” that reveal interesting 
insights on the relationship between poverty 
and city size (Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lan-
jouw 2002, 2003). Recent research for a 
large number of countries shows that urban 
poverty is clearly lowest in the largest cities 
(Ferré, Ferreira, and Lanjouw 2012). In the 
1970s and 1980s, better provision of services 
in urban areas of developing countries led 
to the perception that governments had an 
“urban bias” (Lipton 1977). In recent years, 
researchers who have analyzed the poverty–
city size gradient have raised similar ques-
tions: Is there a “metropolitan bias” in the 
allocation of resources to larger cities at the 
expense of smaller towns?2
In a fairly large number of developing 
countries, not only is the incidence of poverty 
higher in small cities and towns than in the 
large urban areas, but these smaller urban 
centers also account for a larger share of the 
urban poor. In such countries as Brazil and 
Thailand, with well-known megacities such 
as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Bangkok, 
the share of the urban poor residing in small- 
and medium-size towns exceeds that in the 
largest cities. In Brazil, one of the most urban-
ized developing countries, 83 percent of the 
population is settled relatively evenly along 
the urban spatial spectrum—22 percent in 
megacities, 33 percent in intermediate-size 
cities, and 28 percent in the smallest towns. 
Brazilian poverty has a predominantly urban 
face, though not in its megacities: 72 percent 
of the poor live in urban areas, but surpris-
ingly, only 9 percent reside in the megacities 
of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The rest of 
the poor are concentrated in medium (17 per-
cent) and very small towns (39 percent). In 
Thailand, the share of the urban poor is 17 
percent, of which 76 percent resides in extra 
small towns. 
Findings from a study of eight develop-
ing countries show that with the exception 
of Mexico, the urban population was con-
centrated in the largest cities but the urban 
poor were dispersed along a continuum 
of medium, small, and extra small towns 
(table 2.3). Lower rates of poverty in large 
cities are consistent with the hypotheses of 
urban growth being driven by agglomeration 
externalities. 
Many small countries do not have a mega-
city, and nearly all large countries have many 
large cities of various sizes as well as one or 
several megacities. Similarly, the small towns 
in small countries are significantly smaller 
than the small towns in large countries. In 
addition, while official boundaries rarely 
demarcate them as “slums,” the size of urban 
cityscapes that can be considered slums is 
significant. Almost by definition, slums are 
home to many of the urban poor. Asia is 
home to 61 percent of the world’s nearly 1 
billion slum dwellers; Africa 25.5 percent; 
and Latin America, 13.4 percent. The num-
ber of slum dwellers is projected to grow by 
nearly 500 million between now and 2020 
(UN-Habitat 2010). The proportion of urban 
residents living in slums is already about 62 
percent in Africa. Between 2000 and 2010, 
the increase in the absolute number of slum 
dwellers was greatest in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
southeastern Asia, southern Asia, and west-
ern Asia.3 While southern Asia, southeastern 
Asia, and eastern Asia have made impressive 
progress in moving people out of slums, the 
most significant reductions have occurred 
in North Africa. During 2000–10, regional 
differences in the success of addressing the 
MDG 7.d slum target (achieve, by 2020, a 
significant improvement in the lives of at least 
100 million slum dwellers), were self-evident, 
with some 227 million people moving out of 
slum conditions.4 
The effects of urban poverty can be as 
dehumanizing and intense as those associated 
with rural poverty. Various MDG indicators 
showed remarkable similarities between slum 
and rural areas. For instance, in low-income 
countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Haiti, India, Nepal, and Niger—countries 
where poverty is seen as primarily a rural 
phenomenon—4 of every 10 slum children 
are malnourished, a rate comparable to that 
found in the rural areas of these countries. 
Likewise, in cities such as Khartoum and 
Nairobi, the prevalence of diarrhea is much 
higher among slum children than among 
children in the rural areas of Kenya and 
Sudan. In slums, child deaths result less from 
TABLE 2.2 Distribution of urban population by size of urban area 
  Number of agglomerations   Population in urban areas (in 1,000s)   Percentage of urban population
 City size class 1975 2005 2010   1975 2005 2010   1975 2005 2010
10 million or more 3 19 23  53,185 284,943 352,465  3.5 8.9 9.9
5 to 10 million 14 33 38  109,426 229,718 266,078  7.1 7.2 7.5
1 to 5 million 144 340 388  291,663 667,652 759,919  19.0 20.9 21.4
500,000 to 1 million 224 463 513  155,770 317,166 353,802  10.1 9.9 9.9
Fewer than 500,000 — — —  927,625 1,698,055 1,826,313  60.3 53.1 51.3
Source: UN 2011.
Note: — = not available.
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Source: Adapted from World Bank 2009.
TABLE 2.3 The poor are disproportionately concentrated in smaller cities and towns 
Percent
 Country  Urban XL L M S XS
Albania      
Population share 42  — — 15 13 14
Share of the poor 31 —  — 11 9 11
Brazil    —    
Population share 83 22 7 24 1 28
Share of the poor 72 9 6 17 1 39
Kazakhstan       
Population share 57 8  — 29 5 15
Share of the poor 43 1  — 21 5 15
Kenya       
Population share 19 7 2 3 2 4
Share of the poor 16 6 2 3 2 4
Mexico       
Population share 6 27 13 11 4 6
Share of the poor 39 16 6 7 3 7
Morocco       
Population share 51 12 9 27 3 1
Share of the poor 34 3 7 2 3 1
Sri Lanka       
Population share 12  — 3 3 2 4
Share of the poor 5  — 1 1 1 2
Thailand       
Population share 31 12  — 3 2 14
Share of the poor 17 1  — 1 1 13
Source: Ferré, Ferreira and Lanjouw 2012.
Note: Population share = percent of the population living in each category; share of the poor = percent of the country’s poor living in each category.
XL =  > 1m; L = 500k–1m; M = 100k–500k; S = 50k–100k; XS = < 50k. 
— = not available.
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With the aid of new analytical techniques 
that combine census and household survey 
data, researchers have constructed  “poverty–
city size gradients” that reveal interesting 
insights on the relationship between poverty 
and city size (Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lan-
jouw 2002, 2003). Recent research for a 
large number of countries shows that urban 
poverty is clearly lowest in the largest cities 
(Ferré, Ferreira, and Lanjouw 2012). In the 
1970s and 1980s, better provision of services 
in urban areas of developing countries led 
to the perception that governments had an 
“urban bias” (Lipton 1977). In recent years, 
researchers who have analyzed the poverty–
city size gradient have raised similar ques-
tions: Is there a “metropolitan bias” in the 
allocation of resources to larger cities at the 
expense of smaller towns?2
In a fairly large number of developing 
countries, not only is the incidence of poverty 
higher in small cities and towns than in the 
large urban areas, but these smaller urban 
centers also account for a larger share of the 
urban poor. In such countries as Brazil and 
Thailand, with well-known megacities such 
as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Bangkok, 
the share of the urban poor residing in small- 
and medium-size towns exceeds that in the 
largest cities. In Brazil, one of the most urban-
ized developing countries, 83 percent of the 
population is settled relatively evenly along 
the urban spatial spectrum—22 percent in 
megacities, 33 percent in intermediate-size 
cities, and 28 percent in the smallest towns. 
Brazilian poverty has a predominantly urban 
face, though not in its megacities: 72 percent 
of the poor live in urban areas, but surpris-
ingly, only 9 percent reside in the megacities 
of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The rest of 
the poor are concentrated in medium (17 per-
cent) and very small towns (39 percent). In 
Thailand, the share of the urban poor is 17 
percent, of which 76 percent resides in extra 
small towns. 
Findings from a study of eight develop-
ing countries show that with the exception 
of Mexico, the urban population was con-
centrated in the largest cities but the urban 
poor were dispersed along a continuum 
of medium, small, and extra small towns 
(table 2.3). Lower rates of poverty in large 
cities are consistent with the hypotheses of 
urban growth being driven by agglomeration 
externalities. 
Many small countries do not have a mega-
city, and nearly all large countries have many 
large cities of various sizes as well as one or 
several megacities. Similarly, the small towns 
in small countries are significantly smaller 
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with some 227 million people moving out of 
slum conditions.4 
The effects of urban poverty can be as 
dehumanizing and intense as those associated 
with rural poverty. Various MDG indicators 
showed remarkable similarities between slum 
and rural areas. For instance, in low-income 
countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Haiti, India, Nepal, and Niger—countries 
where poverty is seen as primarily a rural 
phenomenon—4 of every 10 slum children 
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infectious diseases and more from unhealthy 
living conditions, such as indoor air pollution 
or lack of access to safe water and sanitation, 
which lead to water-borne and respiratory ill-
nesses among children (UN-Habitat 2008).
Sub-Saharan Africa: Low urban poverty 
concentrated in the largest cities
An ongoing study of 12 Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries shows that although the pov-
erty–city size gradient observed in African 
countries is similar to that seen in developing 
countries elsewhere, the African experience 
is different (Coulombe and Lanjouw 2013). 
Not surprising, poverty is a rural phenom-
enon in the region, with the share of the 
poor in rural areas ranging from 68 percent 
in the Central African Republic to 90 per-
cent in Mali and Swaziland to 95 percent in 
Malawi. The urban poor are a small share of 
the total urban population, but unlike other 
regions, they are concentrated in large cities. 
Sub-Saharan Africa thus reflects a “largest 
city” model: the largest city accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of the total 
urban population and hence also for the bulk 
of the urban poor. For example, in the Cen-
tral African Republic, Gabon, and Malawi, 
more than half of each country’s urban poor 
live in the largest city, which is usually the 
capital. In Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Swaziland, 40 percent of the 
urban poor live in the largest city. In most 
African countries, “urban” is synonymous 
with “largest city.” In Malawi, Mali, and 
Togo, the combined population of the towns 
with 5,000–100,000 inhabitants account 
for just 2–6 percent of the total population. 
This pattern is different from other predomi-
nantly “rural” developing countries such 
as India and Vietnam. The primary reason 
for urban poverty’s relative concentration in 
the capital city is the paucity of better-pay-
ing, nonfarm jobs in smaller towns. Rural 
migration to urban areas in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has stalled in large part because the 
structural transformation from agriculture 
to industry (manufacturing and services) 
has been slow to emerge. Manufacturing, 
especially agro-industry, and related service 
sectors account for only 10 percent of the 
economy in the region, and industries related 
to them generally locate in the largest city.
South and East Asia: High urban poverty 
concentrated in small towns 
Despite their megacities and sprawling slums, 
urban poverty in South and East Asia is 
firmly located in smaller towns, not in big 
 cities. The majority of the poor in South 
Asia reside in rural areas where the poverty 
rate was 38 percent in 2008. At 30 percent, 
the urban poverty rate was only 4 percent-
age points below that in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in the same year. But unlike Africa, poverty 
rates in smaller towns are significantly higher 
than in megacities. 
Recent research in India, for example, 
indicates that poverty is still primarily a rural 
phenomenon at the aggregate level, but that 
urban poverty is growing and, within urban 
areas, is concentrated in smaller towns. The 
poverty rate in India in 2004–05 was 28 per-
cent in rural areas and 26 percent in urban 
areas. As figure 2.4a shows, among urban 
areas, the poverty rate in small towns (popu-
lation less than 50,000) was double the rate 
in large towns with a population of 1 million 
or more (30 percent to 15 percent) (World 
Bank 2011; Lanjouw and Marra 2012). 
The poverty–city size gradient is steep 
in India, however, so even a “medium” city 
has close to 1 million residents. In Vietnam, 
in contrast, the population of an average 
medium-size town is about 85,000. In Viet-
nam, the nexus between urban population 
and urban poverty is mirrored in a remark-
able U-shape (figure 2.4b). Two megacities, 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, with a population 
of over 4 million each, are home to about 
30 percent of urban residents but only about 
10 percent of the poor. In comparison, the 634 
smallest Vietnamese towns, with an average 
population of about 10,000, are home to more 
than 55 percent of the urban poor (World 
Bank 2011; Lanjouw and Marra 2012). 
Small towns can play an important role 
in arresting the “urbanization” of poverty if 
policies that nurture economic activity and 
improve residents’ access to basic services 
are implemented. The reality of the poverty–
city-size gradient shows that policies that 
improve service delivery and foster nonfarm 
job creation in small towns and peri-urban 
areas can offer rural migrants better liveli-
hoods, thus helping to reduce both urban and 
rural poverty. In countries where population 
density is high in smaller towns, the scale 
economies may be sufficiently large to make 
service delivery, including infrastructure- 
related services, cost-effective. 
More than 200 cities and towns dot Ban-
gladesh and Pakistan, yet urbanization in 
both of these countries is dominated by a few 
large metropolitan cities with a population of 
more than 1 million. Chittagong and Dhaka 
account for 43 percent of Bangladesh’s urban 
population; in Pakistan, eight cities each with 
a population of more than 1 million account 
for 58 percent of the urban population. 
Another 24 percent of the urban population 
in Pakistan resides in 48 cities with popula-
tions of 100,000 to 1 million. Evidence from 
these countries reveals that the incidence of 
poverty is highest in rural areas (43 percent), 
followed by smaller towns and cities (38 per-
cent), and then metropolitan areas (26 per-
cent) (Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis 2009). 
The MDGs, human capital, and 
disparities along the rural-urban 
spectrum
Not all MDG-related services have simi-
lar characteristics. Investments in primary 
education, nutrition, and health care lay the 
foundations for the human capital endowed 
in individuals, who can carry it with them 
when they move and add to it if they migrate 
to places where related secondary and ter-
tiary services are available. In this sense, pri-
mary education and health care are portable. 
Together, education, nutrition, and health 
care, combine to form human skills and 
abilities that have been powerfully linked 
to productivity growth and poverty reduc-
tion in the medium to longer run (Hanushek 
and Woessmann 2008; Commander and 
Svejnar 2011). As such, human capital is a 
fundamental ingredient for desirable job out-
comes, in both rural and urban areas (World 
Bank 2013). 
FIGURE 2.4 In India and Vietnam, poverty in small towns is worse than in large cities
Source: World Bank 2011.
Note: Poverty rates based on Uniform Recall Period (URP) and official 
poverty lines.
Source: Lanjouw and Marra 2012.
Note: XS = > 4k – 50k; S = 50k – 300k; M = 300k – 500k; L = 1m–5m for 
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Primary education improves an indi-
vidual’s opportunity to join the workforce, 
regardless of location. An additional year 
of schooling can raise wage earnings sub-
stantially, reflecting the higher productivity 
of more educated workers (Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos 2004; Montenegro and Patrinos 
2012). Education is also positively associated 
with farm productivity. And rural migrants 
who have had at least a primary education 
are better prepared to take advantage of job 
opportunities in urban areas. For many rural 
migrants, the basic education acquired in 
the village can be the turning point between 
being prepared for a better-paying job upon 
arrival in a city or remaining in poverty once 
in the city. Better health leads directly to 
higher labor productivity. Gender differen-
tials in primary enrollments erode the human 
capital foundations of women, putting them 
at a disadvantage compared with men in 
all aspects of human welfare but especially 
economic empowerment. Lack of gender 
equality in one dimension can multiply the 
negative effects on other dimensions. World 
Development Report 2012: Gender Equality 
and Development (WDR 2012) noted that in 
Mozambique low levels of maternal educa-
tion are strongly related to high levels of child 
malnutrition and low use of health services.
Quality of primary education matters
East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean 
have either already achieved or are close to 
achieving the MDG target of universal pri-
mary school completion by 2015. The dif-
ferentials in primary school completion rates 
in rural and urban areas are surprisingly low 
across these regions (based on data from 46 
countries) but mask enrollment shortfalls 
(see box 2.1). Gender differences in educa-
tion, however, are also large in rural areas. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where rural enrollments 
are already low, gender differentials of 8–15 
percentage points prevail in Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Zambia. 
The differentials in the quality of educa-
tion, on the other hand, are greater: Urban 
areas have a higher percentage of pupils 
reaching reading competency than do rural 
areas. 
As with poverty, learning also varies along 
the rural-urban spectrum. A comprehensive 
study in 2007 in 15 Sub-Saharan countries 
recorded considerable rural-urban differen-
tials in the share of sixth-grade pupils reach-
ing competency levels in reading and math-
ematics relative to national scores. Several 
findings of the study were both noteworthy 
and worrisome. First, the rural-urban differ-
entials were vast. On average, only 57 per-
cent of rural students reached competency in 
reading levels 4–8 compared with 75 percent 
of urban students. In Malawi and Zambia, 
the corresponding figures were under 25 per-
cent in rural schools and 40 percent in urban 
schools. Competency in mathematics at level 
4 was discouragingly low: only 18 percent 
of children in rural schools and 24 percent 
in urban schools reached this level. Worse, 
only 1.2 percent of all pupils reached com-
petency in mathematics level 8. Clearly, gov-
ernments need to pay as much, if not more, 
attention to the quality of schooling in Sub-
Saharan Africa as they do to completion rates 
(SACMEQ 2010).
Poor literacy (reading and writing) scores 
in rural Sub-Saharan Africa highlight the risk 
of overestimating the schooling benefits asso-
ciated with urban living (figure 2.5). In a study 
of 12 Sub-Saharan African countries, the dif-
ferentials in urban-rural literacy rates range 
from 32 percent–39 percent in 7 countries, 
and around 22 percent in another 2 countries. 
The differences between the small towns and 
large cities are small in several countries 
and are explained by the fact that the pov-
erty city-size gradient is not as pronounced 
in Sub-Saharan Africa as in other regions 
(Coulombe and Lanjouw, 2013).
Children attending primary school in 
rural areas are often disadvantaged because 
it is difficult to attract teachers to rural areas. 
One study finds that many parents in rural 
schools complain that the schools do not 
have enough teachers. Parents also com-
plain about high rates of teacher absenteeism 
(Wodon 2013a). 
Rural-urban differentials in health 
indicators 
“Successful development is so intimately 
related to health—to measures that directly 
or indirectly help individuals, households, 
or communities avoid or prevent disease, 
injury, and inadequate food intake” (Sat-
terthwaite 2011). The foundations of good 
health start even before birth. Like basic 
education, the human capital formation of 
good health is cumulative and continues to 
be formed throughout childhood and young 
adulthood. Of crucial importance are ade-
quate health and nutrition during “the first 
1,000 days,” from conception to two years 
of age (World Bank 2012a).
While many factors underlie the differ-
ences in rural and urban mortality rates, 
including differences in income, consump-
tion, and wealth between urban and rural 
households, fertility rates and access to safe 
water, sanitation, and health services play a 
critical role. 
Rural-urban differentials in access to pri-
mary health care are significant across all 
regions. Evidence from DHS surveys for a 
large number of developing countries indi-
cates that urban infant mortality rates are 
8–9 percentage points lower than the rural 
BOX 2.1 The link between primary enrollment and completion
A recent study permits a closer examination of prog-
ress toward primary school completion (Nguyen and 
Wodon 2013a). It demonstrates that completion rates 
need to be evaluated with more care.  One way to look 
at differentials in education attainment structures 
between various households consists in calculating an 
attainment ratio for the completion of primary school, 
which is itself the result of a two-step process: start-
ing primary school, and completing primary school 
for those who started it. This type of simple decom-
position helps in assessing where exactly differences 
in attainment between gender, quintiles of well-being, 
or urban and rural areas take place. Rural-urban 
ratios estimated at each step of the process help to 
identify exactly where the main attrition takes place 
in the education system. The decomposition has been 
applied to a large number of African countries and in 
South Asia using Demographic and Household Survey 
(DHS) data (Nguyen and Wodon 2013b, 2013c). 
Data for urban-rural enrollment in Bangladesh, 
India, Nepal, and Pakistan are set out in table B2.1. 
The share of those starting primary education is 
higher in urban areas, and the gap widens for the 
completion of primary school. As an example, the 
completion rate in rural Pakistan is 87 percent of the 
proportion of students who actually started primary 
school. This number may not seem overly worrisome 
until one considers that only 59 percent of the rural 
child population started school. The actual propor-
tion of rural children completing primary school is 
51 percent (0.59 x 0.87). Of the two steps that relate 
to primary education completion, which matters the 
most for disparities between urban and rural areas? 
Data on Indian states show that in about half of the 
states, the largest determinant of the gap is fewer stu-
dents starting primary school in rural areas, while in 
the other half, completion is the issue.




Share of children 
who start primary 
school
Share of starting 
children who complete 
primary school
Bangladesh   
Urban 90 84
Rural 84 75
India   
Urban 92 96
Rural 79 90
Nepal   
Urban 93 93
Rural 83 86
Pakistan   
Urban 82 95
Rural 59 87
Source: Nguyen and Wodon 2013b.
Source: Nguyen and Wodon 2013b.
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Primary education improves an indi-
vidual’s opportunity to join the workforce, 
regardless of location. An additional year 
of schooling can raise wage earnings sub-
stantially, reflecting the higher productivity 
of more educated workers (Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos 2004; Montenegro and Patrinos 
2012). Education is also positively associated 
with farm productivity. And rural migrants 
who have had at least a primary education 
are better prepared to take advantage of job 
opportunities in urban areas. For many rural 
migrants, the basic education acquired in 
the village can be the turning point between 
being prepared for a better-paying job upon 
arrival in a city or remaining in poverty once 
in the city. Better health leads directly to 
higher labor productivity. Gender differen-
tials in primary enrollments erode the human 
capital foundations of women, putting them 
at a disadvantage compared with men in 
all aspects of human welfare but especially 
economic empowerment. Lack of gender 
equality in one dimension can multiply the 
negative effects on other dimensions. World 
Development Report 2012: Gender Equality 
and Development (WDR 2012) noted that in 
Mozambique low levels of maternal educa-
tion are strongly related to high levels of child 
malnutrition and low use of health services.
Quality of primary education matters
East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean 
have either already achieved or are close to 
achieving the MDG target of universal pri-
mary school completion by 2015. The dif-
ferentials in primary school completion rates 
in rural and urban areas are surprisingly low 
across these regions (based on data from 46 
countries) but mask enrollment shortfalls 
(see box 2.1). Gender differences in educa-
tion, however, are also large in rural areas. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where rural enrollments 
are already low, gender differentials of 8–15 
percentage points prevail in Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Zambia. 
The differentials in the quality of educa-
tion, on the other hand, are greater: Urban 
areas have a higher percentage of pupils 
reaching reading competency than do rural 
areas. 
As with poverty, learning also varies along 
the rural-urban spectrum. A comprehensive 
study in 2007 in 15 Sub-Saharan countries 
recorded considerable rural-urban differen-
tials in the share of sixth-grade pupils reach-
ing competency levels in reading and math-
ematics relative to national scores. Several 
findings of the study were both noteworthy 
and worrisome. First, the rural-urban differ-
entials were vast. On average, only 57 per-
cent of rural students reached competency in 
reading levels 4–8 compared with 75 percent 
of urban students. In Malawi and Zambia, 
the corresponding figures were under 25 per-
cent in rural schools and 40 percent in urban 
schools. Competency in mathematics at level 
4 was discouragingly low: only 18 percent 
of children in rural schools and 24 percent 
in urban schools reached this level. Worse, 
only 1.2 percent of all pupils reached com-
petency in mathematics level 8. Clearly, gov-
ernments need to pay as much, if not more, 
attention to the quality of schooling in Sub-
Saharan Africa as they do to completion rates 
(SACMEQ 2010).
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in rural Sub-Saharan Africa highlight the risk 
of overestimating the schooling benefits asso-
ciated with urban living (figure 2.5). In a study 
of 12 Sub-Saharan African countries, the dif-
ferentials in urban-rural literacy rates range 
from 32 percent–39 percent in 7 countries, 
and around 22 percent in another 2 countries. 
The differences between the small towns and 
large cities are small in several countries 
and are explained by the fact that the pov-
erty city-size gradient is not as pronounced 
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(Coulombe and Lanjouw, 2013).
Children attending primary school in 
rural areas are often disadvantaged because 
it is difficult to attract teachers to rural areas. 
One study finds that many parents in rural 
schools complain that the schools do not 
have enough teachers. Parents also com-
plain about high rates of teacher absenteeism 
(Wodon 2013a). 
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1,000 days,” from conception to two years 
of age (World Bank 2012a).
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8–9 percentage points lower than the rural 
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Data on Indian states show that in about half of the 
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dents starting primary school in rural areas, while in 
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rates in Latin America, Europe and Central 
Asia, and 10–16 percentage points in the 
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. East Asia has the 
highest differential, at 21 percentage points. 
Individual country differences are more 
informative (figure 2.6).  
A study of 40 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries based on DHS data indicates that the 
infant mortality rate is 65 (per 1,000 live 
births) in urban areas and 80 in rural areas.  
The percentage of deliveries in health 
facilities in urban areas is about 78 percent 
on average across the countries, compared 
with 43 percent in rural areas, in a sample of 
28 Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The larg-
est rural-urban differences are in some of the 
poorest countries (Wodon 2013b). Similar 
patterns are observed for measures of child 
malnutrition. Countries with the worst indi-
cators for infant and child mortality also 
have the largest absolute differences between 
rural and urban areas. The average share of 
stunting in children is 42 percent in rural 
areas compared to 30 percent in urban areas 
(Wodon 2013b).
It is sometimes argued that other dimen-
sions of poverty—health outcomes, for 
example—tend to be better in large cities. 
Analysis of anthropometric health outcomes 
for children across cities of different sizes 
in Mexico (based on small-area estimation 
methods) suggests that the prevalence of 
child stunting in Mexico tends to be higher 
in small towns than in the largest cities 
(Ferre, Ferreira, and Lanjouw 2012). This 
corresponds with findings regarding poverty, 
which is more pronounced in smaller cities 
than in larger cities.
Understanding the broader economic 
consequences of closing health gaps in 
low-income countries
Most countries are lagging behind in all three 
health-related MDGs. It is therefore useful to 
quantitatively evaluate the broader economic 
consequences of closing health gaps in low-
income countries. In a simulation exercise 
conducted for this report, the broader eco-
nomic consequences of closing health gaps 
in low-income countries were explored by 
adapting maquette for MDG simulations 
(MAMS), a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for country strategy analysis, 
to address the rural-urban aspects of MDG 
achievement (Lofgren 2013). The database 
used was designed to capture characteris-
tics typical of low-income countries, includ-
ing their MDG outcomes, sectoral shares in 
value-added of agriculture, manufacturing 
and services, degree of urbanization, and 
population growth. Annex 2A.1 presents 
the results of this exercise. The main results 
indicate that if the government can finance 
increased access to rural health care through 
a combination of borrowing and greater effi-
ciency in health sector spending, it can con-
siderably reduce rural under-five mortality. If 
the financing is a combination of grants and 
greater efficiency in health sector spending, 
government can do even more—it can reduce 
rural under-five mortality and contribute to 
other MDGs, including poverty reduction. If 
the government has to rely solely on domes-
tic resources, however, then the trade-off is 
lower poverty reduction and less progress in 
other MDGs. These trade-offs are especially 
difficult for governments in low-income 
countries. 
Increasingly, governments are becoming 
interested in collaborating with the private 
sector or nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) to deliver services to the poor. Such 
partnerships can be instrumental in improv-
ing the delivery of health care, especially in 
South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, where over 90 percent of the 
poor live (box 2.2).
Affordable access to sanitation and 
water: Infrastructure needs scale 
economies
In comparison to basic education and health 
care whose benefits are embedded in an indi-
vidual’s human capital, infrastructure needed 
to increase access to safe water and sanita-
tion must be provided at a fixed spatial loca-
tion. New or old connections in a rural area 
cannot be moved costlessly to an urban area. 
The initial fixed costs of establishing these 
services are high; routine maintenance is also 
costly. Because sparsely populated areas do 
not have sufficient population density, they 
are unable to benefit from scale economies 
that reduce the unit costs of network infra-
structure services. As a result, residents in 
less agglomerated areas (typically, rural pop-
ulations, very small towns, and less densely 
populated peri-urban areas) often receive a 
lower level of service (map 2.2). 
The greatest rural-urban disparities in 
the delivery of MDG-related infrastructure 
services are in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In these two regions, access to sani-
tation among the rural population, which 
accounts for between 60–80 percent of the 
total population, is significantly lower than 
in most urban areas. This disparity would 
appear to be a combination of extreme pov-
erty in the rural areas combined with the 
lack of network scale economies. In regions 
with higher proportions of their populations 
in urban areas, access to sanitation is higher 
in both urban and rural areas and the rural-
urban differentials are much smaller. 
FIGURE 2.5 Literacy rates in rural areas and smaller towns are worse than in large cities 
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rates in Latin America, Europe and Central 
Asia, and 10–16 percentage points in the 
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. East Asia has the 
highest differential, at 21 percentage points. 
Individual country differences are more 
informative (figure 2.6).  
A study of 40 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries based on DHS data indicates that the 
infant mortality rate is 65 (per 1,000 live 
births) in urban areas and 80 in rural areas.  
The percentage of deliveries in health 
facilities in urban areas is about 78 percent 
on average across the countries, compared 
with 43 percent in rural areas, in a sample of 
28 Sub-Saharan Africa countries. The larg-
est rural-urban differences are in some of the 
poorest countries (Wodon 2013b). Similar 
patterns are observed for measures of child 
malnutrition. Countries with the worst indi-
cators for infant and child mortality also 
have the largest absolute differences between 
rural and urban areas. The average share of 
stunting in children is 42 percent in rural 
areas compared to 30 percent in urban areas 
(Wodon 2013b).
It is sometimes argued that other dimen-
sions of poverty—health outcomes, for 
example—tend to be better in large cities. 
Analysis of anthropometric health outcomes 
for children across cities of different sizes 
in Mexico (based on small-area estimation 
methods) suggests that the prevalence of 
child stunting in Mexico tends to be higher 
in small towns than in the largest cities 
(Ferre, Ferreira, and Lanjouw 2012). This 
corresponds with findings regarding poverty, 
which is more pronounced in smaller cities 
than in larger cities.
Understanding the broader economic 
consequences of closing health gaps in 
low-income countries
Most countries are lagging behind in all three 
health-related MDGs. It is therefore useful to 
quantitatively evaluate the broader economic 
consequences of closing health gaps in low-
income countries. In a simulation exercise 
conducted for this report, the broader eco-
nomic consequences of closing health gaps 
in low-income countries were explored by 
adapting maquette for MDG simulations 
(MAMS), a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for country strategy analysis, 
to address the rural-urban aspects of MDG 
achievement (Lofgren 2013). The database 
used was designed to capture characteris-
tics typical of low-income countries, includ-
ing their MDG outcomes, sectoral shares in 
value-added of agriculture, manufacturing 
and services, degree of urbanization, and 
population growth. Annex 2A.1 presents 
the results of this exercise. The main results 
indicate that if the government can finance 
increased access to rural health care through 
a combination of borrowing and greater effi-
ciency in health sector spending, it can con-
siderably reduce rural under-five mortality. If 
the financing is a combination of grants and 
greater efficiency in health sector spending, 
government can do even more—it can reduce 
rural under-five mortality and contribute to 
other MDGs, including poverty reduction. If 
the government has to rely solely on domes-
tic resources, however, then the trade-off is 
lower poverty reduction and less progress in 
other MDGs. These trade-offs are especially 
difficult for governments in low-income 
countries. 
Increasingly, governments are becoming 
interested in collaborating with the private 
sector or nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) to deliver services to the poor. Such 
partnerships can be instrumental in improv-
ing the delivery of health care, especially in 
South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, where over 90 percent of the 
poor live (box 2.2).
Affordable access to sanitation and 
water: Infrastructure needs scale 
economies
In comparison to basic education and health 
care whose benefits are embedded in an indi-
vidual’s human capital, infrastructure needed 
to increase access to safe water and sanita-
tion must be provided at a fixed spatial loca-
tion. New or old connections in a rural area 
cannot be moved costlessly to an urban area. 
The initial fixed costs of establishing these 
services are high; routine maintenance is also 
costly. Because sparsely populated areas do 
not have sufficient population density, they 
are unable to benefit from scale economies 
that reduce the unit costs of network infra-
structure services. As a result, residents in 
less agglomerated areas (typically, rural pop-
ulations, very small towns, and less densely 
populated peri-urban areas) often receive a 
lower level of service (map 2.2). 
The greatest rural-urban disparities in 
the delivery of MDG-related infrastructure 
services are in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In these two regions, access to sani-
tation among the rural population, which 
accounts for between 60–80 percent of the 
total population, is significantly lower than 
in most urban areas. This disparity would 
appear to be a combination of extreme pov-
erty in the rural areas combined with the 
lack of network scale economies. In regions 
with higher proportions of their populations 
in urban areas, access to sanitation is higher 
in both urban and rural areas and the rural-
urban differentials are much smaller. 
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To the extent that infrastructure avail-
ability acts as a determinant of urban growth 
and poverty reduction, the imbalance of 
service availability could help explain lower 
welfare outcomes in smaller towns. For 
many of the 12 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries shown in figure 2.7, the differences in 
access to sanitation between the largest cit-
ies and smaller towns are as stark as those 
between urban areas as a whole and rural 
areas. In Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, 
and Sierra Leone, access to sanitation in the 
smallest towns is significantly lower than 
in larger cities. In Gabon, Malawi, Niger, 
and Swaziland, access in smaller towns is as 
good as it is in larger towns (Coulombe and 
Lanjouwe 2013). 
All regions offer better access to safe 
drinking water in urban than in rural areas, 
although rural-urban differentials are shrink-
ing (see MDG 7 in the report card, which 
follows the overview). In 2010, 96 percent of 
the urban population in developing countries 
had access to safe drinking water compared 
to 81 percent of the rural population. In gen-
eral, the rural-urban differentials in access 
to water diminish with the level of urbaniza-
tion in most regions. The largest differentials 
(about 70 percent or higher) are in Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Niger, and Sierra Leone, which are 
mostly rural. 
Through their density, urban areas make 
public services more accessible and afford-
able. For example, on average a cubic meter 
of piped water costs $0.70–$0.80 to provide 
in urban areas compared with $2 in sparsely 
populated areas (Kariuki and Schwartz 
2005). As a result, the poor often pay the 
highest price for the water they consume 
while having the lowest consumption levels. 
For example, in Niger, the average price of a 
cubic meter of water cost CFAF 182 when it 
BOX 2.2 Leveraging the private sector to reach the health-related MDGs
More than 90 percent of the poor live in South Asia, 
East Asia and Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
these three regions, the private sector provides at 
least 50 percent of the health services that the poor 
receive. Furthermore, delivery of priority health ser-
vices by the private sector has been growing rapidly. 
For example, the proportion of women who delivered 
children in private facilities increased from 8 percent 
in 1990 to 22 percent in 2008.a Indeed, the private 
sector already plays and must continue to play an 
important role in many countries if they are to meet 
their health-related MDGs. 
Some of the innovative mechanisms being pio-
neered around the world to leverage the private sector 
are:
•   Smart policies and regulations with a dual 
approach to reaching the poor. On one hand, 
marketwide reforms such as simplifying licensing 
of health facilities and establishing enforceable 
patient safety and quality standards are expected 
to disproportionately benefit the poor. On the 
other, interventions explicitly target the poor and 
those private providers that serve them. In Kenya, 
for example, the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) are helping the National 
Health Insurance Fund introduce poverty-targeted 
subsidized coverage. They are also working with 
the Ministry of Health to introduce the legal and 
regulatory framework for newly established local 
governments to contract services from faith-based 
organizations and other nongovernmental organi-
zations located in the hardest-to-reach areas of the 
country.
•   Public-private partnerships that tap the capital, 
management capacity, and creativity of the private 
sector to improve public services. In India, the IFC 
helped the state of Meghalaya design an innova-
tive insurance scheme whereby the government, a 
private sector insurer, and hundreds of surveyed 
public and private health care providers cooperated 
in a large-scale partnership to enhance financial 
protection and access to quality health care for the 
population of one of the lowest-income states in the 
country. 
•   Capital finance that fuels expansion of access to 
quality health services and products from the pri-
vate sector. The IFC is investing in and advising 
health care companies seeking to expand access 
to quality health services and products to those at 
the “bottom of the pyramid.”b In Africa, the IFC 
helped establish an innovative private equity fund 
that not only focuses on health but is also given 
explicit incentives to finance companies that serve 
the poorest. One such company is the Nairobi 
Women’s Hospital. An independent assessment 
shows that about three-fifths of its patients are at 
the bottom of the pyramid. In India, IFC investee 
Apollo Hospitals is seeking to expand its top qual-
ity services to smaller cities and rural areas.
FIGURE B2.2.1 Percent seeking care in private versus public facilities by region
Source: Demographic and Health surveys.
Note: The figure shows the shares of health care facilities funded by public and private providers for the poorest quintile.
a. Karen Grepin, http://ps4h.org/ihea2011.
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Note: The bars show the percent of regional urban and rural populations (developing countries only) with access to sanitation; the bars are not proportional 
to population size. For a definition of agglomeration, please see the note to map 2.1.
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in larger cities. In Gabon, Malawi, Niger, 
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good as it is in larger towns (Coulombe and 
Lanjouwe 2013). 
All regions offer better access to safe 
drinking water in urban than in rural areas, 
although rural-urban differentials are shrink-
ing (see MDG 7 in the report card, which 
follows the overview). In 2010, 96 percent of 
the urban population in developing countries 
had access to safe drinking water compared 
to 81 percent of the rural population. In gen-
eral, the rural-urban differentials in access 
to water diminish with the level of urbaniza-
tion in most regions. The largest differentials 
(about 70 percent or higher) are in Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Niger, and Sierra Leone, which are 
mostly rural. 
Through their density, urban areas make 
public services more accessible and afford-
able. For example, on average a cubic meter 
of piped water costs $0.70–$0.80 to provide 
in urban areas compared with $2 in sparsely 
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2005). As a result, the poor often pay the 
highest price for the water they consume 
while having the lowest consumption levels. 
For example, in Niger, the average price of a 
cubic meter of water cost CFAF 182 when it 
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vices by the private sector has been growing rapidly. 
For example, the proportion of women who delivered 
children in private facilities increased from 8 percent 
in 1990 to 22 percent in 2008.a Indeed, the private 
sector already plays and must continue to play an 
important role in many countries if they are to meet 
their health-related MDGs. 
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those private providers that serve them. In Kenya, 
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FIGURE B2.2.1 Percent seeking care in private versus public facilities by region
Source: Demographic and Health surveys.
Note: The figure shows the shares of health care facilities funded by public and private providers for the poorest quintile.
a. Karen Grepin, http://ps4h.org/ihea2011.
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Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: The bars show the percent of regional urban and rural populations (developing countries only) with access to sanitation; the bars are not proportional 
to population size. For a definition of agglomeration, please see the note to map 2.1.
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Agglomeration economies arise when 
there is a confluence of people, or population 
density, and firms, or economic density. The 
main outcome is the creation of jobs, which 
are central to poverty reduction and reach-
ing MDG 1. According to the World Devel-
opment Report 2013: Jobs (WDR 2013), in 
26 countries across all regions, more than 
50 percent of the reduction in poverty can 
be attributed to an increase in labor income 
(World Bank 2013).
Higher economic and population densities 
of urban areas are also good for governments. 
They generate tax revenues that are essential 
FIGURE 2.7 Small towns have generally poorer service delivery than large cities 
Source: Coulombe and Lanjouw 2013.
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was piped from a network, CFAF 534 when 
it came from a public fountain, and CFAF 
926 when it came from a vendor (Bardasi and 
Wodon 2008). This means that the urban 
poor without access to the network often pay 
the highest price for the water they consume 
while having the lowest consumption levels. 
More than 55 percent of households did not 
have access to piped water in their dwelling. 
Having a private connection was strongly 
correlated with wealth: among the poorest 
20 percent of households, none had a private 
connection, while 65 percent of households 
in the top quintile were connected. 
Poor access to basic infrastructure dispro-
portionately affects rural women by directly 
reducing the time they have available for 
income generating activities because they per-
form most of the domestic chores and often 
walk long distances to reach clean water. 
WDR 2012 on gender noted that in rural 
Guinea, women spend three and a half times 
more than men in fetching water. In several 
rural and small towns in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where network connections are often not eco-
nomically viable, public private partnerships 
have been designed to leverage innovative 
means for delivering safe water (box 2.3).
Why urbanization matters  
for the MDGs
Urbanization matters for the MDGs. It can 
facilitate several factors that play an impor-
tant role in attaining those goals. It can 
reduce poverty in two main ways: through 
the benefits of agglomeration, cities poten-
tially generate higher living standards for 
all their residents and reduce urban poverty; 
and through the benefits of scale economies, 
public services, including those related to 
the MDGs can be provided in urban areas 
at a lower fixed unit cost. Cities are also a 
source of revenues that governments need 
to foster agglomeration economies for firms 
and households, and to finance services for 
rural and urban migrants. But when the posi-
tive forces driving cities are strained by urban 
congestion, service delivery is unable to keep 
pace with demand and slums can emerge. An 
important negative externality of excessive 
urban congestion is pollution. 
BOX 2.3 Water in Africa: Strong public sector leadership is key to sustainable PPPs in 
rural and small towns 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in nontraditional 
markets. Nontraditional markets, such as those in 
sparsely populated and dispersed settlements, present 
a challenge to making private sector participation a 
commercially viable proposition because of econo-
mies of scale and affordability issues. The experiences 
of Cambodia, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, 
Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda have shown, how-
ever, that given the right allocation of risks among 
participants in the PPP, interest can be generated in 
the private sector. In many African countries, the 
private sector’s role is mostly confined to operat-
ing rural water supply schemes, and generally small 
piped water schemes, serving households through a 
combination of private connections and standpipes. 
In India, the private sector is involved in higher 
value-added services, such as processing and dis-
posal of solid waste. Success comes not just by help-
ing develop PPP arrangements but also by strength-
ening the enabling legal, regulatory, financial, and 
institutional environment. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
number of governments have explicit policies for the 
delegation of water supply services to private opera-
tors, as in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda. 
Lease and management contracts are the most com-
mon types of contract today, whereby operators take 
commercial and operational responsibility, including 
for small repairs. 
Key lessons from the field: Financial viability suggests 
the need to lower the cost of services in rural areas to 
drive consumption. Evidence suggests that a growing 
number of privately operated schemes are just able to 
achieve operating cost recovery, with a few making 
comfortable margins. What separates financial win-
ners and losers? Analysis in Uganda found that the 
number of active connections was a strong positive 
determinant of financial cost recovery. More active 
connections translate to higher volumes of water sold, 
given that consumption tends to be higher from pri-
vate house connections than standpipes. This obser-
vation captures the common issues across countries: 
the price of water and connections, rates of consump-
tion, and economies of scale. In rural growth centers 
outside of small towns, the cost of service tends to be 
higher than in urban areas. Lowering the cost of ser-
vice requires approaches that are usually not easy to 
coordinate or navigate politically and hence, they are 
typically not undertaken. These include subsidizing 
the densification of standpipes to bring them closer to 
household settlements or subsidizing the cost of house 
connections; and clustering schemes across different 
political/administrative boundaries to be managed by 
a single operator.
Holding local institutions accountable matters for the 
success of the partnership and for rehabilitation. Pri-
vate sector participation in Africa is often an accom-
paniment to political devolution, which saw the 
responsibility for water services decentralized to the 
local level. This is the case in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, and Uganda. The role of local governments as 
the focal point between the state, consumers, and the 
private sector is critical. Often, however, transfer of 
authority for water services is incomplete and not 
well thought out. Uganda is unique as it has set up a 
dedicated and autonomous local body that represents 
the public sector in water services delivery. In con-
trast, most West African countries, such as Benin and 
Burkina Faso, expect the local communes (mayors) to 
take on oversight for water services as an additional 
mandate. 
Source: Water and Sanitation Program, http://www.wsp 
.org/topics.
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was piped from a network, CFAF 534 when 
it came from a public fountain, and CFAF 
926 when it came from a vendor (Bardasi and 
Wodon 2008). This means that the urban 
poor without access to the network often pay 
the highest price for the water they consume 
while having the lowest consumption levels. 
More than 55 percent of households did not 
have access to piped water in their dwelling. 
Having a private connection was strongly 
correlated with wealth: among the poorest 
20 percent of households, none had a private 
connection, while 65 percent of households 
in the top quintile were connected. 
Poor access to basic infrastructure dispro-
portionately affects rural women by directly 
reducing the time they have available for 
income generating activities because they per-
form most of the domestic chores and often 
walk long distances to reach clean water. 
WDR 2012 on gender noted that in rural 
Guinea, women spend three and a half times 
more than men in fetching water. In several 
rural and small towns in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where network connections are often not eco-
nomically viable, public private partnerships 
have been designed to leverage innovative 
means for delivering safe water (box 2.3).
Why urbanization matters  
for the MDGs
Urbanization matters for the MDGs. It can 
facilitate several factors that play an impor-
tant role in attaining those goals. It can 
reduce poverty in two main ways: through 
the benefits of agglomeration, cities poten-
tially generate higher living standards for 
all their residents and reduce urban poverty; 
and through the benefits of scale economies, 
public services, including those related to 
the MDGs can be provided in urban areas 
at a lower fixed unit cost. Cities are also a 
source of revenues that governments need 
to foster agglomeration economies for firms 
and households, and to finance services for 
rural and urban migrants. But when the posi-
tive forces driving cities are strained by urban 
congestion, service delivery is unable to keep 
pace with demand and slums can emerge. An 
important negative externality of excessive 
urban congestion is pollution. 
BOX 2.3 Water in Africa: Strong public sector leadership is key to sustainable PPPs in 
rural and small towns 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in nontraditional 
markets. Nontraditional markets, such as those in 
sparsely populated and dispersed settlements, present 
a challenge to making private sector participation a 
commercially viable proposition because of econo-
mies of scale and affordability issues. The experiences 
of Cambodia, Mali, Mozambique, the Philippines, 
Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda have shown, how-
ever, that given the right allocation of risks among 
participants in the PPP, interest can be generated in 
the private sector. In many African countries, the 
private sector’s role is mostly confined to operat-
ing rural water supply schemes, and generally small 
piped water schemes, serving households through a 
combination of private connections and standpipes. 
In India, the private sector is involved in higher 
value-added services, such as processing and dis-
posal of solid waste. Success comes not just by help-
ing develop PPP arrangements but also by strength-
ening the enabling legal, regulatory, financial, and 
institutional environment. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
number of governments have explicit policies for the 
delegation of water supply services to private opera-
tors, as in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda. 
Lease and management contracts are the most com-
mon types of contract today, whereby operators take 
commercial and operational responsibility, including 
for small repairs. 
Key lessons from the field: Financial viability suggests 
the need to lower the cost of services in rural areas to 
drive consumption. Evidence suggests that a growing 
number of privately operated schemes are just able to 
achieve operating cost recovery, with a few making 
comfortable margins. What separates financial win-
ners and losers? Analysis in Uganda found that the 
number of active connections was a strong positive 
determinant of financial cost recovery. More active 
connections translate to higher volumes of water sold, 
given that consumption tends to be higher from pri-
vate house connections than standpipes. This obser-
vation captures the common issues across countries: 
the price of water and connections, rates of consump-
tion, and economies of scale. In rural growth centers 
outside of small towns, the cost of service tends to be 
higher than in urban areas. Lowering the cost of ser-
vice requires approaches that are usually not easy to 
coordinate or navigate politically and hence, they are 
typically not undertaken. These include subsidizing 
the densification of standpipes to bring them closer to 
household settlements or subsidizing the cost of house 
connections; and clustering schemes across different 
political/administrative boundaries to be managed by 
a single operator.
Holding local institutions accountable matters for the 
success of the partnership and for rehabilitation. Pri-
vate sector participation in Africa is often an accom-
paniment to political devolution, which saw the 
responsibility for water services decentralized to the 
local level. This is the case in Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, and Uganda. The role of local governments as 
the focal point between the state, consumers, and the 
private sector is critical. Often, however, transfer of 
authority for water services is incomplete and not 
well thought out. Uganda is unique as it has set up a 
dedicated and autonomous local body that represents 
the public sector in water services delivery. In con-
trast, most West African countries, such as Benin and 
Burkina Faso, expect the local communes (mayors) to 
take on oversight for water services as an additional 
mandate. 
Source: Water and Sanitation Program, http://www.wsp 
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for financing the public goods necessary for 
poverty reduction. 
Successful urbanization is reflected in 
dynamic cities that foster agglomeration 
economies. The latter thrive on large numbers 
of businesses and create plenty of jobs. Urban-
ization is a “win-win” recipe for poverty 
reduction when it generates higher incomes 
than workers would earn elsewhere, provides 
access to services essential for a decent liveli-
hood, and creates opportunities for workers 
to enjoy higher standards of living. 
The effects of urbanization on 
prosperity and poverty 
According to World Development Report 
2009: Reshaping Economic Geography 
(WDR 2009), it is not a coincidence that 
the high-income countries are more urban-
ized: “Place is the most important correlate 
of a person’s welfare. . . . The best predic-
tor of income in the world today is not what 
or whom you know, but where you work.” 
Economic history shows that this has always 
been true. Before the Industrial Revolu-
tion, the world was a “rural” place, where 
the differences in living standards between 
countries were minimal. England’s Industrial 
Revolution unleashed a wave of industrializa-
tion that was necessarily grounded in cities or 
urban spaces. The mechanization of produc-
tion was powered by economies of scale and 
a concentration of population available only 
in cities. Rapid industrialization was accom-
panied by increasing urbanization, which, in 
turn, nurtured agglomeration economies. 
There is a nexus between urbanization, 
poverty, and prosperity (figure 2.8). Urban-
ization in developing countries can offer 
similar benefits to its citizens. Income per 
capita tends to rise as the share of the urban 
population rises. Urbanization rates above 70 
percent are typically found in high-income 
countries, whereas those in poorer countries, 
such as Chad Ethiopia, Laos, and Uganda, 
are closer to 20–30 percent.
The relationship between the level of 
urbanization and poverty is negative. Coun-
tries with low levels of urbanization have sig-
nificantly higher poverty rates than countries 
with high levels of urbanization (map 2.3). 
Rising urbanization is also positively related 
to increases in the share of gross domestic 
product (GDP) generated by industry and 
services as well as with the share of the labor 
force working in those sectors (Satterthwaite 
2007). Indeed, together with complementary 
macroeconomic policies and an investment 
and business-friendly climate, urbaniza-
tion is one of the important ingredients of a 
policy mix that fosters economic growth and 
prosperity. 
The potential of urbanization to close 
the gender gap in earnings and enhance 
women’s empowerment is enormous and 
rests to a large extent on women’s access 
to education. Women earn less than men 
everywhere—in the informal sector, paid 
work, and farm and nonfarm jobs. WDR 
2012 reports that wage differences by gen-
der range from 20 percent in Mozambique 
and Pakistan to more than 80 percent in 
Jordan, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic. 
The emergence of agglomeration economies 
benefits poor women with basic education 
through large-scale job opportunities in 
light manufacturing. The feminization 
of export industries that produce labor-
intensive goods is prolific in countries such 
as Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, 
Laos, Lesotho, Nepal, and Vietnam. While 
the average share of female employment in 
manufacturing is 30 percent, it is as high as 
56–66 percent in apparel and accessories, 
leather tanning and finishing, retail baker-
ies, and garments (Do, Levchenko and Rad-
datz 2011) that are also less skill intensive. 
In Bangladesh, Kabeer and Mahnud (2004) 
find that 1.5 million of the 1.8 million jobs 
created in export-oriented garment indus-
tries in 2000 went to women. According 
to WDR 2013, in the urban areas of India, 
the abundance of call center jobs for women 
is another source of women’s economic 
empowerment but more than primary edu-
cation is required for these jobs (World 
Bank 2012d). South Africa provides similar 
FIGURE 2.8 Nexus between urbanization, poverty, and prosperity
Source: GMR team 2013.
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MAP 2.3 The poor are mostly concentrated in less urbanized countries
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: For a definition of agglomeration, please see the note for map 2.1.
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MAP 2.3 The poor are mostly concentrated in less urbanized countries
Source: GMR team 2013. 
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evidence (Levinsohn 2007). On average, 
women are more reliable remitters than men 
and form the backbone of rural household 
support in many cases (Vullnetari and King 
2011; Piotrowski and Rindfuss 2006; Tacoli 
and Mabala 2010). 
Urbanization has not always led to pov-
erty reduction. In most countries, structural 
transformation from agriculture to manufac-
turing and services has been in lockstep with 
urbanization. Industrialization often begins 
in a light manufacturing export sector and 
has created large numbers of better-paying 
jobs, stimulating the urbanization process by 
attracting rural migrants to the urban areas 
(Chandra, Lin, and Wang 2013). In Latin 
America, where the share of the urban popu-
lation is over 80 percent, quantitative analy-
sis confirms that in 10 of 18 Latin American 
countries, changes in labor income explain 
more than half the reduction in poverty, and 
in another five countries, more than a third 
(World Bank 2013).
Sub-Saharan Africa’s higher poverty rates 
and lower income levels have created a per-
ception that African cities have grown larger 
without enjoying the attendant benefits of 
urbanization—better-paying jobs, prosper-
ity, and higher standards of living. It appears 
that the advantages of urbanization set in 
only after it has reached a critical level: coun-
tries with urbanization rates of 40 percent 
or less have distinctly lower income levels 
and higher poverty rates (maps 2.4 and 2.5). 
They also have the largest rural-urban differ-
entials, especially in access to basic services.
Links between urbanization and 
rural poverty 
Urbanization and poverty reduction are 
linked in numerous ways. Rural-urban 
migration and nonfarm economic activity are 
two of them. Other intricate links between 
rural and urban sources of growth generate 
additional potential for poverty reduction.
The concentration of the rural popula-
tion in agriculture has gone hand in hand 
with poverty in most developing countries. 
In developed countries, about 20 percent of 
the population lives in rural areas and 5 per-
cent is dependent on agriculture for employ-
ment. In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
more than half the labor force is employed in 
agriculture, mostly as unpaid family workers 
 (figure 2.9). Indeed, in the absence of ade-
quate safety nets, agriculture is an important 
fallback option for family members who lose 
their job to economic shocks or other crises. 
A consequence of limited job opportunities 
outside agriculture in low-income countries 
is that agriculture, by default, absorbs extra 
labor, which leads to underemployment, 
low labor productivity, and thus low farm 
incomes.
Economic growth is another link between 
rural and urban areas, where what happens 
in one area affects the other. Rural growth 
contributes to urban growth and vice versa, 
but rural growth cannot occur without 
good access to (urban) markets and vibrant 
farm and nonfarm activities. Successful land 
reforms and the green revolution in agricul-
ture preceded East Asia’s rapid population 
and economic growth in urban areas (with 
some exceptions, such as the Republic of 
Korea) (Gollin 2009; Mellor 1996). Rural 
growth helped to lower food prices and real 
wages for urban areas and created demand 
for urban goods. Rising income in rural areas 
allowed rural households to invest in their 
own businesses and in their children’s health 
and education, better preparing them for 
their future. This cycle is not happening as 
fast in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
where rural poverty is most pervasive. 
A large literature documents how lack of 
market access adversely affects agricultural 
productivity as well as commercialization 
and specialization. Da Mata et al. (2007) 
found that the growth of cities in Brazil was 
positively associated with market potential in 
surrounding rural areas (measured by rural 
per capita income weighted by distance). 
Using household data from Nepal, Emran 
and Shilpi (2012) analyzed the relationship 
between market size, defined as the size of the 
population in a certain area, and the distance 
of that area to the closest market. They found 
that the crop portfolio of a village becomes 
MAP 2.4 Level of urbanization in 1990
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: For the definition of “urban” please see UN 2011.




MAP 2.5 Level of urbanization in 2010
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: For the definition of “urban” please see UN 2011.
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evidence (Levinsohn 2007). On average, 
women are more reliable remitters than men 
and form the backbone of rural household 
support in many cases (Vullnetari and King 
2011; Piotrowski and Rindfuss 2006; Tacoli 
and Mabala 2010). 
Urbanization has not always led to pov-
erty reduction. In most countries, structural 
transformation from agriculture to manufac-
turing and services has been in lockstep with 
urbanization. Industrialization often begins 
in a light manufacturing export sector and 
has created large numbers of better-paying 
jobs, stimulating the urbanization process by 
attracting rural migrants to the urban areas 
(Chandra, Lin, and Wang 2013). In Latin 
America, where the share of the urban popu-
lation is over 80 percent, quantitative analy-
sis confirms that in 10 of 18 Latin American 
countries, changes in labor income explain 
more than half the reduction in poverty, and 
in another five countries, more than a third 
(World Bank 2013).
Sub-Saharan Africa’s higher poverty rates 
and lower income levels have created a per-
ception that African cities have grown larger 
without enjoying the attendant benefits of 
urbanization—better-paying jobs, prosper-
ity, and higher standards of living. It appears 
that the advantages of urbanization set in 
only after it has reached a critical level: coun-
tries with urbanization rates of 40 percent 
or less have distinctly lower income levels 
and higher poverty rates (maps 2.4 and 2.5). 
They also have the largest rural-urban differ-
entials, especially in access to basic services.
Links between urbanization and 
rural poverty 
Urbanization and poverty reduction are 
linked in numerous ways. Rural-urban 
migration and nonfarm economic activity are 
two of them. Other intricate links between 
rural and urban sources of growth generate 
additional potential for poverty reduction.
The concentration of the rural popula-
tion in agriculture has gone hand in hand 
with poverty in most developing countries. 
In developed countries, about 20 percent of 
the population lives in rural areas and 5 per-
cent is dependent on agriculture for employ-
ment. In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
more than half the labor force is employed in 
agriculture, mostly as unpaid family workers 
 (figure 2.9). Indeed, in the absence of ade-
quate safety nets, agriculture is an important 
fallback option for family members who lose 
their job to economic shocks or other crises. 
A consequence of limited job opportunities 
outside agriculture in low-income countries 
is that agriculture, by default, absorbs extra 
labor, which leads to underemployment, 
low labor productivity, and thus low farm 
incomes.
Economic growth is another link between 
rural and urban areas, where what happens 
in one area affects the other. Rural growth 
contributes to urban growth and vice versa, 
but rural growth cannot occur without 
good access to (urban) markets and vibrant 
farm and nonfarm activities. Successful land 
reforms and the green revolution in agricul-
ture preceded East Asia’s rapid population 
and economic growth in urban areas (with 
some exceptions, such as the Republic of 
Korea) (Gollin 2009; Mellor 1996). Rural 
growth helped to lower food prices and real 
wages for urban areas and created demand 
for urban goods. Rising income in rural areas 
allowed rural households to invest in their 
own businesses and in their children’s health 
and education, better preparing them for 
their future. This cycle is not happening as 
fast in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 
where rural poverty is most pervasive. 
A large literature documents how lack of 
market access adversely affects agricultural 
productivity as well as commercialization 
and specialization. Da Mata et al. (2007) 
found that the growth of cities in Brazil was 
positively associated with market potential in 
surrounding rural areas (measured by rural 
per capita income weighted by distance). 
Using household data from Nepal, Emran 
and Shilpi (2012) analyzed the relationship 
between market size, defined as the size of the 
population in a certain area, and the distance 
of that area to the closest market. They found 
that the crop portfolio of a village becomes 
MAP 2.4 Level of urbanization in 1990
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: For the definition of “urban” please see UN 2011.




MAP 2.5 Level of urbanization in 2010
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: For the definition of “urban” please see UN 2011.
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available. Demographic and Health Surveys 
indicate that in 26 of the 46 countries with 
data on female migrants, rural-rural migra-
tion is the most common type and tends to 
be highest in Africa. Rural-rural migration 
is also most common among male migrants 
in another seven countries, mostly located in 
Africa (UN-Habitat 2008). These results are 
supported by the Kagera region study, which 
puts a 50 percent estimate on rural-urban 
migration. New research from long-term 
longitudinal data for India finds evidence of 
migration rates of about 34 percent in com-
parison to rates of 55–80 percent in the past 
20 years for China (Dercon, Krishnan, and 
Krutikova forthcoming). 
Poor people are willing to move to gain 
access to basic services. Poor people already 
pay for access to services in rural areas, and 
they are also willing to pay for them in urban 
areas. Their desire to access better educa-
tion and health services to enrich their fami-
lies’ human capital and future income is a 
motivation for moving to urban areas. Lall, 
Timmins, and Yu (2009) combined a rich 
data set of public services at the municipal-
ity level with individual records from four 
decades of Brazilian census data to evaluate 
the relative importance of wage differences 
and public services in migrants’ decisions to 
move. Their findings showed a clear distinc-
tion in preferences according to income level: 
for relatively well-off people, basic public ser-
vices were not important in the decision to 
move, but for the poor, differences in access 
to basic public services did matter. In fact, 
Brazilian minimum wage workers earning 
an average R$7 an hour (about US$2.30 in 
February 2008), for example, were willing 
to pay R$420 a year to have access to better 
health services, R$87 for a better water sup-
ply, and R$42 for electricity.
One reason for not migrating or migrating 
only to the nearest small town is the desire 
to remain close to rural support systems. 
Informal barriers such as language, ethnicity, 
and religious differences also impede migra-
tion. For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2009) found that strong mutual assistance 
networks among subcaste groups in the place 
of origin strongly discourage migration in 
India. Much of the migration in India is from 
rural to rural areas because more than half 
the migrants are women who move primar-
ily for family reasons (marriage). Work is the 
primary reported motivation for migration 
for men. In some countries, higher costs of 
living in the larger cities can be a deterrent. 
Two important factors that can facilitate 
rural-urban migration, as well as benefit the 
overall economy, are investment in educa-
tion and health and the removal of direct and 
indirect restrictions on labor mobility. Edu-
cation helps give workers the skills they need 
to compete for well-paying jobs; good health 
helps workers be their most productive; and 
labor mobility helps balance the supply of 
and demand for labor. Other factors that can 
encourage migration include proximity to 
paved roads and areas with higher housing 
prices or rents which reflect a premium for 
the provision of better services.
When migrants move to cities primarily 
for better access to services (“push effects”), 
congestion in cities can worsen urban pov-
erty, and lead to the creation or expansion 
of slums. Migrants who move in the hope 
of finding better jobs (“pull factors”), and 
who have the human capital necessary to 
find a better job make a positive contribution 
to the process of urbanization. In this con-
text, if people are migrating from villages to 
gain access to services (such as electricity or 
sanitation), policy makers can prioritize pro-
vision of these services in areas where it is 
less costly to provide them. In Nepal, where 
limited agricultural potential in the hills and 
mountains makes migration an important 
livelihood strategy, migrants also value prox-
imity to paved roads because it is easier for 
them to travel back and forth between their 
families in rural areas and their jobs in urban 
areas (map 2.6). Paved roads reduce the time 
and costs of accessing schools, health facili-
ties, and markets. Migrants are willing to 
accept lower wages to get access to better 
services (Fafchamps and Shilpi forthcoming; 
Lall, Timmins, and Yu 2009). 
Many governments have placed restric-
tions on rural-urban migration in an effort 
FIGURE 2.9 Population in rural areas and employment in agriculture
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.





























































more diversified with a decrease in the size 
of the market up to a threshold, after which 
it becomes specialized. They also found that 
agricultural commercialization increased 
with a decline in the distance to a market. 
Rural-urban migration 
In most developing countries, especially low-
income ones, urban areas symbolize many 
good things. They offer better jobs, sufficient 
food for children, a respite from toiling on a 
farm without a decent income, safe drink-
ing water, and shorter distances to doctors 
and other health care facilities. These attri-
butes explain why people from rural areas 
are “pulled” to cities. The “pull” effects, 
which work through the dynamics of rural-
urban migration, are an important source 
of reductions in rural poverty. Through the 
natural movement of people, migration has 
the potential to move large numbers of poor 
people to urban areas where they have better 
economic opportunities and access to basic 
services. In countries where urban areas have 
benefited from structural transformation, 
rural-urban migration has been instrumental 
in moving large numbers of the rural poor 
to the cities. The extent to which migration 
alleviates rural poverty depends upon a vari-
ety of factors. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty remains 
for now a predominantly rural phenomenon, 
but rural to urban migration is playing a 
prominent role in reducing overall poverty. In 
Kagera, a region in northwestern Tanzania, 
between 1991–94 and 2010, more than 50 
percent of the rural population migrated to 
urban areas (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 
2011). For more than 45 percent of male but 
only 15 percent of female migrants, the main 
motivation was to find better-paying work. In 
the same study, Beegle, De Weerdt, and Der-
con (2011) looked at consumption levels of 
residents of the Kagera region, where agricul-
tural production of food and a few cash crops 
are the mainstay for more than 80 percent of 
rural residents. On average, they found that 
over 19 years, consumption increased by more 
than 40 percent for residents who remained 
in Kagera, but for those who left, consump-
tion tripled. Nearly all migrants escaped pov-
erty, but poverty declined only modestly for 
those who remained in rural Kagera. 
Several studies have estimated the mag-
nitude of rural-urban migration for one or 
more regions but a global study that provides 
consistent estimates for all regions is not 
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in another seven countries, mostly located in 
Africa (UN-Habitat 2008). These results are 
supported by the Kagera region study, which 
puts a 50 percent estimate on rural-urban 
migration. New research from long-term 
longitudinal data for India finds evidence of 
migration rates of about 34 percent in com-
parison to rates of 55–80 percent in the past 
20 years for China (Dercon, Krishnan, and 
Krutikova forthcoming). 
Poor people are willing to move to gain 
access to basic services. Poor people already 
pay for access to services in rural areas, and 
they are also willing to pay for them in urban 
areas. Their desire to access better educa-
tion and health services to enrich their fami-
lies’ human capital and future income is a 
motivation for moving to urban areas. Lall, 
Timmins, and Yu (2009) combined a rich 
data set of public services at the municipal-
ity level with individual records from four 
decades of Brazilian census data to evaluate 
the relative importance of wage differences 
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move. Their findings showed a clear distinc-
tion in preferences according to income level: 
for relatively well-off people, basic public ser-
vices were not important in the decision to 
move, but for the poor, differences in access 
to basic public services did matter. In fact, 
Brazilian minimum wage workers earning 
an average R$7 an hour (about US$2.30 in 
February 2008), for example, were willing 
to pay R$420 a year to have access to better 
health services, R$87 for a better water sup-
ply, and R$42 for electricity.
One reason for not migrating or migrating 
only to the nearest small town is the desire 
to remain close to rural support systems. 
Informal barriers such as language, ethnicity, 
and religious differences also impede migra-
tion. For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2009) found that strong mutual assistance 
networks among subcaste groups in the place 
of origin strongly discourage migration in 
India. Much of the migration in India is from 
rural to rural areas because more than half 
the migrants are women who move primar-
ily for family reasons (marriage). Work is the 
primary reported motivation for migration 
for men. In some countries, higher costs of 
living in the larger cities can be a deterrent. 
Two important factors that can facilitate 
rural-urban migration, as well as benefit the 
overall economy, are investment in educa-
tion and health and the removal of direct and 
indirect restrictions on labor mobility. Edu-
cation helps give workers the skills they need 
to compete for well-paying jobs; good health 
helps workers be their most productive; and 
labor mobility helps balance the supply of 
and demand for labor. Other factors that can 
encourage migration include proximity to 
paved roads and areas with higher housing 
prices or rents which reflect a premium for 
the provision of better services.
When migrants move to cities primarily 
for better access to services (“push effects”), 
congestion in cities can worsen urban pov-
erty, and lead to the creation or expansion 
of slums. Migrants who move in the hope 
of finding better jobs (“pull factors”), and 
who have the human capital necessary to 
find a better job make a positive contribution 
to the process of urbanization. In this con-
text, if people are migrating from villages to 
gain access to services (such as electricity or 
sanitation), policy makers can prioritize pro-
vision of these services in areas where it is 
less costly to provide them. In Nepal, where 
limited agricultural potential in the hills and 
mountains makes migration an important 
livelihood strategy, migrants also value prox-
imity to paved roads because it is easier for 
them to travel back and forth between their 
families in rural areas and their jobs in urban 
areas (map 2.6). Paved roads reduce the time 
and costs of accessing schools, health facili-
ties, and markets. Migrants are willing to 
accept lower wages to get access to better 
services (Fafchamps and Shilpi forthcoming; 
Lall, Timmins, and Yu 2009). 
Many governments have placed restric-
tions on rural-urban migration in an effort 
FIGURE 2.9 Population in rural areas and employment in agriculture
Source: GMR team 2013. 
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.





























































more diversified with a decrease in the size 
of the market up to a threshold, after which 
it becomes specialized. They also found that 
agricultural commercialization increased 
with a decline in the distance to a market. 
Rural-urban migration 
In most developing countries, especially low-
income ones, urban areas symbolize many 
good things. They offer better jobs, sufficient 
food for children, a respite from toiling on a 
farm without a decent income, safe drink-
ing water, and shorter distances to doctors 
and other health care facilities. These attri-
butes explain why people from rural areas 
are “pulled” to cities. The “pull” effects, 
which work through the dynamics of rural-
urban migration, are an important source 
of reductions in rural poverty. Through the 
natural movement of people, migration has 
the potential to move large numbers of poor 
people to urban areas where they have better 
economic opportunities and access to basic 
services. In countries where urban areas have 
benefited from structural transformation, 
rural-urban migration has been instrumental 
in moving large numbers of the rural poor 
to the cities. The extent to which migration 
alleviates rural poverty depends upon a vari-
ety of factors. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty remains 
for now a predominantly rural phenomenon, 
but rural to urban migration is playing a 
prominent role in reducing overall poverty. In 
Kagera, a region in northwestern Tanzania, 
between 1991–94 and 2010, more than 50 
percent of the rural population migrated to 
urban areas (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 
2011). For more than 45 percent of male but 
only 15 percent of female migrants, the main 
motivation was to find better-paying work. In 
the same study, Beegle, De Weerdt, and Der-
con (2011) looked at consumption levels of 
residents of the Kagera region, where agricul-
tural production of food and a few cash crops 
are the mainstay for more than 80 percent of 
rural residents. On average, they found that 
over 19 years, consumption increased by more 
than 40 percent for residents who remained 
in Kagera, but for those who left, consump-
tion tripled. Nearly all migrants escaped pov-
erty, but poverty declined only modestly for 
those who remained in rural Kagera. 
Several studies have estimated the mag-
nitude of rural-urban migration for one or 
more regions but a global study that provides 
consistent estimates for all regions is not 
106  R U R A L - U R B A N  D I S P A R I T I E S  A N D  D Y N A M I C S  G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3 G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3  R U R A L - U R B A N  D I S P A R I T I E S  A N D  D Y N A M I C S   107
to preempt overcrowding in cities. These 
restrictions prevent the rural poor from ben-
efiting from the advantages of urbanization. 
However, migration cannot be leveraged 
uniformly by policy makers to equalize the 
benefits of urbanization between rural and 
urban areas in every country. Higher popu-
lation density in cities can accelerate scale 
economies that make the extension of basic 
network services (piped water, sewers) more 
affordable for resource-constrained govern-
ments. However, in countries in South Asia, 
where rural-urban migration is low, its equal-
izing potential will be limited. 
The removal of official direct and indi-
rect restrictions on labor mobility can help 
to reduce poverty and improve access to the 
basic services emphasized in the MDGs. 
Restrictions in the land market are detri-
mental not only to agricultural productivity 
growth but also hinder diversification into 
nonfarm activities that have higher returns. 
Evidence from Mozambique and Uganda sug-
gests that free mobility of labor can eliminate 
welfare differences between rural and urban 
areas for unskilled and poorer workers and 
households (Dudwick et al. 2011). Many 
developing countries have in place land 
market policies in rural areas to discour-
age migration to urban areas but these tend 
to worsen poverty. Migration is officially 
restricted in a large number of developing 
countries, including Ethiopia and  Vietnam. 
In China, the free movement of people from 
the countryside to the city was restricted 
under the hukou system that was established 
in 1958 (Au and Henderson 2006a, 2006b). 
In 2012, restrictions on migration to all 
urban areas except the large cities of China 
were abolished. To discourage migration 
from rural areas, many countries simply do 
not provide basic water and sanitation ser-
vices to poorer urban areas, often the first 
destination of rural migrants. For example, 
governments in the richer and larger locali-
ties in an urban area in Brazil reduce provi-
sion of water and sewerage connections to 
the smaller houses in which poorer migrants 
would live to discourage in-migration and 
deflect migrants to other localities (Feler and 
Henderson 2011). 
Economic growth is often concentrated 
geographically and described as being located 
in a leading region complemented with a 
lagging region where growth is stagnant. 
MDGs’ related issues in leading and lagging 
regions are quite similar to those for rural 
and urban areas. In Uganda, where the lead-
ing lagging region issue surfaces in policy dis-
cussions, the test the government faces is to 
allow, if not encourage, the concentration of 
economic activity while achieving a conver-
gence of living standards and delivery of basic 
services like the MDGs across a geographical 
area (box 2.4).
Nonfarm employment and rural poverty 
Rural areas also undergo profound transfor-
mation as rural workers move out of agricul-
ture to nonfarm activities. Indeed, through-
out the developing world, nonfarm sectors 
have been becoming increasingly important 
MAP 2.6 Travel time to the nearest city in Nepal
Source: GMR team 2013.
Note: Migrants in villages and small towns (population less than 100,000; orange, red, and bur-
gundy) migrate to markets in cities (population greater than 100,000, marked with a black circle). 
The map shows the travel time to the closest city; travel time is calculated using the existing road 
network (travel speed can vary by road type and terrain). When there are no roads, informal tracks 
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BOX 2.4 Is the policy agenda different for leading-lagging regions? The case of Uganda
Economic growth, often concentrated geographically, 
can lead to specialization, and can induce migration. 
Certain regions thus lead economically, while other 
regions lag, creating a challenge for economic and 
social development. Governments face a test to allow, 
if not encourage, the concentration of economic activ-
ity while achieving a convergence of living standards 
and delivery of basic services like the MDGs across 
space. 
Uganda realized that its development path is domi-
nated by these types of challenges. Uganda has made 
commendable progress in reducing income poverty at 
the national level, but there are gaps with some geo-
graphical pockets (lagging regions) not improving 
as much as others (leading regions). The Midnorth, 
Northeast, and West Nile regions are lagging behind 
in the incidence of poverty compared to the national 
average. Kampala is well ahead of other regions, with 
the poverty head count declining from 14 percent to 4 
percent between 1992 and 2010. Similar differentials 
are observed for other measures of welfare. Conse-
quently, in collaboration with the World Bank, the 
government of Uganda is trying to prioritize policies 
that generate the highest payoff for economic effi-
ciency and provide geographic equity at the same time 
(World Bank 2012b).  
The process began by identifying four policy areas 
that can make possible the integration of lagging 
and leading regions. The first is facilitating integra-
tion through better labor mobility, which emphasizes 
equipping people with a minimum level of educa-
tion and skills so they are able to take on the more 
demanding jobs in the leading regions. The second 
one is making land, a physically immobile asset, more 
fluid and its tenure more secure, allowing farmers to 
raise productivity within agriculture and to facilitate 
labor movement from agriculture to nonagricultural 
activities, as leasing and renting of land becomes 
feasible. One important policy action identified in 
Uganda is the development of a well-functioning sys-
tem of conflict and dispute resolution through a clear 
legal and institutional framework to promote security 
and encourage development of the rental market. The 
third policy area is to support integration through 
improved connectivity, which allows for improved 
mobility of people, products, and technology. Iso-
lation can confine producers to small markets and 
restrict them to inputs available in their geographic 
location. By enhancing connectivity, producers and 
firms can increase market size and consequently their 
ability to exploit economies of scale, draw from a 
larger pool of workers, and have greater access to raw 
materials and equipment. Finally, underpinning effec-
tiveness of these areas of focus is broadening cover-
age, quality, and accessibility of MDG-related social 
services across leading and lagging regions. This will 
empower people seeking economic opportunity and 
reduce congestion costs resulting from migration in 
search of access to social services in leading areas.  
Not surprisingly, the expected impact of public 
expenditure on development needs to guide Uganda’s 
policy makers in their decisions on prioritizing and 
sequencing the various policies competing for the lim-
ited resources available. For instance, geographical 
prioritization of investments in (social and physical) 
infrastructure is complicated if the trade-offs between 
economic efficiency and welfare gains are taken into 
account. On one hand, economic returns suggest 
that investing in physical- or place-specific economic 
infrastructure should be prioritized in leading areas to 
exploit economies of scale and agglomeration, build 
density, and accelerate growth. As in many other 
countries, Uganda firms locate where they can ben-
efit from agglomeration economies, suggesting priori-
tization of investments in infrastructure where these 
clusters are already forming in the southern-eastern 
corridor of Uganda. On the other hand, investments 
in social infrastructure yield positive returns across 
all regions, emphasizing the need for equitable provi-
sions of social services across geographical space.
This policy focus is not much different from the 
policy agenda advocated in this GMR; that agenda 
facilitates progress toward the MDGs through bet-
ter use of policies that assist the urbanization process 
given the advantages that urban areas have regarding 
income and thus poverty and MDG-related outcomes 
that are linked to better service delivery in urban 
areas.
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to preempt overcrowding in cities. These 
restrictions prevent the rural poor from ben-
efiting from the advantages of urbanization. 
However, migration cannot be leveraged 
uniformly by policy makers to equalize the 
benefits of urbanization between rural and 
urban areas in every country. Higher popu-
lation density in cities can accelerate scale 
economies that make the extension of basic 
network services (piped water, sewers) more 
affordable for resource-constrained govern-
ments. However, in countries in South Asia, 
where rural-urban migration is low, its equal-
izing potential will be limited. 
The removal of official direct and indi-
rect restrictions on labor mobility can help 
to reduce poverty and improve access to the 
basic services emphasized in the MDGs. 
Restrictions in the land market are detri-
mental not only to agricultural productivity 
growth but also hinder diversification into 
nonfarm activities that have higher returns. 
Evidence from Mozambique and Uganda sug-
gests that free mobility of labor can eliminate 
welfare differences between rural and urban 
areas for unskilled and poorer workers and 
households (Dudwick et al. 2011). Many 
developing countries have in place land 
market policies in rural areas to discour-
age migration to urban areas but these tend 
to worsen poverty. Migration is officially 
restricted in a large number of developing 
countries, including Ethiopia and  Vietnam. 
In China, the free movement of people from 
the countryside to the city was restricted 
under the hukou system that was established 
in 1958 (Au and Henderson 2006a, 2006b). 
In 2012, restrictions on migration to all 
urban areas except the large cities of China 
were abolished. To discourage migration 
from rural areas, many countries simply do 
not provide basic water and sanitation ser-
vices to poorer urban areas, often the first 
destination of rural migrants. For example, 
governments in the richer and larger locali-
ties in an urban area in Brazil reduce provi-
sion of water and sewerage connections to 
the smaller houses in which poorer migrants 
would live to discourage in-migration and 
deflect migrants to other localities (Feler and 
Henderson 2011). 
Economic growth is often concentrated 
geographically and described as being located 
in a leading region complemented with a 
lagging region where growth is stagnant. 
MDGs’ related issues in leading and lagging 
regions are quite similar to those for rural 
and urban areas. In Uganda, where the lead-
ing lagging region issue surfaces in policy dis-
cussions, the test the government faces is to 
allow, if not encourage, the concentration of 
economic activity while achieving a conver-
gence of living standards and delivery of basic 
services like the MDGs across a geographical 
area (box 2.4).
Nonfarm employment and rural poverty 
Rural areas also undergo profound transfor-
mation as rural workers move out of agricul-
ture to nonfarm activities. Indeed, through-
out the developing world, nonfarm sectors 
have been becoming increasingly important 
MAP 2.6 Travel time to the nearest city in Nepal
Source: GMR team 2013.
Note: Migrants in villages and small towns (population less than 100,000; orange, red, and bur-
gundy) migrate to markets in cities (population greater than 100,000, marked with a black circle). 
The map shows the travel time to the closest city; travel time is calculated using the existing road 
network (travel speed can vary by road type and terrain). When there are no roads, informal tracks 
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BOX 2.4 Is the policy agenda different for leading-lagging regions? The case of Uganda
Economic growth, often concentrated geographically, 
can lead to specialization, and can induce migration. 
Certain regions thus lead economically, while other 
regions lag, creating a challenge for economic and 
social development. Governments face a test to allow, 
if not encourage, the concentration of economic activ-
ity while achieving a convergence of living standards 
and delivery of basic services like the MDGs across 
space. 
Uganda realized that its development path is domi-
nated by these types of challenges. Uganda has made 
commendable progress in reducing income poverty at 
the national level, but there are gaps with some geo-
graphical pockets (lagging regions) not improving 
as much as others (leading regions). The Midnorth, 
Northeast, and West Nile regions are lagging behind 
in the incidence of poverty compared to the national 
average. Kampala is well ahead of other regions, with 
the poverty head count declining from 14 percent to 4 
percent between 1992 and 2010. Similar differentials 
are observed for other measures of welfare. Conse-
quently, in collaboration with the World Bank, the 
government of Uganda is trying to prioritize policies 
that generate the highest payoff for economic effi-
ciency and provide geographic equity at the same time 
(World Bank 2012b).  
The process began by identifying four policy areas 
that can make possible the integration of lagging 
and leading regions. The first is facilitating integra-
tion through better labor mobility, which emphasizes 
equipping people with a minimum level of educa-
tion and skills so they are able to take on the more 
demanding jobs in the leading regions. The second 
one is making land, a physically immobile asset, more 
fluid and its tenure more secure, allowing farmers to 
raise productivity within agriculture and to facilitate 
labor movement from agriculture to nonagricultural 
activities, as leasing and renting of land becomes 
feasible. One important policy action identified in 
Uganda is the development of a well-functioning sys-
tem of conflict and dispute resolution through a clear 
legal and institutional framework to promote security 
and encourage development of the rental market. The 
third policy area is to support integration through 
improved connectivity, which allows for improved 
mobility of people, products, and technology. Iso-
lation can confine producers to small markets and 
restrict them to inputs available in their geographic 
location. By enhancing connectivity, producers and 
firms can increase market size and consequently their 
ability to exploit economies of scale, draw from a 
larger pool of workers, and have greater access to raw 
materials and equipment. Finally, underpinning effec-
tiveness of these areas of focus is broadening cover-
age, quality, and accessibility of MDG-related social 
services across leading and lagging regions. This will 
empower people seeking economic opportunity and 
reduce congestion costs resulting from migration in 
search of access to social services in leading areas.  
Not surprisingly, the expected impact of public 
expenditure on development needs to guide Uganda’s 
policy makers in their decisions on prioritizing and 
sequencing the various policies competing for the lim-
ited resources available. For instance, geographical 
prioritization of investments in (social and physical) 
infrastructure is complicated if the trade-offs between 
economic efficiency and welfare gains are taken into 
account. On one hand, economic returns suggest 
that investing in physical- or place-specific economic 
infrastructure should be prioritized in leading areas to 
exploit economies of scale and agglomeration, build 
density, and accelerate growth. As in many other 
countries, Uganda firms locate where they can ben-
efit from agglomeration economies, suggesting priori-
tization of investments in infrastructure where these 
clusters are already forming in the southern-eastern 
corridor of Uganda. On the other hand, investments 
in social infrastructure yield positive returns across 
all regions, emphasizing the need for equitable provi-
sions of social services across geographical space.
This policy focus is not much different from the 
policy agenda advocated in this GMR; that agenda 
facilitates progress toward the MDGs through bet-
ter use of policies that assist the urbanization process 
given the advantages that urban areas have regarding 
income and thus poverty and MDG-related outcomes 
that are linked to better service delivery in urban 
areas.
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sources of employment and income in rural 
areas (Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2001; Hagg-
blade, Hazell, and Dorosh 2007). The non-
farm sector accounts for 25–50 percent of 
rural employment in South Asian countries. 
In eight Sub-Saharan African countries, Fox 
and Sohnesen (2012) estimated that the non-
farm sector accounted for 20–33 percent of 
total rural employment. 
On average, returns to labor are higher 
from nonfarm activities than from farming, 
and the incidence of poverty is lower among 
households with access to nonfarm employ-
ment than among households wholly depen-
dent on agriculture (for an example, see Fos-
ter and Rosenzweig 2004). 
The agglomeration economies associated 
with urbanization strongly affect the location 
of nonfarm activities. Manufacturing and 
salaried nonfarm jobs in developing coun-
tries usually follow specialization patterns 
(von Thunen 1966). Salaried and wage jobs, 
including administrative work (such as clerks 
and managers), are concentrated within and 
around large cities and decline precipitously 
within 3–4 hours travel time from the city 
(Fafchamps and Shilpi 2003, 2005). The con-
centration of better paid nonfarm activities 
near larger cities is confirmed for Bangladesh 
(Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis 2009) and 
Indonesia (Yamauchi et al. 2011). 
Growth of nonfarm activities is often 
driven by growth in agricultural productiv-
ity in the initial stage because of produc-
tion, consumption, and labor market links 
between the farm and nonfarm sectors (Hag-
gblade, Hazell, and Dorosh 2007). Smaller 
towns in the vicinity of rural areas are usu-
ally the most popular locations for nonfarm 
activities. However, nonfarm economic 
opportunities that can alleviate rural and 
small town poverty fail to emerge if access to 
markets in large urban centers do not exist. 
Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis (2009) found 
that lack of connectivity is doubly damaging 
for areas with higher agricultural potentials 
in Bangladesh. It not only depresses growth 
in agricultural productivity but also dis-
courages growth of better-paying nonfarm 
activities directly and indirectly (because of 
agricultural linkages). Other factors that fos-
ter nonfarm activity include education (Lan-
jouw and Lanjouw 2001; World Bank 2007; 
Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007; Fox 
and Sohnesen 2012) and access and reliabil-
ity of electricity. Lack of reliable electricity is 
found to be among the topmost constraints 
to nonfarm activity in rural areas and small 
towns in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, and many more countries, accord-
ing to the World Bank–International Finance 
Corporation Investment Climate Surveys. 
Closing the gender gap in basic education 
can boost rural women’s empowerment by 
increasing agricultural incomes. Farm pro-
ductivity rises when farms are managed by 
more educated and experienced individu-
als (Alene and others 2008; Kumar 1994; 
Moock 1976; Saito, Mekonnen, and Spurl-
ing 1994). WDR 2012 indicates that the 
potential to leverage women’s education to 
boost productivity on female-managed farms 
is large. Relative to male farmers, female 
farmers have lower productivity which can 
be measured in crop yield gaps that aver-
age around 20–30 percent in Benin, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria. In 
Europe and Central Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean, productivity differentials 
of about 34 percent between female- and 
male-managed farms prevail.
Land market restrictions deter diversifi-
cation into nonfarm activities. Do and Iyer 
(2008) reported that land reforms in Viet-
nam had a positive and significant effect on 
long-term investment in agriculture and on 
the time devoted to nonfarm activities. Ethi-
opia (Deininger et al. 2003) and Sri Lanka 
(Emran and Shilpi 2011) are examples of 
countries where land sales are restricted and 
where rural employment has not diversified 
into nonfarm activities.  
Research in India suggests that urban-
ization is associated with rural nonfarm 
employment and thereby with rural poverty 
reduction. Earlier studies showed that urban 
growth had an impact on urban poverty 
but no discernible impact on rural poverty 
(Datt and Ravallion 1996). A recent study 
found that while rural growth remains vital 
for rural poverty reduction, urban economic 
growth has also been good for rural and 
hence aggregate poverty reduction since 
1991 (Datt and Ravallion 2009; Cali and 
Menon 2012). Multiple mechanisms can 
account for this link. The first and obvious 
channel is the first-round effects of urban 
growth that induce migration of poor people 
in rural areas to urban areas. A second chan-
nel is that in rural areas population density 
can increase such that they become classi-
fied as urban. If these rural areas had sig-
nificant concentrations of poor people before 
reclassification, then rural poverty becomes 
automatically urban poverty. The incidence 
of rural poverty in a district decreases 
by some 2–3 percent with an increase of 
200,000 urban residents in the district (Cali 
and Menon 2012). This effect stems from 
reclassification, not migration. Numer-
ous other second-round effects are possible 
when urban growth increases the demand 
for rural goods or leads to growth in mar-
keting, transport, and agricultural trade or 
to remittance incomes from urban to rural 
areas. Diversification out of agriculture in 
rural areas may also raise agricultural wages 
as rural labor markets tighten. The World 
Bank (2011) reports that growth in per 
capita consumption in urban areas in India 
is associated with growth in rural nonfarm 
employment. 
Policy makers can leverage nonfarm activi-
ties that typically connect rural areas to small 
towns to reduce poverty in both. For this, 
they need to focus on the provision of con-
nectivity between rural areas, small towns 
and large cities, electricity provision in rural 
areas and small towns, and establishment of 
an efficient land market.
Small towns and delivery of  
MDG-related services 
The role of small towns in urbanization is of 
importance in achieving progress toward the 
MDGs. Urbanization is usually equated with 
better access to basic services that enable 
the poor to have a decent livelihood. But, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, urban areas 
are not homogenous and the advantages and 
disadvantages of urbanization are not dis-
tributed evenly: some city locations are bet-
ter served than others. In general, megacities 
and large cities offer the best services, smaller 
towns have the next best, and slums and rural 
areas tend to have the worst access as well as 
the lowest quality of services. Both slums and 
small towns contribute to the urbanization 
of poverty. Attention to the small town-large 
city differentials in urban poverty has shed 
light on small town poverty as a critical chal-
lenge to poverty reduction. 
The presumption has long been that pov-
erty-reducing policies should focus on urban 
growth in cities. However, if urban poverty 
is more concentrated in smaller towns, then 
the singular use of poverty-alleviating mea-
sures in larger towns may be neutralized or 
even overwhelmed by worsening poverty in 
smaller towns. The places where the poor live 
may not necessarily be the least-cost loca-
tions for extending coverage of piped water 
and sanitation, or for building a school or 
hospital or health clinic. These differen-
tials can play a pivotal role in determining 
the coverage, efficiency, and costs of MDG 
related service delivery.
Urbanization, congestion,  
and slums
Typically, slums emerge in cities when the 
demand for services outpaces supply. That 
can happen through natural increases in the 
urban population, in rural-urban migration, 
or both. Slums can be a transient home for 
some, and a permanent one for others. 
There is no technical definition of a slum, 
but in 2002, the UN-Habitat Expert Group 
put forth a description of slums that included 
several indicators: “a group of individu-
als living under the same roof in an urban 
area with at least one of the following four 
basic shelter deprivations: lack of access 
to improved water supply; lack of access to 
improved sanitation; overcrowding (three or 
more persons per room); and dwellings made 
of nondurable material.” A fifth indicator 
is insecurity of tenure, but insufficient data 
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sources of employment and income in rural 
areas (Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2001; Hagg-
blade, Hazell, and Dorosh 2007). The non-
farm sector accounts for 25–50 percent of 
rural employment in South Asian countries. 
In eight Sub-Saharan African countries, Fox 
and Sohnesen (2012) estimated that the non-
farm sector accounted for 20–33 percent of 
total rural employment. 
On average, returns to labor are higher 
from nonfarm activities than from farming, 
and the incidence of poverty is lower among 
households with access to nonfarm employ-
ment than among households wholly depen-
dent on agriculture (for an example, see Fos-
ter and Rosenzweig 2004). 
The agglomeration economies associated 
with urbanization strongly affect the location 
of nonfarm activities. Manufacturing and 
salaried nonfarm jobs in developing coun-
tries usually follow specialization patterns 
(von Thunen 1966). Salaried and wage jobs, 
including administrative work (such as clerks 
and managers), are concentrated within and 
around large cities and decline precipitously 
within 3–4 hours travel time from the city 
(Fafchamps and Shilpi 2003, 2005). The con-
centration of better paid nonfarm activities 
near larger cities is confirmed for Bangladesh 
(Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis 2009) and 
Indonesia (Yamauchi et al. 2011). 
Growth of nonfarm activities is often 
driven by growth in agricultural productiv-
ity in the initial stage because of produc-
tion, consumption, and labor market links 
between the farm and nonfarm sectors (Hag-
gblade, Hazell, and Dorosh 2007). Smaller 
towns in the vicinity of rural areas are usu-
ally the most popular locations for nonfarm 
activities. However, nonfarm economic 
opportunities that can alleviate rural and 
small town poverty fail to emerge if access to 
markets in large urban centers do not exist. 
Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis (2009) found 
that lack of connectivity is doubly damaging 
for areas with higher agricultural potentials 
in Bangladesh. It not only depresses growth 
in agricultural productivity but also dis-
courages growth of better-paying nonfarm 
activities directly and indirectly (because of 
agricultural linkages). Other factors that fos-
ter nonfarm activity include education (Lan-
jouw and Lanjouw 2001; World Bank 2007; 
Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007; Fox 
and Sohnesen 2012) and access and reliabil-
ity of electricity. Lack of reliable electricity is 
found to be among the topmost constraints 
to nonfarm activity in rural areas and small 
towns in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, and many more countries, accord-
ing to the World Bank–International Finance 
Corporation Investment Climate Surveys. 
Closing the gender gap in basic education 
can boost rural women’s empowerment by 
increasing agricultural incomes. Farm pro-
ductivity rises when farms are managed by 
more educated and experienced individu-
als (Alene and others 2008; Kumar 1994; 
Moock 1976; Saito, Mekonnen, and Spurl-
ing 1994). WDR 2012 indicates that the 
potential to leverage women’s education to 
boost productivity on female-managed farms 
is large. Relative to male farmers, female 
farmers have lower productivity which can 
be measured in crop yield gaps that aver-
age around 20–30 percent in Benin, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria. In 
Europe and Central Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean, productivity differentials 
of about 34 percent between female- and 
male-managed farms prevail.
Land market restrictions deter diversifi-
cation into nonfarm activities. Do and Iyer 
(2008) reported that land reforms in Viet-
nam had a positive and significant effect on 
long-term investment in agriculture and on 
the time devoted to nonfarm activities. Ethi-
opia (Deininger et al. 2003) and Sri Lanka 
(Emran and Shilpi 2011) are examples of 
countries where land sales are restricted and 
where rural employment has not diversified 
into nonfarm activities.  
Research in India suggests that urban-
ization is associated with rural nonfarm 
employment and thereby with rural poverty 
reduction. Earlier studies showed that urban 
growth had an impact on urban poverty 
but no discernible impact on rural poverty 
(Datt and Ravallion 1996). A recent study 
found that while rural growth remains vital 
for rural poverty reduction, urban economic 
growth has also been good for rural and 
hence aggregate poverty reduction since 
1991 (Datt and Ravallion 2009; Cali and 
Menon 2012). Multiple mechanisms can 
account for this link. The first and obvious 
channel is the first-round effects of urban 
growth that induce migration of poor people 
in rural areas to urban areas. A second chan-
nel is that in rural areas population density 
can increase such that they become classi-
fied as urban. If these rural areas had sig-
nificant concentrations of poor people before 
reclassification, then rural poverty becomes 
automatically urban poverty. The incidence 
of rural poverty in a district decreases 
by some 2–3 percent with an increase of 
200,000 urban residents in the district (Cali 
and Menon 2012). This effect stems from 
reclassification, not migration. Numer-
ous other second-round effects are possible 
when urban growth increases the demand 
for rural goods or leads to growth in mar-
keting, transport, and agricultural trade or 
to remittance incomes from urban to rural 
areas. Diversification out of agriculture in 
rural areas may also raise agricultural wages 
as rural labor markets tighten. The World 
Bank (2011) reports that growth in per 
capita consumption in urban areas in India 
is associated with growth in rural nonfarm 
employment. 
Policy makers can leverage nonfarm activi-
ties that typically connect rural areas to small 
towns to reduce poverty in both. For this, 
they need to focus on the provision of con-
nectivity between rural areas, small towns 
and large cities, electricity provision in rural 
areas and small towns, and establishment of 
an efficient land market.
Small towns and delivery of  
MDG-related services 
The role of small towns in urbanization is of 
importance in achieving progress toward the 
MDGs. Urbanization is usually equated with 
better access to basic services that enable 
the poor to have a decent livelihood. But, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, urban areas 
are not homogenous and the advantages and 
disadvantages of urbanization are not dis-
tributed evenly: some city locations are bet-
ter served than others. In general, megacities 
and large cities offer the best services, smaller 
towns have the next best, and slums and rural 
areas tend to have the worst access as well as 
the lowest quality of services. Both slums and 
small towns contribute to the urbanization 
of poverty. Attention to the small town-large 
city differentials in urban poverty has shed 
light on small town poverty as a critical chal-
lenge to poverty reduction. 
The presumption has long been that pov-
erty-reducing policies should focus on urban 
growth in cities. However, if urban poverty 
is more concentrated in smaller towns, then 
the singular use of poverty-alleviating mea-
sures in larger towns may be neutralized or 
even overwhelmed by worsening poverty in 
smaller towns. The places where the poor live 
may not necessarily be the least-cost loca-
tions for extending coverage of piped water 
and sanitation, or for building a school or 
hospital or health clinic. These differen-
tials can play a pivotal role in determining 
the coverage, efficiency, and costs of MDG 
related service delivery.
Urbanization, congestion,  
and slums
Typically, slums emerge in cities when the 
demand for services outpaces supply. That 
can happen through natural increases in the 
urban population, in rural-urban migration, 
or both. Slums can be a transient home for 
some, and a permanent one for others. 
There is no technical definition of a slum, 
but in 2002, the UN-Habitat Expert Group 
put forth a description of slums that included 
several indicators: “a group of individu-
als living under the same roof in an urban 
area with at least one of the following four 
basic shelter deprivations: lack of access 
to improved water supply; lack of access to 
improved sanitation; overcrowding (three or 
more persons per room); and dwellings made 
of nondurable material.” A fifth indicator 
is insecurity of tenure, but insufficient data 
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prevents this dimension from being formally 
included in estimates of slums.5 
In developing countries, where all five 
indicators are often found together, extreme 
deprivation occurs. Given that the two poor-
est regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, are the farthest behind on access to 
safe water and sanitation, it is no surprise 
that they also house a large proportion of 
their urban population in slums (figure 2.10). 
Poorly functioning land and housing mar-
kets, lack of urban planning, and exclusion-
ary attitudes toward the urban poor are the 
main reasons why the urban poor are forced 
to reside in low-quality housing on insecure 
land with few or no basic services (Baker 
2008). Insecurity of tenure takes on complex 
forms in situations where slum populations 
represent a mix of owners, squatters, and 
renters.
Slum settlements may have differing 
degrees of marginalization depending on the 
recognition of their status by the government. 
Slums may actually serve the urban poor by 
offering low-cost housing and potential prox-
imity to work. Slum settlements can also be 
the basis for self-employment and operation 
of small home-based businesses. 
Lack of basic services in cities is often tied 
to insecure tenure. According to the United 
Nation’s MDG Report 2012, slum evictions 
without due legal process are the most visible 
violation of housing rights confronted by the 
urban poor. Slum evictions have increased 
significantly since 2000. For example, in 
Jakarta in 2003/04 more than 100,000 peo-
ple were either evicted or threatened with 
eviction as part of an effort to clear various 
areas of informal occupation. In Beijing, an 
estimated 300,000 people lost their homes as 
a result of preparations for the 2008 Olympic 
Games (Du Plessis 2005). 
While slum and informal settlements may 
provide an entry point into cities in the short 
run, they are likely to have negative impacts 
on the conditions of the urban poor in the 
medium and long term. A lack of govern-
ment intention to provide basic services in 
slum settlements does not necessarily deter 
urban poor and rural migrants for whom 
slums are the only entry point into urban 
areas. It does, however, negatively affect their 
economic situation if they have no choice but 
to rely on private and informal providers for 
provision of basic services at higher cost than 
those provided by the government to other 
strata of the society (box 2.5). Eviction from 
slums can drastically affect the livelihood 
of the residents by spatially displacing them 
from the proximity of their livelihoods, cre-
ating higher transportation costs. Because 
slums are also sites of economic production 
for small business enterprises, slum evictions 
and demolitions can also destroy livelihoods 
(Mehra, Maik, and Rudolf 2012; Du Ples-
sis 2005). Given the lack of access to insur-
ance or secure savings, such losses can create 
dire economic conditions for the urban poor. 
Slum dwellers often cope with these problems 
by discontinuing the education of children, 
especially girls. 
More significantly, the lack of legal rec-
ognition of slum settlements translates into 
poor access to basic services, especially water 
and sanitation, for those living in slums. For 
example, more than 50 percent of the slum 
population in South Asia and 40 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa lack access to sanitation 
services (UN-Habitat 2010). In the slums 
of Nairobi, there is one toilet for every 500 
people on average. (There are, however, some 
encouraging though rare examples to redress 
the lack of toilets, including an initiative in 
Agra, India, described in box 2.6). Govern-
ments are reluctant to provide basic services 
to slum settlements with insecure tenure, 
for fear such actions will encourage further 
urban poor settlement on unoccupied lands 
and invite rural migrants to migrate to cities 
in expectation of better services (Durand-
Lasserve 2006). According to the World Pop-
ulation Policies Report (UN 2011), in 1976, 
44 percent of developing countries reported 
having implemented policies to restrict or 
retard rural-urban migration; by 2011, that 
proportion had increased to 72 percent. 
Further, the inability of migrants to prove 
urban residence via water or electricity bills 
or formal rental leases in slums, along with 
their informal employment, makes their situ-
ation even more precarious. In some coun-
tries, proof of urban residence is needed to 









































BOX 2.5 Costs of coping with lack of water service 
In Bangladesh, in the absence of state-provided ser-
vices, a parallel network of service providers known 
as mastaans provides the needed services for high 
fees, with patronage from politicians and law enforce-
ment agencies. Based on interviews with government 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations, a 
World Bank (2007) report noted that the mastaans 
exploited slum residents not only by demanding high 
rates for the provision of basic services but also by 
using physical force and threats of eviction when pay-
offs were not made. 
Such instances are not limited to Bangladesh. 
Water sold at water kiosks in informal settlements 
in Eldoret, Kenya, costs more than five times what 
residents in the formal urban areas of Eldoret pay 
the municipal council for water (Kimani-Murage and 
Ngindu 2007). Karuiki and Schwartz (2005) ana-
lyzed data from 47 countries (93 locations) and found 
that the average water prices charged by private ven-
dors compared with the public network were four and 
a half times higher for point sources (ranging from a 
simple connection to a standpost or kiosk and tap to a 
borehole with tank, pipe and tap) that are most com-
monly found in peri-urban or unplanned settlements 
with unclear tenure. 
These higher costs of access to water associated 
with the use of informal providers not only increase 
expenditures of slum households but may also increase 
costs related to ill health. In Indonesia, the use of low-
priced drinking water of lesser quality from informal 
providers by slum families was associated with con-
siderably higher infant and under-five mortality as 
well as child morbidity (Semba et al. 2009). The lack 
of safe water provision in urban slums has far-reach-
ing implications and threatens the progress of MDGs 
related to poverty eradication and child health.
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prevents this dimension from being formally 
included in estimates of slums.5 
In developing countries, where all five 
indicators are often found together, extreme 
deprivation occurs. Given that the two poor-
est regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, are the farthest behind on access to 
safe water and sanitation, it is no surprise 
that they also house a large proportion of 
their urban population in slums (figure 2.10). 
Poorly functioning land and housing mar-
kets, lack of urban planning, and exclusion-
ary attitudes toward the urban poor are the 
main reasons why the urban poor are forced 
to reside in low-quality housing on insecure 
land with few or no basic services (Baker 
2008). Insecurity of tenure takes on complex 
forms in situations where slum populations 
represent a mix of owners, squatters, and 
renters.
Slum settlements may have differing 
degrees of marginalization depending on the 
recognition of their status by the government. 
Slums may actually serve the urban poor by 
offering low-cost housing and potential prox-
imity to work. Slum settlements can also be 
the basis for self-employment and operation 
of small home-based businesses. 
Lack of basic services in cities is often tied 
to insecure tenure. According to the United 
Nation’s MDG Report 2012, slum evictions 
without due legal process are the most visible 
violation of housing rights confronted by the 
urban poor. Slum evictions have increased 
significantly since 2000. For example, in 
Jakarta in 2003/04 more than 100,000 peo-
ple were either evicted or threatened with 
eviction as part of an effort to clear various 
areas of informal occupation. In Beijing, an 
estimated 300,000 people lost their homes as 
a result of preparations for the 2008 Olympic 
Games (Du Plessis 2005). 
While slum and informal settlements may 
provide an entry point into cities in the short 
run, they are likely to have negative impacts 
on the conditions of the urban poor in the 
medium and long term. A lack of govern-
ment intention to provide basic services in 
slum settlements does not necessarily deter 
urban poor and rural migrants for whom 
slums are the only entry point into urban 
areas. It does, however, negatively affect their 
economic situation if they have no choice but 
to rely on private and informal providers for 
provision of basic services at higher cost than 
those provided by the government to other 
strata of the society (box 2.5). Eviction from 
slums can drastically affect the livelihood 
of the residents by spatially displacing them 
from the proximity of their livelihoods, cre-
ating higher transportation costs. Because 
slums are also sites of economic production 
for small business enterprises, slum evictions 
and demolitions can also destroy livelihoods 
(Mehra, Maik, and Rudolf 2012; Du Ples-
sis 2005). Given the lack of access to insur-
ance or secure savings, such losses can create 
dire economic conditions for the urban poor. 
Slum dwellers often cope with these problems 
by discontinuing the education of children, 
especially girls. 
More significantly, the lack of legal rec-
ognition of slum settlements translates into 
poor access to basic services, especially water 
and sanitation, for those living in slums. For 
example, more than 50 percent of the slum 
population in South Asia and 40 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa lack access to sanitation 
services (UN-Habitat 2010). In the slums 
of Nairobi, there is one toilet for every 500 
people on average. (There are, however, some 
encouraging though rare examples to redress 
the lack of toilets, including an initiative in 
Agra, India, described in box 2.6). Govern-
ments are reluctant to provide basic services 
to slum settlements with insecure tenure, 
for fear such actions will encourage further 
urban poor settlement on unoccupied lands 
and invite rural migrants to migrate to cities 
in expectation of better services (Durand-
Lasserve 2006). According to the World Pop-
ulation Policies Report (UN 2011), in 1976, 
44 percent of developing countries reported 
having implemented policies to restrict or 
retard rural-urban migration; by 2011, that 
proportion had increased to 72 percent. 
Further, the inability of migrants to prove 
urban residence via water or electricity bills 
or formal rental leases in slums, along with 
their informal employment, makes their situ-
ation even more precarious. In some coun-
tries, proof of urban residence is needed to 









































BOX 2.5 Costs of coping with lack of water service 
In Bangladesh, in the absence of state-provided ser-
vices, a parallel network of service providers known 
as mastaans provides the needed services for high 
fees, with patronage from politicians and law enforce-
ment agencies. Based on interviews with government 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations, a 
World Bank (2007) report noted that the mastaans 
exploited slum residents not only by demanding high 
rates for the provision of basic services but also by 
using physical force and threats of eviction when pay-
offs were not made. 
Such instances are not limited to Bangladesh. 
Water sold at water kiosks in informal settlements 
in Eldoret, Kenya, costs more than five times what 
residents in the formal urban areas of Eldoret pay 
the municipal council for water (Kimani-Murage and 
Ngindu 2007). Karuiki and Schwartz (2005) ana-
lyzed data from 47 countries (93 locations) and found 
that the average water prices charged by private ven-
dors compared with the public network were four and 
a half times higher for point sources (ranging from a 
simple connection to a standpost or kiosk and tap to a 
borehole with tank, pipe and tap) that are most com-
monly found in peri-urban or unplanned settlements 
with unclear tenure. 
These higher costs of access to water associated 
with the use of informal providers not only increase 
expenditures of slum households but may also increase 
costs related to ill health. In Indonesia, the use of low-
priced drinking water of lesser quality from informal 
providers by slum families was associated with con-
siderably higher infant and under-five mortality as 
well as child morbidity (Semba et al. 2009). The lack 
of safe water provision in urban slums has far-reach-
ing implications and threatens the progress of MDGs 
related to poverty eradication and child health.
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access basic services. A qualitative study 
of the Kyrgyz Republic found that with-
out proof of urban registration status, rural 
migrants faced difficulty accessing treatment 
at health clinics, and many no longer seek 
health services assuming that they will not be 
treated (Nasritdinov 2007).
Substandard housing or illegal and inad-
equate building structures are another hous-
ing-related marker of slums. Overcrowding 
and high density worsen service delivery 
when the one tap or toilet supplied to a dwell-
ing has to be shared by many. Overcrowding 
is associated with a low space per person, 
high occupancy rates, cohabitation by dif-
ferent families, and a high number of single-
room units. Many slum dwelling units have 
five or more persons sharing one room used 
for cooking, sleeping, and living. 
Slums dwellings may be built in haz-
ardous locations or on land unsuitable for 
settlement, such as floodplains, in proxim-
ity to industrial plants with toxic emissions 
or waste disposal sites, or in areas subject 
to landslides. The layout of the settlement 
may be hazardous because of a lack of access 
ways and high densities of dilapidated struc-
tures. Lack of basic services is manifested 
by visible, open sewers, a lack of pathways, 
uncontrolled dumping of waste, and polluted 
environments.
Slums and child morbidity and mortal-
ity go hand in hand. A slum household can 
be one or two times more at risk when it is 
extremely deprived than when it is affected 
by only one deprivation. For example, in 
Ouagadougou, the proportion of children 
with diarrhea in slum areas is 20 percent, 
whereas those children living with three shel-
ter deprivations are two times more exposed 
(37 percent) and those with four shelter depri-
vations are two and a half times more at risk. 
Likewise in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, 
children in slum households suffering from 
two shelter deprivations are five times more 
exposed to diarrhea than children in slum 
households with only one shelter deprivation 
(UN-Habitat 2008). 
A Nairobi Urban Health and Demographic 
Surveillance Site study indicates that slum 
children bear the biggest burden of poor envi-
ronmental sanitation and housing conditions 
and poor quality health services. Data from 
this study show that diarrhea and pneumonia 
are the leading causes of death among chil-
dren under five and that the mortality burden 
among these children is four times higher 
than in the rest of the population (Kyobutungi 
et al. 2008). High mortality levels are not 
surprising given that children in slums have 
exceptionally low levels of vaccination—only 
44 percent are fully immunized) (Mutua and 
Kimani-Murage 2011). These slum children 
were also found to have exceptionally high 
levels of malnutrition and a high prevalence of 
infectious diseases, with little access to cura-
tive health care (Ndugwa and Zulu 2008).
In overcrowded and underserviced urban 
slums, the lack of basic sanitation and safe 
water is an acute problem for women and 
girls. Migration from rural to urban areas 
can increase women’s opportunities to access 
better reproductive health care, education, 
and livelihoods, but these benefits need to be 
weighed against the negative consequences 
of the possibility of living in a slum (Mora 
2008). Many wait until dark to relieve them-
selves, often confronting harassment and 
even sexual assault when defecating in pub-
lic. Because women carry a heavier burden of 
household chores (including cleaning, wash-
ing, and caring for children), the lack of water 
and sanitation provision in slums affects them 
disproportionately more than men (Tacoli 
and Mabala 2012). 
This disproportionate burden on women 
has important implications for attaining the 
MDGs. A recent study of 5,033 migrant 
women living in makeshift slum settlements 
in India found a strong relationship between 
reproductive tract infections and lack of 
access to proper sanitation (Singh, Kandpal, 
and Roy 2011). A lack of gender-balanced 
approaches to sanitation also has significant 
impact on MDGs related to the education of 
adolescent girls. Poor sanitation is a leading 
determinant of adolescent girl dropouts (MoE 
Kenya 2011; FAWE 2006; Obonyo 2003). A 
UNICEF study in urban Bangladesh found 
that a simple school sanitation intervention 
to provide separate facilities for boys and 
girls helped boost girls’ school attendance 
11 percent a year, on average, from 1992 to 
1999 (UNICEF 2003a). Similar results were 
found in Mozambique (UNICEF 2003b). 
Slums often surface on the periphery of a 
city, but the problems are the same as those 
in the city center. As Satterthwaite (2007) 
BOX 2.6 Catalyzing citywide development though toilet design in the slums of Agra, 
India
The city of Agra is making news with a community-
driven, nongovernmental organization (NGO)-facili-
tated, and local government-supported initiative that 
has made toilets an entry point for catalyzing hous-
ing, slum, and city development. In the slums of Agra, 
the user-toilet ratio is as high as one seat for every 
345 to 1,000 users. Personal toilets are a luxury for 
several reasons. Poor families with little savings or 
access to affordable formal credit are unable to invest 
in building a toilet (the initial investment is estimated 
to be equivalent to up to six months of a poor house-
hold’s earnings in Agra). Lack of space in small and 
temporary slum structures makes it impossible to 
construct a toilet using conventional technology. Plus, 
technical knowhow is lacking to make the connection 
to a sewer line (usually far away from a slum) or to 
a safe underground septic tank connected to a con-
veyance system. Women, who are disproportionately 
affected by the lack of toilets, have little influence on 
spending decisions to construct a toilet. But the big-
gest constraint is the insecure tenure of slums. Local 
bodies are reluctant to permit construction of perma-
nent structures for the fear of legitimizing their stay. 
The Centre for Urban and Regional Excellence 
(CURE), an Indian NGO, has approached the lack 
of private toilets for slum dwellers using a four-
cornered strategy: enabling women to be the deci-
sion makers; creating access to credit and technical 
knowhow; designing, improving, customizing, and 
stabilizing the technology with last mile connections; 
and enhancing local capacities to address organiza-
tional, governance, and scaling-up restraints. Toilet 
Savings Groups of CURE enable women to save and 
set aside money for construction. The balance comes 
from a Community Credit Fund, repaid in small 
installments, and the money revolves to other toilet-
less families. While the plumbing and collection and 
conveyance system is mandatory, women can choose 
to make the housing, such as walls, roof, and doors, 
from less permanent materials to save costs. State per-
missions and reformed local bylaws are encouraging 
more families to invest in toilets. 
Toilet designs were customized to suit the slum 
environment; for example, septic tanks were retrofit-
ted and strengthened in partnership with a local man-
ufacturer that was also trained to install the full toilet 
on a turnkey basis for long-term sustainability. Sur-
face drains were improved to convey septic tank over-
flows to the city drain, where the city’s first Decen-
tralized Waste Water Treatment System (DEWAT) 
was built with support from international donors and 
the Agra Municipal Corporation. This model is being 
replicated in the Savda Ghevra resettlement colony 
in Delhi. To simultaneously ensure environmental 
safety and convey toilet waste away from homes, clus-
ter septic tanks were designed below neighborhood 
parks and linked to DEWAT to treat the water, which 
could then be recycled for flushing. The community in 
Savda Ghevra contributes a small monthly amount to 
pay for annual maintenance of common septic tanks 
but also profit by way of sale of composted sludge, 
money that is reinvested in the community.
The success of these toilets in Agra has begun to 
catalyze housing upgrades. For temporary shacks, 
a core house design using columns is enabling the 
poorest to have a toilet and build a stable structure 
around it incrementally from small savings or hous-
ing finance. Local government in Agra has seen this 
as an opportunity to improve the city’s overall sani-
tation and has developed an inclusive city develop-
ment strategy to help build and retrofit 4,000 slum 
toilets, intercepting their direct sewage discharge into 
drains, and transporting it through appropriate chan-
nels. Ultimately, this will restore Agra’s now sewage-
choked storm water drainage system.
Source: Dr. Renu Khosla, Director, Centre for Urban and 
Regional Excellence (CURE), India.
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access basic services. A qualitative study 
of the Kyrgyz Republic found that with-
out proof of urban registration status, rural 
migrants faced difficulty accessing treatment 
at health clinics, and many no longer seek 
health services assuming that they will not be 
treated (Nasritdinov 2007).
Substandard housing or illegal and inad-
equate building structures are another hous-
ing-related marker of slums. Overcrowding 
and high density worsen service delivery 
when the one tap or toilet supplied to a dwell-
ing has to be shared by many. Overcrowding 
is associated with a low space per person, 
high occupancy rates, cohabitation by dif-
ferent families, and a high number of single-
room units. Many slum dwelling units have 
five or more persons sharing one room used 
for cooking, sleeping, and living. 
Slums dwellings may be built in haz-
ardous locations or on land unsuitable for 
settlement, such as floodplains, in proxim-
ity to industrial plants with toxic emissions 
or waste disposal sites, or in areas subject 
to landslides. The layout of the settlement 
may be hazardous because of a lack of access 
ways and high densities of dilapidated struc-
tures. Lack of basic services is manifested 
by visible, open sewers, a lack of pathways, 
uncontrolled dumping of waste, and polluted 
environments.
Slums and child morbidity and mortal-
ity go hand in hand. A slum household can 
be one or two times more at risk when it is 
extremely deprived than when it is affected 
by only one deprivation. For example, in 
Ouagadougou, the proportion of children 
with diarrhea in slum areas is 20 percent, 
whereas those children living with three shel-
ter deprivations are two times more exposed 
(37 percent) and those with four shelter depri-
vations are two and a half times more at risk. 
Likewise in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, 
children in slum households suffering from 
two shelter deprivations are five times more 
exposed to diarrhea than children in slum 
households with only one shelter deprivation 
(UN-Habitat 2008). 
A Nairobi Urban Health and Demographic 
Surveillance Site study indicates that slum 
children bear the biggest burden of poor envi-
ronmental sanitation and housing conditions 
and poor quality health services. Data from 
this study show that diarrhea and pneumonia 
are the leading causes of death among chil-
dren under five and that the mortality burden 
among these children is four times higher 
than in the rest of the population (Kyobutungi 
et al. 2008). High mortality levels are not 
surprising given that children in slums have 
exceptionally low levels of vaccination—only 
44 percent are fully immunized) (Mutua and 
Kimani-Murage 2011). These slum children 
were also found to have exceptionally high 
levels of malnutrition and a high prevalence of 
infectious diseases, with little access to cura-
tive health care (Ndugwa and Zulu 2008).
In overcrowded and underserviced urban 
slums, the lack of basic sanitation and safe 
water is an acute problem for women and 
girls. Migration from rural to urban areas 
can increase women’s opportunities to access 
better reproductive health care, education, 
and livelihoods, but these benefits need to be 
weighed against the negative consequences 
of the possibility of living in a slum (Mora 
2008). Many wait until dark to relieve them-
selves, often confronting harassment and 
even sexual assault when defecating in pub-
lic. Because women carry a heavier burden of 
household chores (including cleaning, wash-
ing, and caring for children), the lack of water 
and sanitation provision in slums affects them 
disproportionately more than men (Tacoli 
and Mabala 2012). 
This disproportionate burden on women 
has important implications for attaining the 
MDGs. A recent study of 5,033 migrant 
women living in makeshift slum settlements 
in India found a strong relationship between 
reproductive tract infections and lack of 
access to proper sanitation (Singh, Kandpal, 
and Roy 2011). A lack of gender-balanced 
approaches to sanitation also has significant 
impact on MDGs related to the education of 
adolescent girls. Poor sanitation is a leading 
determinant of adolescent girl dropouts (MoE 
Kenya 2011; FAWE 2006; Obonyo 2003). A 
UNICEF study in urban Bangladesh found 
that a simple school sanitation intervention 
to provide separate facilities for boys and 
girls helped boost girls’ school attendance 
11 percent a year, on average, from 1992 to 
1999 (UNICEF 2003a). Similar results were 
found in Mozambique (UNICEF 2003b). 
Slums often surface on the periphery of a 
city, but the problems are the same as those 
in the city center. As Satterthwaite (2007) 
BOX 2.6 Catalyzing citywide development though toilet design in the slums of Agra, 
India
The city of Agra is making news with a community-
driven, nongovernmental organization (NGO)-facili-
tated, and local government-supported initiative that 
has made toilets an entry point for catalyzing hous-
ing, slum, and city development. In the slums of Agra, 
the user-toilet ratio is as high as one seat for every 
345 to 1,000 users. Personal toilets are a luxury for 
several reasons. Poor families with little savings or 
access to affordable formal credit are unable to invest 
in building a toilet (the initial investment is estimated 
to be equivalent to up to six months of a poor house-
hold’s earnings in Agra). Lack of space in small and 
temporary slum structures makes it impossible to 
construct a toilet using conventional technology. Plus, 
technical knowhow is lacking to make the connection 
to a sewer line (usually far away from a slum) or to 
a safe underground septic tank connected to a con-
veyance system. Women, who are disproportionately 
affected by the lack of toilets, have little influence on 
spending decisions to construct a toilet. But the big-
gest constraint is the insecure tenure of slums. Local 
bodies are reluctant to permit construction of perma-
nent structures for the fear of legitimizing their stay. 
The Centre for Urban and Regional Excellence 
(CURE), an Indian NGO, has approached the lack 
of private toilets for slum dwellers using a four-
cornered strategy: enabling women to be the deci-
sion makers; creating access to credit and technical 
knowhow; designing, improving, customizing, and 
stabilizing the technology with last mile connections; 
and enhancing local capacities to address organiza-
tional, governance, and scaling-up restraints. Toilet 
Savings Groups of CURE enable women to save and 
set aside money for construction. The balance comes 
from a Community Credit Fund, repaid in small 
installments, and the money revolves to other toilet-
less families. While the plumbing and collection and 
conveyance system is mandatory, women can choose 
to make the housing, such as walls, roof, and doors, 
from less permanent materials to save costs. State per-
missions and reformed local bylaws are encouraging 
more families to invest in toilets. 
Toilet designs were customized to suit the slum 
environment; for example, septic tanks were retrofit-
ted and strengthened in partnership with a local man-
ufacturer that was also trained to install the full toilet 
on a turnkey basis for long-term sustainability. Sur-
face drains were improved to convey septic tank over-
flows to the city drain, where the city’s first Decen-
tralized Waste Water Treatment System (DEWAT) 
was built with support from international donors and 
the Agra Municipal Corporation. This model is being 
replicated in the Savda Ghevra resettlement colony 
in Delhi. To simultaneously ensure environmental 
safety and convey toilet waste away from homes, clus-
ter septic tanks were designed below neighborhood 
parks and linked to DEWAT to treat the water, which 
could then be recycled for flushing. The community in 
Savda Ghevra contributes a small monthly amount to 
pay for annual maintenance of common septic tanks 
but also profit by way of sale of composted sludge, 
money that is reinvested in the community.
The success of these toilets in Agra has begun to 
catalyze housing upgrades. For temporary shacks, 
a core house design using columns is enabling the 
poorest to have a toilet and build a stable structure 
around it incrementally from small savings or hous-
ing finance. Local government in Agra has seen this 
as an opportunity to improve the city’s overall sani-
tation and has developed an inclusive city develop-
ment strategy to help build and retrofit 4,000 slum 
toilets, intercepting their direct sewage discharge into 
drains, and transporting it through appropriate chan-
nels. Ultimately, this will restore Agra’s now sewage-
choked storm water drainage system.
Source: Dr. Renu Khosla, Director, Centre for Urban and 
Regional Excellence (CURE), India.
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observes, settlements are formed on the 
urban periphery of many cities including 
megacities like Buenos Aires, Delhi, Manila, 
Mumbai, Phnom Penh, Santiago, and Seoul, 
when evicted inhabitants were forced out to 
these areas by local government slum clear-
ance schemes. The social and environmen-
tal consequences include the segregation of 
low-income groups in the worst located and 
often most dangerous areas as well as a lack 
of access to water, sanitation, health services, 
and educational facilities. That is particu-
larly the case for recent rural-urban migrants 
who may not be able to afford rentals within 
a slum, and have to squat on sites that may 
not be fit for habitation. Unfortunately, these 
sites are also prone to significant environ-
mental risks. 
Heath, Parker, and Weatherhead (2012) 
used Rapid Climate Adaptation Assessment 
methods to assess how changes to the cli-
mate interact with existing vulnerabilities in 
peri-urban and informal areas in a manner 
that is likely to affect safe water and sanita-
tion supplies for the urban poor. The model 
was tested in Naivasha (Kenya); Antanana-
rivo (Madagascar), and Lusaka (Zambia) in 
the eleven communities studied, eight were 
found to be vulnerable to flooding and four 
to water shortages, with especially severe 
negative effects for the peripheral sites prone 
to flooding. For example, in the peri-urban 
slum settlement of Kanyama on the outskirts 
of Lusaka, the 2009/10 flood lasted for three 
months, causing water kiosks and buildings to 
collapse, contaminating water supplies (par-
ticularly the shallow wells used in the areas 
unserved by the kiosks), and affecting liveli-
hoods, education, and health. Satterthwaite 
(2007) argues that in several cities, extreme 
overcrowding in informal settlements (includ-
ing the unserviced ones on urban peripheries) 
is viewed as a result of serious housing short-
ages and acute shortages of infrastructure 
and services in particular areas. Yet large 
amounts of land in cities are often left vacant 
or only partially developed; planning for low-
income housing with proper basic services 
and infrastructure could result in lower costs 
than those incurred in upgrading existing 
dense settlements, resettling slum dwellers, 
and undertaking slum clearance projects.
In a few countries disillusioned with gov-
ernment’s lack of interest in their plight, 
slum dwellers are taking the initiative to 
make their voices heard. Two examples are 
insightful and encouraging. In Agra, India, a 
community-driven initiative has made toilets 
an entry point for catalyzing housing, slum, 
and city development (box 2.5). In Uganda, 
where more that 60 percent of the country’s 
urban population lives in slum communities, 
the purported benefits of urban agglomera-
tion are not being felt. Rather than waiting 
passively for better service provision, Ugan-
da’s slum dwellers have adopted a proactive 
strategy that is harnessing the potential of 
collective action to drive a shared agenda for 
better service delivery in slums (box 2.7).
Policy challenges and 
implications
The MDGs are about meeting the basic needs 
of all citizens in developing countries. The 
two facets of urbanization that matter the 
most for attainment of the MDGs in general 
and poverty reduction in particular are man-
aging the factors that affect urban population 
growth and expand the boundaries of urban 
areas; and understanding the spatial location 
of poverty. Because these facets vary signifi-
cantly between countries, country specific-
ity should not be ignored in the design of 
any country policies aimed at attaining the 
MDGs.
The key relevant factors identified in this 
report that can inform policy makers and 
others addressing these challenging facets 
are:
•   The natural increase in the urban popula-
tion accounts for approximately 60 percent 
of urban population growth in all coun-
tries. Urban population growth is also 
affected by the reclassification of rural 
boundaries. Migration is a third factor in 
urban population growth. The weight of 
each of these factors in affecting urbaniza-
tion depends on country circumstances. 
•   All else being equal, rural-urban migration 
can lead to a reduction in rural poverty, 
but migration is not uniform across regions 
or countries. It is highest in Latin America 
and East Asia and lowest in South Asia; 
Sub-Saharan Africa falls somewhere in 
between. Governments play an important 
role in urban poverty reduction when they 
facilitate migration. Whether rural-urban 
migration increases or reduces urban pov-
erty depends on whether migrants contrib-
ute to the positive or negative aspects of 
urbanization. 
•   Poverty is not spatially bipolar but distrib-
uted along a spectrum. Rural areas are the 
poorest; megacities and large cities are the 
BOX 2.7 Agglomeration of collective capacity among Uganda’s slum dweller 
communities
In the slum dweller communities of Uganda, where 
over 60 percent of the urban population lives, the 
purported benefits of urban agglomeration are not 
being felt and many urban areas are characterized by 
rising unemployment and inadequate access to basic 
services. Rather than waiting passively for the benefits 
of urban agglomeration, Uganda’s slum dwellers have 
adopted a proactive strategy that is harnessing the 
potential of collective action. The strategy is one that 
has evolved within the Shack/Slum Dwellers Interna-
tional (SDI) network. It involves the clustering, or fed-
erating, of community saving groups into urban poor 
federations. The National Slum Dwellers Federation 
of Uganda (NSDFU) is one of 33 federations in the 
SDI network. Founded in 2002, the NSDFU today 
comprises almost 500 savings groups and approxi-
mately 38,000 members. Savings are used to bring 
people together, build their capacity to act as a col-
lective, and build organizational capacity and trust. 
When savings groups begin, they often focus 
solely on livelihood issues and income generation. But 
with time and greater exposure to SDI rituals such 
as enumeration and peer-to-peer exchange, commu-
nities formulate an urban agenda that looks beyond 
group members and toward transforming the settle-
ments in which they live. This is when benefits to ser-
vice delivery begin to accrue as part of a collective 
upgrading agenda. The spatial proximity of urban 
savings groups allows for the agglomeration of col-
lective capacity necessary to create a critical mass of 
urban poor to hold public officials accountable and 
to collaborate with municipalities and leverage their 
savings. This critical mass is required to make com-
munity participation more than a platitude and aid 
more effective, and it is uniquely possible in the urban 
setting. 
The positive externalities of this agglomeration of 
collective capacity are not hard to see. The NSDFU 
is the key community mobilizer in the government 
of Uganda’s Transforming Settlements of the Urban 
Poor in Uganda (TSUPU) program. The NSDFU 
has capitalized on the opportunities of this Cities 
Alliance–funded program to expand from Jinja and 
Kampala to Arua, Kabale, Mbale, and Mbarara. 
Within this national program, the NSDFU has dem-
onstrated that organized communities can improve 
urban governance by organizing citizens to demand 
accountability; improve urban planning by generat-
ing information on slum populations; improve liv-
ing conditions for members and nonmembers alike 
through slum upgrading projects; and improve the 
environment by upholding their responsibilities to 
keep cities clean and maintain public services. Over 
the past 10 years, the NSDFU has constructed sanita-
tion units and community halls in slums throughout 
the country. Last year the NSDFU began extending 
clean water and improving drainage, while in Jina it 
has begun construction of a low-cost housing project. 
In almost every case, projects were built upon land 
provided by municipal councils, demonstrating true 
partnership. 
The increasing returns to scale for the agglomera-
tion of collective capacity are also evident. The more 
the federation grows, the easier it becomes to negoti-
ate with government, mobilize members and savings, 
leverage funds, and implement projects. Because the 
NSDFU is part of SDI, the returns to scale also ben-
efit tremendously from the growth of the global urban 
poor movement. 
Source: Skye Dobson, Uganda Program Officer, Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International.
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observes, settlements are formed on the 
urban periphery of many cities including 
megacities like Buenos Aires, Delhi, Manila, 
Mumbai, Phnom Penh, Santiago, and Seoul, 
when evicted inhabitants were forced out to 
these areas by local government slum clear-
ance schemes. The social and environmen-
tal consequences include the segregation of 
low-income groups in the worst located and 
often most dangerous areas as well as a lack 
of access to water, sanitation, health services, 
and educational facilities. That is particu-
larly the case for recent rural-urban migrants 
who may not be able to afford rentals within 
a slum, and have to squat on sites that may 
not be fit for habitation. Unfortunately, these 
sites are also prone to significant environ-
mental risks. 
Heath, Parker, and Weatherhead (2012) 
used Rapid Climate Adaptation Assessment 
methods to assess how changes to the cli-
mate interact with existing vulnerabilities in 
peri-urban and informal areas in a manner 
that is likely to affect safe water and sanita-
tion supplies for the urban poor. The model 
was tested in Naivasha (Kenya); Antanana-
rivo (Madagascar), and Lusaka (Zambia) in 
the eleven communities studied, eight were 
found to be vulnerable to flooding and four 
to water shortages, with especially severe 
negative effects for the peripheral sites prone 
to flooding. For example, in the peri-urban 
slum settlement of Kanyama on the outskirts 
of Lusaka, the 2009/10 flood lasted for three 
months, causing water kiosks and buildings to 
collapse, contaminating water supplies (par-
ticularly the shallow wells used in the areas 
unserved by the kiosks), and affecting liveli-
hoods, education, and health. Satterthwaite 
(2007) argues that in several cities, extreme 
overcrowding in informal settlements (includ-
ing the unserviced ones on urban peripheries) 
is viewed as a result of serious housing short-
ages and acute shortages of infrastructure 
and services in particular areas. Yet large 
amounts of land in cities are often left vacant 
or only partially developed; planning for low-
income housing with proper basic services 
and infrastructure could result in lower costs 
than those incurred in upgrading existing 
dense settlements, resettling slum dwellers, 
and undertaking slum clearance projects.
In a few countries disillusioned with gov-
ernment’s lack of interest in their plight, 
slum dwellers are taking the initiative to 
make their voices heard. Two examples are 
insightful and encouraging. In Agra, India, a 
community-driven initiative has made toilets 
an entry point for catalyzing housing, slum, 
and city development (box 2.5). In Uganda, 
where more that 60 percent of the country’s 
urban population lives in slum communities, 
the purported benefits of urban agglomera-
tion are not being felt. Rather than waiting 
passively for better service provision, Ugan-
da’s slum dwellers have adopted a proactive 
strategy that is harnessing the potential of 
collective action to drive a shared agenda for 
better service delivery in slums (box 2.7).
Policy challenges and 
implications
The MDGs are about meeting the basic needs 
of all citizens in developing countries. The 
two facets of urbanization that matter the 
most for attainment of the MDGs in general 
and poverty reduction in particular are man-
aging the factors that affect urban population 
growth and expand the boundaries of urban 
areas; and understanding the spatial location 
of poverty. Because these facets vary signifi-
cantly between countries, country specific-
ity should not be ignored in the design of 
any country policies aimed at attaining the 
MDGs.
The key relevant factors identified in this 
report that can inform policy makers and 
others addressing these challenging facets 
are:
•   The natural increase in the urban popula-
tion accounts for approximately 60 percent 
of urban population growth in all coun-
tries. Urban population growth is also 
affected by the reclassification of rural 
boundaries. Migration is a third factor in 
urban population growth. The weight of 
each of these factors in affecting urbaniza-
tion depends on country circumstances. 
•   All else being equal, rural-urban migration 
can lead to a reduction in rural poverty, 
but migration is not uniform across regions 
or countries. It is highest in Latin America 
and East Asia and lowest in South Asia; 
Sub-Saharan Africa falls somewhere in 
between. Governments play an important 
role in urban poverty reduction when they 
facilitate migration. Whether rural-urban 
migration increases or reduces urban pov-
erty depends on whether migrants contrib-
ute to the positive or negative aspects of 
urbanization. 
•   Poverty is not spatially bipolar but distrib-
uted along a spectrum. Rural areas are the 
poorest; megacities and large cities are the 
BOX 2.7 Agglomeration of collective capacity among Uganda’s slum dweller 
communities
In the slum dweller communities of Uganda, where 
over 60 percent of the urban population lives, the 
purported benefits of urban agglomeration are not 
being felt and many urban areas are characterized by 
rising unemployment and inadequate access to basic 
services. Rather than waiting passively for the benefits 
of urban agglomeration, Uganda’s slum dwellers have 
adopted a proactive strategy that is harnessing the 
potential of collective action. The strategy is one that 
has evolved within the Shack/Slum Dwellers Interna-
tional (SDI) network. It involves the clustering, or fed-
erating, of community saving groups into urban poor 
federations. The National Slum Dwellers Federation 
of Uganda (NSDFU) is one of 33 federations in the 
SDI network. Founded in 2002, the NSDFU today 
comprises almost 500 savings groups and approxi-
mately 38,000 members. Savings are used to bring 
people together, build their capacity to act as a col-
lective, and build organizational capacity and trust. 
When savings groups begin, they often focus 
solely on livelihood issues and income generation. But 
with time and greater exposure to SDI rituals such 
as enumeration and peer-to-peer exchange, commu-
nities formulate an urban agenda that looks beyond 
group members and toward transforming the settle-
ments in which they live. This is when benefits to ser-
vice delivery begin to accrue as part of a collective 
upgrading agenda. The spatial proximity of urban 
savings groups allows for the agglomeration of col-
lective capacity necessary to create a critical mass of 
urban poor to hold public officials accountable and 
to collaborate with municipalities and leverage their 
savings. This critical mass is required to make com-
munity participation more than a platitude and aid 
more effective, and it is uniquely possible in the urban 
setting. 
The positive externalities of this agglomeration of 
collective capacity are not hard to see. The NSDFU 
is the key community mobilizer in the government 
of Uganda’s Transforming Settlements of the Urban 
Poor in Uganda (TSUPU) program. The NSDFU 
has capitalized on the opportunities of this Cities 
Alliance–funded program to expand from Jinja and 
Kampala to Arua, Kabale, Mbale, and Mbarara. 
Within this national program, the NSDFU has dem-
onstrated that organized communities can improve 
urban governance by organizing citizens to demand 
accountability; improve urban planning by generat-
ing information on slum populations; improve liv-
ing conditions for members and nonmembers alike 
through slum upgrading projects; and improve the 
environment by upholding their responsibilities to 
keep cities clean and maintain public services. Over 
the past 10 years, the NSDFU has constructed sanita-
tion units and community halls in slums throughout 
the country. Last year the NSDFU began extending 
clean water and improving drainage, while in Jina it 
has begun construction of a low-cost housing project. 
In almost every case, projects were built upon land 
provided by municipal councils, demonstrating true 
partnership. 
The increasing returns to scale for the agglomera-
tion of collective capacity are also evident. The more 
the federation grows, the easier it becomes to negoti-
ate with government, mobilize members and savings, 
leverage funds, and implement projects. Because the 
NSDFU is part of SDI, the returns to scale also ben-
efit tremendously from the growth of the global urban 
poor movement. 
Source: Skye Dobson, Uganda Program Officer, Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International.
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richest, and smaller towns of varied sizes 
and slums in larger cities lie in between. 
The implications of the spatial location of 
poverty along a spectrum are nontrivial. 
The challenge for the MDGs is to design 
poverty-reducing and service delivery strat-
egies that take into account the spectrum 
along which poverty is located. 
•   In a large number of countries, the major-
ity of the urban population resides in the 
larger cities, as for example in India and 
Vietnam, but the majority of the urban 
poor lives in smaller towns that are often 
as poor as rural areas. Ignoring the growth 
of urban poverty in smaller towns can 
undermine efforts to reduce overall urban 
poverty as well as overall poverty. 
•   The  spatial  distribution  of  poverty  in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is distinct from that 
of other regions. This region’s poor are 
disproportionately concentrated in rural 
areas. Most of the small proportion located 
in urban areas live in the largest city, usu-
ally the capital. Population density in Sub-
Saharan Africa is sparse, making it diffi-
cult and costly to deliver network-based 
services that benefit from scale economies. 
•   Rural poverty is distinct from urban pov-
erty, but there is a strong interdependence 
between rural and urban economies. 
Three-fourths of the poor worldwide still 
reside in rural areas, making the role of 
rural poverty-reducing policies central to 
any policy approaches aimed at attaining 
the MDGs. 
•   The necessary ingredients for strong and 
sustainable links between rural areas and 
smaller towns are a rich rural hinterland 
that can supply urban areas and that has 
access to urban markets where rural house-
holds can trade. In short, rural-urban 
migration can be an equalizer with the 
potential to bridge rural-urban disparities 
in incomes and access to basic services, 
alleviating rural poverty, as illustrated in 
Tanzania. Rural growth also has a positive 
impact on urban poverty reduction. Policies 
that spur this process include an increase 
in rural productivity through the introduc-
tion of new farm technologies and invest-
ment in the human capital development of 
rural residents; removal of land market dis-
tortions; improved connectivity with urban 
markets; and a fostering of nonfarm activ-
ity and rural-urban migration. 
•   At  least seven of the MDGs are related 
directly to the delivery of basic services, 
and the poverty–city size gradient is a 
strong marker of access to services. Invari-
ably, rural areas are the worst off and 
smaller towns and slums have poorer 
access to basic amenities than do larger cit-
ies. Problems in service delivery are related 
to both quantity and quality. 
•   To shrink persisting gender differentials in 
educational attainment and earnings, dis-
crete policies need to improve girls’ access 
to education when poverty, ethnicity, or 
location (rural, small town) excludes them. 
WDR 2012 notes that economic develop-
ment is not enough to shrink all gender dis-
parities. It recommends that corrective pol-
icies focused on persistent gender gaps are 
essential. A priority is reducing the gender 
gaps in human capital, specifically those 
regarding female mortality and education. 
Conditional cash transfers to encourage 
girls to attend school have been successful 
in increasing primary school enrollments 
in various countries. 
•   Other policies that have a disproportion-
ately positive impact on women’s economic 
empowerment are ones that improve rural 
livelihoods by increasing female farmers’ 
access to markets. Policies that increase 
rural women’s access to water reduce the 
time they spend in fetching water and free 
up the time they can spend in income-gen-
erating work that increases their economic 
empowerment. There is also a clear need 
for policy that prioritizes not only the pro-
vision of sanitation in slums on the whole, 
but mainstreams gendered needs in the 
design of sanitation policies. 
The implications of urbanization for the 
provision of MDG-related services to all 
individuals in developing countries are com-
plex and need to be considered in a frame-
work that appropriately recognizes the fac-
tors described here. Governments have two 
main policy levers with which to achieve the 
MDGs: the suite of macroeconomic policy 
instruments that spur agglomeration econo-
mies and job creation; and public investment 
in MDG-related services. 
The first-best solution is to facilitate access 
to all MDG-related services for all poor 
through expert management of the urbaniza-
tion process. This implies either accelerating 
investments in the factors that fuel the urban-
ization process (the subject of chapter 3) and 
attract the poor to cities; or equalizing ser-
vice delivery wherever the poor are located—
that is, in rural areas and small towns as 
well as slums. The implications are differ-
ent, however, in highly urbanized countries 
such as in Latin America, where, compared 
with other regions, rural areas offer greater 
income-earning opportunities. Indeed, recent 
experience in Latin America shows that when 
agricultural production (via higher prices, 
higher productivity, and the like) allows rural 
workers to obtain decent incomes, the pro-
pensity to migrate fades. However, because 
rural-urban poverty differentials remain 
large, Latin America continues to register one 
of the highest migration rates.
Not surprisingly, the first-best solution is 
unviable for several reasons: Resource and 
capacity constraints must be overcome. Not 
all of the rural poor who want to move to 
urban areas can migrate to cities at once, and 
even if they could, congestion effects would 
likely worsen urban poverty and undermine 
the urbanization process. Even if ideal cities 
were created, not all of the rural poor would 
be willing to forgo their rural assets and 
migrate. Finally, it is unrealistic to presume 
that the rural poor who do want to migrate 
would be able to find productive jobs if they 
did not arrive endowed with at least some 
basic human capital. 
The second-best approach is to prioritize 
the type of services provided, their delivery 
location, and their timing. Three types of 
policies could be leveraged:
•   In areas where migration  is  significant 
and poverty is more bipolar, boosting the 
urbanization process in large cities through 
better delivery of MDG-related services 
and provision of incentives for job creation 
would make large cities more attractive 
and would motivate rural-urban migra-
tion. Migrants would enjoy the benefits of 
urban living and would presumably step 
out of poverty and toward greater pros-
perity. For this to happen, poor migrants 
need human capital—that is, they need 
to be healthy and have a basic education. 
Thus public investment in primary educa-
tion and health care should be directed to 
the poor both in small towns and in rural 
areas. 
•   In countries where migration is  limited 
and reclassification and natural popula-
tion growth dominate the expansion of 
urban boundaries, where population den-
sity is high, and where the poverty–city 
size gradient is dominant, the poverty 
differentials between poorly served areas 
and larger cities are unlikely to shrink suf-
ficiently to foster the attainment of the 
MDGs. In these situations, policies that 
encourage migration will help. Progress 
toward the MDGs would be accelerated 
by delivering services wherever the poor 
are concentrated, otherwise both rural 
and urban poverty will remain grounded 
wherever it is. 
•   In situations where poor people are con-
centrated in small towns, policies should 
focus on improving connectivity with other 
urban centers. Poverty in small towns is 
often high, and the quantity and quality 
of services in these places differ little from 
those in rural areas and lag behind those 
in more mature urban settlements. In these 
cases, measures to better connect the activ-
ities in small towns with the economies of 
larger cities become paramount. 
In all three cases, investment in portable 
services (education and health care) would 
optimally be provided wherever the poor are. 
But in countries with high migration and low 
population density in rural areas, delivery of 
nonportable infrastructure services in larger 
cities would be more cost-effective and more 
supportive of urbanization and industrializa-
tion and could be prioritized as such. Coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa would typically 
fall in this group.
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richest, and smaller towns of varied sizes 
and slums in larger cities lie in between. 
The implications of the spatial location of 
poverty along a spectrum are nontrivial. 
The challenge for the MDGs is to design 
poverty-reducing and service delivery strat-
egies that take into account the spectrum 
along which poverty is located. 
•   In a large number of countries, the major-
ity of the urban population resides in the 
larger cities, as for example in India and 
Vietnam, but the majority of the urban 
poor lives in smaller towns that are often 
as poor as rural areas. Ignoring the growth 
of urban poverty in smaller towns can 
undermine efforts to reduce overall urban 
poverty as well as overall poverty. 
•   The  spatial  distribution  of  poverty  in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is distinct from that 
of other regions. This region’s poor are 
disproportionately concentrated in rural 
areas. Most of the small proportion located 
in urban areas live in the largest city, usu-
ally the capital. Population density in Sub-
Saharan Africa is sparse, making it diffi-
cult and costly to deliver network-based 
services that benefit from scale economies. 
•   Rural poverty is distinct from urban pov-
erty, but there is a strong interdependence 
between rural and urban economies. 
Three-fourths of the poor worldwide still 
reside in rural areas, making the role of 
rural poverty-reducing policies central to 
any policy approaches aimed at attaining 
the MDGs. 
•   The necessary ingredients for strong and 
sustainable links between rural areas and 
smaller towns are a rich rural hinterland 
that can supply urban areas and that has 
access to urban markets where rural house-
holds can trade. In short, rural-urban 
migration can be an equalizer with the 
potential to bridge rural-urban disparities 
in incomes and access to basic services, 
alleviating rural poverty, as illustrated in 
Tanzania. Rural growth also has a positive 
impact on urban poverty reduction. Policies 
that spur this process include an increase 
in rural productivity through the introduc-
tion of new farm technologies and invest-
ment in the human capital development of 
rural residents; removal of land market dis-
tortions; improved connectivity with urban 
markets; and a fostering of nonfarm activ-
ity and rural-urban migration. 
•   At  least seven of the MDGs are related 
directly to the delivery of basic services, 
and the poverty–city size gradient is a 
strong marker of access to services. Invari-
ably, rural areas are the worst off and 
smaller towns and slums have poorer 
access to basic amenities than do larger cit-
ies. Problems in service delivery are related 
to both quantity and quality. 
•   To shrink persisting gender differentials in 
educational attainment and earnings, dis-
crete policies need to improve girls’ access 
to education when poverty, ethnicity, or 
location (rural, small town) excludes them. 
WDR 2012 notes that economic develop-
ment is not enough to shrink all gender dis-
parities. It recommends that corrective pol-
icies focused on persistent gender gaps are 
essential. A priority is reducing the gender 
gaps in human capital, specifically those 
regarding female mortality and education. 
Conditional cash transfers to encourage 
girls to attend school have been successful 
in increasing primary school enrollments 
in various countries. 
•   Other policies that have a disproportion-
ately positive impact on women’s economic 
empowerment are ones that improve rural 
livelihoods by increasing female farmers’ 
access to markets. Policies that increase 
rural women’s access to water reduce the 
time they spend in fetching water and free 
up the time they can spend in income-gen-
erating work that increases their economic 
empowerment. There is also a clear need 
for policy that prioritizes not only the pro-
vision of sanitation in slums on the whole, 
but mainstreams gendered needs in the 
design of sanitation policies. 
The implications of urbanization for the 
provision of MDG-related services to all 
individuals in developing countries are com-
plex and need to be considered in a frame-
work that appropriately recognizes the fac-
tors described here. Governments have two 
main policy levers with which to achieve the 
MDGs: the suite of macroeconomic policy 
instruments that spur agglomeration econo-
mies and job creation; and public investment 
in MDG-related services. 
The first-best solution is to facilitate access 
to all MDG-related services for all poor 
through expert management of the urbaniza-
tion process. This implies either accelerating 
investments in the factors that fuel the urban-
ization process (the subject of chapter 3) and 
attract the poor to cities; or equalizing ser-
vice delivery wherever the poor are located—
that is, in rural areas and small towns as 
well as slums. The implications are differ-
ent, however, in highly urbanized countries 
such as in Latin America, where, compared 
with other regions, rural areas offer greater 
income-earning opportunities. Indeed, recent 
experience in Latin America shows that when 
agricultural production (via higher prices, 
higher productivity, and the like) allows rural 
workers to obtain decent incomes, the pro-
pensity to migrate fades. However, because 
rural-urban poverty differentials remain 
large, Latin America continues to register one 
of the highest migration rates.
Not surprisingly, the first-best solution is 
unviable for several reasons: Resource and 
capacity constraints must be overcome. Not 
all of the rural poor who want to move to 
urban areas can migrate to cities at once, and 
even if they could, congestion effects would 
likely worsen urban poverty and undermine 
the urbanization process. Even if ideal cities 
were created, not all of the rural poor would 
be willing to forgo their rural assets and 
migrate. Finally, it is unrealistic to presume 
that the rural poor who do want to migrate 
would be able to find productive jobs if they 
did not arrive endowed with at least some 
basic human capital. 
The second-best approach is to prioritize 
the type of services provided, their delivery 
location, and their timing. Three types of 
policies could be leveraged:
•   In areas where migration  is  significant 
and poverty is more bipolar, boosting the 
urbanization process in large cities through 
better delivery of MDG-related services 
and provision of incentives for job creation 
would make large cities more attractive 
and would motivate rural-urban migra-
tion. Migrants would enjoy the benefits of 
urban living and would presumably step 
out of poverty and toward greater pros-
perity. For this to happen, poor migrants 
need human capital—that is, they need 
to be healthy and have a basic education. 
Thus public investment in primary educa-
tion and health care should be directed to 
the poor both in small towns and in rural 
areas. 
•   In countries where migration is  limited 
and reclassification and natural popula-
tion growth dominate the expansion of 
urban boundaries, where population den-
sity is high, and where the poverty–city 
size gradient is dominant, the poverty 
differentials between poorly served areas 
and larger cities are unlikely to shrink suf-
ficiently to foster the attainment of the 
MDGs. In these situations, policies that 
encourage migration will help. Progress 
toward the MDGs would be accelerated 
by delivering services wherever the poor 
are concentrated, otherwise both rural 
and urban poverty will remain grounded 
wherever it is. 
•   In situations where poor people are con-
centrated in small towns, policies should 
focus on improving connectivity with other 
urban centers. Poverty in small towns is 
often high, and the quantity and quality 
of services in these places differ little from 
those in rural areas and lag behind those 
in more mature urban settlements. In these 
cases, measures to better connect the activ-
ities in small towns with the economies of 
larger cities become paramount. 
In all three cases, investment in portable 
services (education and health care) would 
optimally be provided wherever the poor are. 
But in countries with high migration and low 
population density in rural areas, delivery of 
nonportable infrastructure services in larger 
cities would be more cost-effective and more 
supportive of urbanization and industrializa-
tion and could be prioritized as such. Coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa would typically 
fall in this group.
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Finally, a reduction in the number of slum 
dwellers is a dedicated MDG and needs a 
dedicated approach. To address the unique 
challenges associated with slums, policy solu-
tions must:
•   Tie land tenure policies for slums to those 
of the city as a whole, particularly in terms 
of land pricing, connectivity of residential 
and commercial urban space, and, above 
all, the appropriate balance between eco-
nomic and population density. A “silo” 
approach will lead to a lose-lose solution 
for cities and their slums.
•   Take advantage of  slums’ proximity  to 
the city so that the unit costs of extending 
access to basic health and education ser-
vices to slum dwellers are relatively low. 
•   Expand the supply of public toilets and 
water to slum dwellers in creative ways 
(such as putting water fountains in public 
places) in the short term, recognizing that 
permanent solutions to water and sanita-
tion provision is tied to the land issue. 
•   Make use of the fact that in most cases, 
slum dwellers are willing to pay a small fee 
to access basic services. 
Closing the rural-urban MDG and service 
gaps may represent a major challenge for 
many countries, especially if these gaps are 
large and the unit costs of services for rural 
populations are higher than for their urban 
compatriots. In the simulation exercise pre-
sented in this annex, the broader economic 
consequences of closing health gaps in low-
income countries are explored by adapting 
MAMS, a CGE model for country strategy 
analysis, to address rural-urban aspects of 
MDGs. The database used was designed to 
capture characteristics typical of low-income 
countries, including their MDG outcomes, 
sectoral shares in value-added. 
The base simulation assumes an annual 
growth rate of 5.6 percent, following the 
trend of low-income countries since 2000; 
and “business as usual” in government poli-
cies and spending, including borrowing that 
is consistent with debt sustainability. In 
the comparator simulations, for the period 
2014–30, it is assumed that the government 
gradually scales up its health services, either 
by closing the gap in the levels of per capita 
health services reaching rural and urban resi-
dents, or by closing the rural-urban gap in the 
under-five mortality rate (U5MR), the out-
come indicator of interest here. These efforts 
are undertaken using alternative sources for 
required additional financing (foreign grant 
aid, domestic borrowing, taxes, and reduced 
spending on infrastructure). 
Under the base scenario, the major mac-
roeconomic indicators (GDP, government 
and private consumption, and investment) 
all grow at annual rates of around 5 percent; 
in per capita terms, household consump-
tion grows at an annual rate of around 3.1 
percent, with a slightly more rapid rate for 
rural households (3.2 versus 3.0 percent). As 
shown in figure 2A.1, significant progress 
is realized for both poverty and the U5MR, 
while the rural-urban gaps narrow but still 
remain substantial. 
In the first simulation (denoted mdg4u+fg), 
the government gradually raises per capita 
rural health services to the urban level while 
maintaining a growth rate for urban services 
that is sufficient to maintain the same reduc-
tion in the urban U5MR as under the base; 
in other words, the improvement in the rural 
population does not come at the expense of 
the health outcome of the urban population; 
additional foreign grant aid provides needed 
financing. As shown in figure 2A.2, this set 
of actions reduces the 2030 rural U5MR by 
slightly more than 5 points, closing roughly 
half of the rural-urban gap. Both rural and 
urban poverty rates are virtually unchanged. 
At the macro level, growth in government 
consumption increases by 0.6 percentage 
points (Figure 2A.3), accompanied by a simi-
lar increase for government investment, with 
the increases directed to the health sector 
and financed by foreign grant aid; by 2030, 
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FIGURE 2A.1 Poverty and under-5 mortality for base simulation
Source: Lofgren 2013.
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Finally, a reduction in the number of slum 
dwellers is a dedicated MDG and needs a 
dedicated approach. To address the unique 
challenges associated with slums, policy solu-
tions must:
•   Tie land tenure policies for slums to those 
of the city as a whole, particularly in terms 
of land pricing, connectivity of residential 
and commercial urban space, and, above 
all, the appropriate balance between eco-
nomic and population density. A “silo” 
approach will lead to a lose-lose solution 
for cities and their slums.
•   Take advantage of  slums’ proximity  to 
the city so that the unit costs of extending 
access to basic health and education ser-
vices to slum dwellers are relatively low. 
•   Expand the supply of public toilets and 
water to slum dwellers in creative ways 
(such as putting water fountains in public 
places) in the short term, recognizing that 
permanent solutions to water and sanita-
tion provision is tied to the land issue. 
•   Make use of the fact that in most cases, 
slum dwellers are willing to pay a small fee 
to access basic services. 
Closing the rural-urban MDG and service 
gaps may represent a major challenge for 
many countries, especially if these gaps are 
large and the unit costs of services for rural 
populations are higher than for their urban 
compatriots. In the simulation exercise pre-
sented in this annex, the broader economic 
consequences of closing health gaps in low-
income countries are explored by adapting 
MAMS, a CGE model for country strategy 
analysis, to address rural-urban aspects of 
MDGs. The database used was designed to 
capture characteristics typical of low-income 
countries, including their MDG outcomes, 
sectoral shares in value-added. 
The base simulation assumes an annual 
growth rate of 5.6 percent, following the 
trend of low-income countries since 2000; 
and “business as usual” in government poli-
cies and spending, including borrowing that 
is consistent with debt sustainability. In 
the comparator simulations, for the period 
2014–30, it is assumed that the government 
gradually scales up its health services, either 
by closing the gap in the levels of per capita 
health services reaching rural and urban resi-
dents, or by closing the rural-urban gap in the 
under-five mortality rate (U5MR), the out-
come indicator of interest here. These efforts 
are undertaken using alternative sources for 
required additional financing (foreign grant 
aid, domestic borrowing, taxes, and reduced 
spending on infrastructure). 
Under the base scenario, the major mac-
roeconomic indicators (GDP, government 
and private consumption, and investment) 
all grow at annual rates of around 5 percent; 
in per capita terms, household consump-
tion grows at an annual rate of around 3.1 
percent, with a slightly more rapid rate for 
rural households (3.2 versus 3.0 percent). As 
shown in figure 2A.1, significant progress 
is realized for both poverty and the U5MR, 
while the rural-urban gaps narrow but still 
remain substantial. 
In the first simulation (denoted mdg4u+fg), 
the government gradually raises per capita 
rural health services to the urban level while 
maintaining a growth rate for urban services 
that is sufficient to maintain the same reduc-
tion in the urban U5MR as under the base; 
in other words, the improvement in the rural 
population does not come at the expense of 
the health outcome of the urban population; 
additional foreign grant aid provides needed 
financing. As shown in figure 2A.2, this set 
of actions reduces the 2030 rural U5MR by 
slightly more than 5 points, closing roughly 
half of the rural-urban gap. Both rural and 
urban poverty rates are virtually unchanged. 
At the macro level, growth in government 
consumption increases by 0.6 percentage 
points (Figure 2A.3), accompanied by a simi-
lar increase for government investment, with 
the increases directed to the health sector 
and financed by foreign grant aid; by 2030, 
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FIGURE 2A.1 Poverty and under-5 mortality for base simulation
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foreign grant aid would increase by 1.2 per-
cent of GDP, to 5.1 percent (Figure 2A.4). If 
the financing gap instead were met by con-
cessional foreign borrowing, then the foreign 
debt of the government would reach 43 per-
cent of GDP in 2030 compared with 32 per-
cent for the base scenario.
Instead of relying on foreign resources, 
the government may create the fiscal space 
needed for this increase in health spending 
by turning to domestic resources, including 
borrowing or higher taxes (scenarios denoted 
as mdg4u+db, and mdg4u+tx, respectively). 
While the outcomes are very similar or 
the same in terms of the rural and urban 
U5MRs, these scenarios lead to higher urban 
and rural poverty rates (see figure 2A.2), 
accompanied by slower growth in private 
consumption; for the borrowing scenario, 
the poverty reduction and consumption 
outcomes are more negative, and GDP and 
absorption growth rates also decline, because 
the private sector is deprived of investment 
funding (see figure 2A.3). For both scenarios, 
the macro slowdown reflects the opportunity 
costs of reallocating resources to government 
health spending: less funding for domestic 
private investment and capital accumula-
tion (mdg4u+db), or reduced real dispos-
able income for households, leading to losses 
spread over private consumption, investment, 
and capital stock growth (mdg4u+tx).6 
Under the preceding scenarios, the rural 
U5MR remains above the urban level, indi-
cating that lack of government health services 
is only one factor behind the gap between 
rural and urban health outcomes. Alter-
natively, the government may decide to be 
more ambitious and gradually raise govern-
ment health services in rural areas to such an 
extent that by 2030 the U5MR of the rural 
population will have declined to the urban 
U5MR level in 2030 simulated under the 
base scenario; that is, the government would 
try to make up for the other gaps suffered by 
the rural population by providing them with 
additional targeted health services while, 
at the same time, maintaining the same per 
capita real health spending for the urban 
population as under the base scenario. On 
the margin, the increase in real services per 
capita (or per avoided death) is higher under 
this scenario, reflecting the need to reach 
more disadvantaged population groups and 
to turn to more costly interventions, in effect 
reversing the initial discrimination against 
the rural population in health service provi-
sion. If foreign grants provide the marginal 
financing (mdg4r+fg), then in 2030, these 
will have to increase by 5.6 percent of GDP 
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compared to the base, to 9.7 percent of GDP. 
Compared with the base outcome in 2030, 
the intended reduction in the rural U5MR 
is realized, together with small reductions in 
the urban U5MR and poverty in both rural 
and urban areas (see figure 2A.2). A strong 
growth increase is recorded for govern-
ment consumption, along with more modest 
increases for private consumption, GDP, and 
absorption, the latter enlarged by the increase 
in grant aid (see figure 2A.3). 
It is difficult to reallocate this amount of 
resources to government health spending 
without negative repercussions. If the gov-
ernment relies on higher taxes (mdg4r+tx), 
the increases in which reach 7.6 percent 
of GDP in 2030 compared with the base, 
these repercussions are felt in the form of a 
slightly higher urban U5MR and higher pov-
erty rates, especially in rural areas (see figure 
2A.2), as well as in slower growth for private 
consumption (see Figure 2A.3). The rea-
son behind a relatively strong rural poverty 
increase (for this and some of the preceding 
scenarios) is that government services, which 
were scaled up, are relatively intensive in the 
use of the more educated labor supplied by 
urban households, whereas private spend-
ing, which was scaled down, disproportion-
ately reduces the demand for land and less 
educated labor, factors that provide a rela-
tively large share of the incomes of the rural 
population.7 
From a different angle, given inefficien-
cies in the government health sector in many 
low-income countries, it is possible to reduce 
the need for extra financing by raising effi-
ciency. For a set of scenarios that raise the 
rural U5MR to the urban level by 2030, fig-
ure 2A.5 maps out combinations of average 
per capita foreign grant increases (in constant 
2009 dollars) for 2014–30 and additional 
annual growth in government health service 
efficiency (covering efficiency of new invest-
ments, as well as of labor and capital use but 
excluding material inputs such as medicines). 
In the absence of a gain in efficiency, the 
grant increase in an average year is around 
$26 per capita (at 2009 prices; from the sce-
nario mdg4r+fg). The need for additional 
grant aid would be eliminated if efficiency 
grew by an additional 6.2 percent a year. 
While such rapid gains may be infeasible, 
additional growth of at least 1–2 percent a 
year may be within the realm of possibil-
ity.8 Interestingly, the gains in reduced aid 
per additional percentage point of efficiency 
growth are diminishing—that is due to real 
exchange rate effects: at high levels, grant aid 
leads to strong marginal appreciation, with 
strongly reduced domestic purchasing power 
as the result. 
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FIGURE 2A.5 Trade-offs between more grant aid 
and domestic efficiency gains
Source: Lofgren 2013.
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foreign grant aid would increase by 1.2 per-
cent of GDP, to 5.1 percent (Figure 2A.4). If 
the financing gap instead were met by con-
cessional foreign borrowing, then the foreign 
debt of the government would reach 43 per-
cent of GDP in 2030 compared with 32 per-
cent for the base scenario.
Instead of relying on foreign resources, 
the government may create the fiscal space 
needed for this increase in health spending 
by turning to domestic resources, including 
borrowing or higher taxes (scenarios denoted 
as mdg4u+db, and mdg4u+tx, respectively). 
While the outcomes are very similar or 
the same in terms of the rural and urban 
U5MRs, these scenarios lead to higher urban 
and rural poverty rates (see figure 2A.2), 
accompanied by slower growth in private 
consumption; for the borrowing scenario, 
the poverty reduction and consumption 
outcomes are more negative, and GDP and 
absorption growth rates also decline, because 
the private sector is deprived of investment 
funding (see figure 2A.3). For both scenarios, 
the macro slowdown reflects the opportunity 
costs of reallocating resources to government 
health spending: less funding for domestic 
private investment and capital accumula-
tion (mdg4u+db), or reduced real dispos-
able income for households, leading to losses 
spread over private consumption, investment, 
and capital stock growth (mdg4u+tx).6 
Under the preceding scenarios, the rural 
U5MR remains above the urban level, indi-
cating that lack of government health services 
is only one factor behind the gap between 
rural and urban health outcomes. Alter-
natively, the government may decide to be 
more ambitious and gradually raise govern-
ment health services in rural areas to such an 
extent that by 2030 the U5MR of the rural 
population will have declined to the urban 
U5MR level in 2030 simulated under the 
base scenario; that is, the government would 
try to make up for the other gaps suffered by 
the rural population by providing them with 
additional targeted health services while, 
at the same time, maintaining the same per 
capita real health spending for the urban 
population as under the base scenario. On 
the margin, the increase in real services per 
capita (or per avoided death) is higher under 
this scenario, reflecting the need to reach 
more disadvantaged population groups and 
to turn to more costly interventions, in effect 
reversing the initial discrimination against 
the rural population in health service provi-
sion. If foreign grants provide the marginal 
financing (mdg4r+fg), then in 2030, these 
will have to increase by 5.6 percent of GDP 
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compared to the base, to 9.7 percent of GDP. 
Compared with the base outcome in 2030, 
the intended reduction in the rural U5MR 
is realized, together with small reductions in 
the urban U5MR and poverty in both rural 
and urban areas (see figure 2A.2). A strong 
growth increase is recorded for govern-
ment consumption, along with more modest 
increases for private consumption, GDP, and 
absorption, the latter enlarged by the increase 
in grant aid (see figure 2A.3). 
It is difficult to reallocate this amount of 
resources to government health spending 
without negative repercussions. If the gov-
ernment relies on higher taxes (mdg4r+tx), 
the increases in which reach 7.6 percent 
of GDP in 2030 compared with the base, 
these repercussions are felt in the form of a 
slightly higher urban U5MR and higher pov-
erty rates, especially in rural areas (see figure 
2A.2), as well as in slower growth for private 
consumption (see Figure 2A.3). The rea-
son behind a relatively strong rural poverty 
increase (for this and some of the preceding 
scenarios) is that government services, which 
were scaled up, are relatively intensive in the 
use of the more educated labor supplied by 
urban households, whereas private spend-
ing, which was scaled down, disproportion-
ately reduces the demand for land and less 
educated labor, factors that provide a rela-
tively large share of the incomes of the rural 
population.7 
From a different angle, given inefficien-
cies in the government health sector in many 
low-income countries, it is possible to reduce 
the need for extra financing by raising effi-
ciency. For a set of scenarios that raise the 
rural U5MR to the urban level by 2030, fig-
ure 2A.5 maps out combinations of average 
per capita foreign grant increases (in constant 
2009 dollars) for 2014–30 and additional 
annual growth in government health service 
efficiency (covering efficiency of new invest-
ments, as well as of labor and capital use but 
excluding material inputs such as medicines). 
In the absence of a gain in efficiency, the 
grant increase in an average year is around 
$26 per capita (at 2009 prices; from the sce-
nario mdg4r+fg). The need for additional 
grant aid would be eliminated if efficiency 
grew by an additional 6.2 percent a year. 
While such rapid gains may be infeasible, 
additional growth of at least 1–2 percent a 
year may be within the realm of possibil-
ity.8 Interestingly, the gains in reduced aid 
per additional percentage point of efficiency 
growth are diminishing—that is due to real 
exchange rate effects: at high levels, grant aid 
leads to strong marginal appreciation, with 
strongly reduced domestic purchasing power 
as the result. 
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In sum, these simulations explore the con-
sequences of providing and financing govern-
ment health services to reduce the U5MR of 
the rural population. The results suggest that 
if, by either mobilizing required resources or 
raising its own efficiency in the health sec-
tor, or both, a government manages to raise 
the level of real health services reaching the 
rural population, then it is possible to reduce 
the rural U5MR considerably. If the bulk of 
resources come in the form of foreign grants 
or efficiency gains, then progress in the form 
of a lower U5MR can come with broader 
repercussions that have a positive impact 
on other development indicators, including 
poverty reduction. But if most additional 
resources have to be mobilized from domes-
tic sources, then progress on reducing U5MR 
would threaten to come at the expense of 
less progress in poverty reduction and other 
indicators, illustrating the difficult trade-
offs facing low-income countries and their 
governments.
Notes
1.  Because the estimates are derived from cen-
sus information and because the definitions 
of “urban” used in the Chinese censuses have 
been changing, this finding should be inter-
preted with caution. Estimates for Indone-
sia indicate that the contribution of natural 
increase to urban growth declined steadily, 
from nearly 70 percent in the 1960s to 32 per-
cent in the 1990s (UN 2011).
2.  Ferré, Ferreira, and Lanjouw (2012) suggest 
that while “urban bias” was a much discussed 
concern during the 1970s and 1980s, follow-
ing Lipton (1977), the idea of a “metropolitan 
bias” has not been widely emphasized in the 
poverty measurement literature. This is likely 
due, at least in part, to scant availability of 
data on living standards across finely defined 
city-size categories. 
3.  It should be noted that estimation of a complex 
concept such as “slum” will always be some-
what arbitrary and definition driven. By using 
a consistent definition in the same places at dif-
ferent points in time, genuine changes may be 
observed—particularly when broad averages 
are “drilled down” to examine the underlying 
changes in real conditions in individual cities.
4.  The original target to improve the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 was 
based on an estimation of close to 100 million 
slum dwellers in the world. Upon measurement 
of the slum population using the internation-
ally agreed upon UN-Habitat definition of 
slums following the UN Expert Group Meet-
ing of October 2002, it was learned that the 
global estimate of the slum population was in 
fact close to 1 billion (924 million). As a result, 
even though the slum target has been globally 
achieved, and in fact significantly surpassed 10 
years ahead of schedule, there is little room for 
complacency given the existing magnitude of 
populations currently living in slums.
5.  In April 2011, however, the UN Habitat Gov-
erning Council adopted a resolution to improve 
the measurement of tenure security and to gen-
erate globally comparable estimates. Observa-
tions using this method are being implemented 
in 25 cities around the world.
6.  As a result of more rapid private consumption 
growth for mdg4u+fg than for the other sce-
narios, the health objectives can be achieved 
with a slightly smaller acceleration in govern-
ment health spending and government con-
sumption growth for mdg4u+fg. 
7.  Additional simulations showed that the domes-
tic resources that could be mobilized through 
increased government borrowing were insuffi-
cient to finance the health policy of the last two 
scenarios (mdg4r+fg and mdg4r+tx). 
8.  For example, on the basis of surveys in six low- 
and middle-income countries, Chaudhury et al. 
(2006) found that, on average, primary health 
workers were absent 35 percent of the time. 
Other things being equal, a moderate gradual 
reduction in their absenteeism to 17.5 percent 
of their time by 2030 would correspond to an 
annual increase in their productivity by around 
1.5 percent a year.
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In sum, these simulations explore the con-
sequences of providing and financing govern-
ment health services to reduce the U5MR of 
the rural population. The results suggest that 
if, by either mobilizing required resources or 
raising its own efficiency in the health sec-
tor, or both, a government manages to raise 
the level of real health services reaching the 
rural population, then it is possible to reduce 
the rural U5MR considerably. If the bulk of 
resources come in the form of foreign grants 
or efficiency gains, then progress in the form 
of a lower U5MR can come with broader 
repercussions that have a positive impact 
on other development indicators, including 
poverty reduction. But if most additional 
resources have to be mobilized from domes-
tic sources, then progress on reducing U5MR 
would threaten to come at the expense of 
less progress in poverty reduction and other 
indicators, illustrating the difficult trade-
offs facing low-income countries and their 
governments.
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4.  The original target to improve the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 was 
based on an estimation of close to 100 million 
slum dwellers in the world. Upon measurement 
of the slum population using the internation-
ally agreed upon UN-Habitat definition of 
slums following the UN Expert Group Meet-
ing of October 2002, it was learned that the 
global estimate of the slum population was in 
fact close to 1 billion (924 million). As a result, 
even though the slum target has been globally 
achieved, and in fact significantly surpassed 10 
years ahead of schedule, there is little room for 
complacency given the existing magnitude of 
populations currently living in slums.
5.  In April 2011, however, the UN Habitat Gov-
erning Council adopted a resolution to improve 
the measurement of tenure security and to gen-
erate globally comparable estimates. Observa-
tions using this method are being implemented 
in 25 cities around the world.
6.  As a result of more rapid private consumption 
growth for mdg4u+fg than for the other sce-
narios, the health objectives can be achieved 
with a slightly smaller acceleration in govern-
ment health spending and government con-
sumption growth for mdg4u+fg. 
7.  Additional simulations showed that the domes-
tic resources that could be mobilized through 
increased government borrowing were insuffi-
cient to finance the health policy of the last two 
scenarios (mdg4r+fg and mdg4r+tx). 
8.  For example, on the basis of surveys in six low- 
and middle-income countries, Chaudhury et al. 
(2006) found that, on average, primary health 
workers were absent 35 percent of the time. 
Other things being equal, a moderate gradual 
reduction in their absenteeism to 17.5 percent 
of their time by 2030 would correspond to an 
annual increase in their productivity by around 
1.5 percent a year.
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How Can Urbanization Accelerate 
Progress toward the MDGs?
Nor will urban growth be limited to the 
megacities of today. Secondary cities such as 
Huambo in Angola, Fushun in China, and 
Surat in India—cities that few would be able 
to pinpoint on a map—are likely to grow rap-
idly into large cities in their own right. The 
good news is that many of these emerging 
urban centers are still taking shape, provid-
ing policy makers with a unique but rapidly 
closing window of opportunity to get their 
cities “right” to enhance economic, social, 
and environmental outcomes. 
In many respects, the move to cities is 
entirely rational. Cities are the hubs of pros-
perity—more than 80 percent of global 
economic activity is concentrated in cities 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2011). The den-
sities that cities offer can create scale econ-
omies that enhance job opportunities and 
productivity, as well as make it cheaper to 
expand services. Cities, through their den-
sity, make public services more accessible. 
For example, providing piped water costs 
$0.70–$0.80 per cubic meter in urban areas, 
but $2 in sparsely populated areas (Kariuki 
and Schwartz 2005). Schooling and health 
care can be delivered at scale in dense envi-
ronments, close to where people actually 
live. 
Summary and messages
Urbanization matters. In the past two 
decades, developing countries have urbanized 
rapidly, with the number of people living in 
urban settlements rising from about 1.5 bil-
lion in 1990 to 3.6 billion (more than half 
of the world’s population) in 2011. Some 2.7 
billion people in the developing world now 
live in urban areas. Citizens in urban areas 
have an advantage over their rural brethren 
in that urban poverty rates are significantly 
lower than rural poverty rates and urban 
populations also have far better access to the 
basic public services defined by the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs), including 
access to safe water and sanitation facilities 
(chapter 2). 
In the next two decades, developing coun-
tries will become even more urbanized. 
Between 2011 and 2030, the population of 
the developing world is expected to grow 
by 1.4 billion—and 96 percent of them will 
live in urban areas. If the forces of urban-
ization are not managed speedily and effi-
ciently, slum growth can overwhelm city 
growth, exacerbate urban poverty, derail 
MDG achievements and reduce, if not elimi-
nate, cities’ comparative advantage regarding 
attainment of the MDGs. 
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Urban densities can pull up rural areas. 
Research in India has shown a growing link 
between urban development and a reduction 
of rural poverty following India’s economic 
liberalization in the early 1990s, with urban 
development linked to higher demand for 
rural products and more options for rural 
nonfarm diversification (World Bank 2013b). 
Unregulated markets are unlikely to get 
densities “right,” however, because the pro-
ductivity of firms and the job-opportunity-
generating aspects of increased density are 
positive externalities accruing freely to all, 
whereas the increased costs of construction, 
such as buildings, roads, and network utili-
ties, necessary for higher density to remain 
efficient are not often fully internalized by 
firms and households. This situation leads 
to lower levels of investment than would be 
optimal and ultimately to less productivity 
improvement, less job creation, and lower 
wages (Collier and Venables forthcoming). 
Yet, higher-quality construction material and 
more sophisticated buildings are required to 
support greater densities, and complemen-
tary physical infrastructure is critical: roads, 
drainage, street lighting, electricity, water, 
and sewerage, together with policing, waste 
disposal, and health care. More, not less, 
public policy is needed to ensure that the 
productivity gains and services that cities can 
deliver are not overwhelmed by crime, dis-
ease, and squalor.
While a fully market-driven process could 
possibly gradually increase densities through 
land values over time, the long-lived and 
lumpy nature of urban investment inhibits 
such a process. A city’s physical structures, 
once established, may remain in place for 
more than 150 years (Hallegatte 2009). The 
alarming news is that the doubling of the 
urban population in the developing world 
will be accompanied by a tripling in the built-
up area of cities, from 200,000 to 600,000 
square kilometers. As an example, consider 
map 3.1, which shows Shanghai’s spatial 
expansion over the past 20 years. Such rapid 
population growth accompanied by an even 
faster spatial expansion of cities is likely to 
lead to low-density development dominated 
by individual-vehicle transportation—a 
largely irreversible pattern (World Bank 
2012b). Low-density expansions run the risk 
of dampening density-induced productivity 
and service delivery efficiencies. An addi-
tional consequence of rapid urban growth is 
worsening air quality; a recent study of the 
189 largest cities using satellite data found 
that air quality worsened between 2002 
and 2010, particularly in the largest cities 
of the Indian subcontinent, parts of Africa, 
the Middle East, and north China, all places 
experiencing rapid urban growth (Alpert, 
Shvainshtein, and Kishcha 2012).
Emissions from burning fossil fuel include 
fine particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5), 
carbon monoxide, nitric oxides, and sulfur 
dioxide, which can cause allergies, respira-
tory problems, cardiovascular disease, and 
cognitive deficits. The impacts are signifi-
cant. In the Russian Federation, a conser-
vative estimate suggests that annual health 
damages from fossil-fuel burning amount to 
$6 billion (Markandya and Golub 2012). The 
social cost of transport in Beijing is equiva-
lent to 7.5–15 percent of its gross domes-
tic product (GDP), with about half of that 
stemming from air pollution (Creutzig and 
He 2009). The largest share of these costs 
comes from increased mortality. Globally, 
acute respiratory infections associated with 
air pollution cause about 20 percent of all 
under-five mortality (Mehta et al. 2011). In 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
a country of about 2 million people, an esti-
mated 1,300 premature deaths are caused by 
air pollution every year. Beijing, Cairo, Delhi, 
Dhaka, and Karachi each see an estimated 
3,500 to 7,000 premature deaths annually 
from cardiovascular disease stemming from 
air pollution (Gurjar et al. 2010). Karachi has 
the highest overall mortality related to air 
pollution, at 15,000 a year. That is close to 
the excess mortality of 13,000 deaths caused 
by the “Great Smog” in London in 1952, evi-
dence that many cities in today’s advanced 
countries have gone through similar stages of 
excessive pollution. Managing environmental 
quality alongside enhancing urban productiv-
ity is critical as a means of avoiding signifi-
cant costs down the road. 
Cities can accelerate both economic 
and social progress when complementary 
improvements are made along two fronts: 
•   Job  creation,  investment,  and  growth, 
which depend on the density of cities 
and their links with the rural economy. 
Enhancing job opportunities in cities 
requires careful thought about coordinat-
ing improvements in land management, 
housing, transport, communications, 
and infrastructure (World Bank 2013b). 
Urbanization generates an increase in the 
demand for land, and a clear definition of 
property rights along with robust systems 
for assessing land values is key for land 
redevelopment. Urbanization has to be 
combined with the development of reliable 
and affordable public transit to physically 
connect people with jobs. Complemen-
tary improvements in communication and 
interregional transport can make it easier 




rural areas, so that people are “pulled” 
to cities by the opportunities there, rather 
than being pushed from the countryside 
in search of basic services they have been 
denied. Improvements in basic services 
such as water, sanitation, education, and 
health are essential for improving living 
standards and workers’ health and educa-
tion everywhere, as Colombia did when 
it systematically improved basic service 
levels across the country in rural and urban 
areas alike. In 1964, only half the residents 
of Bogotá and other large cities had access 
to water, electricity, and sanitation; today 
there is nearly universal access in cities 
of all sizes, a convergence that took more 
than 40 years (Samad, Lozano-Gracia, and 
Panman 2012). 
Many developing countries have been 
unable to provide a coordinated package of 
physical infrastructure and social services 
(box 3.1). In part, that is because many of 
these services are network goods that house-
holds and communities cannot provide on 
their own. Even where the service can be sup-
plied by each individual household or a com-
munity, as with sanitation, there are substan-
tial externalities, where the benefits of service 
improvements spread beyond the household 
or community that made the investment. 
As a consequence, individual households 
and communities are likely to underinvest 
in these services, setting up a classic role for 
public policy of ensuring that basic services Source: China Data Center at University of Michigan. 
MAP 3.1 Shanghai’s spatial expansion as shown by average nighttime light intensity
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are adequately provided. While each infra-
structure sector and service can be addressed 
by appropriate government policies, address-
ing only one or two of them has little payoff 
if the others remain unresolved (Collier and 
Venables forthcoming). Getting the highest 
level of political support to enable cross-sec-
toral and intergovernmental coordination is 
critical for getting urbanization right.
Framework for urbanization 
policy
The policy framework used here draws 
heavily on the World Development Report 
2009:  Reshaping  Economic  Geography 
(WDR 2009) (World Bank 2008) and sub-
sequent country level diagnostics under the 
World Bank’s Urbanization Review Program, 
whose lessons are synthesized in Planning, 
Connecting, and Financing Cities—Now 
(World Bank 2013a). WDR 2009 looked at 
urbanization trends and policies worldwide 
and proposed a three-part policy framework 
for urbanization. First, institutions should 
provide the foundations for liberalizing the 
movement of people and goods and easing 
the exchange and redevelopment of land, 
enabling vast economic gains. Second, invest-
ments should respond to the needs of resi-
dents and businesses, especially for basic and 
connective infrastructure. Third, targeted 
interventions should respond to the needs of 
the poor and people in marginal locations or 
address individual behaviors that endanger 
health, safety, or the environment. Apply-
ing this policy framework, the World Bank’s 
Urbanization Reviews offer policy makers 
diagnostic tools to identify policy distortions 
and analyze investment priorities. 
Each review starts by assessing a country 
or region’s spatial transformation: how the 
urban economy is evolving; how urbanization 
is changing the demand for services within 
the city; the pace of new arrivals; and where 
these new arrivals are finding places to live 
and how they are commuting to their jobs. 
It then compares the city’s observed patterns 
with benchmarks in other cities or with past 
conditions. Such comparisons help reveal 
how policy distortions constrain urbaniza-
tion and how investment shortfalls limit the 
benefits from it. Once the review has identi-
fied the possible constraints and shortfalls, 
it proposes policy options. It aims to show 
how a city can harness economic and social 
benefits not just today, but in the future as 
economies grow, technologies change, and 
institutions are strengthened. Urbanization 
Reviews have been piloted in some dozen 
countries at varying stages of urbanization, 
including Sri Lanka and Uganda (where 
urbanization is nascent), China, India, Indo-
nesia, and Vietnam (where it is rapid), and 
Brazil, Colombia, the Republic of Korea, and 
Turkey (where it is mature).
At the heart of the diagnostic approach 
used in the Urbanization Reviews are three 
main dimensions of urban development (fig-
ure 3.1):
•   Planning—charting a course for cities by 
setting the terms of urbanization, espe-
cially policies for using urban land and 
expanding basic infrastructure and public 
services.
•   Connecting—making a city’s markets 
(labor, goods, and services) accessible to 
other cities and to other neighborhoods 
in the city, as well as to outside export 
markets.
•   Financing—finding sources for large capi-
tal outlays needed to provide infrastruc-
ture and services as cities grow and urban-
ization picks up speed.
Planning, connecting, financing—these 
are terms that policy makers use on a daily 
basis. Of the three, a major finding from the 
Urbanization Reviews is that regardless of 
the level or speed of urbanization, planning 
for land use management must be the top 
priority. By clearly defining property rights, 
and putting in place effective systems for land 
use that are coordinated with infrastructure, 
transport, and natural resources, policy mak-
ers can help their cities attract private invest-
ment, connect people with jobs, and reduce 
environmental, social, and natural hazard 
risks. With much of urban growth in devel-
oping countries likely to take place in second-
ary cities, strengthening land management 
FIGURE 3.1 A framework for urbanization policy: planning, connecting, and financing
Source: This framework draws on World Bank 2013a and the findings from various country pilots under the Urbanization Reviews. Urbanization Review team.
Note: This framework draws on World Bank (2012a) and the findings from various country pilots under the Urbanization Reviews. 
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BOX 3.1 Bangalore has nurtured skills but must now tackle infrastructure
Bangalore’s economic growth has been rapid and 
successful. In 1998, the Indian city’s incomes were 
24 percent higher than the national average. In 2005, 
they were nearly 70 percent higher. 
An analysis shows that the skills of the city’s resi-
dents are the bedrock of that success. These skills 
have long been valued in Bangalore, with the mahara-
jas of the princely state of Mysore instituting compul-
sory education and building the University of Mysore 
and Bangalore’s engineering college. This was the 
starting point for the cluster of educated engineers 
that persists to this day. Building on an initial corpus 
of engineering expertise, firms such as Infosys were 
attracted to Bangalore, jumpstarting a virtuous circle 
where smart companies and smart workers came to 
Bangalore to be close to one another.
Bangalore’s economic success is creating infra-
structure problems, however, including poor water 
quality, traffic congestion, and housing shortages. The 
water system is strained—30 percent of city residents 
use polluted groundwater; the sewer system does not 
reach a large part of the city; and average commute 
times are more than 40 minutes because jobs are dis-
persed from the city core. If the water problems or 
commuting times get worse, skilled people—the city’s 
main asset—will leave for cities that offer better ame-
nities. How Bangalore improves the quality of life for 
its residents will have a considerable bearing on how 
bright Bangalore continues to shine. 
Source: Glaeser 2010.
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institutions are strengthened. Urbanization 
Reviews have been piloted in some dozen 
countries at varying stages of urbanization, 
including Sri Lanka and Uganda (where 
urbanization is nascent), China, India, Indo-
nesia, and Vietnam (where it is rapid), and 
Brazil, Colombia, the Republic of Korea, and 
Turkey (where it is mature).
At the heart of the diagnostic approach 
used in the Urbanization Reviews are three 
main dimensions of urban development (fig-
ure 3.1):
•   Planning—charting a course for cities by 
setting the terms of urbanization, espe-
cially policies for using urban land and 
expanding basic infrastructure and public 
services.
•   Connecting—making a city’s markets 
(labor, goods, and services) accessible to 
other cities and to other neighborhoods 
in the city, as well as to outside export 
markets.
•   Financing—finding sources for large capi-
tal outlays needed to provide infrastruc-
ture and services as cities grow and urban-
ization picks up speed.
Planning, connecting, financing—these 
are terms that policy makers use on a daily 
basis. Of the three, a major finding from the 
Urbanization Reviews is that regardless of 
the level or speed of urbanization, planning 
for land use management must be the top 
priority. By clearly defining property rights, 
and putting in place effective systems for land 
use that are coordinated with infrastructure, 
transport, and natural resources, policy mak-
ers can help their cities attract private invest-
ment, connect people with jobs, and reduce 
environmental, social, and natural hazard 
risks. With much of urban growth in devel-
oping countries likely to take place in second-
ary cities, strengthening land management 
FIGURE 3.1 A framework for urbanization policy: planning, connecting, and financing
Source: This framework draws on World Bank 2013a and the findings from various country pilots under the Urbanization Reviews. Urbanization Review team.
Note: This framework draws on World Bank (2012a) and the findings from various country pilots under the Urbanization Reviews. 
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BOX 3.1 Bangalore has nurtured skills but must now tackle infrastructure
Bangalore’s economic growth has been rapid and 
successful. In 1998, the Indian city’s incomes were 
24 percent higher than the national average. In 2005, 
they were nearly 70 percent higher. 
An analysis shows that the skills of the city’s resi-
dents are the bedrock of that success. These skills 
have long been valued in Bangalore, with the mahara-
jas of the princely state of Mysore instituting compul-
sory education and building the University of Mysore 
and Bangalore’s engineering college. This was the 
starting point for the cluster of educated engineers 
that persists to this day. Building on an initial corpus 
of engineering expertise, firms such as Infosys were 
attracted to Bangalore, jumpstarting a virtuous circle 
where smart companies and smart workers came to 
Bangalore to be close to one another.
Bangalore’s economic success is creating infra-
structure problems, however, including poor water 
quality, traffic congestion, and housing shortages. The 
water system is strained—30 percent of city residents 
use polluted groundwater; the sewer system does not 
reach a large part of the city; and average commute 
times are more than 40 minutes because jobs are dis-
persed from the city core. If the water problems or 
commuting times get worse, skilled people—the city’s 
main asset—will leave for cities that offer better ame-
nities. How Bangalore improves the quality of life for 
its residents will have a considerable bearing on how 
bright Bangalore continues to shine. 
Source: Glaeser 2010.
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provides a unique, albeit rapidly closing, 
opportunity to shape urban design in these 
cities so that people do not have to spend a 
significant part of their day traveling to and 
from work.
Of course financing rapid urban growth 
is challenging, because large up-front capital 
investments are needed to build systems for 
transport and water, solid waste manage-
ment, and sewage removal and treatment. 
But financing can become more sustainable 
through taxes that come with increased 
economic growth, and also with the abil-
ity of mayors to leverage land markets and 
approach local currency debt markets. An 
important point is that financing should be 
closely integrated with a city’s plans for man-
aging growth. The process of urban man-
agement should also involve as many private 
actors as necessary, as well as address wom-
en’s empowerment, to ensure that the city 
becomes or remains competitive and conse-
quently an engine of growth and well-being 
for all (box 3.2).
Policy makers, however, often place 
financing first without fully considering a 
city’s plans and connections. And the lack of 
such coordination will be regretted by later 
urban generations. For example, in Hanoi, 
a projected new mass transit system will 
extend in several directions from today’s 
central business district, but it will not reach 
an emerging second central business district 
southwest of the city, where dense housing 
developments called New Urban Zones are 
already being built (World Bank 2011).
Similarly, Colombia’s urban development 
challenges arise from problems of policy 
and planning. One of Latin America’s most 
decentralized countries, Colombia has more 
than 1,000 municipal governments with par-
allel responsibilities—basic infrastructure 
and service delivery, land use and economic 
development, and social service provision. 
Urban areas comprise multiple municipali-
ties: Bogotá, for example, contains seven. 
These municipalities lack mechanisms to 
coordinate policy and planning across their 
boundaries. As a result, Colombia’s metro-
politan areas are crippled by inertia—unable 
to coordinate their land use policies, or plan 
for strategic investments, at the metropolitan 
or regional scale that is demanded by a grow-
ing urban economy.
Uganda’s 1995 constitution created private 
land ownership and abolished land leases 
vested with local urban bodies. As a result, 
local governments were fiscally starved, 
unable to acquire land or protect rights of 
way for infrastructure improvement. And 
land transactions generally were hampered 
by poor tenure security (only 18 percent of 
land is registered and titled); the lack of a 
credible system for valuing land; low incen-
tives for landowners to rent their land; and 
high entry costs for land development ven-
tures. To remedy the situation, especially in 
the metropolis of Kampala, Uganda urgently 
needs a credible system for documenting 
and valuing land. To be sure, local urban 
bodies also need financing support—to buy 
land and pay for infrastructure. But with-
out sound planning, no amount of financing 
alone will solve Uganda’s problems (World 
Bank 2012c).
Planning cities
Planning is fundamental to agglomeration 
economies in three ways. First, land use 
requires effective systems for land valua-
tion. Second, land use must be allocated in a 
way that allows for infrastructure improve-
ments. Third, the most basic infrastructure 
services—water, energy, sanitation, and solid 
waste management—need to be provided for 
all residents, urban, peri-urban, and rural 
alike.
Set up systematic and transparent 
systems for valuing land 
The use and reuse of land is central to a 
city’s expansion and development. For eco-
nomic efficiency, land should be able to shift 
among various uses; in some cases, public 
intervention may be required to offset mar-
ket failures (Henderson and Wang 2007). 
Urban land markets should efficiently allo-
cate land between urban and rural uses (with 
incentives to conserve farmland and green 
space) and within urban areas (to prevent 
inappropriate land use and underserved 
neighborhoods).
What is the key to efficient land use? 
The answer is the price of land. Institutions 
that improve the information foundations 
of the valuation process, including a cadre 
of appraisers trained in property valuation, 
help to ensure transparency and to make 
information about land values widely acces-
sible. In Korea until the early 1970s, local 
BOX 3.2 Urbanization, gender, jobs, and urban poverty
Women’s labor, paid and unpaid, is crucial to the 
prosperity of cities. In turn, for women, urbaniza-
tion opens up greater access to services and employ-
ment opportunities, offers advantages arising from 
lower fertility, and promotes increased indepen-
dence. Indeed, women’s growing participation in 
paid employment is a positive trend that is not only 
contributing to their empowerment but also improv-
ing individuals’ and households’ chances to move out 
of poverty. Increased movement of women between 
rural and urban areas is motivated by the greater 
availability of employment opportunities in urban 
centers and confirms the positive impact of urbaniza-
tion on women’s empowerment. 
However, urbanization does not necessarily result 
in a more equitable distribution of wealth and well-
being between men and women. Compared with 
men, women often remain at a disadvantage in equi-
table access to work and living conditions, income 
levels, health outcomes and education, assets, and 
representation in formal institutions and urban gov-
ernance, as also discussed in World Development 
Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development 
(WDR 2012). This is especially so for the urban poor, 
especially slum dwellers, who face considerable envi-
ronmental hazards, shelter deprivations arising from 
a lack of proper water and sanitation provisions, and 
difficulties in accessing health and education services. 
Unpaid care work for children, older people, and 
the sick or disabled at home is typically (though not 
always or only) performed by women in low-income 
settlements; this work can include food preparation, 
cleaning, and washing among other tasks. Limited 
access to water and sanitation puts an additional 
burden on women responsible for such activities, not 
only by making the chores more difficult, but also by 
requiring more time to perform them. This burden is 
further exacerbated by the type of employment that 
poor urban women engage in—typically low-paid 
jobs with long working hours. Poverty generated by 
these factors therefore has a specific gender dimen-
sion. Women further face an unequal position in the 
labor market because of their lower income relative 
to their male counterparts, their limited ability to 
secure assets independently from male relatives, and 
their greater exposure to violence. In this sense, a 
gendered lens is not only essential for examining the 
nonincome dimensions of urban poverty but is also 
critical in understanding the broader issues of equal-
ity and social justice. 
Social programs often do not sufficiently focus on 
efforts to improve the efficiency and productivity of 
household tasks. Often, this can be achieved through 
relatively simple infrastructure and provision of basic 
services and appliances, such as gas or electric stoves. 
In addition, policy makers can support initiatives that 
help reduce the time constraints caused by balancing 
paid work with unpaid care work. Some such initia-
tives already exist within the activities of grassroots 
and women’s organizations, such as the Women’s 
Network of Street Traders and Collective Kitchen 
initiatives in Lima (Peru), the Shack/Slum Dwellers 
International (SDI) savings groups in several devel-
oping countries, and Kenya’s Home-Based Care Alli-
ance. A lack of even basic data disaggregated by sex 
has prevented researchers from developing a more 
gender-nuanced picture of urban poverty. Data col-
lection efforts on basic poverty indicators as well as 
more specific surveys of labor force participation and 
migration need to record respondents’ sex at a mini-
mum and make it available to researchers. Along with 
this, unpaid work needs to be incorporated within 
an understanding of how economies operate for the 
urban poor; without that, the impact of public poli-
cies directed at urban poverty reduction cannot be 
fully grasped. 
Source: Based on Tacoli 2012. 
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provides a unique, albeit rapidly closing, 
opportunity to shape urban design in these 
cities so that people do not have to spend a 
significant part of their day traveling to and 
from work.
Of course financing rapid urban growth 
is challenging, because large up-front capital 
investments are needed to build systems for 
transport and water, solid waste manage-
ment, and sewage removal and treatment. 
But financing can become more sustainable 
through taxes that come with increased 
economic growth, and also with the abil-
ity of mayors to leverage land markets and 
approach local currency debt markets. An 
important point is that financing should be 
closely integrated with a city’s plans for man-
aging growth. The process of urban man-
agement should also involve as many private 
actors as necessary, as well as address wom-
en’s empowerment, to ensure that the city 
becomes or remains competitive and conse-
quently an engine of growth and well-being 
for all (box 3.2).
Policy makers, however, often place 
financing first without fully considering a 
city’s plans and connections. And the lack of 
such coordination will be regretted by later 
urban generations. For example, in Hanoi, 
a projected new mass transit system will 
extend in several directions from today’s 
central business district, but it will not reach 
an emerging second central business district 
southwest of the city, where dense housing 
developments called New Urban Zones are 
already being built (World Bank 2011).
Similarly, Colombia’s urban development 
challenges arise from problems of policy 
and planning. One of Latin America’s most 
decentralized countries, Colombia has more 
than 1,000 municipal governments with par-
allel responsibilities—basic infrastructure 
and service delivery, land use and economic 
development, and social service provision. 
Urban areas comprise multiple municipali-
ties: Bogotá, for example, contains seven. 
These municipalities lack mechanisms to 
coordinate policy and planning across their 
boundaries. As a result, Colombia’s metro-
politan areas are crippled by inertia—unable 
to coordinate their land use policies, or plan 
for strategic investments, at the metropolitan 
or regional scale that is demanded by a grow-
ing urban economy.
Uganda’s 1995 constitution created private 
land ownership and abolished land leases 
vested with local urban bodies. As a result, 
local governments were fiscally starved, 
unable to acquire land or protect rights of 
way for infrastructure improvement. And 
land transactions generally were hampered 
by poor tenure security (only 18 percent of 
land is registered and titled); the lack of a 
credible system for valuing land; low incen-
tives for landowners to rent their land; and 
high entry costs for land development ven-
tures. To remedy the situation, especially in 
the metropolis of Kampala, Uganda urgently 
needs a credible system for documenting 
and valuing land. To be sure, local urban 
bodies also need financing support—to buy 
land and pay for infrastructure. But with-
out sound planning, no amount of financing 
alone will solve Uganda’s problems (World 
Bank 2012c).
Planning cities
Planning is fundamental to agglomeration 
economies in three ways. First, land use 
requires effective systems for land valua-
tion. Second, land use must be allocated in a 
way that allows for infrastructure improve-
ments. Third, the most basic infrastructure 
services—water, energy, sanitation, and solid 
waste management—need to be provided for 
all residents, urban, peri-urban, and rural 
alike.
Set up systematic and transparent 
systems for valuing land 
The use and reuse of land is central to a 
city’s expansion and development. For eco-
nomic efficiency, land should be able to shift 
among various uses; in some cases, public 
intervention may be required to offset mar-
ket failures (Henderson and Wang 2007). 
Urban land markets should efficiently allo-
cate land between urban and rural uses (with 
incentives to conserve farmland and green 
space) and within urban areas (to prevent 
inappropriate land use and underserved 
neighborhoods).
What is the key to efficient land use? 
The answer is the price of land. Institutions 
that improve the information foundations 
of the valuation process, including a cadre 
of appraisers trained in property valuation, 
help to ensure transparency and to make 
information about land values widely acces-
sible. In Korea until the early 1970s, local 
BOX 3.2 Urbanization, gender, jobs, and urban poverty
Women’s labor, paid and unpaid, is crucial to the 
prosperity of cities. In turn, for women, urbaniza-
tion opens up greater access to services and employ-
ment opportunities, offers advantages arising from 
lower fertility, and promotes increased indepen-
dence. Indeed, women’s growing participation in 
paid employment is a positive trend that is not only 
contributing to their empowerment but also improv-
ing individuals’ and households’ chances to move out 
of poverty. Increased movement of women between 
rural and urban areas is motivated by the greater 
availability of employment opportunities in urban 
centers and confirms the positive impact of urbaniza-
tion on women’s empowerment. 
However, urbanization does not necessarily result 
in a more equitable distribution of wealth and well-
being between men and women. Compared with 
men, women often remain at a disadvantage in equi-
table access to work and living conditions, income 
levels, health outcomes and education, assets, and 
representation in formal institutions and urban gov-
ernance, as also discussed in World Development 
Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development 
(WDR 2012). This is especially so for the urban poor, 
especially slum dwellers, who face considerable envi-
ronmental hazards, shelter deprivations arising from 
a lack of proper water and sanitation provisions, and 
difficulties in accessing health and education services. 
Unpaid care work for children, older people, and 
the sick or disabled at home is typically (though not 
always or only) performed by women in low-income 
settlements; this work can include food preparation, 
cleaning, and washing among other tasks. Limited 
access to water and sanitation puts an additional 
burden on women responsible for such activities, not 
only by making the chores more difficult, but also by 
requiring more time to perform them. This burden is 
further exacerbated by the type of employment that 
poor urban women engage in—typically low-paid 
jobs with long working hours. Poverty generated by 
these factors therefore has a specific gender dimen-
sion. Women further face an unequal position in the 
labor market because of their lower income relative 
to their male counterparts, their limited ability to 
secure assets independently from male relatives, and 
their greater exposure to violence. In this sense, a 
gendered lens is not only essential for examining the 
nonincome dimensions of urban poverty but is also 
critical in understanding the broader issues of equal-
ity and social justice. 
Social programs often do not sufficiently focus on 
efforts to improve the efficiency and productivity of 
household tasks. Often, this can be achieved through 
relatively simple infrastructure and provision of basic 
services and appliances, such as gas or electric stoves. 
In addition, policy makers can support initiatives that 
help reduce the time constraints caused by balancing 
paid work with unpaid care work. Some such initia-
tives already exist within the activities of grassroots 
and women’s organizations, such as the Women’s 
Network of Street Traders and Collective Kitchen 
initiatives in Lima (Peru), the Shack/Slum Dwellers 
International (SDI) savings groups in several devel-
oping countries, and Kenya’s Home-Based Care Alli-
ance. A lack of even basic data disaggregated by sex 
has prevented researchers from developing a more 
gender-nuanced picture of urban poverty. Data col-
lection efforts on basic poverty indicators as well as 
more specific surveys of labor force participation and 
migration need to record respondents’ sex at a mini-
mum and make it available to researchers. Along with 
this, unpaid work needs to be incorporated within 
an understanding of how economies operate for the 
urban poor; without that, the impact of public poli-
cies directed at urban poverty reduction cannot be 
fully grasped. 
Source: Based on Tacoli 2012. 
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government officials assessed the market 
value and replacement costs of assets for land 
acquisition purposes. In 1972, the govern-
ment introduced the Basic Land Prices system 
to improve assessments. In this new system, 
land and buildings had to be assessed by cer-
tified private appraisers rather than govern-
ment officials. Two appraisers had to provide 
estimated values for the property, and the 
final value was calculated as the average of 
the two values. If the two appraisals differed 
by more than 10 percent, a third appraiser 
was selected and the average recalculated. 
Since 2003, a third appraiser may be rec-
ommended by affected individuals as well 
(World Bank 2013a ).
Developing countries often lack the sys-
tems to record and manage information on 
land transactions. The data may not reflect 
the true price of land because of black market 
transactions to save on duties, for example, 
or because of heavy public subsidies on hous-
ing and land use. Land registries are often 
archaic and lack the dynamic functions that 
allow them to be searched or updated quickly. 
These deficiencies translate into a dearth 
of data on real estate prices, preventing the 
critical analysis necessary for appraising land 
values. That, in turn, has heavy implications 
for local revenue generation, such as property 
tax collection and land sales or leases, that is 
based on real estate values. 
Take India, where such information sys-
tems are in their infancy and the govern-
ment often acquires land for industrial and 
infrastructure development. Farmers and 
other landowners are compensated with pay-
ments benchmarked to the stamp duties, a 
land transaction tax. But because the mar-
ginal rate for stamp duties has been as high 
as 12 percent historically, land and property 
values have long been underreported (World 
Bank 2013b).1 Now, as India’s policy makers 
amend the rules for changes in land use, the 
lack of independent and reliable land valu-
ations is likely to result in public discontent 
and conflicts over land.
In Vietnam, too, official land prices fail to 
reflect demand. The country has two prices 
for land transactions—a market price, and 
an imposed land price, a much lower value 
used by the government in acquiring land 
and allocating it to developers and investors 
(World Bank 2011). Such an inequitable sys-
tem generates resentment over land acquisi-
tions: over 1996–2005, there were more than 
12,000 complaints. And conflicts over land, 
in turn, hinder the consolidation of plots for 
industrial development. More than 85 per-
cent of available plots in Vietnam are smaller 
than 20 hectares, but industrial parks and 
districts typically need 150–200 hectares of 
contiguous land (figure 3.2). So the country’s 
two-price system impedes efficiency and eco-
nomic development.
In countries where land valuation is suc-
cessful, standardized techniques enable 
appraisers to arrive at uniform and trans-
parent valuations. In the United States, most 
states require appraisers and assessors to be 
certified. Appraisers generally work for pri-
vate clients to determine the market value of 
property for real estate transactions, while 
assessors generally work for the government 
to determine property values for tax pur-
poses. Both must follow the same regula-
tions in valuing real estate. For practical pur-
poses, however, and to avoid overestimation 
of prices, property prices for tax purposes 
are often set at about two-thirds of actual 
market value. In Bogotá, property values 
are usually set at 70–80 percent of estimated 
market value.
Public land valuation in developing coun-
tries is fraught with challenges, including the 
cost of hiring private appraisers (these coun-
tries lack standardized public valuation meth-
ods) and the need to update land price data. 
In addition, intergovernmental transfers of 
public land are often recorded as having zero 
value. These challenges can be overcome, 
however, as seen in at least two cases of 
innovation in public land valuation. Kuwait 
now requires two separate private appraisals 
for land involved in public-private partner-
ships (PPPs). And South Africa mandates that 
public land be taxed the same way as private 
land, which means that public land under-
goes the same valuation processes (Peterson 
and Kaganova 2010). In other developing 
countries auctions are often used to reveal 
land values. 
In contrast, federal regulation governs 
private land valuation in Germany. Ger-
many has local land valuation boards that 
are charged with collecting and maintain-
ing land price data as well as disseminating 
land price information (Lozano-Gracia et al. 
2013). The United States allows each state 
to define its own method for private prop-
erty valuation, and most states delegate this 
power to local governments, leading to a vast 
array of approaches. While the most com-
mon is the market value (or sales compari-
son) approach, there are at least two others: 
the cost approach, and the income approach. 
All three methods are often used in paral-
lel to estimate property values. The state of 
New York, for example, uses these methods 
for different property categories. It follows 
the sales comparison approach to value small 
residential properties and vacant land, using 
sales data of comparable properties for the 
previous three years. It adopts the income 
approach to value offices and businesses, tak-
ing an estimated income for the office rental, 
and dividing the net income by a capitaliza-
tion rate. It uses the cost approach for new 
construction and renovations and for special 
properties such as stadiums, museums, and 
places of worship (Lafuente 2009). 
Complementary policies that assign prop-
erty rights and encourage trade of land are 
also needed to help settlements respond to 
the changing needs of the market. Fluid land 
markets help the transition out of agricul-
ture, where rural land can be sold or rented 
for urban uses, and rural residents can seek 
more rewarding opportunities in nonfarm 
activities in urban areas. For instance in Viet-
nam, strengthening of land tenure security 
quadrupled participation in rural rental mar-
kets from 3.8 percent in 1993 to 15.8 percent 
in 1998 and resulted in an increase in rural-
urban migration from 29 percent in 1993 to 
64 percent in 1998. In addition, both rental 
and sales markets had positive impacts on 
productivity.
In conclusion, making land markets and 
land management work better requires 
improving and upgrading or reforming the 
underlying related legal system. Urbaniza-
tion will increase the demand for land, and 
governments at the national and subnational 
levels will employ instruments such as land 
acquisition and land readjustment for accom-
modating urban expansion, or land mon-
etization for financing infrastructure. Strong 
legal systems and credible institutions will 
be a precondition for success. In particu-
lar, these include carefully designed laws to 
assign and protect property rights; institu-
tions that enable independent valuation and 
public dissemination of land values across 
uses; and a strong legal framework supported 
by a healthy judicial system to handle dis-
putes and oversee the process.
For land acquisition, courts need to pro-
vide guidance on the legal scope of eminent 
domain. Given that the definition of public 
purpose constantly evolves, having a rigid 
and exclusive list of public purposes will pose 
Source: World Bank 2011.
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government officials assessed the market 
value and replacement costs of assets for land 
acquisition purposes. In 1972, the govern-
ment introduced the Basic Land Prices system 
to improve assessments. In this new system, 
land and buildings had to be assessed by cer-
tified private appraisers rather than govern-
ment officials. Two appraisers had to provide 
estimated values for the property, and the 
final value was calculated as the average of 
the two values. If the two appraisals differed 
by more than 10 percent, a third appraiser 
was selected and the average recalculated. 
Since 2003, a third appraiser may be rec-
ommended by affected individuals as well 
(World Bank 2013a ).
Developing countries often lack the sys-
tems to record and manage information on 
land transactions. The data may not reflect 
the true price of land because of black market 
transactions to save on duties, for example, 
or because of heavy public subsidies on hous-
ing and land use. Land registries are often 
archaic and lack the dynamic functions that 
allow them to be searched or updated quickly. 
These deficiencies translate into a dearth 
of data on real estate prices, preventing the 
critical analysis necessary for appraising land 
values. That, in turn, has heavy implications 
for local revenue generation, such as property 
tax collection and land sales or leases, that is 
based on real estate values. 
Take India, where such information sys-
tems are in their infancy and the govern-
ment often acquires land for industrial and 
infrastructure development. Farmers and 
other landowners are compensated with pay-
ments benchmarked to the stamp duties, a 
land transaction tax. But because the mar-
ginal rate for stamp duties has been as high 
as 12 percent historically, land and property 
values have long been underreported (World 
Bank 2013b).1 Now, as India’s policy makers 
amend the rules for changes in land use, the 
lack of independent and reliable land valu-
ations is likely to result in public discontent 
and conflicts over land.
In Vietnam, too, official land prices fail to 
reflect demand. The country has two prices 
for land transactions—a market price, and 
an imposed land price, a much lower value 
used by the government in acquiring land 
and allocating it to developers and investors 
(World Bank 2011). Such an inequitable sys-
tem generates resentment over land acquisi-
tions: over 1996–2005, there were more than 
12,000 complaints. And conflicts over land, 
in turn, hinder the consolidation of plots for 
industrial development. More than 85 per-
cent of available plots in Vietnam are smaller 
than 20 hectares, but industrial parks and 
districts typically need 150–200 hectares of 
contiguous land (figure 3.2). So the country’s 
two-price system impedes efficiency and eco-
nomic development.
In countries where land valuation is suc-
cessful, standardized techniques enable 
appraisers to arrive at uniform and trans-
parent valuations. In the United States, most 
states require appraisers and assessors to be 
certified. Appraisers generally work for pri-
vate clients to determine the market value of 
property for real estate transactions, while 
assessors generally work for the government 
to determine property values for tax pur-
poses. Both must follow the same regula-
tions in valuing real estate. For practical pur-
poses, however, and to avoid overestimation 
of prices, property prices for tax purposes 
are often set at about two-thirds of actual 
market value. In Bogotá, property values 
are usually set at 70–80 percent of estimated 
market value.
Public land valuation in developing coun-
tries is fraught with challenges, including the 
cost of hiring private appraisers (these coun-
tries lack standardized public valuation meth-
ods) and the need to update land price data. 
In addition, intergovernmental transfers of 
public land are often recorded as having zero 
value. These challenges can be overcome, 
however, as seen in at least two cases of 
innovation in public land valuation. Kuwait 
now requires two separate private appraisals 
for land involved in public-private partner-
ships (PPPs). And South Africa mandates that 
public land be taxed the same way as private 
land, which means that public land under-
goes the same valuation processes (Peterson 
and Kaganova 2010). In other developing 
countries auctions are often used to reveal 
land values. 
In contrast, federal regulation governs 
private land valuation in Germany. Ger-
many has local land valuation boards that 
are charged with collecting and maintain-
ing land price data as well as disseminating 
land price information (Lozano-Gracia et al. 
2013). The United States allows each state 
to define its own method for private prop-
erty valuation, and most states delegate this 
power to local governments, leading to a vast 
array of approaches. While the most com-
mon is the market value (or sales compari-
son) approach, there are at least two others: 
the cost approach, and the income approach. 
All three methods are often used in paral-
lel to estimate property values. The state of 
New York, for example, uses these methods 
for different property categories. It follows 
the sales comparison approach to value small 
residential properties and vacant land, using 
sales data of comparable properties for the 
previous three years. It adopts the income 
approach to value offices and businesses, tak-
ing an estimated income for the office rental, 
and dividing the net income by a capitaliza-
tion rate. It uses the cost approach for new 
construction and renovations and for special 
properties such as stadiums, museums, and 
places of worship (Lafuente 2009). 
Complementary policies that assign prop-
erty rights and encourage trade of land are 
also needed to help settlements respond to 
the changing needs of the market. Fluid land 
markets help the transition out of agricul-
ture, where rural land can be sold or rented 
for urban uses, and rural residents can seek 
more rewarding opportunities in nonfarm 
activities in urban areas. For instance in Viet-
nam, strengthening of land tenure security 
quadrupled participation in rural rental mar-
kets from 3.8 percent in 1993 to 15.8 percent 
in 1998 and resulted in an increase in rural-
urban migration from 29 percent in 1993 to 
64 percent in 1998. In addition, both rental 
and sales markets had positive impacts on 
productivity.
In conclusion, making land markets and 
land management work better requires 
improving and upgrading or reforming the 
underlying related legal system. Urbaniza-
tion will increase the demand for land, and 
governments at the national and subnational 
levels will employ instruments such as land 
acquisition and land readjustment for accom-
modating urban expansion, or land mon-
etization for financing infrastructure. Strong 
legal systems and credible institutions will 
be a precondition for success. In particu-
lar, these include carefully designed laws to 
assign and protect property rights; institu-
tions that enable independent valuation and 
public dissemination of land values across 
uses; and a strong legal framework supported 
by a healthy judicial system to handle dis-
putes and oversee the process.
For land acquisition, courts need to pro-
vide guidance on the legal scope of eminent 
domain. Given that the definition of public 
purpose constantly evolves, having a rigid 
and exclusive list of public purposes will pose 
Source: World Bank 2011.
FIGURE 3.2 Vietnam’s dual land price system 
creates problems for the assembly of large plots  
of land needed for industry
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stringent barriers to urban expansion. As 
an alternative, a flexible definition of public 
purpose can be combined with a strong judi-
cial system to guide and evaluate acquisition 
decisions on a case-by-case basis. If a flexible 
definition is used, it becomes increasingly 
important to provide a clear definition of the 
process to adjudicate conflicts in cases where 
the “public purpose” of a particular acquisi-
tion is questioned, as well as to establish the 
institutions that guarantee that affected par-
ties can voice their concerns.
Coordinate land management with 
infrastructure, housing, and transport 
Manage densities
Just as valuing land and assigning property 
rights are challenges for accommodating 
urban expansion, so are managing densi-
ties within cities and finding ways to finance 
urban expansion and city renewal. One 
widely used tool for managing densities is the 
floor space index (FSI), or floor area ratio. 
This is the ratio of the gross floor area of a 
building on a lot divided by the area of that 
lot. If, for example, the FSI in an area of a 
city is 1:1, developers can only put up a build-
ing with a gross floor area less than or equal 
to the total lot area. While in some cases it 
may be possible to build a one-story build-
ing that covers the lot entirely, thus achieving 
an FSI of 1:1, developers typically construct 
buildings with a “footprint” or “plinth” 
that covers less than the whole lot, and so 
the structure has more than one story. For 
example, a developer could build a four-story 
building that covered 25 percent of the lot 
and still meet the FSI of 1:1. 
Other planning regulations include set-
backs (minimum distances to the front, rear, 
and sides of a plot) and maximum building 
heights. Both are designed to protect adjacent 
properties and preserve access to sun, air, 
and open space (parks and plazas). Finally, 
plot coverage ratio regulations limit the total 
area of a plot that can be developed (World 
Bank 2013a). There is no such thing as an 
optimal FSI. The “right” FSI for a specific 
area depends on the existing spatial structure 
of the city, the street patterns and widths, the 
level of infrastructure (is there enough capac-
ity to accommodate higher density, that is, 
higher FSIs?), and cultural and social factors 
(are skyscrapers acceptable?) (Bertaud 2004).
Although these regulations exist for good 
reasons, they often have unintended con-
sequences. If an area’s FSI is set far below 
the level at which investors might otherwise 
develop it, this repression of supply can push 
people into other areas, and the increased 
demand for those other areas can raise prices 
across the city (Annez and Linn 2010). Simi-
larly, if the FSI is a uniform limit, it may 
increase housing prices by limiting the sup-
ply of land that would otherwise be built 
up. It may also encourage the allocation of 
land and buildings to less productive uses. 
Beyond slowing city growth in these ways, a 
uniform limit can also push poor households 
to distant suburbs, adding to their poverty by 
increasing their commuting costs and times. 
When households have no choice but to 
locate near jobs, they often join hazard-prone 
informal settlements.
Consider South Africa, where the gov-
ernment has focused on provision of subsi-
dized housing, first introduced as part of 
the Reconstruction and Development Pro-
gram. The benefits of the program have been 
questioned, however. The most common 
complaint is that households receiving the 
subsidized housing are not satisfied, because 
the housing is often far from employment 
centers; the new houses were often built in 
the “old” apartheid locations (which were 
deliberately sited far from urban centers and 
white neighborhoods). In addition, most 
households do not receive title deeds imme-
diately but are allocated the housing admin-
istratively; whether they receive title right 
away or not, households are barred from 
selling or renting for a period of five years. 
Furthermore, even after the five-year period, 
the government has a preemptive right (the 
right of first refusal) on the sale of the prop-
erty. In short, poor location and lack of fully 
tradable property rights are often cited as 
reasons for the limited impact of the subsi-
dized housing.
MAP 3.2 New York’s density management is granular and integrated with infrastructure while Mumbai’s is coarse and 
uncoordinated
Integrate land management with infrastructure 
A central problem of urban planning is that 
of matching land use and infrastructure for 
the best possible outcome. Higher densities 
generate a greater need for infrastructure ser-
vices (electricity, water, sewerage). But they 
also support environmental sustainability 
because they are better suited to public trans-
port. To be sure, density must not overwhelm 
infrastructure. Yet it is equally important not 
to underuse infrastructure, imposing low-
density caps where infrastructure can sup-
port higher ones.
To see what is at stake, compare Man-
hattan, New York City’s archetypal bor-
ough, with Mumbai (map 3.2). Manhattan’s 
density zones are typically small. Its restric-
tions on land use vary with street width and 
capacity, with infrastructure capacity, and 
with historical land use patterns (commercial 
office districts typically have higher FSIs than 
residential districts). This granularity helps to 
make Manhattan a good example of integra-
tion between land use and infrastructure.
In contrast, Mumbai’s density zones are 
large and uniform across much of the city, 
and densities are generally low. India’s urban 
planners justify such low formal densities 
as necessary to avoid overburdening exist-
ing infrastructure, which is severely limited. 
Rather than increase formal or planned den-
sities, they have tried to preserve urban areas 
Sources: New York City Planning Department 2011 (left); Bertaud 2004 (right).
Note: In some zones, the floor space index (FSI) might be increased up to two additional units because of bonuses due to plaza, arcades, and the like. In some areas, the permitted FSI 
might not be reached because of setbacks and plot geometry.
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stringent barriers to urban expansion. As 
an alternative, a flexible definition of public 
purpose can be combined with a strong judi-
cial system to guide and evaluate acquisition 
decisions on a case-by-case basis. If a flexible 
definition is used, it becomes increasingly 
important to provide a clear definition of the 
process to adjudicate conflicts in cases where 
the “public purpose” of a particular acquisi-
tion is questioned, as well as to establish the 
institutions that guarantee that affected par-
ties can voice their concerns.
Coordinate land management with 
infrastructure, housing, and transport 
Manage densities
Just as valuing land and assigning property 
rights are challenges for accommodating 
urban expansion, so are managing densi-
ties within cities and finding ways to finance 
urban expansion and city renewal. One 
widely used tool for managing densities is the 
floor space index (FSI), or floor area ratio. 
This is the ratio of the gross floor area of a 
building on a lot divided by the area of that 
lot. If, for example, the FSI in an area of a 
city is 1:1, developers can only put up a build-
ing with a gross floor area less than or equal 
to the total lot area. While in some cases it 
may be possible to build a one-story build-
ing that covers the lot entirely, thus achieving 
an FSI of 1:1, developers typically construct 
buildings with a “footprint” or “plinth” 
that covers less than the whole lot, and so 
the structure has more than one story. For 
example, a developer could build a four-story 
building that covered 25 percent of the lot 
and still meet the FSI of 1:1. 
Other planning regulations include set-
backs (minimum distances to the front, rear, 
and sides of a plot) and maximum building 
heights. Both are designed to protect adjacent 
properties and preserve access to sun, air, 
and open space (parks and plazas). Finally, 
plot coverage ratio regulations limit the total 
area of a plot that can be developed (World 
Bank 2013a). There is no such thing as an 
optimal FSI. The “right” FSI for a specific 
area depends on the existing spatial structure 
of the city, the street patterns and widths, the 
level of infrastructure (is there enough capac-
ity to accommodate higher density, that is, 
higher FSIs?), and cultural and social factors 
(are skyscrapers acceptable?) (Bertaud 2004).
Although these regulations exist for good 
reasons, they often have unintended con-
sequences. If an area’s FSI is set far below 
the level at which investors might otherwise 
develop it, this repression of supply can push 
people into other areas, and the increased 
demand for those other areas can raise prices 
across the city (Annez and Linn 2010). Simi-
larly, if the FSI is a uniform limit, it may 
increase housing prices by limiting the sup-
ply of land that would otherwise be built 
up. It may also encourage the allocation of 
land and buildings to less productive uses. 
Beyond slowing city growth in these ways, a 
uniform limit can also push poor households 
to distant suburbs, adding to their poverty by 
increasing their commuting costs and times. 
When households have no choice but to 
locate near jobs, they often join hazard-prone 
informal settlements.
Consider South Africa, where the gov-
ernment has focused on provision of subsi-
dized housing, first introduced as part of 
the Reconstruction and Development Pro-
gram. The benefits of the program have been 
questioned, however. The most common 
complaint is that households receiving the 
subsidized housing are not satisfied, because 
the housing is often far from employment 
centers; the new houses were often built in 
the “old” apartheid locations (which were 
deliberately sited far from urban centers and 
white neighborhoods). In addition, most 
households do not receive title deeds imme-
diately but are allocated the housing admin-
istratively; whether they receive title right 
away or not, households are barred from 
selling or renting for a period of five years. 
Furthermore, even after the five-year period, 
the government has a preemptive right (the 
right of first refusal) on the sale of the prop-
erty. In short, poor location and lack of fully 
tradable property rights are often cited as 
reasons for the limited impact of the subsi-
dized housing.
MAP 3.2 New York’s density management is granular and integrated with infrastructure while Mumbai’s is coarse and 
uncoordinated
Integrate land management with infrastructure 
A central problem of urban planning is that 
of matching land use and infrastructure for 
the best possible outcome. Higher densities 
generate a greater need for infrastructure ser-
vices (electricity, water, sewerage). But they 
also support environmental sustainability 
because they are better suited to public trans-
port. To be sure, density must not overwhelm 
infrastructure. Yet it is equally important not 
to underuse infrastructure, imposing low-
density caps where infrastructure can sup-
port higher ones.
To see what is at stake, compare Man-
hattan, New York City’s archetypal bor-
ough, with Mumbai (map 3.2). Manhattan’s 
density zones are typically small. Its restric-
tions on land use vary with street width and 
capacity, with infrastructure capacity, and 
with historical land use patterns (commercial 
office districts typically have higher FSIs than 
residential districts). This granularity helps to 
make Manhattan a good example of integra-
tion between land use and infrastructure.
In contrast, Mumbai’s density zones are 
large and uniform across much of the city, 
and densities are generally low. India’s urban 
planners justify such low formal densities 
as necessary to avoid overburdening exist-
ing infrastructure, which is severely limited. 
Rather than increase formal or planned den-
sities, they have tried to preserve urban areas 
Sources: New York City Planning Department 2011 (left); Bertaud 2004 (right).
Note: In some zones, the floor space index (FSI) might be increased up to two additional units because of bonuses due to plaza, arcades, and the like. In some areas, the permitted FSI 
might not be reached because of setbacks and plot geometry.
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by pushing development out to new towns 
and suburban industrial estates, disconnect-
ing people from job opportunities (World 
Bank 2013b). But this strategy ignores an 
opportunity: India’s cities could instead use 
rising land values to finance better, higher-
capacity infrastructure, to increase office 
space, and to add affordable housing for low- 
and moderate-income groups.
Keeping densities low and failing to coor-
dinate density with infrastructure suppresses 
economic growth, most importantly exacer-
bating housing shortages and affordability. 
Cities’ plans and zoning designations need to 
reflect market realities. The consequence of 
master plans that artificially limit land sup-
ply can be soaring land prices. When plans 
underestimate required land uses, such as 
residential, industrial, commercial, and ser-
vices, land prices for parcels zoned as such 
tend to sell at higher prices than would be 
set in the marketplace. In many cities in the 
developing world, urban planning consists of 
designing the expansion of cities using norms 
and spatial choices that reflect the preferences 
of urban planners rather than to supply con-
straints and consumer demands. The result is 
often a master plan that is ineffective for both 
forecasting and guiding urban development 
(box 3.3). 
Integrate land use and mobility planning 
When urban land and building regulations 
limit densities in urban areas, they push peo-
ple and firms to the outskirts. When cities are 
forced to grow out instead of up, the urban 
transport network becomes increasingly 
important as the only way to connect peo-
ple to jobs. A good transport system allows 
people to make efficient trade-offs between 
the housing type and amenities they consume 
and the distance they travel to work. When 
the network is deficient, the problems stem-
ming from stringent regulations in land mar-
kets are exacerbated. For example, people 
may be forced to live in slums close to job 
centers, often assuming natural hazard risks, 
because they cannot afford to move into for-
mal housing or cannot access cheaper land on 
the outskirts of cities for lack of an efficient 
urban transport system. In Santo Domingo, 
the capital of the Dominican Republic, 45 
percent of the houses in the largest slum are 
located near a river and are flooded in heavy 
rains (Fay, Ghesquiere, and Solo 2003). The 
poorest live in the lowest-quality dwellings 
in the areas most at risk. Likewise, informal 
settlements in Rio de Janeiro and Caracas 
cling to steep slopes with large landslide risk 
during rainstorms. Publicly available infor-
mation on hazard risk can enable households 
to make informed decisions (box 3.4), but 
lack of coordinated land use and mobility 
improvements will force them to make sub-
optimal choices.
Thus, plans to connect neighborhoods 
should be integrated with plans for urban 
land use, especially density plans. For any of 
these policies to benefit the city as intended, 
they must be integrated throughout the plan-
ning process. Urban transport is often an 
“institutional orphan,” however, with its 
responsibility often fragmented across agen-
cies (World Bank 2013a). Land use planning 
is a core function of development authori-
ties, with transport planning often limited 
to developing the road network. Such frag-
mentation of responsibilities results in ineffi-
ciencies. In Bangalore, a new airport several 
miles outside the city was close to being com-
missioned when city authorities realized that 
the road connecting the city to the airport 
was inadequate.
Land use planning is integral to transport 
planning because land use largely determines 
transport demand. Different cities need dif-
ferent mixes of transport types, and differ-
ent neighborhoods need different modes. 
Mass transport generally suits compact 
areas; private vehicles, more sprawling ones. 
BOX 3.4 Publicly accessible information on urban hazard risk can improve household 
decision making
With access to good information about hazard risk, 
households can make better decisions on where to 
live, depending on the location’s proximity to job 
centers, the quality and cost of transport services, 
and the location’s risk of exposure to natural haz-
ards. Some examples of such information systems 
include:
•   The Bogotá Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Proj-
ect, launched in 2006, invested in information 
collection and vulnerability assessments for better 
targeting of risk reduction measures. One output 
was a database of earthquake vulnerability scores 
for all buildings in the city that helps prioritize 
upgrades and makes insurance markets more trans-
parent (Prasad et al. 2009).
•   Jakarta and Can Tho (Vietnam) recently carried 
out vulnerability assessments with World Bank 
support (World Bank 2012b). The studies demon-
strate the use of geographically referenced data to 
pinpoint hazard risk and to support cost-benefit 
analysis of various risk reduction strategies. Flood-
prone Jakarta, for instance, is considering measures 
such as drainage improvement, river improvement, 
upgrading of retention ponds, and various options 
for a coastal defense infrastructure. 
•   Better risk information supported the introduc-
tion of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool, a 
risk transfer mechanism set up after the Marmara 
earthquake in 1999 that killed at least 17,000 peo-
ple and damaged 120,000 houses in the Istanbul 
region. The program reduced households’ financial 
damages by enabling them to have catastrophic 
insurance and encouraging physical risk mitigation.
•   A joint study by the World Bank, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, and the Japan International Coop-
eration Agency assessed future climate risks for 
coastal megacities and found that by 2050, the fre-
quency of major floods in Bangkok could increase 
from once every 50 years to once every 15 years. 
About 1 million inhabitants would be affected 
(ADB, JICA, and WB 2010).
BOX 3.3 Do cities need master plans?
Instead of drawing up a master plan and making a 
large effort to update it every 10 years, as is frequently 
the pattern, it may be better to produce a much sim-
pler spatial strategy document that could be updated 
every year by staff of a city’s urban planning depart-
ment. The emphasis of such a document would be on 
the current spatial situation and spatial trends. Its 
main objectives would be to ensure housing and land 
affordability and adequate mobility. Such a process 
would focus on analyzing real estate prices and supply 
and demand constraints for all income groups, firms, 
and households. The plan would cover three topics: 
land use and spatially distributed demographics; road 
and transport networks; and land use and develop-
ment regulations. Rather than attempting to cover all 
sectors, when the spatial strategy is approved by gov-
ernment, it could be distributed to line agencies that 
have the technical expertise to develop sectoral plans 
that are consistent with spatial distribution of peo-
ple and jobs, as well as consistent with their budget 
constraints. It is important to provide the line agen-
cies with a constantly updated spatial distribution of 
populations so that they can adjust their investment 
programs to meet current and future demand. 
This proposal is not revolutionary. Most master 
plans around the world are largely ignored (even in 
China). In Vietnam, master plans are often referred 
to as “hanging plans,” suggesting that they often 
decorate the walls of planning departments but are 
rarely implemented. As in most countries, Vietnam 
line agencies typically make investment decisions 
based on their own population projections, which are 
rarely consistent with master plans and often differ 
between agencies. Changing the planning process to 
be more in line with market dynamics would lead to 
better and more consistent development outcomes. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are good examples of land 
use planning and internal consistency between spa-
tial objectives and the provision of physical and social 
infrastructure. 
Source: World Bank 2011.
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by pushing development out to new towns 
and suburban industrial estates, disconnect-
ing people from job opportunities (World 
Bank 2013b). But this strategy ignores an 
opportunity: India’s cities could instead use 
rising land values to finance better, higher-
capacity infrastructure, to increase office 
space, and to add affordable housing for low- 
and moderate-income groups.
Keeping densities low and failing to coor-
dinate density with infrastructure suppresses 
economic growth, most importantly exacer-
bating housing shortages and affordability. 
Cities’ plans and zoning designations need to 
reflect market realities. The consequence of 
master plans that artificially limit land sup-
ply can be soaring land prices. When plans 
underestimate required land uses, such as 
residential, industrial, commercial, and ser-
vices, land prices for parcels zoned as such 
tend to sell at higher prices than would be 
set in the marketplace. In many cities in the 
developing world, urban planning consists of 
designing the expansion of cities using norms 
and spatial choices that reflect the preferences 
of urban planners rather than to supply con-
straints and consumer demands. The result is 
often a master plan that is ineffective for both 
forecasting and guiding urban development 
(box 3.3). 
Integrate land use and mobility planning 
When urban land and building regulations 
limit densities in urban areas, they push peo-
ple and firms to the outskirts. When cities are 
forced to grow out instead of up, the urban 
transport network becomes increasingly 
important as the only way to connect peo-
ple to jobs. A good transport system allows 
people to make efficient trade-offs between 
the housing type and amenities they consume 
and the distance they travel to work. When 
the network is deficient, the problems stem-
ming from stringent regulations in land mar-
kets are exacerbated. For example, people 
may be forced to live in slums close to job 
centers, often assuming natural hazard risks, 
because they cannot afford to move into for-
mal housing or cannot access cheaper land on 
the outskirts of cities for lack of an efficient 
urban transport system. In Santo Domingo, 
the capital of the Dominican Republic, 45 
percent of the houses in the largest slum are 
located near a river and are flooded in heavy 
rains (Fay, Ghesquiere, and Solo 2003). The 
poorest live in the lowest-quality dwellings 
in the areas most at risk. Likewise, informal 
settlements in Rio de Janeiro and Caracas 
cling to steep slopes with large landslide risk 
during rainstorms. Publicly available infor-
mation on hazard risk can enable households 
to make informed decisions (box 3.4), but 
lack of coordinated land use and mobility 
improvements will force them to make sub-
optimal choices.
Thus, plans to connect neighborhoods 
should be integrated with plans for urban 
land use, especially density plans. For any of 
these policies to benefit the city as intended, 
they must be integrated throughout the plan-
ning process. Urban transport is often an 
“institutional orphan,” however, with its 
responsibility often fragmented across agen-
cies (World Bank 2013a). Land use planning 
is a core function of development authori-
ties, with transport planning often limited 
to developing the road network. Such frag-
mentation of responsibilities results in ineffi-
ciencies. In Bangalore, a new airport several 
miles outside the city was close to being com-
missioned when city authorities realized that 
the road connecting the city to the airport 
was inadequate.
Land use planning is integral to transport 
planning because land use largely determines 
transport demand. Different cities need dif-
ferent mixes of transport types, and differ-
ent neighborhoods need different modes. 
Mass transport generally suits compact 
areas; private vehicles, more sprawling ones. 
BOX 3.4 Publicly accessible information on urban hazard risk can improve household 
decision making
With access to good information about hazard risk, 
households can make better decisions on where to 
live, depending on the location’s proximity to job 
centers, the quality and cost of transport services, 
and the location’s risk of exposure to natural haz-
ards. Some examples of such information systems 
include:
•   The Bogotá Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Proj-
ect, launched in 2006, invested in information 
collection and vulnerability assessments for better 
targeting of risk reduction measures. One output 
was a database of earthquake vulnerability scores 
for all buildings in the city that helps prioritize 
upgrades and makes insurance markets more trans-
parent (Prasad et al. 2009).
•   Jakarta and Can Tho (Vietnam) recently carried 
out vulnerability assessments with World Bank 
support (World Bank 2012b). The studies demon-
strate the use of geographically referenced data to 
pinpoint hazard risk and to support cost-benefit 
analysis of various risk reduction strategies. Flood-
prone Jakarta, for instance, is considering measures 
such as drainage improvement, river improvement, 
upgrading of retention ponds, and various options 
for a coastal defense infrastructure. 
•   Better risk information supported the introduc-
tion of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool, a 
risk transfer mechanism set up after the Marmara 
earthquake in 1999 that killed at least 17,000 peo-
ple and damaged 120,000 houses in the Istanbul 
region. The program reduced households’ financial 
damages by enabling them to have catastrophic 
insurance and encouraging physical risk mitigation.
•   A joint study by the World Bank, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, and the Japan International Coop-
eration Agency assessed future climate risks for 
coastal megacities and found that by 2050, the fre-
quency of major floods in Bangkok could increase 
from once every 50 years to once every 15 years. 
About 1 million inhabitants would be affected 
(ADB, JICA, and WB 2010).
BOX 3.3 Do cities need master plans?
Instead of drawing up a master plan and making a 
large effort to update it every 10 years, as is frequently 
the pattern, it may be better to produce a much sim-
pler spatial strategy document that could be updated 
every year by staff of a city’s urban planning depart-
ment. The emphasis of such a document would be on 
the current spatial situation and spatial trends. Its 
main objectives would be to ensure housing and land 
affordability and adequate mobility. Such a process 
would focus on analyzing real estate prices and supply 
and demand constraints for all income groups, firms, 
and households. The plan would cover three topics: 
land use and spatially distributed demographics; road 
and transport networks; and land use and develop-
ment regulations. Rather than attempting to cover all 
sectors, when the spatial strategy is approved by gov-
ernment, it could be distributed to line agencies that 
have the technical expertise to develop sectoral plans 
that are consistent with spatial distribution of peo-
ple and jobs, as well as consistent with their budget 
constraints. It is important to provide the line agen-
cies with a constantly updated spatial distribution of 
populations so that they can adjust their investment 
programs to meet current and future demand. 
This proposal is not revolutionary. Most master 
plans around the world are largely ignored (even in 
China). In Vietnam, master plans are often referred 
to as “hanging plans,” suggesting that they often 
decorate the walls of planning departments but are 
rarely implemented. As in most countries, Vietnam 
line agencies typically make investment decisions 
based on their own population projections, which are 
rarely consistent with master plans and often differ 
between agencies. Changing the planning process to 
be more in line with market dynamics would lead to 
better and more consistent development outcomes. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are good examples of land 
use planning and internal consistency between spa-
tial objectives and the provision of physical and social 
infrastructure. 
Source: World Bank 2011.
142  U R B A N I Z A T I O N  A N D  T H E  M D G S  G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3 G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3  U R B A N I Z A T I O N  A N D  T H E  M D G S   143
Mixed-use plans can reduce the need for long 
trips by locating housing, shops, services, and 
jobs all within a short radius. Studies also 
suggest that higher densities are good for effi-
ciency and for environmental sustainability, 
reducing energy consumption and emissions 
by reducing vehicle miles traveled (Newman 
and Kenworthy 1989; Mokhtarian, Bagley, 
and Salomon 1998; Schrank, Lomax, and 
Eisele 2011). Transport plans, in turn, shape 
land use by making specific sites more acces-
sible. For example, a new road to undevel-
oped land can facilitate its development, or a 
new downtown metro connection can boost 
demand for redevelopment of the urban core.
However, increased prosperity leads in 
general to increased purchase of vehicles and 
even though the miles traveled in urban areas 
is smaller than in rural areas, this increase in 
vehicle ownership will have serious implica-
tions for carbon emissions. Controlling car-
bon emissions is a daunting challenge for 
policy makers in developing countries (Kahn 
forthcoming). As population and manufac-
turing firm densities in urban areas grow, 
so too do negative spillovers that affect the 
population’s health, with significant effects 
on children’s development, and that lead to 
environmental damage in the form of floods 
and droughts. The implications of both spill-
overs for the MDGs related to health and 
sustainable development are not trivial and 
have well-known policy implications for indi-
vidual countries. 
In the absence of urban planning, individ-
ual firms invariably locate in city centers to 
take advantage of industrial agglomeration, 
which contributes to high carbon emissions. 
Usually, labor-intensive industries choose 
countries with low wages, and electricity-
intensive heavy industries pick locations 
where electricity is cheap. The challenge for 
developing-country policy makers of indus-
trial cities is to foster sustainable urbaniza-
tion policies to reduce carbon emissions with-
out constraining industrial growth. The key 
to sustainable urbanization is designing city-
specific and type of local pollution specific 
interventions. 
A low-cost way for governments to break 
the link between industrial and pollution 
production is to encourage firms to locate in 
dedicated industrial parks such as China’s 
special economic zones where government 
has encouraged the installation of industrial 
infrastructure to increase industrial produc-
tivity without compromising environmental 
damage. Another option to break the link 
is to invest in transport infrastructure to 
encourage suburbanization of manufactur-
ing, which reduces industrial pollution expo-
sure for people who live in the center city, 
while encouraging them to move closer to 
the suburban jobs. In China and the Republic 
of Korea, these policies also had the positive 
effect of attracting the industry’s supply chain 
(intermediate goods suppliers) to the suburbs, 
causing population suburbanization.
“Smart” regulation includes allocating 
pollution permits to achieve the dual goals of 
pollution mitigation and continued industrial 
production. Under such a permit system, the 
government places a cap on total tons of pol-
lution that may be released by industry in a 
given area surrounding the city and requires 
polluting firms to bid for permits to pollute in 
the area. This system discourages firms from 
polluting and gives them incentives to install 
production technologies that economize on 
pollution. Governments can disseminate 
information about industrial polluter activity 
by requiring firms to report their emissions 
levels. After the 1984 Union Carbide chemi-
cal disaster in Bhopal, India, the United States 
created the Toxic Release Inventory dataset, 
requiring U.S. manufacturing firms to publi-
cize their emissions released to air, water, and 
land. Indonesia followed with success. 
To economize on transportation costs, 
workers choose housing located close to 
firms. Government can invest in urban trans-
portation to move goods and people within 
the metropolitan area, but richer people 
particularly continue to prefer private cars 
that add to carbon emissions. Some evidence 
suggests that a 10 percent growth in per 
capita income is associated with a 10 per-
cent increase in per capita vehicle ownership. 
Policy options to minimize the environmen-
tal impact of private car ownership include 
a tax that influences a household choice to 
purchase a vehicle, the type of vehicle, and 
use of the vehicle. A gasoline tax that not 
only discourages driving but also increases 
fiscal revenues, pricing the use of public roads 
through tolls, and increasing public parking 
rates are other policy options to dampen the 
“heat-island effect” created by running vehi-
cles. Government also can issue “pollution 
tickets,” similar to speeding tickets to older 
cars and diesel trucks, and mandate the use 
of cleaner gasoline.
To encourage mass use of public transit, 
subways linked to city centers are popular. 
Investments in subways in Beijing and New 
Delhi are examples. But subways are costly 
and irreversible investments. The alternatives 
are investments in rapid buses, which offer 
competing speed and environmental benefits. 
Bogotá has done this with TransMilenio. 
Urban households also use energy for air 
conditioning, heating, and appliances like 
refrigerators. These improve the quality of 
life but also add to carbon emissions. Gov-
ernments can mitigate future climate change 
through flexible electricity pricing, which 
encourages consumers to keep energy use 
low. Smart cities use “smart meters” to moni-
tor energy use but variable pricing penalizes 
the poor. Through block tariff rates with a 
low bottom rate for households that con-
sume a low level of electricity, governments 
can make energy use affordable for the poor. 
In addition, poor urban households tend 
to choose the riskiest places where hous-
ing is cheapest. Policies to encourage energy 
efficient buildings can be helpful in these 
situations. 
Leverage competitive forces to  
expand services 
Governments have many choices in how to 
provide or expand basic services for their 
urban residents. In many instances, basic 
services are lacking altogether. Lack of elec-
tricity, for example, often forces households 
to trade off their health when they use alter-
nate fuels for cooking and other uses. Indoor 
air pollution from solid fuels—wood, dung, 
coal, charcoal—continues to be widespread 
in areas where electricity is not available. 
This is a larger issue in rural areas but is still 
significant in urban settings. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, 83 percent of rural and 
60 percent of urban households rely on solid 
fuels for cooking. Indoor combustion of solid 
fuels can cause severe health effects, espe-
cially among women and children who spend 
more time in the house (Bruce, Perez-Padilla, 
and Albalak 2000). These include lung can-
cer, pulmonary disease, low birth weight, 
cataracts, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. 
The World Health Organization estimates 
that exposure to solid fuel smoke causes 1.6 
million deaths a year and the loss of 39 mil-
lion disability-adjusted life years. With ris-
ing wealth in urban areas, households often 
switch to more convenient liquid fuels. Kero-
sene use is widespread in urban areas where 
electricity access is lacking, especially where 
kerosene is subsidized, such as in India and 
Nepal. Perhaps as many as 500 million 
households globally still use kerosene and 
similar fuels for lighting, as well as for cook-
ing and heating. Apart from poisoning, fires, 
and explosions, kerosene poses risks from 
exposure to fine particulates, carbon mon-
oxide, formaldehyde, and other potentially 
harmful emissions (Lam et al. 2012).
Basic services in many developing coun-
tries are distributed unevenly. Consider figure 
3.3, which shows access to piped water for 
urban residents in Brazil, Colombia, India, 
Uganda, and Vietnam. In each of these five 
countries, water access varies with city size, 
but it does so differentially. In Vietnam, 
access is high but less equitable, with smaller 
cities showing lower access. In Brazil and 
Colombia, service coverage is high and fairly 
equitable. In India and Uganda, access is 
lower and less equitable.
Examine market structure
When policy makers consider how to expand 
infrastructure and improve the provision of 
basic services, they have a choice. Rather 
than give first priority to financing, as is 
often done, they can look at the structure 
of markets for basic services and determine 
what rules will work best. In particular, 
policy makers may consider rules for com-
petitive pricing and cost recovery. Indeed, in 
many cases the expectation of cost recovery 
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Mixed-use plans can reduce the need for long 
trips by locating housing, shops, services, and 
jobs all within a short radius. Studies also 
suggest that higher densities are good for effi-
ciency and for environmental sustainability, 
reducing energy consumption and emissions 
by reducing vehicle miles traveled (Newman 
and Kenworthy 1989; Mokhtarian, Bagley, 
and Salomon 1998; Schrank, Lomax, and 
Eisele 2011). Transport plans, in turn, shape 
land use by making specific sites more acces-
sible. For example, a new road to undevel-
oped land can facilitate its development, or a 
new downtown metro connection can boost 
demand for redevelopment of the urban core.
However, increased prosperity leads in 
general to increased purchase of vehicles and 
even though the miles traveled in urban areas 
is smaller than in rural areas, this increase in 
vehicle ownership will have serious implica-
tions for carbon emissions. Controlling car-
bon emissions is a daunting challenge for 
policy makers in developing countries (Kahn 
forthcoming). As population and manufac-
turing firm densities in urban areas grow, 
so too do negative spillovers that affect the 
population’s health, with significant effects 
on children’s development, and that lead to 
environmental damage in the form of floods 
and droughts. The implications of both spill-
overs for the MDGs related to health and 
sustainable development are not trivial and 
have well-known policy implications for indi-
vidual countries. 
In the absence of urban planning, individ-
ual firms invariably locate in city centers to 
take advantage of industrial agglomeration, 
which contributes to high carbon emissions. 
Usually, labor-intensive industries choose 
countries with low wages, and electricity-
intensive heavy industries pick locations 
where electricity is cheap. The challenge for 
developing-country policy makers of indus-
trial cities is to foster sustainable urbaniza-
tion policies to reduce carbon emissions with-
out constraining industrial growth. The key 
to sustainable urbanization is designing city-
specific and type of local pollution specific 
interventions. 
A low-cost way for governments to break 
the link between industrial and pollution 
production is to encourage firms to locate in 
dedicated industrial parks such as China’s 
special economic zones where government 
has encouraged the installation of industrial 
infrastructure to increase industrial produc-
tivity without compromising environmental 
damage. Another option to break the link 
is to invest in transport infrastructure to 
encourage suburbanization of manufactur-
ing, which reduces industrial pollution expo-
sure for people who live in the center city, 
while encouraging them to move closer to 
the suburban jobs. In China and the Republic 
of Korea, these policies also had the positive 
effect of attracting the industry’s supply chain 
(intermediate goods suppliers) to the suburbs, 
causing population suburbanization.
“Smart” regulation includes allocating 
pollution permits to achieve the dual goals of 
pollution mitigation and continued industrial 
production. Under such a permit system, the 
government places a cap on total tons of pol-
lution that may be released by industry in a 
given area surrounding the city and requires 
polluting firms to bid for permits to pollute in 
the area. This system discourages firms from 
polluting and gives them incentives to install 
production technologies that economize on 
pollution. Governments can disseminate 
information about industrial polluter activity 
by requiring firms to report their emissions 
levels. After the 1984 Union Carbide chemi-
cal disaster in Bhopal, India, the United States 
created the Toxic Release Inventory dataset, 
requiring U.S. manufacturing firms to publi-
cize their emissions released to air, water, and 
land. Indonesia followed with success. 
To economize on transportation costs, 
workers choose housing located close to 
firms. Government can invest in urban trans-
portation to move goods and people within 
the metropolitan area, but richer people 
particularly continue to prefer private cars 
that add to carbon emissions. Some evidence 
suggests that a 10 percent growth in per 
capita income is associated with a 10 per-
cent increase in per capita vehicle ownership. 
Policy options to minimize the environmen-
tal impact of private car ownership include 
a tax that influences a household choice to 
purchase a vehicle, the type of vehicle, and 
use of the vehicle. A gasoline tax that not 
only discourages driving but also increases 
fiscal revenues, pricing the use of public roads 
through tolls, and increasing public parking 
rates are other policy options to dampen the 
“heat-island effect” created by running vehi-
cles. Government also can issue “pollution 
tickets,” similar to speeding tickets to older 
cars and diesel trucks, and mandate the use 
of cleaner gasoline.
To encourage mass use of public transit, 
subways linked to city centers are popular. 
Investments in subways in Beijing and New 
Delhi are examples. But subways are costly 
and irreversible investments. The alternatives 
are investments in rapid buses, which offer 
competing speed and environmental benefits. 
Bogotá has done this with TransMilenio. 
Urban households also use energy for air 
conditioning, heating, and appliances like 
refrigerators. These improve the quality of 
life but also add to carbon emissions. Gov-
ernments can mitigate future climate change 
through flexible electricity pricing, which 
encourages consumers to keep energy use 
low. Smart cities use “smart meters” to moni-
tor energy use but variable pricing penalizes 
the poor. Through block tariff rates with a 
low bottom rate for households that con-
sume a low level of electricity, governments 
can make energy use affordable for the poor. 
In addition, poor urban households tend 
to choose the riskiest places where hous-
ing is cheapest. Policies to encourage energy 
efficient buildings can be helpful in these 
situations. 
Leverage competitive forces to  
expand services 
Governments have many choices in how to 
provide or expand basic services for their 
urban residents. In many instances, basic 
services are lacking altogether. Lack of elec-
tricity, for example, often forces households 
to trade off their health when they use alter-
nate fuels for cooking and other uses. Indoor 
air pollution from solid fuels—wood, dung, 
coal, charcoal—continues to be widespread 
in areas where electricity is not available. 
This is a larger issue in rural areas but is still 
significant in urban settings. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, 83 percent of rural and 
60 percent of urban households rely on solid 
fuels for cooking. Indoor combustion of solid 
fuels can cause severe health effects, espe-
cially among women and children who spend 
more time in the house (Bruce, Perez-Padilla, 
and Albalak 2000). These include lung can-
cer, pulmonary disease, low birth weight, 
cataracts, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. 
The World Health Organization estimates 
that exposure to solid fuel smoke causes 1.6 
million deaths a year and the loss of 39 mil-
lion disability-adjusted life years. With ris-
ing wealth in urban areas, households often 
switch to more convenient liquid fuels. Kero-
sene use is widespread in urban areas where 
electricity access is lacking, especially where 
kerosene is subsidized, such as in India and 
Nepal. Perhaps as many as 500 million 
households globally still use kerosene and 
similar fuels for lighting, as well as for cook-
ing and heating. Apart from poisoning, fires, 
and explosions, kerosene poses risks from 
exposure to fine particulates, carbon mon-
oxide, formaldehyde, and other potentially 
harmful emissions (Lam et al. 2012).
Basic services in many developing coun-
tries are distributed unevenly. Consider figure 
3.3, which shows access to piped water for 
urban residents in Brazil, Colombia, India, 
Uganda, and Vietnam. In each of these five 
countries, water access varies with city size, 
but it does so differentially. In Vietnam, 
access is high but less equitable, with smaller 
cities showing lower access. In Brazil and 
Colombia, service coverage is high and fairly 
equitable. In India and Uganda, access is 
lower and less equitable.
Examine market structure
When policy makers consider how to expand 
infrastructure and improve the provision of 
basic services, they have a choice. Rather 
than give first priority to financing, as is 
often done, they can look at the structure 
of markets for basic services and determine 
what rules will work best. In particular, 
policy makers may consider rules for com-
petitive pricing and cost recovery. Indeed, in 
many cases the expectation of cost recovery 
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through fees will determine the availability of 
financing (box 3.5).
Recall Colombia’s success in providing 
nearly universal access to water, electricity, 
and sanitation in cities nationwide. A big part 
of Colombia’s success is that policy reforms 
allowed fees to nearly cover costs. For 
example, average residential water fees more 
than doubled over 1990–2001 (World Bank 
2004). With almost 90 percent of households 
having a metered connection, household 
consumption was nearly halved. And that, 
in turn, reduced the need to develop major 
new infrastructure. Even with fee increases, 
water remains fairly affordable in Colombia. 
The fee structure allows the government to 
cross-subsidize: richer households and indus-
trial users pay for the poorest consumers. As 
a result, the average poor household spends 
less than 5 percent of its income on water.
Ugandan policy makers have started 
thinking about the rules that need to be in 
place to expand access to basic services. 
Water reform in 1998 focused on creating the 
right incentives for more efficient service pro-
vision, attributing responsibility to local ser-
vice managers and increasing their account-
ability. Since 2000, the national government 
BOX 3.5 Expanding access to services: A tale of two sectors 
For the most clear-cut demonstration of the role of 
prices and price formation processes, consider access 
to water versus access to phone services in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: just about everywhere in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, access to mobile phones is greater than 
access to modern water systems (figure B3.4.1). Offi-
cial policy statements have been full of promises to 
enhance access to water for decades, yet similar state-
ments have not been made regarding access to cell 
phones. Hence, official policy stance does not seem 
the key factor.
Maybe de facto administrative capability is more 
important. Both water and phones need some level 
of regulation. Yet the regulation of modern phone 
systems is conceptually more challenging than the 
regulation of water systems. In all systems, regula-
tion needs to set prices that cover costs. Costs and an 
allowed rate of return need to be calculated. So it is 
for water systems that typically have monopoly pro-
viders in any given area. The mobile phone sector has 
both competitive and noncompetitive segments that 
require regulation. Multiple players pose challenges 
to regulating interconnection; as a result, telecommu-
nications regulation should be more demanding than 
water regulation. However, many African countries 
have been able to provide a regulatory environment 
that enables penetration of mobile phone usage, even 
in challenging environments like the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, whereas they have not been able 
to achieve the same for water. Hence “capacity” to 
regulate does not seem to be the deciding factor either.
So what can explain the divergent patterns of 
access? A striking difference between the two sec-
tors is the level of prices relative to cost. In the water 
sector, prices typically barely cover operating costs 
and tend to be about 30 percent of total cost. In the 
mobile telephone sector, prices tend to exceed cost. 
Unsurprisingly, both public and private system opera-
tors, who can charge and collect prices that exceed 
costs, have an incentive to expand systems and can do 
so. Providers who receive less than full cost have nei-
ther the incentive nor the financial ability to expand 
access. 
FIGURE B3.4.1 Water services versus mobile phones 
in Africa
Source: Global Water Intelligence 2008.
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FIGURE 3.3 Share of population with access to piped water by country and across city size
Sources: Brazil: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), for 2000; Colombia: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) for 2005; 
India: Ministry of Home Affairs for 2001; Uganda: Uganda Bureau of Statistics for 2010; Vietnam: General Statistics Office of Vietnam for 2009. 
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through fees will determine the availability of 
financing (box 3.5).
Recall Colombia’s success in providing 
nearly universal access to water, electricity, 
and sanitation in cities nationwide. A big part 
of Colombia’s success is that policy reforms 
allowed fees to nearly cover costs. For 
example, average residential water fees more 
than doubled over 1990–2001 (World Bank 
2004). With almost 90 percent of households 
having a metered connection, household 
consumption was nearly halved. And that, 
in turn, reduced the need to develop major 
new infrastructure. Even with fee increases, 
water remains fairly affordable in Colombia. 
The fee structure allows the government to 
cross-subsidize: richer households and indus-
trial users pay for the poorest consumers. As 
a result, the average poor household spends 
less than 5 percent of its income on water.
Ugandan policy makers have started 
thinking about the rules that need to be in 
place to expand access to basic services. 
Water reform in 1998 focused on creating the 
right incentives for more efficient service pro-
vision, attributing responsibility to local ser-
vice managers and increasing their account-
ability. Since 2000, the national government 
BOX 3.5 Expanding access to services: A tale of two sectors 
For the most clear-cut demonstration of the role of 
prices and price formation processes, consider access 
to water versus access to phone services in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: just about everywhere in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, access to mobile phones is greater than 
access to modern water systems (figure B3.4.1). Offi-
cial policy statements have been full of promises to 
enhance access to water for decades, yet similar state-
ments have not been made regarding access to cell 
phones. Hence, official policy stance does not seem 
the key factor.
Maybe de facto administrative capability is more 
important. Both water and phones need some level 
of regulation. Yet the regulation of modern phone 
systems is conceptually more challenging than the 
regulation of water systems. In all systems, regula-
tion needs to set prices that cover costs. Costs and an 
allowed rate of return need to be calculated. So it is 
for water systems that typically have monopoly pro-
viders in any given area. The mobile phone sector has 
both competitive and noncompetitive segments that 
require regulation. Multiple players pose challenges 
to regulating interconnection; as a result, telecommu-
nications regulation should be more demanding than 
water regulation. However, many African countries 
have been able to provide a regulatory environment 
that enables penetration of mobile phone usage, even 
in challenging environments like the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, whereas they have not been able 
to achieve the same for water. Hence “capacity” to 
regulate does not seem to be the deciding factor either.
So what can explain the divergent patterns of 
access? A striking difference between the two sec-
tors is the level of prices relative to cost. In the water 
sector, prices typically barely cover operating costs 
and tend to be about 30 percent of total cost. In the 
mobile telephone sector, prices tend to exceed cost. 
Unsurprisingly, both public and private system opera-
tors, who can charge and collect prices that exceed 
costs, have an incentive to expand systems and can do 
so. Providers who receive less than full cost have nei-
ther the incentive nor the financial ability to expand 
access. 
FIGURE B3.4.1 Water services versus mobile phones 
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Source: Global Water Intelligence 2008.
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FIGURE 3.3 Share of population with access to piped water by country and across city size
Sources: Brazil: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), for 2000; Colombia: National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) for 2005; 
India: Ministry of Home Affairs for 2001; Uganda: Uganda Bureau of Statistics for 2010; Vietnam: General Statistics Office of Vietnam for 2009. 
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has been working with Uganda’s National 
Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), 
the autonomous public provider of water 
and sanitation to the country’s large towns, 
to enforce performance contracts. Renewed 
every three years, the contracts include spe-
cific indicators that NWSC must meet at 
the end of the period (Banerjee and Morella 
2011]). However, Uganda’s reform has not yet 
attempted to promote cost recovery through 
user fees. The NWSC charges a uniform fee 
across all towns and customer categories 
served. In 2010, the fee covered production 
costs in only 6 of 23 areas served.
For some services such as urban transport, 
competition has to be regulated, because free 
market entry could undermine safety stan-
dards. The “penny wars” of Bogotá are an 
interesting example. Before a bus rapid tran-
sit system called TransMilenio was intro-
duced in 2000, about 30,000–35,000 buses 
were operating in the city (Hook 2005). The 
government granted nonexclusive permits to 
the route operators, with whom bus own-
ers were affiliated. The bus owners in turn 
charged their drivers fixed rents. The drivers’ 
revenue thus depended directly on how many 
fares they collected. Cutthroat competition 
ensued, with unsafe results: drivers had a 
strong incentive to speed, cut people off, and 
carry too many passengers. The introduction 
of TransMilenio, together with a new regu-
latory framework, eliminated these “penny 
wars.” The new framework included bid-
ding for all parts of the service, from routes 
to infrastructure. TransMilenio allocates the 
market to operators according to their qual-
ity, among other factors, and it pays them 
by the kilometer, assuring them of a certain 
amount regardless of their passenger load 
(World Bank 2013a). 
Direct competition may also not be fea-
sible in sectors that naturally favor monopo-
lies. Much of a city’s networked infrastruc-
ture falls in this category: its duplication 
tends to be inefficient. A single network, 
fully built out, can often underbid any com-
petitor (Klein 2012). Canada’s cities are one 
example of a natural monopoly superseding 
market competition. Water utilities would at 
first compete to supply firms and households 
in a given market by laying separate pipe-
lines. Then all the providers but one would 
fade away. In other cases, a monopoly pro-
vider started and was not challenged, either 
because competitors could not undercut it or 
because entry was forbidden by law. Natu-
ral monopolies can also appear in exclusive 
locations, such as airports and central metro 
stations.
Yet monopolies can abuse their market 
power, charging prices that are too high to 
be socially acceptable. Such prices can also 
make economies less productive and less 
competitive. So how can policy allow prices 
to cover costs while ensuring that prices 
stay close to costs, as opposed to fattening a 
monopoly with excessive profits?
Auctioning service franchises
Regulation can closely mimic the effects of 
competitive pricing even where monopolies 
exist. City leaders can auction the right to 
provide a service for a certain period, moving 
away from a monopolistic price and closer to 
the price that would arise from competition. 
Firms that lose at auction exit that particular 
market. If it is possible to put such a monop-
oly franchise up for auction fairly frequently 
based on the lowest price, the auction will act 
like a market to set prices.
Many cities, including Bogotá, London, 
and Santiago, auction bus routes, assigning 
operators to predefined itineraries. Santiago 
awards five-year contracts using criteria that 
include the fare offered by the bidder, along 
with quality variables. Before the auctions 
began, during a period of deregulation, bus 
fares had risen; with the auctions, the fares 
came back down. Where possible, franchise 
auctions repeated at intervals of one to three 
years can make price regulation essentially 
unnecessary. Such auctions have been used 
not only in bus transport but also in waste 
management. If a company loses a franchise, 
its assets—buses, garbage trucks—can be 
deployed elsewhere.
Public policy can set service prices below 
cost-recovery levels to meet social and envi-
ronmental obligations. When prices are set to 
cover all the costs of an infrastructure proj-
ect, including the cost of capital, systems will 
likely be built out to serve all customers who 
are ready to pay the service cost. But policy 
makers may also want access to infrastruc-
ture to be extended to other customers, both 
for equity and for environmental sustainabil-
ity. Price discrimination and subsidies can 
boost coverage and access.
Establish subsidies for social equity
The poor often pay higher prices per unit of, 
say, water or energy than do wealthier peo-
ple. Water vendors in poor urban areas may 
charge several times the unit cost of modern 
water service (Klein 2012). Price discrimina-
tion—charging rich people more and poor 
people less—is one way to restore equity. One 
method of price discrimination is to offer the 
poor a specially tailored price-quality mix. 
For example, poor people who can afford 
to buy water at times, but not regularly, can 
buy it by the bucket. Or the poor can be 
served by simpler pipelines. In other ways, 
too, the poor can be offered flexible service 
that is better than what they had before, yet 
not exactly what the rich receive. (Water 
that is not fully treated can still serve many 
common uses, such as flushing toilets. Poor 
people can make their water potable by boil-
ing it.) Finally, the poor can be given more 
flexible payment terms, for example, through 
the use of electronic cards. In pursuing these 
possibilities, it can help to let unconventional 
providers, from for-profit vendors to commu-
nity-based organizations, enter the market 
(Baker 2009). While these are clearly not the 
only solutions for improving access to water, 
they provide various second-best options to 
provide services of varying quality. 
Governments can also provide subsidies 
to improve equity—but one must recognize 
that many subsidies do not increase access to 
services. For example, subsidizing an existing 
utility may help the better-off people who are 
already connected, but no one else (Komi-
ves et al. 2005; Estache and de Rus 2000). 
Accordingly, policy makers should focus dis-
cussions of subsidies on policies to expand 
access. They should target subsidies to poor 
people, either by conducting means testing (as 
in Chile’s water subsidy system), by target-
ing areas where the poor tend to live, or by 
offering lifeline rates (for reduced service at 
a reduced price). Lifeline rates raise an objec-
tion, though, because they can benefit people 
at any income level. Such objections are a 
reminder that subsidies require careful design. 
Basing them on quantity or consumption does 
not necessarily promote equity. A study of 26 
quantity-based subsidy cases in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America suggested that 24 were 
regressive, and that where coverage is not uni-
versal, connection subsidies may be a solution 
for reaching the poor (Komives et al. 2005). A 
noteworthy innovation in enhancing access to 
services for the urban poor is through output-
based aid, which links the payment of public 
funds or subsidies to the achievement of spec-
ified outputs and actual service performance 
(box 3.6).
Establish subsidies for environmental 
sustainability
Public transport can mitigate urban conges-
tion: a bus carrying 40 or 50 people takes up 
no more road space than two or three private 
cars. And public transport pollutes less, gen-
erating fewer greenhouse emissions. Yet in 
many countries, public transport is unafford-
able for the poor. For example, households 
in Kampala pay $13 a month for fares, about 
8 percent of their budget (World Bank 
2012c). Although that is consistent with 
global estimates of what people pay for trans-
port, it is unaffordable for the poor. To use 
public transport, the poorest 20 percent of 
households would need to spend 41 percent 
of their income on fares. Similar patterns 
appear in other cities worldwide.
The predictable result is that in many 
developing countries, urban public transport 
ridership is low. In cities where transport fares 
do not cover the full cost of service provi-
sion, transport subsidies can boost ridership. 
But to succeed, such subsidies require strong 
contractual agreements and regulation. The 
problem is that even after fares are decoupled 
from full operating costs, transport provid-
ers still need assurance that their costs will be 
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has been working with Uganda’s National 
Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), 
the autonomous public provider of water 
and sanitation to the country’s large towns, 
to enforce performance contracts. Renewed 
every three years, the contracts include spe-
cific indicators that NWSC must meet at 
the end of the period (Banerjee and Morella 
2011]). However, Uganda’s reform has not yet 
attempted to promote cost recovery through 
user fees. The NWSC charges a uniform fee 
across all towns and customer categories 
served. In 2010, the fee covered production 
costs in only 6 of 23 areas served.
For some services such as urban transport, 
competition has to be regulated, because free 
market entry could undermine safety stan-
dards. The “penny wars” of Bogotá are an 
interesting example. Before a bus rapid tran-
sit system called TransMilenio was intro-
duced in 2000, about 30,000–35,000 buses 
were operating in the city (Hook 2005). The 
government granted nonexclusive permits to 
the route operators, with whom bus own-
ers were affiliated. The bus owners in turn 
charged their drivers fixed rents. The drivers’ 
revenue thus depended directly on how many 
fares they collected. Cutthroat competition 
ensued, with unsafe results: drivers had a 
strong incentive to speed, cut people off, and 
carry too many passengers. The introduction 
of TransMilenio, together with a new regu-
latory framework, eliminated these “penny 
wars.” The new framework included bid-
ding for all parts of the service, from routes 
to infrastructure. TransMilenio allocates the 
market to operators according to their qual-
ity, among other factors, and it pays them 
by the kilometer, assuring them of a certain 
amount regardless of their passenger load 
(World Bank 2013a). 
Direct competition may also not be fea-
sible in sectors that naturally favor monopo-
lies. Much of a city’s networked infrastruc-
ture falls in this category: its duplication 
tends to be inefficient. A single network, 
fully built out, can often underbid any com-
petitor (Klein 2012). Canada’s cities are one 
example of a natural monopoly superseding 
market competition. Water utilities would at 
first compete to supply firms and households 
in a given market by laying separate pipe-
lines. Then all the providers but one would 
fade away. In other cases, a monopoly pro-
vider started and was not challenged, either 
because competitors could not undercut it or 
because entry was forbidden by law. Natu-
ral monopolies can also appear in exclusive 
locations, such as airports and central metro 
stations.
Yet monopolies can abuse their market 
power, charging prices that are too high to 
be socially acceptable. Such prices can also 
make economies less productive and less 
competitive. So how can policy allow prices 
to cover costs while ensuring that prices 
stay close to costs, as opposed to fattening a 
monopoly with excessive profits?
Auctioning service franchises
Regulation can closely mimic the effects of 
competitive pricing even where monopolies 
exist. City leaders can auction the right to 
provide a service for a certain period, moving 
away from a monopolistic price and closer to 
the price that would arise from competition. 
Firms that lose at auction exit that particular 
market. If it is possible to put such a monop-
oly franchise up for auction fairly frequently 
based on the lowest price, the auction will act 
like a market to set prices.
Many cities, including Bogotá, London, 
and Santiago, auction bus routes, assigning 
operators to predefined itineraries. Santiago 
awards five-year contracts using criteria that 
include the fare offered by the bidder, along 
with quality variables. Before the auctions 
began, during a period of deregulation, bus 
fares had risen; with the auctions, the fares 
came back down. Where possible, franchise 
auctions repeated at intervals of one to three 
years can make price regulation essentially 
unnecessary. Such auctions have been used 
not only in bus transport but also in waste 
management. If a company loses a franchise, 
its assets—buses, garbage trucks—can be 
deployed elsewhere.
Public policy can set service prices below 
cost-recovery levels to meet social and envi-
ronmental obligations. When prices are set to 
cover all the costs of an infrastructure proj-
ect, including the cost of capital, systems will 
likely be built out to serve all customers who 
are ready to pay the service cost. But policy 
makers may also want access to infrastruc-
ture to be extended to other customers, both 
for equity and for environmental sustainabil-
ity. Price discrimination and subsidies can 
boost coverage and access.
Establish subsidies for social equity
The poor often pay higher prices per unit of, 
say, water or energy than do wealthier peo-
ple. Water vendors in poor urban areas may 
charge several times the unit cost of modern 
water service (Klein 2012). Price discrimina-
tion—charging rich people more and poor 
people less—is one way to restore equity. One 
method of price discrimination is to offer the 
poor a specially tailored price-quality mix. 
For example, poor people who can afford 
to buy water at times, but not regularly, can 
buy it by the bucket. Or the poor can be 
served by simpler pipelines. In other ways, 
too, the poor can be offered flexible service 
that is better than what they had before, yet 
not exactly what the rich receive. (Water 
that is not fully treated can still serve many 
common uses, such as flushing toilets. Poor 
people can make their water potable by boil-
ing it.) Finally, the poor can be given more 
flexible payment terms, for example, through 
the use of electronic cards. In pursuing these 
possibilities, it can help to let unconventional 
providers, from for-profit vendors to commu-
nity-based organizations, enter the market 
(Baker 2009). While these are clearly not the 
only solutions for improving access to water, 
they provide various second-best options to 
provide services of varying quality. 
Governments can also provide subsidies 
to improve equity—but one must recognize 
that many subsidies do not increase access to 
services. For example, subsidizing an existing 
utility may help the better-off people who are 
already connected, but no one else (Komi-
ves et al. 2005; Estache and de Rus 2000). 
Accordingly, policy makers should focus dis-
cussions of subsidies on policies to expand 
access. They should target subsidies to poor 
people, either by conducting means testing (as 
in Chile’s water subsidy system), by target-
ing areas where the poor tend to live, or by 
offering lifeline rates (for reduced service at 
a reduced price). Lifeline rates raise an objec-
tion, though, because they can benefit people 
at any income level. Such objections are a 
reminder that subsidies require careful design. 
Basing them on quantity or consumption does 
not necessarily promote equity. A study of 26 
quantity-based subsidy cases in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America suggested that 24 were 
regressive, and that where coverage is not uni-
versal, connection subsidies may be a solution 
for reaching the poor (Komives et al. 2005). A 
noteworthy innovation in enhancing access to 
services for the urban poor is through output-
based aid, which links the payment of public 
funds or subsidies to the achievement of spec-
ified outputs and actual service performance 
(box 3.6).
Establish subsidies for environmental 
sustainability
Public transport can mitigate urban conges-
tion: a bus carrying 40 or 50 people takes up 
no more road space than two or three private 
cars. And public transport pollutes less, gen-
erating fewer greenhouse emissions. Yet in 
many countries, public transport is unafford-
able for the poor. For example, households 
in Kampala pay $13 a month for fares, about 
8 percent of their budget (World Bank 
2012c). Although that is consistent with 
global estimates of what people pay for trans-
port, it is unaffordable for the poor. To use 
public transport, the poorest 20 percent of 
households would need to spend 41 percent 
of their income on fares. Similar patterns 
appear in other cities worldwide.
The predictable result is that in many 
developing countries, urban public transport 
ridership is low. In cities where transport fares 
do not cover the full cost of service provi-
sion, transport subsidies can boost ridership. 
But to succeed, such subsidies require strong 
contractual agreements and regulation. The 
problem is that even after fares are decoupled 
from full operating costs, transport provid-
ers still need assurance that their costs will be 
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met by revenues. Cities such as Bogotá, Curi-
tiba (Brazil), London, and Seoul have solved 
the problem with gross-cost contracts, which 
assure operators that their revenues will 
be based on performance, not on fare box 
collections (or not directly so). To cover costs 
fully, public agencies then seek other sources 
of revenue. Transport systems around the 
world vary widely in the share of operating 
costs recovered through fares. In a sample of 
20 public transit systems, only 5 fully covered 
their costs through fares. In New York City, 
35 percent of costs were recovered through 
fares; in Mexico City, 40 percent (figure 3.4). 
Connecting cities 
Connections—between and within cities—
benefit producers and consumers, both in 
urban and rural areas. They give producers 
access to input (including labor) and output 
markets. They give consumers options and, 
in many cases, better prices. And connections 
provide cities and rural areas with new eco-
nomic opportunities. But policy makers who 
envision better transport connections for cit-
ies and neighborhoods face difficult choices. 
With limited resources, they cannot invest in 
everything. It is hard to know which new or 
improved connections will yield the highest 
returns over time. 
Setting priorities for connective invest-
ment means picking winners and losers in the 
short run, but in the long run, thinking about 
priorities can make a vast difference for cit-
ies, surrounding rural areas, and even coun-
tries. To identify the most effective additions 
and improvements to the networks connect-
ing cities and neighborhoods, policy makers 
can take the steps described in the following 
three subsections.
Value the city’s external and internal 
connections
For external connections to other cities and 
rural areas, policy makers can compare 
transport costs—and the density, quality, and 
capacity of roads, railways, waterways, and 
the like—with data from similar places. In 
this way, they can determine where improve-
ment is most needed. 
Systematically disaggregating transport 
costs can identify bottlenecks and reveal 
opportunities for infrastructure improve-
ments that yield high dividends. A survey of 
truckers in India showed that transport costs 
were highest near large cities and their sur-
rounding rural and peri-urban areas, a pat-
tern similar to that found in Brazil and Viet-
nam. Freight rates for metropolitan transport 
in India, defined as trips shorter than 100 
kilometers, averaged as high as Rs 5.2 per 
ton-kilometer ($0.12)—twice the national 
average of Rs 2.6, and more than five times 
the cost of such trips in the United States 
(figure 3.5).
Why are India’s metropolitan freight trans-
port costs so much higher than its long-haul 
FIGURE 3.4 Ratio of public transit fares to 
operating costs in a sample of large cities
Source: World Bank 2013a.
Note: The numbers in this chart relate to bus and metro systems oper-
ated by public entities or large corporate entities. A weighted average 
was based on ridership across modes. Small private operators were not 
included because data were lacking.
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FIGURE 3.5 Costs of moving freight in India
Source: World Bank 2013b.
BOX 3.6 Using output-based aid in urban projects
The people most affected by the lack of access to basic 
services in urban areas are the poor, who often obtain 
essential services such as drinking water or electricity 
from informal vendors at substandard quality and at 
a high premium. Given the growing demand for basic 
services, the need to improve service delivery in low-
income urban settlements in increasing. One way to 
help the urban poor gain access to basic services is 
through output-based aid (OBA), which links the pay-
ment of public funds or subsidies to the achievement 
of specified outputs and actual service performance. 
Output definitions are designed to be as close to the 
desired development outcomes as is practicable and 
still within the scope of the service provider to deliver. 
Most urban OBA projects also require that a portion 
of the subsidy payment be withheld until sustainable 
service delivery has been demonstrated. 
Targeting the urban poor: A core component of OBA 
is explicit targeting of low-income households. For 
the urban poor, a major hurdle to obtaining basic ser-
vices is the high initial cost of access, such as a con-
nection fee for water supply. OBA can help reduce this 
barrier by paying a subsidy to bridge the gap between 
the actual cost of access and what users are willing 
and able to pay. Geographic targeting can be effective 
in cities where poor households tend to be concen-
trated in slums and informal communities; alternative 
targeting strategies subsidize only those services that 
the nonpoor are less likely to use, or target beneficia-
ries based on their income or poverty level. 
Risk transfer and access to finance: In OBA schemes, 
payment on delivery of specific outputs shifts perfor-
mance risk to service providers, which can be public, 
private, or nongovernmental organizations. Since ser-
vice providers are not paid the subsidy in full until 
they deliver outputs, they must have access to suffi-
cient finance for the initial investments, a significant 
risk and one of the biggest constraints to developing 
output- or results-based projects. When service pro-
viders cannot afford to finance the whole project in 
advance, phased subsidy payments against intermedi-
ate outputs have been used. On rare occasions, small 
advance payments have been required for start-up 
costs and awareness campaigns. Most service provid-
ers meet prefinancing needs from internal cash flows 
or externally sourced funds, or both. 
Designing OBA projects for the urban poor: A major 
obstacle to service provision in informal or slum set-
tings is the often precarious tenure status of slum 
dwellers; many are ineligible by law for formal house-
hold connections. Residents also have no guarantee 
that their dwellings will be safe from demolition. 
Service providers may lack legal or regulatory author-
ity to serve these informal areas and are also likely 
to lack incentives to do so for fear of low uptake or 
because they see it as a high-risk investment. For OBA 
schemes to succeed, they must have buy-in and com-
mitment from local governments. Furthermore, the 
government agency should have the administrative 
capacity to manage OBA contracts and subsidies.
Lessons learned and prospects for scaling-up or rep-
lication: Although OBA is not the solution for all 
urban service problems, it is a tool to help increase 
the access of urban poor households to basic services, 
particularly where the cost of service access is unaf-
fordable, and where service access needs to be built 
into urban project design. Land tenure issues must 
be addressed early on in the design stage. Active out-
reach and engagement with community-based orga-
nizations and political and community leaders is also 
key for successful project design and implementa-
tion. Incorporating OBA schemes into broader urban 
reform and slum upgrading programs can also be 
effective in bringing multiple stakeholders together, 
acting as a resource convener, and potentially playing 
an important role in shaping the urban development 
policy framework for service provision and service 
access for the urban poor.
Source: Adapted from Ahmed and Menzies 2012.
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met by revenues. Cities such as Bogotá, Curi-
tiba (Brazil), London, and Seoul have solved 
the problem with gross-cost contracts, which 
assure operators that their revenues will 
be based on performance, not on fare box 
collections (or not directly so). To cover costs 
fully, public agencies then seek other sources 
of revenue. Transport systems around the 
world vary widely in the share of operating 
costs recovered through fares. In a sample of 
20 public transit systems, only 5 fully covered 
their costs through fares. In New York City, 
35 percent of costs were recovered through 
fares; in Mexico City, 40 percent (figure 3.4). 
Connecting cities 
Connections—between and within cities—
benefit producers and consumers, both in 
urban and rural areas. They give producers 
access to input (including labor) and output 
markets. They give consumers options and, 
in many cases, better prices. And connections 
provide cities and rural areas with new eco-
nomic opportunities. But policy makers who 
envision better transport connections for cit-
ies and neighborhoods face difficult choices. 
With limited resources, they cannot invest in 
everything. It is hard to know which new or 
improved connections will yield the highest 
returns over time. 
Setting priorities for connective invest-
ment means picking winners and losers in the 
short run, but in the long run, thinking about 
priorities can make a vast difference for cit-
ies, surrounding rural areas, and even coun-
tries. To identify the most effective additions 
and improvements to the networks connect-
ing cities and neighborhoods, policy makers 
can take the steps described in the following 
three subsections.
Value the city’s external and internal 
connections
For external connections to other cities and 
rural areas, policy makers can compare 
transport costs—and the density, quality, and 
capacity of roads, railways, waterways, and 
the like—with data from similar places. In 
this way, they can determine where improve-
ment is most needed. 
Systematically disaggregating transport 
costs can identify bottlenecks and reveal 
opportunities for infrastructure improve-
ments that yield high dividends. A survey of 
truckers in India showed that transport costs 
were highest near large cities and their sur-
rounding rural and peri-urban areas, a pat-
tern similar to that found in Brazil and Viet-
nam. Freight rates for metropolitan transport 
in India, defined as trips shorter than 100 
kilometers, averaged as high as Rs 5.2 per 
ton-kilometer ($0.12)—twice the national 
average of Rs 2.6, and more than five times 
the cost of such trips in the United States 
(figure 3.5).
Why are India’s metropolitan freight trans-
port costs so much higher than its long-haul 
FIGURE 3.4 Ratio of public transit fares to 
operating costs in a sample of large cities
Source: World Bank 2013a.
Note: The numbers in this chart relate to bus and metro systems oper-
ated by public entities or large corporate entities. A weighted average 
was based on ridership across modes. Small private operators were not 
included because data were lacking.
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FIGURE 3.5 Costs of moving freight in India
Source: World Bank 2013b.
BOX 3.6 Using output-based aid in urban projects
The people most affected by the lack of access to basic 
services in urban areas are the poor, who often obtain 
essential services such as drinking water or electricity 
from informal vendors at substandard quality and at 
a high premium. Given the growing demand for basic 
services, the need to improve service delivery in low-
income urban settlements in increasing. One way to 
help the urban poor gain access to basic services is 
through output-based aid (OBA), which links the pay-
ment of public funds or subsidies to the achievement 
of specified outputs and actual service performance. 
Output definitions are designed to be as close to the 
desired development outcomes as is practicable and 
still within the scope of the service provider to deliver. 
Most urban OBA projects also require that a portion 
of the subsidy payment be withheld until sustainable 
service delivery has been demonstrated. 
Targeting the urban poor: A core component of OBA 
is explicit targeting of low-income households. For 
the urban poor, a major hurdle to obtaining basic ser-
vices is the high initial cost of access, such as a con-
nection fee for water supply. OBA can help reduce this 
barrier by paying a subsidy to bridge the gap between 
the actual cost of access and what users are willing 
and able to pay. Geographic targeting can be effective 
in cities where poor households tend to be concen-
trated in slums and informal communities; alternative 
targeting strategies subsidize only those services that 
the nonpoor are less likely to use, or target beneficia-
ries based on their income or poverty level. 
Risk transfer and access to finance: In OBA schemes, 
payment on delivery of specific outputs shifts perfor-
mance risk to service providers, which can be public, 
private, or nongovernmental organizations. Since ser-
vice providers are not paid the subsidy in full until 
they deliver outputs, they must have access to suffi-
cient finance for the initial investments, a significant 
risk and one of the biggest constraints to developing 
output- or results-based projects. When service pro-
viders cannot afford to finance the whole project in 
advance, phased subsidy payments against intermedi-
ate outputs have been used. On rare occasions, small 
advance payments have been required for start-up 
costs and awareness campaigns. Most service provid-
ers meet prefinancing needs from internal cash flows 
or externally sourced funds, or both. 
Designing OBA projects for the urban poor: A major 
obstacle to service provision in informal or slum set-
tings is the often precarious tenure status of slum 
dwellers; many are ineligible by law for formal house-
hold connections. Residents also have no guarantee 
that their dwellings will be safe from demolition. 
Service providers may lack legal or regulatory author-
ity to serve these informal areas and are also likely 
to lack incentives to do so for fear of low uptake or 
because they see it as a high-risk investment. For OBA 
schemes to succeed, they must have buy-in and com-
mitment from local governments. Furthermore, the 
government agency should have the administrative 
capacity to manage OBA contracts and subsidies.
Lessons learned and prospects for scaling-up or rep-
lication: Although OBA is not the solution for all 
urban service problems, it is a tool to help increase 
the access of urban poor households to basic services, 
particularly where the cost of service access is unaf-
fordable, and where service access needs to be built 
into urban project design. Land tenure issues must 
be addressed early on in the design stage. Active out-
reach and engagement with community-based orga-
nizations and political and community leaders is also 
key for successful project design and implementa-
tion. Incorporating OBA schemes into broader urban 
reform and slum upgrading programs can also be 
effective in bringing multiple stakeholders together, 
acting as a resource convener, and potentially playing 
an important role in shaping the urban development 
policy framework for service provision and service 
access for the urban poor.
Source: Adapted from Ahmed and Menzies 2012.
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costs? One reason is the use of smaller, older 
trucks on metropolitan routes. Another is 
the higher share of empty backhauls (truck-
ers returning empty) on metropolitan routes. 
Finally, trucks on metropolitan routes clock 
about 25,000 kilometers annually, just a 
fourth of what they need to be economically 
viable. To improve coordination and reduce 
the cost of metropolitan freight movements, 
trucking firms could adopt logistics manage-
ment systems; they could collaborate or con-
solidate with competitors; or they could form 
trucking associations. If India’s high freight 
costs are not reined in, then they will affect 
national economic development, as happened 
in Vietnam, which, like India, has large 
concentrations of economic activity in and 
around metropolitan areas.
Alternatively, policy makers can identify 
possible transport cost reductions and con-
nectivity gains that reflect the city’s desired 
mix of economic activities and extent of spe-
cialization. In Colombia, lowering transport 
costs along the country’s key trade corridors 
can enhance competitiveness for its cities and 
for the nation. For example, transporting 
freight by road from Bogotá to the Atlantic 
coast costs about $94 a ton while maritime 
transport from the Colombian coast to the 
United States costs about $75 a ton. High 
domestic transport costs undermine the com-
petitiveness of goods produced in Colom-
bia’s largest cities, especially compared with 
other large cities around the world. Reduc-
ing domestic transport costs by 12 percent 
could lead to an increase in exports of about 
9 percent.
For internal connections that link people 
with jobs, it is important to identify the prob-
lems: Are gridlock and lack of adequate pub-
lic transport deterring residents from working 
outside their immediate neighborhoods (mak-
ing labor markets inefficient)? Conversely, are 
long commuting times or high fares forcing 
residents to live in crowded slums so that they 
can walk to work? A city that faces one or 
both of these challenges needs a plan for a 
better transport system, including a desired 
mix of transportation modes. The plan must 
balance two main objectives: increasing 
the supply of affordable transport options 
and ensuring that congestion and pollution 
remain within acceptable limits.
Coordinate among transport options 
and with land use
As discussed earlier, policy makers must 
systematically coordinate transport plans 
with land use policies and related infra-
structure plans. Although each situation is 
unique, it is important to ensure that trans-
port options are consistent with affordabil-
ity. In Uganda for example, public transport 
is unaffordable to many at current income 
levels. Household survey data suggest that 64 
percent of urban dwellers walk to work, and 
the share is as high as 70 percent in Kampala 
(figure 3.6). As cities in Uganda expand their 
spatial footprints, lack of viable commuting 
alternatives to walking severely limits labor 
market opportunities for people who live fur-
ther away from economic centers and may 
even exacerbate slum formation, because 
many people will trade off housing quality to 
be close to jobs. 
Typically, income determines transport 
choice. In Addis Ababa, 70 percent of trips are 
by walking, with an average distance walked 
of 5 kilometers; public transport is estimated 
to cost 3–37 percent of household income. In 
Nairobi, 48 percent of trips are by walking 
or other forms of nonmotorized transport, 
and the average trip is 4 kilometers; the poor 
pay 34 percent of their income on transport. 
And in Dar es Salaam, the average distance 
walked is 2.2 kilometers and the share of 
nonmotorized transport is 45 percent, with 
transport expenditures for the poor account-
ing for 53 percent of income (World Bank 
2013a). These patterns are typical through-
out Africa. Another challenge here is that 
although most (poor) people walk, hardly any 
facilities and safety standards are available 
to protect pedestrian road users. Improving 
sidewalks, streetlights, and other measures to 
protect pedestrian users should be important 
in an urban transport strategy. 
Despite the challenges, policy makers 
can encourage the use of public transport 
and increase the geographic scope of the 
labor market. In Brazil, for example, the 
government requires formal sector employers 
to provide transit tickets to their employees 
through a system called vale transporte (VT); 
firms then deduct the VT expenditures from 
taxable income. Although it applies only 
to the formal sector, the VT system effec-
tively spreads the cost of transport subsidies 
between employers and the government.
In most rapidly growing cities, a useful 
mobility plan needs to make way for multiple 
options for shared travel. Metro rail systems 
and bus systems are the most common among 
them. There may also be multiple operators 
managing each of these systems. It is impor-
tant that these are well coordinated and feed 
into each other rather than duplicate each 
other. Therefore, an important regulatory 
role will be to coordinate service planning. 
Leverage investments that will yield the 
highest returns for cities collectively 
and individually
National leaders must identify the most effi-
cient investments in connections among all 
the cities and rural areas in a country. Where 
is demand for the expansion of intercity 
and regional infrastructure and transport 
services highest? Which corridors are iden-
tified through spatial analysis and simula-
tions as most central to the network, so that 
improvements to them will yield the highest 
returns for efficiency and equity? Similarly, 
leaders must find ways to make transport 
within cities affordable while limiting con-
gestion and pollution. This challenge is 
particularly important for infrastructure 
such as roads, where user charges alone can-
not recover costs (box 3.7). Investments to 
increase capacity should be combined and 
aligned with other policies. Targeted sub-
sidies, though not effective for all purposes 
or in all contexts, can sometimes be used 
to make transport more efficient as well as 
more equitable and safer for the environ-
ment. And other fiscal and regulatory tools 
can be used to manage demand for particu-
lar transport modes.
Financing cities
Having identified priorities for planning and 
connecting, policy makers confront the prob-
lem of financing those investments. The main 
difficulty is the need for money up front. 
Large capital outlays are needed to provide 
infrastructure and services, especially those 
that are not fully in demand now but will 
become so as urbanization picks up speed 
(Mohan 2009). The large capital investments 
that are needed in the construction phase, 
whether for transport, water provision, solid 
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FIGURE 3.6 Modes for commuting to work in Uganda’s urban areas 
Sources: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2010; World Bank 2013a. 
Note: A boda-boda is a bicycle taxi.
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costs? One reason is the use of smaller, older 
trucks on metropolitan routes. Another is 
the higher share of empty backhauls (truck-
ers returning empty) on metropolitan routes. 
Finally, trucks on metropolitan routes clock 
about 25,000 kilometers annually, just a 
fourth of what they need to be economically 
viable. To improve coordination and reduce 
the cost of metropolitan freight movements, 
trucking firms could adopt logistics manage-
ment systems; they could collaborate or con-
solidate with competitors; or they could form 
trucking associations. If India’s high freight 
costs are not reined in, then they will affect 
national economic development, as happened 
in Vietnam, which, like India, has large 
concentrations of economic activity in and 
around metropolitan areas.
Alternatively, policy makers can identify 
possible transport cost reductions and con-
nectivity gains that reflect the city’s desired 
mix of economic activities and extent of spe-
cialization. In Colombia, lowering transport 
costs along the country’s key trade corridors 
can enhance competitiveness for its cities and 
for the nation. For example, transporting 
freight by road from Bogotá to the Atlantic 
coast costs about $94 a ton while maritime 
transport from the Colombian coast to the 
United States costs about $75 a ton. High 
domestic transport costs undermine the com-
petitiveness of goods produced in Colom-
bia’s largest cities, especially compared with 
other large cities around the world. Reduc-
ing domestic transport costs by 12 percent 
could lead to an increase in exports of about 
9 percent.
For internal connections that link people 
with jobs, it is important to identify the prob-
lems: Are gridlock and lack of adequate pub-
lic transport deterring residents from working 
outside their immediate neighborhoods (mak-
ing labor markets inefficient)? Conversely, are 
long commuting times or high fares forcing 
residents to live in crowded slums so that they 
can walk to work? A city that faces one or 
both of these challenges needs a plan for a 
better transport system, including a desired 
mix of transportation modes. The plan must 
balance two main objectives: increasing 
the supply of affordable transport options 
and ensuring that congestion and pollution 
remain within acceptable limits.
Coordinate among transport options 
and with land use
As discussed earlier, policy makers must 
systematically coordinate transport plans 
with land use policies and related infra-
structure plans. Although each situation is 
unique, it is important to ensure that trans-
port options are consistent with affordabil-
ity. In Uganda for example, public transport 
is unaffordable to many at current income 
levels. Household survey data suggest that 64 
percent of urban dwellers walk to work, and 
the share is as high as 70 percent in Kampala 
(figure 3.6). As cities in Uganda expand their 
spatial footprints, lack of viable commuting 
alternatives to walking severely limits labor 
market opportunities for people who live fur-
ther away from economic centers and may 
even exacerbate slum formation, because 
many people will trade off housing quality to 
be close to jobs. 
Typically, income determines transport 
choice. In Addis Ababa, 70 percent of trips are 
by walking, with an average distance walked 
of 5 kilometers; public transport is estimated 
to cost 3–37 percent of household income. In 
Nairobi, 48 percent of trips are by walking 
or other forms of nonmotorized transport, 
and the average trip is 4 kilometers; the poor 
pay 34 percent of their income on transport. 
And in Dar es Salaam, the average distance 
walked is 2.2 kilometers and the share of 
nonmotorized transport is 45 percent, with 
transport expenditures for the poor account-
ing for 53 percent of income (World Bank 
2013a). These patterns are typical through-
out Africa. Another challenge here is that 
although most (poor) people walk, hardly any 
facilities and safety standards are available 
to protect pedestrian road users. Improving 
sidewalks, streetlights, and other measures to 
protect pedestrian users should be important 
in an urban transport strategy. 
Despite the challenges, policy makers 
can encourage the use of public transport 
and increase the geographic scope of the 
labor market. In Brazil, for example, the 
government requires formal sector employers 
to provide transit tickets to their employees 
through a system called vale transporte (VT); 
firms then deduct the VT expenditures from 
taxable income. Although it applies only 
to the formal sector, the VT system effec-
tively spreads the cost of transport subsidies 
between employers and the government.
In most rapidly growing cities, a useful 
mobility plan needs to make way for multiple 
options for shared travel. Metro rail systems 
and bus systems are the most common among 
them. There may also be multiple operators 
managing each of these systems. It is impor-
tant that these are well coordinated and feed 
into each other rather than duplicate each 
other. Therefore, an important regulatory 
role will be to coordinate service planning. 
Leverage investments that will yield the 
highest returns for cities collectively 
and individually
National leaders must identify the most effi-
cient investments in connections among all 
the cities and rural areas in a country. Where 
is demand for the expansion of intercity 
and regional infrastructure and transport 
services highest? Which corridors are iden-
tified through spatial analysis and simula-
tions as most central to the network, so that 
improvements to them will yield the highest 
returns for efficiency and equity? Similarly, 
leaders must find ways to make transport 
within cities affordable while limiting con-
gestion and pollution. This challenge is 
particularly important for infrastructure 
such as roads, where user charges alone can-
not recover costs (box 3.7). Investments to 
increase capacity should be combined and 
aligned with other policies. Targeted sub-
sidies, though not effective for all purposes 
or in all contexts, can sometimes be used 
to make transport more efficient as well as 
more equitable and safer for the environ-
ment. And other fiscal and regulatory tools 
can be used to manage demand for particu-
lar transport modes.
Financing cities
Having identified priorities for planning and 
connecting, policy makers confront the prob-
lem of financing those investments. The main 
difficulty is the need for money up front. 
Large capital outlays are needed to provide 
infrastructure and services, especially those 
that are not fully in demand now but will 
become so as urbanization picks up speed 
(Mohan 2009). The large capital investments 
that are needed in the construction phase, 
whether for transport, water provision, solid 
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FIGURE 3.6 Modes for commuting to work in Uganda’s urban areas 
Sources: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2010; World Bank 2013a. 
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waste management, or sewage removal and 
treatment, are likely to far exceed the bud-
get of any city government. But financing can 
become more sustainable through taxes real-
ized with increased economic growth, and 
with the ability of policy makers to leverage 
land markets and approach local currency 
debt markets.
How do policy makers bridge the gap 
between readily available resources and 
investment needs? What sources should they 
tap? To start with, the government can estab-
lish its creditworthiness by first securing 
cash flows from user fees and taxes and by 
leveraging the value of land in several ways, 
including through taxes. Only after that can 
the government begin to borrow money and 
attract private investment, making finance 
easier. Whether financing is public or pri-
vate generally does not make the difference 
between successful and struggling cities. But 
there are at least two situations in which pri-
vate financing may be the preferred course: 
when the government sees public-private 
partnerships as a way to improve efficiency in 
service provision, and when the government 
suffers from severe credit constraints that 
prevent it from obtaining credit for improve-
ments to publicly run systems.
Value and develop creditworthiness
Without domestic credit markets, and often 
lacking the transparency needed in munici-
pal bond markets, many city governments in 
developing countries cannot access long-term 
credit. Experience shows that subnational 
debt can work when clear regulations are in 
place to guide the issuance of debt, risks from 
borrowing are appropriately managed, and 
the conditions for subnational governments 
to issue debt (including the purpose, type, 
and amount of debt that can be issued) are 
clearly set forth.2
To make the issuance of debt to cities more 
transparent, Colombia has published “traffic 
light” ratings of the capacity of individual 
local governments to pay, with red, green, 
and yellow signals reflecting a combination 
of liquidity and solvency indicators. To rate 
municipalities’ subnational debt, a red light 
identifies those whose ratio of interest to 
operational savings exceeds 40 percent and 
whose ratio of debt stock to current revenues 
exceeds 80 percent. Red-light municipalities 
cannot borrow. Green-light municipalities 
can. Yellow-light municipalities can borrow 
only after obtaining the approval of the cen-
tral government.
Creditworthiness extends beyond local 
governments to their utility companies. In 
Kenya, the Water Services Regulatory Board 
calculated and published utility shadow 
credit ratings for 43 water service providers 
in 2011 and found only 13 providers to have 
investment grade ratings.
Smaller cit ies can seek short- and 
medium-term loans from higher levels of 
government and pool their credit. Thus, 
governments of smaller cities can use bond 
banks, loan pools, and guarantees to reduce 
lenders’ risks. Two common types of munici-
pal bonds are general obligation bonds, debt 
instruments secured by general purpose 
municipal revenue such as property taxes, 
and revenue bonds, debt instruments secured 
by the revenue generated from specific 
municipal assets (such as ports, toll roads, 
and water and wastewater utilities), with or 
without recourse to general revenues. Rev-
enue bonds are particularly useful in cases 
where bond markets are not well developed. 
Colombia, India, Malaysia, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, the  Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Africa, and República Boli-
variana de Venezuela provide examples of 
countries where cities have raised funds from 
municipal bonds.
In the absence of a well-developed bond 
market, financial intermediaries in diverse 
forms play important roles in mobilizing 
resources for urban infrastructure financing. 
In Colombia, a successful financial inter-
mediary is FINDETER (Financiadora de 
Desarrollo Territorial S.A.), a government 
company created to finance regional urban 
infrastructure projects. More than 90 per-
cent owned by the national government, with 
the remainder owned by the regions (depart-
ments), FINDETER provides resources for 
financial intermediaries who assign them to 
regional authorities. It has received funds 
from multilateral banks and has consistently 
received high credit ratings (Samad, Lozano-
Gracia, and Panman 2012). Still, none of 
these methods can replace a creditworthy 
local government.
Coordinate public and private finance 
using clear and consistent rules 
When city governments have constrained 
access to credit, private investors may step 
in to fill the gap. There are many types of 
partnership structures, with each one trans-
ferring different levels of risk to the private 
sector. They include service contracts, man-
agement contracts, leases, and privatization. 
Under any of these structures, property rights 
must first be clearly defined so that credi-
tors need not depend on the government’s 
promises. Then a PPP, with private sector 
selection mechanisms based on the market 
and on cost-benefit analyses, can improve 
project selection and ensure project sustain-
ability while adding sources of infrastruc-
ture financing. Nevertheless, PPPs are no 
magic bullet: they require commitments to 
sustainable cost-covering tariffs or equiva-
lent tax revenues. They cannot stand in for 
good financial management or good project 
evaluation. Clear rules must dictate the pro-
cedures, the requirements, the approvals, and 
the institutional responsibilities of the entities 
involved, and the allocation of risk. 
Consider Ghana, where such rules were 
not in place. In 2002, the government of 
Ghana initiated a process to encourage sev-
eral PPPs in the urban water sector, but the 
partnerships succumbed to lack of transpar-
ency and accusations of corruption in the 
selection process. In contrast, Chile put in 
place a clear and transparent procurement 
process, focusing on public awareness and a 
learning-by-doing approach that allowed for 
adjustments along the way. This process led 
to the award of 21 road projects on a compet-
itive basis between 1993 and 2001 (Hodge 
2006). The bidding started with smaller proj-
ects to test the market while also minimizing 
the risk for the private sector. More than 40 
Chilean and international companies from 10 
countries participated in the bidding through 
27 consortia. 
To successfully implement PPPs, city lead-
ers will have to consider strengthening pub-
lic sector capacity, laying out the appropri-
ate legal and sector framework, promoting 
BOX 3.7 Pricing and funding through ancillary services
A number of infrastructure services cannot be 
charged for easily. Roads are a prime example. Here 
it may be possible to use ancillary services to pro-
vide revenues for the venture. For example, a toll 
road franchise may be combined with the right to 
rent out service concessions for gas stations as well 
as restaurant or hotel services at rest stops along the 
highway. Going further, it is possible to provide a toll 
road company with rights to real estate development 
along parts, or all, of the highway. When granting a 
highway concession, the full package of rights and 
obligations can be auctioned to obtain the best price 
for the whole package. An example is airport fran-
chises, where the rights to concession services (shops, 
restaurants, and so forth) at the airport are a major 
source of revenue.
Such add-ons to the basic infrastructure service 
can make funding possible, while avoiding recourse 
to the regular government budget. Such add-ons can 
make an infrastructure service independent of fiscal 
processes and can help insulate the service provider 
from undue political influence.
At the same time, there is danger of excessive sub-
sidization, particularly subsidization that makes it 
possible for economically unviable projects to go for-
ward. Hence, cost-benefit analysis should routinely 
be used to ascertain that the infrastructure service is 
likely to be welfare enhancing.
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waste management, or sewage removal and 
treatment, are likely to far exceed the bud-
get of any city government. But financing can 
become more sustainable through taxes real-
ized with increased economic growth, and 
with the ability of policy makers to leverage 
land markets and approach local currency 
debt markets.
How do policy makers bridge the gap 
between readily available resources and 
investment needs? What sources should they 
tap? To start with, the government can estab-
lish its creditworthiness by first securing 
cash flows from user fees and taxes and by 
leveraging the value of land in several ways, 
including through taxes. Only after that can 
the government begin to borrow money and 
attract private investment, making finance 
easier. Whether financing is public or pri-
vate generally does not make the difference 
between successful and struggling cities. But 
there are at least two situations in which pri-
vate financing may be the preferred course: 
when the government sees public-private 
partnerships as a way to improve efficiency in 
service provision, and when the government 
suffers from severe credit constraints that 
prevent it from obtaining credit for improve-
ments to publicly run systems.
Value and develop creditworthiness
Without domestic credit markets, and often 
lacking the transparency needed in munici-
pal bond markets, many city governments in 
developing countries cannot access long-term 
credit. Experience shows that subnational 
debt can work when clear regulations are in 
place to guide the issuance of debt, risks from 
borrowing are appropriately managed, and 
the conditions for subnational governments 
to issue debt (including the purpose, type, 
and amount of debt that can be issued) are 
clearly set forth.2
To make the issuance of debt to cities more 
transparent, Colombia has published “traffic 
light” ratings of the capacity of individual 
local governments to pay, with red, green, 
and yellow signals reflecting a combination 
of liquidity and solvency indicators. To rate 
municipalities’ subnational debt, a red light 
identifies those whose ratio of interest to 
operational savings exceeds 40 percent and 
whose ratio of debt stock to current revenues 
exceeds 80 percent. Red-light municipalities 
cannot borrow. Green-light municipalities 
can. Yellow-light municipalities can borrow 
only after obtaining the approval of the cen-
tral government.
Creditworthiness extends beyond local 
governments to their utility companies. In 
Kenya, the Water Services Regulatory Board 
calculated and published utility shadow 
credit ratings for 43 water service providers 
in 2011 and found only 13 providers to have 
investment grade ratings.
Smaller cit ies can seek short- and 
medium-term loans from higher levels of 
government and pool their credit. Thus, 
governments of smaller cities can use bond 
banks, loan pools, and guarantees to reduce 
lenders’ risks. Two common types of munici-
pal bonds are general obligation bonds, debt 
instruments secured by general purpose 
municipal revenue such as property taxes, 
and revenue bonds, debt instruments secured 
by the revenue generated from specific 
municipal assets (such as ports, toll roads, 
and water and wastewater utilities), with or 
without recourse to general revenues. Rev-
enue bonds are particularly useful in cases 
where bond markets are not well developed. 
Colombia, India, Malaysia, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, the  Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Africa, and República Boli-
variana de Venezuela provide examples of 
countries where cities have raised funds from 
municipal bonds.
In the absence of a well-developed bond 
market, financial intermediaries in diverse 
forms play important roles in mobilizing 
resources for urban infrastructure financing. 
In Colombia, a successful financial inter-
mediary is FINDETER (Financiadora de 
Desarrollo Territorial S.A.), a government 
company created to finance regional urban 
infrastructure projects. More than 90 per-
cent owned by the national government, with 
the remainder owned by the regions (depart-
ments), FINDETER provides resources for 
financial intermediaries who assign them to 
regional authorities. It has received funds 
from multilateral banks and has consistently 
received high credit ratings (Samad, Lozano-
Gracia, and Panman 2012). Still, none of 
these methods can replace a creditworthy 
local government.
Coordinate public and private finance 
using clear and consistent rules 
When city governments have constrained 
access to credit, private investors may step 
in to fill the gap. There are many types of 
partnership structures, with each one trans-
ferring different levels of risk to the private 
sector. They include service contracts, man-
agement contracts, leases, and privatization. 
Under any of these structures, property rights 
must first be clearly defined so that credi-
tors need not depend on the government’s 
promises. Then a PPP, with private sector 
selection mechanisms based on the market 
and on cost-benefit analyses, can improve 
project selection and ensure project sustain-
ability while adding sources of infrastruc-
ture financing. Nevertheless, PPPs are no 
magic bullet: they require commitments to 
sustainable cost-covering tariffs or equiva-
lent tax revenues. They cannot stand in for 
good financial management or good project 
evaluation. Clear rules must dictate the pro-
cedures, the requirements, the approvals, and 
the institutional responsibilities of the entities 
involved, and the allocation of risk. 
Consider Ghana, where such rules were 
not in place. In 2002, the government of 
Ghana initiated a process to encourage sev-
eral PPPs in the urban water sector, but the 
partnerships succumbed to lack of transpar-
ency and accusations of corruption in the 
selection process. In contrast, Chile put in 
place a clear and transparent procurement 
process, focusing on public awareness and a 
learning-by-doing approach that allowed for 
adjustments along the way. This process led 
to the award of 21 road projects on a compet-
itive basis between 1993 and 2001 (Hodge 
2006). The bidding started with smaller proj-
ects to test the market while also minimizing 
the risk for the private sector. More than 40 
Chilean and international companies from 10 
countries participated in the bidding through 
27 consortia. 
To successfully implement PPPs, city lead-
ers will have to consider strengthening pub-
lic sector capacity, laying out the appropri-
ate legal and sector framework, promoting 
BOX 3.7 Pricing and funding through ancillary services
A number of infrastructure services cannot be 
charged for easily. Roads are a prime example. Here 
it may be possible to use ancillary services to pro-
vide revenues for the venture. For example, a toll 
road franchise may be combined with the right to 
rent out service concessions for gas stations as well 
as restaurant or hotel services at rest stops along the 
highway. Going further, it is possible to provide a toll 
road company with rights to real estate development 
along parts, or all, of the highway. When granting a 
highway concession, the full package of rights and 
obligations can be auctioned to obtain the best price 
for the whole package. An example is airport fran-
chises, where the rights to concession services (shops, 
restaurants, and so forth) at the airport are a major 
source of revenue.
Such add-ons to the basic infrastructure service 
can make funding possible, while avoiding recourse 
to the regular government budget. Such add-ons can 
make an infrastructure service independent of fiscal 
processes and can help insulate the service provider 
from undue political influence.
At the same time, there is danger of excessive sub-
sidization, particularly subsidization that makes it 
possible for economically unviable projects to go for-
ward. Hence, cost-benefit analysis should routinely 
be used to ascertain that the infrastructure service is 
likely to be welfare enhancing.
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rigorous planning and risk assessment 
through feasibility studies, ensuring trans-
parent and competitive procurement, build-
ing strong monitoring systems, and allow-
ing flexibility for adapting to unpredictable 
events.
Leverage existing assets to develop new 
ones, linking both to land use planning
Land sales and leaseholds can provide initial 
capital for new infrastructure investments. 
Sales in Cairo, Istanbul, and Mumbai pro-
vide examples of the revenue potential of 
land auctions. For example:
•   In Cairo  in 2007,  the auction of 3,100 
hectares of desert land for a new town gen-
erated $3.12 billion, an amount 117 times 
greater than the country’s total urban 
property tax collections, and about a tenth 
the size of national government revenue. 
The proceeds were to be used to reimburse 
the costs of internal infrastructure and to 
build a connecting highway to Cairo’s ring 
road. 
•   In Istanbul in 2007, the auction of an old 
bus station and government building gen-
erated $1.5 billion, more than the city’s 
total 2005 fiscal expenditures and infra-
structure investments.
•   In Mumbai in 2006–07, the auction of 13 
hectares of land in the new financial cen-
ter—the Bandra-Kurla Complex—gener-
ated $1.2 billion. That was more than 10 
times the total 2005 fiscal spending of the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Develop-
ment Authority, and six times the total 
value of municipal bonds issued by all 
urban local bodies and local utilities in 
India in more than a decade. The proceeds 
were to be used primarily to finance proj-
ects identified by the Metropolitan Trans-
portation Plan.
Yet policy makers should recognize that 
all successful land-based financing instru-
ments require at least three kinds of rules to 
be in place. First are rules to assign and pro-
tect property rights. Second are institutions 
for the valuation and public dissemination 
of land values across various uses. Third is a 
strong legal framework, with a healthy judi-
cial system to handle disputes and oversee the 
land-based financing process. Furthermore, 
a single planning strategy should integrate 
land-based financing with urban land use 
planning. With developing land management 
institutions, identifying infrastructure needs 
and integrating planning across sectors are 
the first steps in securing financing, because 
investors will be able to better assess risks 
and see the city as a good investment. 
Managing decentralization
More generally, the financing of all local ser-
vices is challenging: while services are best 
delivered locally, the local tax base is often 
narrow. That is true not only for cities but for 
all subnational governments (SNGs), includ-
ing not only municipalities but also provin-
cial and state or regional governments. All 
poverty is “local”—and given their proximity 
to citizens, SNGs are often better suited than 
higher levels of government to address these 
challenges. First, they have an informational 
advantage that makes them more efficient in 
discerning citizens’ needs, which is particu-
larly relevant for beneficiary identification in 
poverty programs. SNGs can direct resources 
toward these needs (allocative efficiency) 
and can also provide some services more effi-
ciently than higher levels of government (pro-
ductive efficiency). Political decentralization 
also lowers the “barriers to entry” for differ-
ent groups of society, so they can more easily 
and directly participate in decision making 
(box 3.8). 
Reductions in poverty can only be 
achieved if the net fiscal incidence remains 
pro poor (Boex et al. 2006). That is, regres-
sivity of local revenue can be accepted as long 
as expenditures are progressive and lead to 
an overall positive incidence. That, however, 
also requires that the burden and benefit dis-
tribution of the tax system and public expen-
ditures as a whole be considered, which in 
turn requires coordination across all levels 
of government. But achieving this coordina-
tion is becoming harder in the current urban-
rural dynamics and now represents one of 
the challenges to achieving the MDG targets. 
As urbanization unfolds, the more populous 
areas acquire higher fiscal capacity (that is, 
their governments can generate more rev-
enue). That implies they have more resources 
available to address poverty issues. Absent 
any convergence effect, SNGs in rural areas 
will face continued or even higher resource 
constraints. And because poverty is concen-
trated in these areas, the gap between needs 
and the means to address them will increase. 
In any decentralized system, there are 
trade-offs to be faced. Decentralization of 
revenue-generating authority reduces the 
ability of central governments to redistribute. 
Decentralization of the spending authority 
implies that priority setting needs to be coor-
dinated among the different levels. This fail-
ure to coordinate can affect the capacity to 
establish a “level playing field” in countries 
through fiscal equalization. 
Decentralization also carries other risks: 
institutional capacity can be weak; special 
interests can capture government entities; 
and the poor and their priorities can be over-
looked. Political party systems and electoral 
rules greatly influence the service delivery pri-
orities of councilors, mayors, and governors, 
so services and resources may not always 
be directed to where the needs are greatest. 
Urban areas are, in principle, more attractive 
for “vote seekers” than rural areas, and that 
can create an undesirable expenditure bias. 
Moreover, urban and rural service delivery 
gaps may not coincide with territorial bound-
aries, making coordination all the more nec-
essary—and all the more difficult. 
Weighing the risks and advantages of 
decentralization is prudent—but countries 
often have no choice: several levels of gov-
ernment need to find ways to cooperate if 
the MDG goals are to be reached. Many 
examples from across the world underscore 
not only that effective policies can be crafted, 
but that they can be crafted and coordinated 
by various levels of government working 
together. 
Revenue challenges in rural areas
Because a large share of their population is 
poor, SNGs in rural areas have a relatively 
low fiscal capacity and are consequently 
more dependent on revenue transfers from 
higher levels of government. A large infor-
mal economy may further limit subnational 
taxation. Some rural governments can even 
be in a “transfer dependence trap,” because 
there is no linear relation between increased 
tax effort and the level of expenditures that 
can realistically be achieved—a dilemma that 
BOX 3.8 Key design issues of decentralization
The three elements of decentralization are adminis-
trative, fiscal, and political. Administrative, or expen-
diture, decentralization relates to expenditures and 
services assigned to subnational governments; fiscal, 
or revenue, decentralization is related to the sub-
national government’s own revenue, transfers, and 
debt; and political decentralization refers to elections 
and the delegation of authority, as well as citizen 
participation.
Countries are constantly adjusting and fine-tuning 
their intergovernmental relations. Given the several 
trade-offs that have to be faced, the three elements of 
decentralization constitute a never-ending balancing 
act. In fact, decentralization is a “moving target”—
there is no final model that countries can reach. What 
matters most is to fit the different design elements 
together coherently and avoid disjointed decision 
making.
The degree of fiscal, political, and administrative 
decentralization is not related to whether a country is 
federal or unitary. Relevant examples include unitary 
China, with about 76.5 percent of expenditure decen-
tralization (accountability, in turn, is upward toward 
the central level). In contrast, in federal Mexico, the 
degree of expenditure decentralization is about 46 
percent.
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rigorous planning and risk assessment 
through feasibility studies, ensuring trans-
parent and competitive procurement, build-
ing strong monitoring systems, and allow-
ing flexibility for adapting to unpredictable 
events.
Leverage existing assets to develop new 
ones, linking both to land use planning
Land sales and leaseholds can provide initial 
capital for new infrastructure investments. 
Sales in Cairo, Istanbul, and Mumbai pro-
vide examples of the revenue potential of 
land auctions. For example:
•   In Cairo  in 2007,  the auction of 3,100 
hectares of desert land for a new town gen-
erated $3.12 billion, an amount 117 times 
greater than the country’s total urban 
property tax collections, and about a tenth 
the size of national government revenue. 
The proceeds were to be used to reimburse 
the costs of internal infrastructure and to 
build a connecting highway to Cairo’s ring 
road. 
•   In Istanbul in 2007, the auction of an old 
bus station and government building gen-
erated $1.5 billion, more than the city’s 
total 2005 fiscal expenditures and infra-
structure investments.
•   In Mumbai in 2006–07, the auction of 13 
hectares of land in the new financial cen-
ter—the Bandra-Kurla Complex—gener-
ated $1.2 billion. That was more than 10 
times the total 2005 fiscal spending of the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Develop-
ment Authority, and six times the total 
value of municipal bonds issued by all 
urban local bodies and local utilities in 
India in more than a decade. The proceeds 
were to be used primarily to finance proj-
ects identified by the Metropolitan Trans-
portation Plan.
Yet policy makers should recognize that 
all successful land-based financing instru-
ments require at least three kinds of rules to 
be in place. First are rules to assign and pro-
tect property rights. Second are institutions 
for the valuation and public dissemination 
of land values across various uses. Third is a 
strong legal framework, with a healthy judi-
cial system to handle disputes and oversee the 
land-based financing process. Furthermore, 
a single planning strategy should integrate 
land-based financing with urban land use 
planning. With developing land management 
institutions, identifying infrastructure needs 
and integrating planning across sectors are 
the first steps in securing financing, because 
investors will be able to better assess risks 
and see the city as a good investment. 
Managing decentralization
More generally, the financing of all local ser-
vices is challenging: while services are best 
delivered locally, the local tax base is often 
narrow. That is true not only for cities but for 
all subnational governments (SNGs), includ-
ing not only municipalities but also provin-
cial and state or regional governments. All 
poverty is “local”—and given their proximity 
to citizens, SNGs are often better suited than 
higher levels of government to address these 
challenges. First, they have an informational 
advantage that makes them more efficient in 
discerning citizens’ needs, which is particu-
larly relevant for beneficiary identification in 
poverty programs. SNGs can direct resources 
toward these needs (allocative efficiency) 
and can also provide some services more effi-
ciently than higher levels of government (pro-
ductive efficiency). Political decentralization 
also lowers the “barriers to entry” for differ-
ent groups of society, so they can more easily 
and directly participate in decision making 
(box 3.8). 
Reductions in poverty can only be 
achieved if the net fiscal incidence remains 
pro poor (Boex et al. 2006). That is, regres-
sivity of local revenue can be accepted as long 
as expenditures are progressive and lead to 
an overall positive incidence. That, however, 
also requires that the burden and benefit dis-
tribution of the tax system and public expen-
ditures as a whole be considered, which in 
turn requires coordination across all levels 
of government. But achieving this coordina-
tion is becoming harder in the current urban-
rural dynamics and now represents one of 
the challenges to achieving the MDG targets. 
As urbanization unfolds, the more populous 
areas acquire higher fiscal capacity (that is, 
their governments can generate more rev-
enue). That implies they have more resources 
available to address poverty issues. Absent 
any convergence effect, SNGs in rural areas 
will face continued or even higher resource 
constraints. And because poverty is concen-
trated in these areas, the gap between needs 
and the means to address them will increase. 
In any decentralized system, there are 
trade-offs to be faced. Decentralization of 
revenue-generating authority reduces the 
ability of central governments to redistribute. 
Decentralization of the spending authority 
implies that priority setting needs to be coor-
dinated among the different levels. This fail-
ure to coordinate can affect the capacity to 
establish a “level playing field” in countries 
through fiscal equalization. 
Decentralization also carries other risks: 
institutional capacity can be weak; special 
interests can capture government entities; 
and the poor and their priorities can be over-
looked. Political party systems and electoral 
rules greatly influence the service delivery pri-
orities of councilors, mayors, and governors, 
so services and resources may not always 
be directed to where the needs are greatest. 
Urban areas are, in principle, more attractive 
for “vote seekers” than rural areas, and that 
can create an undesirable expenditure bias. 
Moreover, urban and rural service delivery 
gaps may not coincide with territorial bound-
aries, making coordination all the more nec-
essary—and all the more difficult. 
Weighing the risks and advantages of 
decentralization is prudent—but countries 
often have no choice: several levels of gov-
ernment need to find ways to cooperate if 
the MDG goals are to be reached. Many 
examples from across the world underscore 
not only that effective policies can be crafted, 
but that they can be crafted and coordinated 
by various levels of government working 
together. 
Revenue challenges in rural areas
Because a large share of their population is 
poor, SNGs in rural areas have a relatively 
low fiscal capacity and are consequently 
more dependent on revenue transfers from 
higher levels of government. A large infor-
mal economy may further limit subnational 
taxation. Some rural governments can even 
be in a “transfer dependence trap,” because 
there is no linear relation between increased 
tax effort and the level of expenditures that 
can realistically be achieved—a dilemma that 
BOX 3.8 Key design issues of decentralization
The three elements of decentralization are adminis-
trative, fiscal, and political. Administrative, or expen-
diture, decentralization relates to expenditures and 
services assigned to subnational governments; fiscal, 
or revenue, decentralization is related to the sub-
national government’s own revenue, transfers, and 
debt; and political decentralization refers to elections 
and the delegation of authority, as well as citizen 
participation.
Countries are constantly adjusting and fine-tuning 
their intergovernmental relations. Given the several 
trade-offs that have to be faced, the three elements of 
decentralization constitute a never-ending balancing 
act. In fact, decentralization is a “moving target”—
there is no final model that countries can reach. What 
matters most is to fit the different design elements 
together coherently and avoid disjointed decision 
making.
The degree of fiscal, political, and administrative 
decentralization is not related to whether a country is 
federal or unitary. Relevant examples include unitary 
China, with about 76.5 percent of expenditure decen-
tralization (accountability, in turn, is upward toward 
the central level). In contrast, in federal Mexico, the 
degree of expenditure decentralization is about 46 
percent.
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constitutes one of the “dangers” of decen-
tralization (Prud’homme 1995). Assume, for 
example, a SNG whose total revenue is com-
posed of 10 percent in taxes and 90 percent 
in transfers. All other things equal, financing 
a 10 percent increase in expenditures requires 
doubling the tax effort. That often exceeds 
the institutional capacity as well as the will-
ingness to assume the political cost of rais-
ing taxes. Transfer dependence is particularly 
large for regional governments in many uni-
tary government systems where policy deci-
sions are channeled to subnational governing 
units for implementation (such as Bangladesh 
and Bolivia), because tax bases that are best 
suited to regional management (automobile 
taxes, for instance) have been given to munic-
ipalities. For SNGs in rural areas, therefore, 
the possibilities to engage in redistribution 
through local taxation are limited. 
Redistribution therefore needs to come 
mainly from the expenditure side, which 
depends critically on the level of expenditure 
decentralization. More often than not, an 
SNG manages only parts of the service deliv-
ery: public investment and infrastructure. 
Human resource management, particularly 
in the social sectors (health and teaching per-
sonnel) has long been a politically sensitive 
area, and most management decisions remain 
centralized in many countries.
Given these uneven advances and levels 
of autonomy in expenditures, SNGs in rural 
areas are often constrained in their ability to 
provide packages of services to the poor and 
to target the incidence of spending so that ser-
vices are directed where the needs are greatest.
In addition, the often low population den-
sity implies higher per capita costs in pro-
viding public services (Hon 2009; Kitchen 
2006; McMillan 2007). Consider that the 
marginal cost in service provision for water 
and sewerage increases substantially in rural 
areas, and it is particularly high for tertiary 
education. Although education costs for pri-
mary and secondary education are often less 
affected by economies of scale than other 
services, factors such as very small class size 
can increase costs substantially even in rural 
areas. Roads can facilitate access between 
rural areas and economic centers, but, given 
the limited possibility to establish user fees 
and toll roads, financing by other entities or 
higher levels of government is required.
These challenges have important con-
sequences. They require different levels of 
governments to contribute with grant financ-
ing to service delivery. These coordination 
requirements can be particularly significant 
at the regional or intermediate level of gov-
ernment, where there may be dual authori-
ties. Investment funds can play a large role in 
rural areas because they cofinance or execute 
public works directly. Some of these entities 
have been trying to substitute for weak insti-
tutional capacity. But such efforts have also 
led to a bypassing of rural SNGs in service 
provision, creating an undesirable spiral of 
weak accountability and capacity. 
The financing challenge of the MDGs in 
metropolitan areas
In contrast to rural areas, SNGs in urban 
areas have greater fiscal capacity and hence 
can influence outcomes much more through 
their own revenue decisions. Nevertheless the 
overall level of transfer dependence of metro-
politan governments can be substantial. Some 
of the more financially autonomous metro 
areas include Addis Ababa, Melbourne, 
and Pretoria (Shah 2012). Cities like Berlin, 
Bucharest, and London, however, are depen-
dent on central grants for about 80 percent 
of their revenue. Absent any convergence 
effects regarding how to structure revenues, 
fiscal capacity will increase as agglomera-
tion unfolds. The tax incidence of revenue 
decisions naturally depends on the particular 
taxes and user fees applied. Common revenue 
sources are land-related revenue (property 
taxes, improvement levies, auctions, leases), 
which can affect the locational decisions 
and income of individuals; personal income 
taxes (applied at the local level in 13 of 27 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD] countries); and user 
fees, which are usually applied at uniform 
rates and therefore can have regressive effects. 
Institutional changes often cannot keep up 
with rapid urbanization and therefore usually 
remain informal. It is no surprise then that 
many informal local institutions are merely 
planning entities with no taxing powers, or 
that the central government influence is con-
siderable. These institutional arrangements 
also affect if and how citizens are repre-
sented and can make their voice heard (box 
3.9). The informality of these institutional 
arrangements has three consequences:
•   It rules out more firmly establishing the 
authority to tax at these levels, which can 
be used to finance local expenditures. 
•   It  limits  possibilities  for  redistributing 
within metro areas or to other subnational 
units, which is critical for maintaining a 
level playing field for all entities. For exam-
ple, redistributive efforts will be more diffi-
cult to be launched from subnational levels 
themselves—in contrast, in Argentina and 
Canada, for instance, the provinces are 
entitled to choose formulas for redistribu-
tion in some of the financial instruments. 
Although vertical equalization can achieve 
the same results from any level, such a sub-
national solution would need political con-
sensus that would perhaps not exist on a 
nationwide scale.
•   If  revenues are  further decentralized  in 
urban areas, it can undermine the capacity 
of the central government to redistribute to 
other areas, among them the rural SNGs.
Setting up a financing system that sets 
the right incentives for service delivery 
can be challenging for a metropolitan area 
(World Bank 2013a; Kim 2013; Shah 2012; 
Slack 2006; Sud and Yilmaz 2013). The high 
proportion of commuters leads to a break-
down of the tax-benefit principle: citizens 
may benefit from the public services pro-
vided by a metropolitan area but pay taxes 
at their residence in medium-size towns at 
the outskirts. Cross-territorial transactions 
can occur more frequently in areas with 
many entities and jurisdictions, affecting 
collection and distribution of sales taxes and 
corporate income taxes, for example, unless 
they are administered at a higher level of 
government.
Service delivery itself is challenging for 
several reasons—all of which limit account-
ability and efficiency:
•   The multiple territorial boundaries of met-
ropolitan areas can complicate the assign-
ment of responsibilities for delivering the 
service, as well as accountability.
BOX 3.9 The complex structure of metropolitan governments
Metropolitan governance is complex in many cases, 
involving several single- or multiple-purpose jurisdic-
tions covering a whole metro area or just parts of it. 
Metropolitan areas and their surrounding jurisdic-
tions are either managed by subnational entities or 
have some central government involvement, given 
the complexity in finding purely local solutions. For 
example:
•   New Delhi is affected by overlapping jurisdictions: 
power is divided among all three levels of govern-
ment—the central government, the Union Territory 
of Delhi, and three municipal bodies (the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal 
Committee, and Delhi Cantonment).
•   In  Jakarta’s metropolitan area,  there are  three 
urban municipalities and three rural municipali-
ties (districts) that are split among three provinces 
(Banten, Jakarta, and West Java).
•   Mexico City’s metropolitan area spans parts of two 
states and has a national capital district and more 
than 50 municipal-type local governments.
•   The São Paulo metropolitan area (with 39 munici-
pal governments) operates with relatively little 
coordination, because a suprametropolitan entity 
has yet to emerge.
•   The Cairo  region  incorporates  five  contiguous 
governorates (the intermediate tier of Egyptian 
administration) and eight new cities. Governor-
ates represent the central government. New cities 
were created to attract people from the Nile Delta 
to Cairo and have no formal relationship with local 
administration. They are overseen by the Ministry 
of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development.
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constitutes one of the “dangers” of decen-
tralization (Prud’homme 1995). Assume, for 
example, a SNG whose total revenue is com-
posed of 10 percent in taxes and 90 percent 
in transfers. All other things equal, financing 
a 10 percent increase in expenditures requires 
doubling the tax effort. That often exceeds 
the institutional capacity as well as the will-
ingness to assume the political cost of rais-
ing taxes. Transfer dependence is particularly 
large for regional governments in many uni-
tary government systems where policy deci-
sions are channeled to subnational governing 
units for implementation (such as Bangladesh 
and Bolivia), because tax bases that are best 
suited to regional management (automobile 
taxes, for instance) have been given to munic-
ipalities. For SNGs in rural areas, therefore, 
the possibilities to engage in redistribution 
through local taxation are limited. 
Redistribution therefore needs to come 
mainly from the expenditure side, which 
depends critically on the level of expenditure 
decentralization. More often than not, an 
SNG manages only parts of the service deliv-
ery: public investment and infrastructure. 
Human resource management, particularly 
in the social sectors (health and teaching per-
sonnel) has long been a politically sensitive 
area, and most management decisions remain 
centralized in many countries.
Given these uneven advances and levels 
of autonomy in expenditures, SNGs in rural 
areas are often constrained in their ability to 
provide packages of services to the poor and 
to target the incidence of spending so that ser-
vices are directed where the needs are greatest.
In addition, the often low population den-
sity implies higher per capita costs in pro-
viding public services (Hon 2009; Kitchen 
2006; McMillan 2007). Consider that the 
marginal cost in service provision for water 
and sewerage increases substantially in rural 
areas, and it is particularly high for tertiary 
education. Although education costs for pri-
mary and secondary education are often less 
affected by economies of scale than other 
services, factors such as very small class size 
can increase costs substantially even in rural 
areas. Roads can facilitate access between 
rural areas and economic centers, but, given 
the limited possibility to establish user fees 
and toll roads, financing by other entities or 
higher levels of government is required.
These challenges have important con-
sequences. They require different levels of 
governments to contribute with grant financ-
ing to service delivery. These coordination 
requirements can be particularly significant 
at the regional or intermediate level of gov-
ernment, where there may be dual authori-
ties. Investment funds can play a large role in 
rural areas because they cofinance or execute 
public works directly. Some of these entities 
have been trying to substitute for weak insti-
tutional capacity. But such efforts have also 
led to a bypassing of rural SNGs in service 
provision, creating an undesirable spiral of 
weak accountability and capacity. 
The financing challenge of the MDGs in 
metropolitan areas
In contrast to rural areas, SNGs in urban 
areas have greater fiscal capacity and hence 
can influence outcomes much more through 
their own revenue decisions. Nevertheless the 
overall level of transfer dependence of metro-
politan governments can be substantial. Some 
of the more financially autonomous metro 
areas include Addis Ababa, Melbourne, 
and Pretoria (Shah 2012). Cities like Berlin, 
Bucharest, and London, however, are depen-
dent on central grants for about 80 percent 
of their revenue. Absent any convergence 
effects regarding how to structure revenues, 
fiscal capacity will increase as agglomera-
tion unfolds. The tax incidence of revenue 
decisions naturally depends on the particular 
taxes and user fees applied. Common revenue 
sources are land-related revenue (property 
taxes, improvement levies, auctions, leases), 
which can affect the locational decisions 
and income of individuals; personal income 
taxes (applied at the local level in 13 of 27 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD] countries); and user 
fees, which are usually applied at uniform 
rates and therefore can have regressive effects. 
Institutional changes often cannot keep up 
with rapid urbanization and therefore usually 
remain informal. It is no surprise then that 
many informal local institutions are merely 
planning entities with no taxing powers, or 
that the central government influence is con-
siderable. These institutional arrangements 
also affect if and how citizens are repre-
sented and can make their voice heard (box 
3.9). The informality of these institutional 
arrangements has three consequences:
•   It rules out more firmly establishing the 
authority to tax at these levels, which can 
be used to finance local expenditures. 
•   It  limits  possibilities  for  redistributing 
within metro areas or to other subnational 
units, which is critical for maintaining a 
level playing field for all entities. For exam-
ple, redistributive efforts will be more diffi-
cult to be launched from subnational levels 
themselves—in contrast, in Argentina and 
Canada, for instance, the provinces are 
entitled to choose formulas for redistribu-
tion in some of the financial instruments. 
Although vertical equalization can achieve 
the same results from any level, such a sub-
national solution would need political con-
sensus that would perhaps not exist on a 
nationwide scale.
•   If  revenues are  further decentralized  in 
urban areas, it can undermine the capacity 
of the central government to redistribute to 
other areas, among them the rural SNGs.
Setting up a financing system that sets 
the right incentives for service delivery 
can be challenging for a metropolitan area 
(World Bank 2013a; Kim 2013; Shah 2012; 
Slack 2006; Sud and Yilmaz 2013). The high 
proportion of commuters leads to a break-
down of the tax-benefit principle: citizens 
may benefit from the public services pro-
vided by a metropolitan area but pay taxes 
at their residence in medium-size towns at 
the outskirts. Cross-territorial transactions 
can occur more frequently in areas with 
many entities and jurisdictions, affecting 
collection and distribution of sales taxes and 
corporate income taxes, for example, unless 
they are administered at a higher level of 
government.
Service delivery itself is challenging for 
several reasons—all of which limit account-
ability and efficiency:
•   The multiple territorial boundaries of met-
ropolitan areas can complicate the assign-
ment of responsibilities for delivering the 
service, as well as accountability.
BOX 3.9 The complex structure of metropolitan governments
Metropolitan governance is complex in many cases, 
involving several single- or multiple-purpose jurisdic-
tions covering a whole metro area or just parts of it. 
Metropolitan areas and their surrounding jurisdic-
tions are either managed by subnational entities or 
have some central government involvement, given 
the complexity in finding purely local solutions. For 
example:
•   New Delhi is affected by overlapping jurisdictions: 
power is divided among all three levels of govern-
ment—the central government, the Union Territory 
of Delhi, and three municipal bodies (the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal 
Committee, and Delhi Cantonment).
•   In  Jakarta’s metropolitan area,  there are  three 
urban municipalities and three rural municipali-
ties (districts) that are split among three provinces 
(Banten, Jakarta, and West Java).
•   Mexico City’s metropolitan area spans parts of two 
states and has a national capital district and more 
than 50 municipal-type local governments.
•   The São Paulo metropolitan area (with 39 munici-
pal governments) operates with relatively little 
coordination, because a suprametropolitan entity 
has yet to emerge.
•   The Cairo  region  incorporates  five  contiguous 
governorates (the intermediate tier of Egyptian 
administration) and eight new cities. Governor-
ates represent the central government. New cities 
were created to attract people from the Nile Delta 
to Cairo and have no formal relationship with local 
administration. They are overseen by the Ministry 
of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development.
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•   In two-tier models, economies of scale may 
be limited at lower levels. As metropolitan 
areas encircle small municipalities, frag-
mentation may occur across jurisdictions, 
at the same time that further horizontal 
integration is limited for political reasons.
•   Organizational arrangements can be com-
plex: regional transport authorities, public 
enterprises, and special-purpose districts, 
among others, are common, and coordina-
tion among these and with entities of the 
SNG can be problematic.
•   Metropolitan  areas may  not  have  the 
incentives to invest adequately in making 
complex services accessible in all sectors, 
including inpatient care, specialized medi-
cal treatment, and higher education, all 
of which have positive externalities and 
spillovers to other areas. Such underinvest-
ment can be mitigated with grants from the 
central government, although that raises 
the question of alignment of the different 
compensation mechanisms. Bahl and Bird 
(2013) refer to India, where a large federal 
grant for urban infrastructure development 
and slum upgrading is allocated to cities on 
a matching basis. The program was intro-
duced in 2005, and while it has succeeded 
in focusing increased attention on urban 
infrastructure issues, implementation prog-
ress has been slow. South Africa makes use 
of a more formal municipal infrastructure 
grant, designed primarily to improve ser-
vices in poor neighborhoods. In Brazil, ad 
hoc grants are made to support specific 
projects.
As a consequence, coordination with other 
levels of government and within the metro-
politan areas are significant and, if not done 
well, can limit accountability and efficiency. 
Going forward: Three priorities 
for subnational governments
If rural and urban SNGs are to successfully 
address the challenges to delivering basic ser-
vices necessary to achieve the MDGs, three 
areas of future action are critical: improving 
public investment; fiscal equalization; and 
governance arrangements for accountability.
Public investment
Public investment is directly related to attain-
ment of the MDGs because of its importance 
in closing infrastructure gaps in urban and 
rural areas (Alm 2010; Bahl and Bird 2013; 
Frank and Martinez-Vazquez 2013; Pagano 
2011; Romeo and Smoke 2013). But the level 
of efficiency in public investment varies sub-
stantially across both developed and devel-
oping countries. Surveys done for the World 
Economic Forum in a sample of 94 coun-
tries worldwide indicate that some advanced 
countries have seen decreases in the quality 
of infrastructure, while some countries in 
the developing world have taken respectable 
leaps forward.
Decentralized public investment is complex 
and might lead to inequity in spending. Project 
appraisal may not be sufficiently rigorous to 
weed out those with questionable impact, so 
cost and time overruns often do not become 
apparent until later stages—when sunk costs 
have to be accepted. Inequities in the distribu-
tion of assets across different jurisdictions can 
also be significant. Public investment often 
implies bulky infrastructure works offering 
localized benefits whose distribution is influ-
enced by political economy factors. Together, 
these factors can undermine equity, one of the 
key aspects for achieving the MDGs.
Improved public investment will require 
three actions. First, coordination across lev-
els of government should be strengthened. 
Experience in developed countries (France, 
Spain) has underscored that this coordi-
nation requires reasonably strong fiscal 
levers. Chile, for instance, is coordinating 
public investment through regional invest-
ment windows, including cofinancing with 
municipalities.
Second, institutional and process reform 
should allow “poor” projects to be weeded 
out before they gain traction and support—
while projects with high returns should be 
selected. Korea, for instance, has successfully 
addressed the “optimism bias” by requiring 
reappraisal in projects with cost and time 
overruns. 
Third, equalization of public investment 
spending should be strengthened. With 
infrastructure gaps shifting among urban 
and rural areas at a quickening pace, the 
need for “place-based” responses to the ser-
vice delivery challenge is increasing. This 
adequacy in resources should be provided in 
terms of a country’s entire expenditure needs, 
which include capital infrastructure, with the 
goal of creating a level playing field.
Fiscal equalization
The incidence of both revenues and expen-
ditures is critical for MDG outcomes. These 
effects can be enhanced by establishing some 
level of equalization to address inequities in 
resource distribution (Blöchliger and Vam-
malle 2009; Boadway 2012; Dafflon 2012; 
OECD 2007). Changes in the patterns of 
urban-rural development imply three basic 
forces: citizens’ needs change because of 
ongoing changes in their demographic com-
position, poverty profiles, and income levels; 
costs of service provision are affected; and 
fiscal capacity is affected. Fiscal equalization 
can help address these factors.
Equalization can be structured vertically 
(across different levels of government), hori-
zontally (across and among jurisdictions), or 
as a combination of both. It requires defining 
the particular need, cost, and fiscal capac-
ity issue to be addressed through a transfer; 
defining a group of representative taxes and 
representative expenditures to be equalized; 
and agreeing on the degree of equalization. 
All these decisions have both a technical and 
a political ingredient. 
In short, equalization is a complex under-
taking both politically and practically. As 
an outcome of political negotiation, trans-
fers are often overburdened with objectives, 
which may weaken desirable compensatory 
effects. Some countries do organize spatially 
targeted programs aimed at stimulating 
regional development at large with a focus on 
the private sector. However, those programs 
that include incentives such as tax breaks 
or subsidies often challenge coordination 
among the different interventions, including 
service delivery and taxation, and specific 
poverty and social programs. For example, 
in Malawi, transfers are not establishing 
sufficient levels of horizontal equity, as mea-
sured using a per capita standard as a rea-
sonable comparator (World Bank 2012b). In 
Bolivia, distribution is driven by hydrocarbon 
revenues, which bear no relation to levels of 
poverty in the different provinces. If horizon-
tal equity is recognized as a base for address-
ing the MDGs, then more effort needs to be 
put into fiscal equalization. 
The type and degree of equalization is, 
in the end, a political decision. Given the 
prominence of infrastructure challenges in 
the urban-rural dynamics, however, it is 
unlikely that full equalization for all sectors 
can or should be achieved. The right bal-
ance is likely to depend on the type of infra-
structure needed and may vary with specific 
circumstances, such as subnational capacity 
and credit availability. In the case of infra-
structure for social services, such as health 
and education, recurrent equalization grants 
may be needed to cover continuing operation 
and maintenance costs. For utilities and other 
infrastructure whose costs can be largely 
recovered through fees, credit-facilitating 
policies may be the most appropriate means 
of equalizing expenditures. For network 
infrastructure where costs cannot be recov-
ered through fees, such as no-toll roads, a 
conditional grant may be most appropriate. 
Overall, it is clear that no country begins 
with a clean slate. More often than not, 
reforms of intergovernmental transfers are 
done at the margin and incrementally, as is 
demonstrated by Colombia’s current royalty 
reform, which achieves more equality for roy-
alty resources in a gradual fashion. Other note-
worthy efforts are currently being undertaken 
by Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, and Tajikistan, 
although the results remain to be seen.
Governance for accountability
Accountability is critical to tackle the MDG 
challenge. Accountability depends on the way 
authority is constituted, but it also depends 
on human resources management, an often 
forgotten but critical element for accountabil-
ity and efficiency.
All decisions on resource distribution 
require institutional arrangements and the 
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•   In two-tier models, economies of scale may 
be limited at lower levels. As metropolitan 
areas encircle small municipalities, frag-
mentation may occur across jurisdictions, 
at the same time that further horizontal 
integration is limited for political reasons.
•   Organizational arrangements can be com-
plex: regional transport authorities, public 
enterprises, and special-purpose districts, 
among others, are common, and coordina-
tion among these and with entities of the 
SNG can be problematic.
•   Metropolitan  areas may  not  have  the 
incentives to invest adequately in making 
complex services accessible in all sectors, 
including inpatient care, specialized medi-
cal treatment, and higher education, all 
of which have positive externalities and 
spillovers to other areas. Such underinvest-
ment can be mitigated with grants from the 
central government, although that raises 
the question of alignment of the different 
compensation mechanisms. Bahl and Bird 
(2013) refer to India, where a large federal 
grant for urban infrastructure development 
and slum upgrading is allocated to cities on 
a matching basis. The program was intro-
duced in 2005, and while it has succeeded 
in focusing increased attention on urban 
infrastructure issues, implementation prog-
ress has been slow. South Africa makes use 
of a more formal municipal infrastructure 
grant, designed primarily to improve ser-
vices in poor neighborhoods. In Brazil, ad 
hoc grants are made to support specific 
projects.
As a consequence, coordination with other 
levels of government and within the metro-
politan areas are significant and, if not done 
well, can limit accountability and efficiency. 
Going forward: Three priorities 
for subnational governments
If rural and urban SNGs are to successfully 
address the challenges to delivering basic ser-
vices necessary to achieve the MDGs, three 
areas of future action are critical: improving 
public investment; fiscal equalization; and 
governance arrangements for accountability.
Public investment
Public investment is directly related to attain-
ment of the MDGs because of its importance 
in closing infrastructure gaps in urban and 
rural areas (Alm 2010; Bahl and Bird 2013; 
Frank and Martinez-Vazquez 2013; Pagano 
2011; Romeo and Smoke 2013). But the level 
of efficiency in public investment varies sub-
stantially across both developed and devel-
oping countries. Surveys done for the World 
Economic Forum in a sample of 94 coun-
tries worldwide indicate that some advanced 
countries have seen decreases in the quality 
of infrastructure, while some countries in 
the developing world have taken respectable 
leaps forward.
Decentralized public investment is complex 
and might lead to inequity in spending. Project 
appraisal may not be sufficiently rigorous to 
weed out those with questionable impact, so 
cost and time overruns often do not become 
apparent until later stages—when sunk costs 
have to be accepted. Inequities in the distribu-
tion of assets across different jurisdictions can 
also be significant. Public investment often 
implies bulky infrastructure works offering 
localized benefits whose distribution is influ-
enced by political economy factors. Together, 
these factors can undermine equity, one of the 
key aspects for achieving the MDGs.
Improved public investment will require 
three actions. First, coordination across lev-
els of government should be strengthened. 
Experience in developed countries (France, 
Spain) has underscored that this coordi-
nation requires reasonably strong fiscal 
levers. Chile, for instance, is coordinating 
public investment through regional invest-
ment windows, including cofinancing with 
municipalities.
Second, institutional and process reform 
should allow “poor” projects to be weeded 
out before they gain traction and support—
while projects with high returns should be 
selected. Korea, for instance, has successfully 
addressed the “optimism bias” by requiring 
reappraisal in projects with cost and time 
overruns. 
Third, equalization of public investment 
spending should be strengthened. With 
infrastructure gaps shifting among urban 
and rural areas at a quickening pace, the 
need for “place-based” responses to the ser-
vice delivery challenge is increasing. This 
adequacy in resources should be provided in 
terms of a country’s entire expenditure needs, 
which include capital infrastructure, with the 
goal of creating a level playing field.
Fiscal equalization
The incidence of both revenues and expen-
ditures is critical for MDG outcomes. These 
effects can be enhanced by establishing some 
level of equalization to address inequities in 
resource distribution (Blöchliger and Vam-
malle 2009; Boadway 2012; Dafflon 2012; 
OECD 2007). Changes in the patterns of 
urban-rural development imply three basic 
forces: citizens’ needs change because of 
ongoing changes in their demographic com-
position, poverty profiles, and income levels; 
costs of service provision are affected; and 
fiscal capacity is affected. Fiscal equalization 
can help address these factors.
Equalization can be structured vertically 
(across different levels of government), hori-
zontally (across and among jurisdictions), or 
as a combination of both. It requires defining 
the particular need, cost, and fiscal capac-
ity issue to be addressed through a transfer; 
defining a group of representative taxes and 
representative expenditures to be equalized; 
and agreeing on the degree of equalization. 
All these decisions have both a technical and 
a political ingredient. 
In short, equalization is a complex under-
taking both politically and practically. As 
an outcome of political negotiation, trans-
fers are often overburdened with objectives, 
which may weaken desirable compensatory 
effects. Some countries do organize spatially 
targeted programs aimed at stimulating 
regional development at large with a focus on 
the private sector. However, those programs 
that include incentives such as tax breaks 
or subsidies often challenge coordination 
among the different interventions, including 
service delivery and taxation, and specific 
poverty and social programs. For example, 
in Malawi, transfers are not establishing 
sufficient levels of horizontal equity, as mea-
sured using a per capita standard as a rea-
sonable comparator (World Bank 2012b). In 
Bolivia, distribution is driven by hydrocarbon 
revenues, which bear no relation to levels of 
poverty in the different provinces. If horizon-
tal equity is recognized as a base for address-
ing the MDGs, then more effort needs to be 
put into fiscal equalization. 
The type and degree of equalization is, 
in the end, a political decision. Given the 
prominence of infrastructure challenges in 
the urban-rural dynamics, however, it is 
unlikely that full equalization for all sectors 
can or should be achieved. The right bal-
ance is likely to depend on the type of infra-
structure needed and may vary with specific 
circumstances, such as subnational capacity 
and credit availability. In the case of infra-
structure for social services, such as health 
and education, recurrent equalization grants 
may be needed to cover continuing operation 
and maintenance costs. For utilities and other 
infrastructure whose costs can be largely 
recovered through fees, credit-facilitating 
policies may be the most appropriate means 
of equalizing expenditures. For network 
infrastructure where costs cannot be recov-
ered through fees, such as no-toll roads, a 
conditional grant may be most appropriate. 
Overall, it is clear that no country begins 
with a clean slate. More often than not, 
reforms of intergovernmental transfers are 
done at the margin and incrementally, as is 
demonstrated by Colombia’s current royalty 
reform, which achieves more equality for roy-
alty resources in a gradual fashion. Other note-
worthy efforts are currently being undertaken 
by Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, and Tajikistan, 
although the results remain to be seen.
Governance for accountability
Accountability is critical to tackle the MDG 
challenge. Accountability depends on the way 
authority is constituted, but it also depends 
on human resources management, an often 
forgotten but critical element for accountabil-
ity and efficiency.
All decisions on resource distribution 
require institutional arrangements and the 
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authority to exercise those decisions. These 
determine, to some degree, if and how costs 
and revenue can be shared within and across 
jurisdictions. Institutional and governance 
arrangements reflect a country’s political 
decisions, often based on its particular social, 
geographic, or political context. Subnational 
governments and their authorities can be 
elected or delegated; in some cases, parallel or 
dual authorities exist. Whatever the arrange-
ment, as a guiding principle, a minimum level 
of accountability, vertically across levels and 
horizontally across the different territorial 
units, needs to be in place for MDG-relevant 
policies to be fully effective.
Human resources are a critical, yet often 
overlooked element of accountability. They 
establish institutional capacity, a necessary 
condition to addressing service delivery chal-
lenges. They define the “fine dividing line” in 
responsibilities among levels of government, 
which is key for accountability. And they are 
a significant cost driver that can impact fis-
cal responsibility. Three areas of institutional 
capacity are critical because they establish a 
basic level of transparency: financial manage-
ment, procurement, and human resources. 
Efforts are under way to create integrated 
financial management systems in many coun-
tries, including Russia (as a centralized solu-
tion), and some Latin American countries 
(Guatemala, Peru). 
Given deeply entrenched political economy 
factors, the risk of disjointed decision mak-
ing is high. Hiring and firing decisions, along 
with salary policies, need to be made in a 
coordinated fashion. The example of Mexico 
underscores some of the challenges: because of 
political resistance, federal teachers were not 
decentralized to the states, resulting in a paral-
lel hiring process at the state level that blurred 
the lines of accountability. In Colombia, the 
early decentralization process established cen-
tral pay levels, while SNGs were supposed to 
cover the increased cost, which was shifted 
back to the center through higher transfers.
With growing interdependencies, human 
resources management needs to be strength-
ened in an intergovernmental fashion. 
Because these capacities are often “invisible” 
to citizens, which limits any demand-based 
reform, they need particularly strong incen-
tives to be sustainable. These examples 
underscore the fact that human resources 
reform constitutes a challenging area that 
can often progress only in limited, narrowly 
defined service delivery areas where suffi-
cient demand for reform exists. In contrast, 
Kenya’s ambitious territorial and devolution 
reform has forced it to engage in large-scale 
human resources reform, but the reform is 
still too new to evaluate the results. 
Planning first, followed by 
financing
As urban centers continue their inexorable 
growth over the next decades, a strategy is 
needed to better manage the urbanization 
process through a coordinated, prioritized, 
and sequenced approach to the planning-
connecting-financing formula of urbaniza-
tion. Unplanned and uncoordinated urban 
development can pose risks, trading the 
hopes of those who migrate in search of a 
better life for unsanitary living conditions, 
joblessness, and high exposure to natural 
disasters. Public policy makers must act now 
to get this rapidly paced urbanization “right” 
by improving access to affordable and reli-
able basic services such as education, hous-
ing, transport, and health care for all, and 
by promoting effective land use management 
to influence the spatial structure of cities. 
Isolated efforts are unlikely to help. Experi-
ence in managing urban growth has varied 
considerably across countries (see box 3.10 
for policies in the BRICS), but policy makers 
going forward will need to focus on getting 
land management “right” and integrating the 
intensity of land use with the placement of 
infrastructure, housing, mobility, and envi-
ronmental amenities. 
Of course, financing rapid urban growth 
is challenging, because large up-front capi-
tal investments are needed to build systems 
for transport and water, solid waste manage-
ment, and sewage removal and treatment. 
Financing, however, needs to be closely 
tied to how urban areas are planned and con-
nected. Often, getting the planning in place 
will allow cities to leverage land and credit 
BOX 3.10 Learning from urbanization in the BRICS
The economic motors of development are shifting 
from the urbanized developed world toward the rap-
idly urbanizing developing world, and most famously 
those of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (the BRICS). The BRICS provide some inspir-
ing examples of how to seize the opportunities that 
urbanization can provide. Their governments all went 
through difficult periods when they tried to resist the 
predictable movement of people into cities, or steered 
people or enterprises to inappropriate urban locations. 
Several of the BRICS bear heavy burdens from past 
failures to accommodate urban population growth 
equitably and efficiently. To avoid such burdens, cit-
ies and nations need to plan proactively for urban 
growth, making use of both markets and planning 
tools, and engaging with all sectors of society, includ-
ing the economically and politically weakest.
Rapid urbanization in the BRICS has generally 
accompanied economic growth and a shift out of 
agriculture. Nevertheless, governments have been 
ambivalent about urbanization, even causing some of 
the economic and social disruption that has attended 
this march toward urbanization; examples are China 
during the Cultural Revolution and South Africa 
during Apartheid. Each country illustrates different 
lessons about the opportunities and risks associated 
with urbanization.
Brazil’s reluctant urbanization and the emergence of 
favelas. Brazil’s world-famous slums or shanty towns 
also called favelas show how the failure to accommo-
date growing urban populations can lead to enduring 
social inequalities. Fearing that urban planning would 
encourage poor rural migrants, the Brazilian govern-
ment did little to plan for rapid urban growth. Inac-
tion did not slow the pace of urbanization, but poor 
planning did contribute to a very unequal urbaniza-
tion, with large segments of the population inhabiting 
poorly located and ill-served informal settlements. 
Many inhabitants have done surprisingly well under 
the circumstances, but hazardous locations, enor-
mous barriers to service delivery, bad relations with 
local authorities, and the like persisted. 
In recent decades, pioneering approaches have 
emerged: participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 
sustainable travel in Curitiba, and condominial sew-
erage in various cities. These and other innovations 
have gained international renown. The national gov-
ernment has introduced some of the most inclusive 
urban legislation, as exemplified by its ambitious City 
Statute. Nevertheless, the problems of the divided 
city, stemming from past urban policies, remain a 
huge challenge. In retrospect, a more inclusive and 
proactive approach to rural-urban migration and 
urban growth from the start would have been more 
equitable at the time and very beneficial in the long 
run.
China’s ardent urbanization and rapid economic 
growth. China’s economic transformation, which 
began as a rural experiment, soon became urban, 
involving first a string of coastal cities, then larger 
urban regions, then inland cities. These innovative 
cities soon brought vast quantities of capital from 
around the world together with low-wage workers 
from China’s agricultural regions. The central gov-
ernment progressively loosened controls on private 
investment within cities and on temporary rural 
migration into the cities. Economic powerhouses 
arose incrementally from locally driven but centrally 
sanctioned urban experimentation. City governments 
were given increasing powers and put under enormous 
pressure to raise economic production. A dominant 
model emerged of entrepreneurial city bureaucrats 
taking lead roles in land conversions. They oversaw 
the transformation of low-value urban or rural land 
into serviced plots whose long-term leases were sold 
at near-market prices to real estate developers, or at 
lower prices to investors promising industrial or com-
mercial establishments. 
China’s stunning economic success highlights the 
importance of achieving moderately efficient urban-
ization for economic growth, but it is based on poli-
cies other countries would struggle to replicate and 
has brought unenviable environmental costs and 
social inequalities. China has recently tried to reduce 
these detractions while maintaining rapid economic 
growth, but it has been difficult to challenge the exist-
ing model, whose success is based on closely align-
ing local authorities’ official and unofficial interests 
with market pressures, even when that causes envi-
ronmental damage or amplifies inequalities. Urban 
experimentation could still hold the key to progress 
on social and environmental agendas, but local alli-
ances of entrepreneurial bureaucrats and developers 
are unlikely to drive these agendas.
(box continues next page)
160  U R B A N I Z A T I O N  A N D  T H E  M D G S  G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3 G L O B A L  M O N I T O R I N G  R E P O R T  2 0 1 3  U R B A N I Z A T I O N  A N D  T H E  M D G S   161
authority to exercise those decisions. These 
determine, to some degree, if and how costs 
and revenue can be shared within and across 
jurisdictions. Institutional and governance 
arrangements reflect a country’s political 
decisions, often based on its particular social, 
geographic, or political context. Subnational 
governments and their authorities can be 
elected or delegated; in some cases, parallel or 
dual authorities exist. Whatever the arrange-
ment, as a guiding principle, a minimum level 
of accountability, vertically across levels and 
horizontally across the different territorial 
units, needs to be in place for MDG-relevant 
policies to be fully effective.
Human resources are a critical, yet often 
overlooked element of accountability. They 
establish institutional capacity, a necessary 
condition to addressing service delivery chal-
lenges. They define the “fine dividing line” in 
responsibilities among levels of government, 
which is key for accountability. And they are 
a significant cost driver that can impact fis-
cal responsibility. Three areas of institutional 
capacity are critical because they establish a 
basic level of transparency: financial manage-
ment, procurement, and human resources. 
Efforts are under way to create integrated 
financial management systems in many coun-
tries, including Russia (as a centralized solu-
tion), and some Latin American countries 
(Guatemala, Peru). 
Given deeply entrenched political economy 
factors, the risk of disjointed decision mak-
ing is high. Hiring and firing decisions, along 
with salary policies, need to be made in a 
coordinated fashion. The example of Mexico 
underscores some of the challenges: because of 
political resistance, federal teachers were not 
decentralized to the states, resulting in a paral-
lel hiring process at the state level that blurred 
the lines of accountability. In Colombia, the 
early decentralization process established cen-
tral pay levels, while SNGs were supposed to 
cover the increased cost, which was shifted 
back to the center through higher transfers.
With growing interdependencies, human 
resources management needs to be strength-
ened in an intergovernmental fashion. 
Because these capacities are often “invisible” 
to citizens, which limits any demand-based 
reform, they need particularly strong incen-
tives to be sustainable. These examples 
underscore the fact that human resources 
reform constitutes a challenging area that 
can often progress only in limited, narrowly 
defined service delivery areas where suffi-
cient demand for reform exists. In contrast, 
Kenya’s ambitious territorial and devolution 
reform has forced it to engage in large-scale 
human resources reform, but the reform is 
still too new to evaluate the results. 
Planning first, followed by 
financing
As urban centers continue their inexorable 
growth over the next decades, a strategy is 
needed to better manage the urbanization 
process through a coordinated, prioritized, 
and sequenced approach to the planning-
connecting-financing formula of urbaniza-
tion. Unplanned and uncoordinated urban 
development can pose risks, trading the 
hopes of those who migrate in search of a 
better life for unsanitary living conditions, 
joblessness, and high exposure to natural 
disasters. Public policy makers must act now 
to get this rapidly paced urbanization “right” 
by improving access to affordable and reli-
able basic services such as education, hous-
ing, transport, and health care for all, and 
by promoting effective land use management 
to influence the spatial structure of cities. 
Isolated efforts are unlikely to help. Experi-
ence in managing urban growth has varied 
considerably across countries (see box 3.10 
for policies in the BRICS), but policy makers 
going forward will need to focus on getting 
land management “right” and integrating the 
intensity of land use with the placement of 
infrastructure, housing, mobility, and envi-
ronmental amenities. 
Of course, financing rapid urban growth 
is challenging, because large up-front capi-
tal investments are needed to build systems 
for transport and water, solid waste manage-
ment, and sewage removal and treatment. 
Financing, however, needs to be closely 
tied to how urban areas are planned and con-
nected. Often, getting the planning in place 
will allow cities to leverage land and credit 
BOX 3.10 Learning from urbanization in the BRICS
The economic motors of development are shifting 
from the urbanized developed world toward the rap-
idly urbanizing developing world, and most famously 
those of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (the BRICS). The BRICS provide some inspir-
ing examples of how to seize the opportunities that 
urbanization can provide. Their governments all went 
through difficult periods when they tried to resist the 
predictable movement of people into cities, or steered 
people or enterprises to inappropriate urban locations. 
Several of the BRICS bear heavy burdens from past 
failures to accommodate urban population growth 
equitably and efficiently. To avoid such burdens, cit-
ies and nations need to plan proactively for urban 
growth, making use of both markets and planning 
tools, and engaging with all sectors of society, includ-
ing the economically and politically weakest.
Rapid urbanization in the BRICS has generally 
accompanied economic growth and a shift out of 
agriculture. Nevertheless, governments have been 
ambivalent about urbanization, even causing some of 
the economic and social disruption that has attended 
this march toward urbanization; examples are China 
during the Cultural Revolution and South Africa 
during Apartheid. Each country illustrates different 
lessons about the opportunities and risks associated 
with urbanization.
Brazil’s reluctant urbanization and the emergence of 
favelas. Brazil’s world-famous slums or shanty towns 
also called favelas show how the failure to accommo-
date growing urban populations can lead to enduring 
social inequalities. Fearing that urban planning would 
encourage poor rural migrants, the Brazilian govern-
ment did little to plan for rapid urban growth. Inac-
tion did not slow the pace of urbanization, but poor 
planning did contribute to a very unequal urbaniza-
tion, with large segments of the population inhabiting 
poorly located and ill-served informal settlements. 
Many inhabitants have done surprisingly well under 
the circumstances, but hazardous locations, enor-
mous barriers to service delivery, bad relations with 
local authorities, and the like persisted. 
In recent decades, pioneering approaches have 
emerged: participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 
sustainable travel in Curitiba, and condominial sew-
erage in various cities. These and other innovations 
have gained international renown. The national gov-
ernment has introduced some of the most inclusive 
urban legislation, as exemplified by its ambitious City 
Statute. Nevertheless, the problems of the divided 
city, stemming from past urban policies, remain a 
huge challenge. In retrospect, a more inclusive and 
proactive approach to rural-urban migration and 
urban growth from the start would have been more 
equitable at the time and very beneficial in the long 
run.
China’s ardent urbanization and rapid economic 
growth. China’s economic transformation, which 
began as a rural experiment, soon became urban, 
involving first a string of coastal cities, then larger 
urban regions, then inland cities. These innovative 
cities soon brought vast quantities of capital from 
around the world together with low-wage workers 
from China’s agricultural regions. The central gov-
ernment progressively loosened controls on private 
investment within cities and on temporary rural 
migration into the cities. Economic powerhouses 
arose incrementally from locally driven but centrally 
sanctioned urban experimentation. City governments 
were given increasing powers and put under enormous 
pressure to raise economic production. A dominant 
model emerged of entrepreneurial city bureaucrats 
taking lead roles in land conversions. They oversaw 
the transformation of low-value urban or rural land 
into serviced plots whose long-term leases were sold 
at near-market prices to real estate developers, or at 
lower prices to investors promising industrial or com-
mercial establishments. 
China’s stunning economic success highlights the 
importance of achieving moderately efficient urban-
ization for economic growth, but it is based on poli-
cies other countries would struggle to replicate and 
has brought unenviable environmental costs and 
social inequalities. China has recently tried to reduce 
these detractions while maintaining rapid economic 
growth, but it has been difficult to challenge the exist-
ing model, whose success is based on closely align-
ing local authorities’ official and unofficial interests 
with market pressures, even when that causes envi-
ronmental damage or amplifies inequalities. Urban 
experimentation could still hold the key to progress 
on social and environmental agendas, but local alli-
ances of entrepreneurial bureaucrats and developers 
are unlikely to drive these agendas.
(box continues next page)
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International financial institutions (IFIs) have 
long been engaged in supporting the urban-
ization process through different lending and 
nonlending mechanisms. These include a 
range of responses from financial support to 
improve housing conditions for slum dwellers 
to strengthening transport services to reduce 
congestion costs to integrating knowledge 
products that help countries plan better for 
anticipated migration from rural areas to its 
cities as well as address issues of congestion 
from natural growth of urban areas. 
African Development Bank
The African Development Bank (AfDB) 
Group recognizes that the continent’s cities 
and towns can be a major driving force for 
economic development. In 1992, its board 
approved an Urban Development Policy to 
provide guidance for AfDB Group opera-
tions in the urban sector, build a foundation 
for dialogue with counterparts, and promote 
cooperation with other development part-
ners. The policy targeted regional member 
countries’ capacity to plan and implement 
investment programs, promote private initia-
tives, support decentralization, and upgrade 
human resources. An important component 
was improving the living conditions of the 
urban poor. The AfDB has supported urban 
development over the years through projects 
in public utilities, industry, transport, educa-
tion, health, and other social interventions. 
Between 1967 and 2007, roughly 15–20 per-
cent of the cumulative financing provided by 
the AfDB Group benefited urban dwellers 
and enterprises either directly or indirectly. 
In 2011, the AfDB developed its urban 
strategy , which was aimed at enhancing the 
effectiveness of its interventions in urban 
development in Africa (AfDB 2011). The 
main objective is to boost the viability and 
competitiveness of African cities to help them 
enhance their role as engines of growth and 
economic development. The strategy focuses 
on three main pillars in alignment with the 
AfDB’s core areas of interventions: infra-
structure development, urban governance, 
and private sector development. The urban 
strategy is based on the AfDB’s medium-term 
plan for 2008–12 and the 2009 mid-term 
review of the African Development Fund 
(ADF), the concessional financing window 
of the AfDB. The urban strategy aims to 
help member countries progress toward the 
achievement of MDGs and to mainstream 
the key cross-cutting issues concerning all 
urban operations, namely, knowledge genera-
tion and management, regional integration, 
environment, climate change, gender, and 
empowerment of vulnerable populations. 
Implementation of the AfDB’s urban strat-
egy will exploit the bank’s existing financing 
instruments using the central governments’ 
channels: loans and guarantees, mainly to 
middle-income countries, and private sector 
loans to middle- and low-income countries; 
loans or grants from the ADF to low-income 
countries and fragile states; and trust funds 
and other facilities. For financing in the case 
of creditworthy municipalities, the AfDB will 
invest in knowledge generation and lessons 
from other institutions concerned with this 
type of financing.
In recent years, the AfDB has supported 
some 70 urban-related projects and ini-
tiatives, such as: improving Zanzibar’s 
water supply and sanitation services (spe-
cial drawing rights [SDR] 28 million); the 
Dakar-Diamniadio Highway Project (SDR 
45 million); the Nairobi-Thika Highway 
Improvement Project (SDR 121 million); and 
the Conakry Electrical Networks Rehabilita-
tion and Extension Project (SDR 12 million). 
Since 2000, the AfDB’s financial commitment 
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markets to generate finances, as well as to 
encourage investments by the private sector.
Integrating planning, connecting, and 
financing can go a long way in ensuring that 
urban areas enhance job opportunities, pro-
ductivity, and living standards by better man-
aging densities, and by also reaching out and 
improving welfare in rural areas.
BOX 3.10 Learning from urbanization in the BRICS (continued)
Russia: Cities in the wrong places. Russia’s urbaniza-
tion history shows how long-term economic growth 
requires people and economic enterprises to move to 
productive urban locations—not just to anywhere in 
any city. This is a difficult process to direct unless 
markets are allowed to play a larger role than permit-
ted by the Soviet authorities. 
From an economic perspective, the Soviet system 
located many urban activities and populations in the 
wrong places. Central decision making that did not 
take markets into account left many cities exposed at 
the end of the Soviet era. The need for spatial restruc-
turing brought heavy social and economic costs, add-
ing to the traumas that accompanied the dismantling 
of the Soviet central planning system. Populations 
shifted toward newly vibrant cities and service centers 
in the south and west, and away from industrial cit-
ies with few amenities in the far north and east. That 
may have been the right response from an economic 
standpoint, but it involved considerable dislocation. 
Cities that produced goods for the military-industrial 
complex, or consumer goods protected from compe-
tition, have suffered enormously, even as those with 
natural resource bases or other strengths in the mar-
ket economy have thrived. 
South Africa’s apartheid urban controls and its frag-
mented cities. South Africa’s apartheid system was an 
extreme lesson in the dangers of exclusionary urban 
policies, particularly when combined with overt dis-
crimination against particular social groups. Since 
apartheid ended, urbanization has rebounded, but the 
inherited social and economic divisions have proven 
to be intractable. The low density, fragmented form 
of South African cities has also had harmful social, 
economic, and environmental consequences, some of 
which are only beginning to be addressed. Low den-
sity has imposed additional barriers to employment 
for the poorest communities, added to the cost of 
bulk infrastructure provision and public transport, 
and fostered carbon-emitting private transport.
The creation of constitutional rights for the poor 
has helped to promote equity but has not always been 
backed by political will and sufficient government 
resources to meet people’s basic needs for electric-
ity, water, and sanitation. Equally needed are city-
level leadership and investment plans that integrate 
fragmented cities more effectively, boost jobs and 
livelihoods, and work with poorer communities to 
improve essential services.
India: Ambivalence to urbanization offers an uncer-
tain future. India is less urban than the other BRICS, 
and its ambivalence toward urbanization could 
impede economic progress, at least for the low-income 
groups who find it increasingly difficult to secure a 
place in India’s cities. The size of India’s still-growing 
population that has to find sustenance in rural set-
tings is daunting. India’s current challenges illustrate 
the importance of taking the rural implications into 
account when designing urban policies. 
This is a particularly critical time for India’s 
urban policies because they will help to determine 
whether economic growth is maintained, who will 
benefit, and what the environmental consequences 
will be. The Indian government has initiated several 
important programs intended to support equitable 
and efficient urban development, including the Jawa-
harlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission and 
Rajiv Awas Yojana. India has also pioneered civil 
society and grassroots efforts to improve conditions 
for deprived urban dwellers, including a partner-
ship between the Society for the Promotion of Area 
Resource Centres, Mahila Milan, and the Indian 
National Slum Dwellers Association. To meet its 
urbanization challenge, India must not only address 
existing urban poverty but also create cities that can 
accommodate rapid urbanization and give even the 
poorest rural dwellers a fairer share of the benefits of 
economic growth.
Sources: Contributed by IIED and UNFPA.
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International financial institutions (IFIs) have 
long been engaged in supporting the urban-
ization process through different lending and 
nonlending mechanisms. These include a 
range of responses from financial support to 
improve housing conditions for slum dwellers 
to strengthening transport services to reduce 
congestion costs to integrating knowledge 
products that help countries plan better for 
anticipated migration from rural areas to its 
cities as well as address issues of congestion 
from natural growth of urban areas. 
African Development Bank
The African Development Bank (AfDB) 
Group recognizes that the continent’s cities 
and towns can be a major driving force for 
economic development. In 1992, its board 
approved an Urban Development Policy to 
provide guidance for AfDB Group opera-
tions in the urban sector, build a foundation 
for dialogue with counterparts, and promote 
cooperation with other development part-
ners. The policy targeted regional member 
countries’ capacity to plan and implement 
investment programs, promote private initia-
tives, support decentralization, and upgrade 
human resources. An important component 
was improving the living conditions of the 
urban poor. The AfDB has supported urban 
development over the years through projects 
in public utilities, industry, transport, educa-
tion, health, and other social interventions. 
Between 1967 and 2007, roughly 15–20 per-
cent of the cumulative financing provided by 
the AfDB Group benefited urban dwellers 
and enterprises either directly or indirectly. 
In 2011, the AfDB developed its urban 
strategy , which was aimed at enhancing the 
effectiveness of its interventions in urban 
development in Africa (AfDB 2011). The 
main objective is to boost the viability and 
competitiveness of African cities to help them 
enhance their role as engines of growth and 
economic development. The strategy focuses 
on three main pillars in alignment with the 
AfDB’s core areas of interventions: infra-
structure development, urban governance, 
and private sector development. The urban 
strategy is based on the AfDB’s medium-term 
plan for 2008–12 and the 2009 mid-term 
review of the African Development Fund 
(ADF), the concessional financing window 
of the AfDB. The urban strategy aims to 
help member countries progress toward the 
achievement of MDGs and to mainstream 
the key cross-cutting issues concerning all 
urban operations, namely, knowledge genera-
tion and management, regional integration, 
environment, climate change, gender, and 
empowerment of vulnerable populations. 
Implementation of the AfDB’s urban strat-
egy will exploit the bank’s existing financing 
instruments using the central governments’ 
channels: loans and guarantees, mainly to 
middle-income countries, and private sector 
loans to middle- and low-income countries; 
loans or grants from the ADF to low-income 
countries and fragile states; and trust funds 
and other facilities. For financing in the case 
of creditworthy municipalities, the AfDB will 
invest in knowledge generation and lessons 
from other institutions concerned with this 
type of financing.
In recent years, the AfDB has supported 
some 70 urban-related projects and ini-
tiatives, such as: improving Zanzibar’s 
water supply and sanitation services (spe-
cial drawing rights [SDR] 28 million); the 
Dakar-Diamniadio Highway Project (SDR 
45 million); the Nairobi-Thika Highway 
Improvement Project (SDR 121 million); and 
the Conakry Electrical Networks Rehabilita-
tion and Extension Project (SDR 12 million). 
Since 2000, the AfDB’s financial commitment 
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markets to generate finances, as well as to 
encourage investments by the private sector.
Integrating planning, connecting, and 
financing can go a long way in ensuring that 
urban areas enhance job opportunities, pro-
ductivity, and living standards by better man-
aging densities, and by also reaching out and 
improving welfare in rural areas.
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Russia: Cities in the wrong places. Russia’s urbaniza-
tion history shows how long-term economic growth 
requires people and economic enterprises to move to 
productive urban locations—not just to anywhere in 
any city. This is a difficult process to direct unless 
markets are allowed to play a larger role than permit-
ted by the Soviet authorities. 
From an economic perspective, the Soviet system 
located many urban activities and populations in the 
wrong places. Central decision making that did not 
take markets into account left many cities exposed at 
the end of the Soviet era. The need for spatial restruc-
turing brought heavy social and economic costs, add-
ing to the traumas that accompanied the dismantling 
of the Soviet central planning system. Populations 
shifted toward newly vibrant cities and service centers 
in the south and west, and away from industrial cit-
ies with few amenities in the far north and east. That 
may have been the right response from an economic 
standpoint, but it involved considerable dislocation. 
Cities that produced goods for the military-industrial 
complex, or consumer goods protected from compe-
tition, have suffered enormously, even as those with 
natural resource bases or other strengths in the mar-
ket economy have thrived. 
South Africa’s apartheid urban controls and its frag-
mented cities. South Africa’s apartheid system was an 
extreme lesson in the dangers of exclusionary urban 
policies, particularly when combined with overt dis-
crimination against particular social groups. Since 
apartheid ended, urbanization has rebounded, but the 
inherited social and economic divisions have proven 
to be intractable. The low density, fragmented form 
of South African cities has also had harmful social, 
economic, and environmental consequences, some of 
which are only beginning to be addressed. Low den-
sity has imposed additional barriers to employment 
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bulk infrastructure provision and public transport, 
and fostered carbon-emitting private transport.
The creation of constitutional rights for the poor 
has helped to promote equity but has not always been 
backed by political will and sufficient government 
resources to meet people’s basic needs for electric-
ity, water, and sanitation. Equally needed are city-
level leadership and investment plans that integrate 
fragmented cities more effectively, boost jobs and 
livelihoods, and work with poorer communities to 
improve essential services.
India: Ambivalence to urbanization offers an uncer-
tain future. India is less urban than the other BRICS, 
and its ambivalence toward urbanization could 
impede economic progress, at least for the low-income 
groups who find it increasingly difficult to secure a 
place in India’s cities. The size of India’s still-growing 
population that has to find sustenance in rural set-
tings is daunting. India’s current challenges illustrate 
the importance of taking the rural implications into 
account when designing urban policies. 
This is a particularly critical time for India’s 
urban policies because they will help to determine 
whether economic growth is maintained, who will 
benefit, and what the environmental consequences 
will be. The Indian government has initiated several 
important programs intended to support equitable 
and efficient urban development, including the Jawa-
harlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission and 
Rajiv Awas Yojana. India has also pioneered civil 
society and grassroots efforts to improve conditions 
for deprived urban dwellers, including a partner-
ship between the Society for the Promotion of Area 
Resource Centres, Mahila Milan, and the Indian 
National Slum Dwellers Association. To meet its 
urbanization challenge, India must not only address 
existing urban poverty but also create cities that can 
accommodate rapid urbanization and give even the 
poorest rural dwellers a fairer share of the benefits of 
economic growth.
Sources: Contributed by IIED and UNFPA.
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for urban development interventions has 
amounted to SDR 2.26 billion (US$3.5 bil-
lion). The AfDB has also invested in various 
other interventions that have played a role in 
improving the socioeconomic levels of both 
urban and rural populations, through such 
means as increased access to energy and 
transport facilities and in regional integra-
tion. Table 3A.1 illustrates some of the key 
results delivered in these areas in 2010–12.
The AfDB has also undertaken economic 
sector work, such as a study on the expan-
sion of Monrovia’s water supply and sanita-
tion system (SDR 1.5 million). Moreover, fol-
lowing its 2008 annual meetings in Maputo 
where the High-level Symposium addressed 
issues on urbanization, inequality, and pov-
erty in Africa,  in 2009 it embarked on a 
research program in partnership with the 
Swedish International Development Coop-
eration Authority aimed to yield knowledge 
products to assist AfDB staff and member 
countries in addressing urban development 
issues. A key product of this partnership is a 
book titled Fostering Shared Growth: Urban-
ization, Inequality and Poverty in Africa, 
due for publication in 2013.
An exemplary project illustrating the 
impact of AfDB’s projects on the lives of the 
urban poor is the poverty reduction project 
in Ghana (Box 3A.1). 
Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has 
sought to facilitate the structural transforma-
tion for successful urbanization by providing 
various financial and knowledge-based instru-
ments to its client countries. Of project financ-
ing identified for rural and urban development 
projects, approximately $3.3 billion was allo-
cated for urban development and $2.3 billion 
for rural development in 2012. In rural areas, 
the transport and information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) sectors received the 
most, at 45 percent in 2012; agriculture was 
well behind, with 25 percent of the total allo-
cation for rural development in 2012. In urban 
areas, transport and ICT is also the largest 
sector, receiving 35 percent of the total allo-
cation for urban projects; energy received 24 
percent, and water supply and other municipal 
services received 17 percent in 2012. Note that 
the ADB has slowly increased its allocation to 
support urban development from around 50 
percent in 2008 to close to 60 percent of a 
growing amount of total resources available 
for both areas of development.
East Asia: China and Mongolia 
Support for “urban-rural dynamics” in 
China and Mongolia is broadly in line with 
the ADB’s support for inclusive growth. ADB 
operations help address regional and urban-
rural disparities, improve rural livelihoods, 
and facilitate urbanization with job creation 
for migrant workers. 
In China, more than 90 percent of the 
ADB’s operations are focused on the lesser-
developed central, western, and northeastern 
regions to promote regionally balanced and 
integrated urban-rural development. Trans-
port operations have facilitated movement 
of people for better access to job opportuni-
ties and public services, particularly among 
migrant workers. Urban operations have 
supported integrated urban-rural infrastruc-
ture development and improvement of urban 
services, including provision of employ-
ment services and technical and vocational 
education and training. Natural resources 
and agriculture operations have supported 
biomass energy and water and natural 
resources protection, which help generate 
income and expand livelihood improvement 
opportunities. 
The Chinese government is accelerating 
its support of the development of the coun-
try’s small- and medium-size cities. The 
country’s macroeconomic urban strategy 
aims to rationalize the unbalanced urban 
structure at all levels of the urban hierarchy, 
which currently provides a weak base for 
supporting sustainable and inclusive develop-
ment. The approved loan amounts for urban 
development ranged from around $485 mil-
lion in 2008 to $350 million in 2012. These 
projects aim to enhance the development 
potential of small- and medium-size cities, 
thereby directly and indirectly providing 
support to reduce regional imbalances and 
income disparities between urban and rural 
areas. The ADB has been a close partner 
to the Chongqing Municipality, the first 
 provincial-level demonstration area for 
piloting urban-rural reforms in China. In 
2010, the first $100 million in funding for 
the Chongqing Urban-Rural Infrastructure 
Development Demonstration Project was 
approved to finance key infrastructure of 
urban-rural roads and small-scale potable 
water supply plants in eight poor districts 
and counties of Chongqing. In 2013, the 
ADB and the national government are work-
ing on a proposed $150 million loan proj-
ect for the second phase, which will further 
TABLE A3.1 AfDB’s deliverables in energy, transport, and regional integration, 2010–12 
Indicator  
Energy  
Length of transmission and distribution lines rehabilitated or installed (km) 13,129
Distribution substations and transformers constructed or rehabilitated (number) Forthcoming
Power capacity installed (MW) 780
Staff trained/recruited in the maintenance of energy facilities (number) 1,963
People with a new electricity connection (number) 203,602
Population benefiting from new electricity connections (people) 6,498,853
Transport  
Roads constructed, rehabilitated, or maintained (km) 15,695
Feeder roads constructed or rehabilitated (km) 7,994
Staff trained/recruited for road maintenance (number) 13,950
People educated in road safety and HIV transmission (people) 810,000
People with improved access to transport (people) 40,326,880
Regional integration  
Cross-border roads constructed or rehabilitated (km) 471
Cross-border transmission lines constructed or rehabilitated (km) 597
Source: AfDB 2013.
BOX 3A.1 Tackling urban poverty in Ghana
As urbanization has proliferated in Ghana, particu-
larly in the central and northern regions, the level 
of urban poverty has also been on the increase. An 
estimated 2 million urban dwellers in Ghana are clas-
sified as poor. In Accra alone, 45 percent of the pop-
ulation lives in the poorest neighborhoods and lack 
water, sanitation, and educational facilities. As a pilot 
country, Ghana benefited from the AfDB urban pov-
erty reduction project worth about $40.25 million. 
The objectives of this project were to develop 
urban settlements through participatory manage-
ment, job creation, and strengthened public-private 
partnerships and local governance and management 
capacity; improve living conditions in urban and peri-
urban zones by increasing access to basic quality ser-
vices and socioeconomic infrastructure; and facilitate 
access to income-generating activities through capac-
ity building and a strengthened urban small-scale 
enterprise sector. 
The project covered 12 metropolitan, municipal, 
and secondary towns with a total population of 4.45 
million. The expected benefits include improvement 
in the livelihoods of the urban poor through better 
access to good socioeconomic infrastructure, cre-
ation of 6,000 jobs for unemployed youth, and skills 
development training for at least 4,000 women. The 
project was expected to generate 350 urban and peri-
urban socioeconomic subprojects and 50 environ-
mental subprojects.
Source: AfDB 2011.
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transport facilities and in regional integra-
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results delivered in these areas in 2010–12.
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Asian Development Bank
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well behind, with 25 percent of the total allo-
cation for rural development in 2012. In urban 
areas, transport and ICT is also the largest 
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cation for urban projects; energy received 24 
percent, and water supply and other municipal 
services received 17 percent in 2012. Note that 
the ADB has slowly increased its allocation to 
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percent in 2008 to close to 60 percent of a 
growing amount of total resources available 
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and facilitate urbanization with job creation 
for migrant workers. 
In China, more than 90 percent of the 
ADB’s operations are focused on the lesser-
developed central, western, and northeastern 
regions to promote regionally balanced and 
integrated urban-rural development. Trans-
port operations have facilitated movement 
of people for better access to job opportuni-
ties and public services, particularly among 
migrant workers. Urban operations have 
supported integrated urban-rural infrastruc-
ture development and improvement of urban 
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opportunities. 
The Chinese government is accelerating 
its support of the development of the coun-
try’s small- and medium-size cities. The 
country’s macroeconomic urban strategy 
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structure at all levels of the urban hierarchy, 
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supporting sustainable and inclusive develop-
ment. The approved loan amounts for urban 
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lion in 2008 to $350 million in 2012. These 
projects aim to enhance the development 
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ity building and a strengthened urban small-scale 
enterprise sector. 
The project covered 12 metropolitan, municipal, 
and secondary towns with a total population of 4.45 
million. The expected benefits include improvement 
in the livelihoods of the urban poor through better 
access to good socioeconomic infrastructure, cre-
ation of 6,000 jobs for unemployed youth, and skills 
development training for at least 4,000 women. The 
project was expected to generate 350 urban and peri-
urban socioeconomic subprojects and 50 environ-
mental subprojects.
Source: AfDB 2011.
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demonstrate more balanced and inclusive 
urban-rural development in Chongqing. 
Mongolia’s population was 2.8 million in 
2011, including 1.3 million inhabitants of 
Ulaanbaatar City. Forty percent of Ulaan-
baatar’s population lives in the city core 
while 60 percent (approximately 800,000 
people, or about 30 percent of the national 
population) live in peri-urban, or ger, areas. 
During the past five years, the population 
of the country increased by about 220,000; 
all but 10,000 of these were in Ulaanbaatar 
City. In addition, the countryside population 
decreased dramatically while the populations 
of the aimag (provincial) capitals and other 
small cities remained almost stable. The pop-
ulation growth of Ulaanbaatar City mainly 
happens in the ger areas, which, despite their 
size, are considered temporary settlements 
and have never been formally integrated into 
the city development process or infrastruc-
ture programming. Thus, the continuing 
ger area densification and sprawl is putting 
tremendous pressure on the urban environ-
ment. The huge gap between services in the 
formal and ger areas remains one of the most 
difficult challenges for the government, espe-
cially as projections indicate that they will 
add another 350,000 people over the next 10 
years.
Approved loans for infrastructure in Mon-
golia during the past five years amounted to 
about $78.2 million. They included projects 
to improve water and other municipal infra-
structure and services in small towns in the 
southeast area of the Gobi Desert ($15 mil-
lion) and the improvement of urban transport 
in Ulaanbaatar City ($59.9 million). In 2011, 
a Public-Private Transportation Act was 
approved to prepare a multiannual financial 
framework for improving Ulaanbaatar City’s 
urban services and ger areas development.
Central and West Asia: Multisector 
assessment for Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan 
In addition to financial support, the ADB 
also provides analytical services to facilitate 
decision making by policy makers faced with 
urban and rural development challenges. 
For example, in Kazakhstan, the Country 
Partnership Strategy for 2012–16 includes a 
detailed sector assessment of urban transport 
and water and sanitation.3 In Uzbekistan, the 
Country Partnership Strategy for 2012–2016 
assessed issues surrounding water supply and 
sanitation, waste management, urban trans-
port, and other municipal services.4 
The urban regional technical assistance 
projects fostered the work of the Urban Com-
munity of Practice, one of the core knowl-
edge management areas of the ADB, and, in 
particular, the Cities Development Initiative 
for Asia (CDIA), an international partnership 
program assisting medium-size Asian cities 
to bridge the gap between their development 
plans and implementation of their infrastruc-
ture investments. The CDIA uses a demand-
driven approach to help identify and develop 
urban infrastructure investment projects in 
the framework of existing city development 
plans. These projects focus on urban environ-
mental improvement, urban poverty reduc-
tion and gender, climate change mitigation or 
adaptation, and improved governance.
To facilitate these initiatives, the CDIA 
provides a range of international and domes-
tic expertise and advice to help cities move 
from strategic master plans to concrete poli-
cies and infrastructure projects ready to pres-
ent to financiers and project developers. Core 
city-level CDIA activities include:
•   Advisory support for undertaking infra-
structure investment programming and 
prioritization.
•   Consultancy support for preparing prefea-
sibility studies on high priority infrastruc-
ture investment projects that demonstrate 
integration within a city’s overall develop-
ment process.
•   Identifying financial sources for selected 
investments from domestic and interna-
tional finance markets as well as opportu-
nities for public-private partnerships (PPPs).
•   Strengthening  local  institutional capac-
ity through on-the-job training related to 
infrastructure investment planning and 
programming and project management.
As of December 2012, the CDIA had 
approved applications from four cities in 
thirteen countries with a number of oth-
ers under consideration. These interventions 
are estimated to lead to about $6.5 billion in 
strategic urban infrastructure investments. 
In the current portfolio, urban transport is 
the largest CDIA sector, followed by flood 
and drainage management, urban renewal, 
and wastewater management. While the 
ADB and the KfW (German government–
owned development bank) are the primary 
downstream financiers, increasing emphasis 
is being placed on assisting cities to bring in 
additional financing through PPPs. Although 
the CDIA focuses on environmental improve-
ment, poverty reduction, and governance 
aspects, its work has invariably contrib-
uted to a wider set of cross-cutting impacts. 
Especially through capacity strengthening, 
the CDIA has contributed to improved gov-
ernance with city partner agencies (see also 
Linfield and Steinberg 2012). 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development
The activities of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
that address issues related to urbanization 
differ from those implemented by other mul-
tilateral development banks. The EBRD has a 
specific mandate that identifies the main goal 
as support for its member countries in their 
transition to market economies. Through 
a variety of products (both investment and 
technical co-operation) offered to private 
and public sector clients representing a range 
of different sectors, the EBRD therefore 
has a specific role that indirectly addresses 
the urbanization issue. This role involves 
improving the business environment and 
removing infrastructure bottlenecks, both of 
which are crucial in facilitating the urban-
ization process in EBRD’s 34 countries of 
operation. Examples include specifically tar-
geting micro, small, and medium enterprises 
in rural underserved areas for finance loans 
and supporting the involvement of farmers by 
extending backward linkages in agribusiness. 
The EBRD also plays an active role in 
helping put adequate infrastructure in place 
to facilitate changing urban-rural dynam-
ics and to minimize the negative impact of 
urbanization on cities. The EBRD’s activi-
ties in the water and wastewater sector aim 
at achieving an enhanced and sustainable 
provision of services to urban populations. 
These operations are based on sustainable 
cost-recovery tariff structures; the develop-
ment of robust regulatory approaches with a 
focus on the modernization of infrastructure; 
the promotion of appropriate environmental, 
social, health, and safety improvements that 
result in high-quality service delivery; and 
management efficiency. Since its inception, 
the EBRD has rapidly expanded its activities 
in the water and wastewater sectors through-
out its countries of operation. To date, EBRD 
has financed over 130 water and wastewater 
projects, for a total of e2 billion. 
Improvement in urban transport, in 
which the EBRD has been actively involved, 
is another essential component of facilitat-
ing urbanization processes. Urban transport 
has a unique ability to provide high-quality 
alternatives to use of private cars and is thus a 
viable antidote to urban congestion and pol-
lution, two negative consequences of urban-
ization. Urban transport provides value added 
to the urban environment and increases the 
general quality of life for the urban popula-
tion by improving air quality, reducing delays 
caused by congestion, and contributing to 
carbon reductions. The EBRD has financed 
more than 60 urban projects in different 
countries of operation, for a total of e1.4 
billion. The EBRD addresses complex issues 
related to a variety of existing bottlenecks in 
the urban transport sector by implementing 
an integrated approach that consists of invest-
ments, technical assistance aimed at improv-
ing management capabilities, and policy dia-
logue with local and national authorities to 
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demonstrate more balanced and inclusive 
urban-rural development in Chongqing. 
Mongolia’s population was 2.8 million in 
2011, including 1.3 million inhabitants of 
Ulaanbaatar City. Forty percent of Ulaan-
baatar’s population lives in the city core 
while 60 percent (approximately 800,000 
people, or about 30 percent of the national 
population) live in peri-urban, or ger, areas. 
During the past five years, the population 
of the country increased by about 220,000; 
all but 10,000 of these were in Ulaanbaatar 
City. In addition, the countryside population 
decreased dramatically while the populations 
of the aimag (provincial) capitals and other 
small cities remained almost stable. The pop-
ulation growth of Ulaanbaatar City mainly 
happens in the ger areas, which, despite their 
size, are considered temporary settlements 
and have never been formally integrated into 
the city development process or infrastruc-
ture programming. Thus, the continuing 
ger area densification and sprawl is putting 
tremendous pressure on the urban environ-
ment. The huge gap between services in the 
formal and ger areas remains one of the most 
difficult challenges for the government, espe-
cially as projections indicate that they will 
add another 350,000 people over the next 10 
years.
Approved loans for infrastructure in Mon-
golia during the past five years amounted to 
about $78.2 million. They included projects 
to improve water and other municipal infra-
structure and services in small towns in the 
southeast area of the Gobi Desert ($15 mil-
lion) and the improvement of urban transport 
in Ulaanbaatar City ($59.9 million). In 2011, 
a Public-Private Transportation Act was 
approved to prepare a multiannual financial 
framework for improving Ulaanbaatar City’s 
urban services and ger areas development.
Central and West Asia: Multisector 
assessment for Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan 
In addition to financial support, the ADB 
also provides analytical services to facilitate 
decision making by policy makers faced with 
urban and rural development challenges. 
For example, in Kazakhstan, the Country 
Partnership Strategy for 2012–16 includes a 
detailed sector assessment of urban transport 
and water and sanitation.3 In Uzbekistan, the 
Country Partnership Strategy for 2012–2016 
assessed issues surrounding water supply and 
sanitation, waste management, urban trans-
port, and other municipal services.4 
The urban regional technical assistance 
projects fostered the work of the Urban Com-
munity of Practice, one of the core knowl-
edge management areas of the ADB, and, in 
particular, the Cities Development Initiative 
for Asia (CDIA), an international partnership 
program assisting medium-size Asian cities 
to bridge the gap between their development 
plans and implementation of their infrastruc-
ture investments. The CDIA uses a demand-
driven approach to help identify and develop 
urban infrastructure investment projects in 
the framework of existing city development 
plans. These projects focus on urban environ-
mental improvement, urban poverty reduc-
tion and gender, climate change mitigation or 
adaptation, and improved governance.
To facilitate these initiatives, the CDIA 
provides a range of international and domes-
tic expertise and advice to help cities move 
from strategic master plans to concrete poli-
cies and infrastructure projects ready to pres-
ent to financiers and project developers. Core 
city-level CDIA activities include:
•   Advisory support for undertaking infra-
structure investment programming and 
prioritization.
•   Consultancy support for preparing prefea-
sibility studies on high priority infrastruc-
ture investment projects that demonstrate 
integration within a city’s overall develop-
ment process.
•   Identifying financial sources for selected 
investments from domestic and interna-
tional finance markets as well as opportu-
nities for public-private partnerships (PPPs).
•   Strengthening  local  institutional capac-
ity through on-the-job training related to 
infrastructure investment planning and 
programming and project management.
As of December 2012, the CDIA had 
approved applications from four cities in 
thirteen countries with a number of oth-
ers under consideration. These interventions 
are estimated to lead to about $6.5 billion in 
strategic urban infrastructure investments. 
In the current portfolio, urban transport is 
the largest CDIA sector, followed by flood 
and drainage management, urban renewal, 
and wastewater management. While the 
ADB and the KfW (German government–
owned development bank) are the primary 
downstream financiers, increasing emphasis 
is being placed on assisting cities to bring in 
additional financing through PPPs. Although 
the CDIA focuses on environmental improve-
ment, poverty reduction, and governance 
aspects, its work has invariably contrib-
uted to a wider set of cross-cutting impacts. 
Especially through capacity strengthening, 
the CDIA has contributed to improved gov-
ernance with city partner agencies (see also 
Linfield and Steinberg 2012). 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development
The activities of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
that address issues related to urbanization 
differ from those implemented by other mul-
tilateral development banks. The EBRD has a 
specific mandate that identifies the main goal 
as support for its member countries in their 
transition to market economies. Through 
a variety of products (both investment and 
technical co-operation) offered to private 
and public sector clients representing a range 
of different sectors, the EBRD therefore 
has a specific role that indirectly addresses 
the urbanization issue. This role involves 
improving the business environment and 
removing infrastructure bottlenecks, both of 
which are crucial in facilitating the urban-
ization process in EBRD’s 34 countries of 
operation. Examples include specifically tar-
geting micro, small, and medium enterprises 
in rural underserved areas for finance loans 
and supporting the involvement of farmers by 
extending backward linkages in agribusiness. 
The EBRD also plays an active role in 
helping put adequate infrastructure in place 
to facilitate changing urban-rural dynam-
ics and to minimize the negative impact of 
urbanization on cities. The EBRD’s activi-
ties in the water and wastewater sector aim 
at achieving an enhanced and sustainable 
provision of services to urban populations. 
These operations are based on sustainable 
cost-recovery tariff structures; the develop-
ment of robust regulatory approaches with a 
focus on the modernization of infrastructure; 
the promotion of appropriate environmental, 
social, health, and safety improvements that 
result in high-quality service delivery; and 
management efficiency. Since its inception, 
the EBRD has rapidly expanded its activities 
in the water and wastewater sectors through-
out its countries of operation. To date, EBRD 
has financed over 130 water and wastewater 
projects, for a total of e2 billion. 
Improvement in urban transport, in 
which the EBRD has been actively involved, 
is another essential component of facilitat-
ing urbanization processes. Urban transport 
has a unique ability to provide high-quality 
alternatives to use of private cars and is thus a 
viable antidote to urban congestion and pol-
lution, two negative consequences of urban-
ization. Urban transport provides value added 
to the urban environment and increases the 
general quality of life for the urban popula-
tion by improving air quality, reducing delays 
caused by congestion, and contributing to 
carbon reductions. The EBRD has financed 
more than 60 urban projects in different 
countries of operation, for a total of e1.4 
billion. The EBRD addresses complex issues 
related to a variety of existing bottlenecks in 
the urban transport sector by implementing 
an integrated approach that consists of invest-
ments, technical assistance aimed at improv-
ing management capabilities, and policy dia-
logue with local and national authorities to 
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strengthen the regulatory and institutional 
framework (box 3A.2). 
Inter-American Development 
Bank
The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) established an Emerging and Sustain-
able  Cities Initiative (ESCI) in 2011, since 
urbanization is taking place at a very fast 
pace in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Urbanization in the region rose from 62 per-
cent in 1980 to 81 percent in 2011, making 
it the second most urbanized region in the 
world. If this trend continues, in 20 years 
90 percent or more of the region’s popula-
tion will be living in cities. Although mega-
cities are more prevalent in Latin America 
than in developing countries in other regions, 
it is now intermediate-size cities that are 
growing the fastest (Lora 2010). This pace of 
urbanization is creating daunting challenges 
for intermediate and emerging cities in the 
region.5
These emerging cities are still character-
ized by unacceptably high proportions of 
the population living in poverty, with lim-
ited governance and an enduring scarcity 
of resources. The challenges are multiplied 
when considering the efforts of cities to cope 
and adapt with the adverse effects of climate 
change. Events such as flooding and storm 
surge increasingly impact cities in the region, 
generating significant economic losses. Politi-
cal decentralization has advanced substan-
tially in the region over the last two decades. 
Local governments have assumed greater 
responsibilities for the provision of social 
services. However, fiscal decentralization 
has not kept pace, and most municipalities 
are not fiscally independent and do not man-
age their fiscal affairs well. They have very 
limited fiscal space to accommodate neces-
sary investments in sustainability, and in 
most cases are not creditworthy partners to 
the private sector (PPPs transactions). Their 
capacities to improve the quality of life of 
their citizens are limited. 
Emerging and Sustainable Cities 
Initiative
The first phase of the Emerging and Sus-
tainable Cities Initiative (ESCI), launched 
in 2011, was a pilot test to develop ESCI’s 
methodology and its application in five cities: 
Goiania in Brazil; Santa Ana in El Salvador; 
Trujillo in Peru; Port-of-Spain in Trinidad 
and Tobago; and Montevideo in Uruguay.  
In February 2012, the Bank’s Board of 
Directors approved the second phase of the 
ESCI, which includes scaling up of the pro-
gram to a total of 26 cities in the region 
between 2012 and 2015. The purpose of 
the Initiative is to improve the sustainability 
and quality of life in emerging cities in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The Initiative 
provides a set of tools that intermediate cit-
ies can use to identify key bottlenecks they 
may face in their path toward sustainability; 
weigh and prioritize the identified problems 
to guide investment decisions in the sectors 
that may generate more positive impacts; 
find specific solutions according to their cost-
benefit that would pave the way toward sus-
tainability (“prioritized interventions”); and 
follow up on progress in closing gaps and 
reaching goals. 
The Init iat ive works in three key 
dimensions:
•   The environmental and climate change 
dimension is concerned with environmen-
tal management and local pollution control 
issues (including air and water contamina-
tion, solid waste management, and disas-
ter prevention), climate change mitigation 
(through energy efficiency and other mea-
sures), and climate vulnerability reduction 
and adaptation measures. 
•   The urban development dimension refers 
to the effects of the city’s design and foot-
print (or its ability to control its growth 
through effective planning and land use 
control), social inequality and uneven dis-
tribution of urban services, efficiency of its 
urban transportation network, economic 
competitiveness, and the level of public 
safety. 
•   The  fiscal  sustainability  dimension  is 
related to the ability of local governments 
to prioritize and finance needed invest-
ments, fund and maintain their urban and 
social services, control adequately their 
expenditures and debt, and make decisions 
in a transparent manner. 
ESCI’s methodology 
Deployment of the Initiative in cities con-
sists of two distinct stages. The first stage 
involves the development of an action plan, 
which begins with data collection, analysis 
and diagnosis, and prioritization through the 
application of different filters (environmental, 
economic, public opinion, expert opinion). 
The IDB ensures support for generation of 
expertise and diffusion of innovative experi-
ences among the cities’ governments. 
The IDB, together with McKinsey & 
Company, has developed a rapid assessment 
diagnostic tool that analyzes 150 indicators 
BOX 3A.2 The EBRD’s integrated approach to transition challenges in Almaty’s urban 
transport sector
Fueled by a number of factors, including economic, 
social, and structural changes in Kazakhstan over the 
past decade, the population of Almaty, the country’s 
largest city, has been steadily growing. This growth is 
in large part a result of internal migration of the work-
force from rural areas. The population of Almaty is 
expected to reach 1.6 million before 2015, up from 1.1 
million in 2000. In the urban transport sector, popu-
lation growth has been punctuated by a steady rise in 
private car usage, which subsequently led to a change 
in Almaty’s transport pattern. The car fleet in circula-
tion increased from 218,000 in 2003 to 560,000 in 
2011. Greater reliance on cars has increased road con-
gestion, and air quality in Almaty has been severely 
affected by pollution from traffic, and in particular, 
by emissions resulting from the use of low-quality 
fuel, a badly maintained and outdated private car 
fleet, and ever increasing congestion compounded by 
insufficient road management. In general, there has 
been an underinvestment in public transport solutions 
and traffic and parking management; institutional 
weaknesses and deficiencies in regulatory frameworks 
have also been identified as issues detrimental to the 
effective development of urban transport. 
To address these complex challenges, the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) is pursuing an integrated approach to the 
urban transport sector in Almaty involving invest-
ments in target projects coupled with extensive 
technical cooperation and policy dialogue activities. 
Together, these activities aim at setting new standards 
for service quality in public transport, establishing a 
solid foundation for the introduction of a new regula-
tory framework in the sector, and integrating private 
operators into a single client-oriented system with sig-
nificantly improved service standards. To address the 
growing traffic problems and increasing dependence 
on private car usage, the EBRD’s investments aim at 
increasing the capacity and standards of public trans-
port services as an alternative to car usage and pro-
viding an overall balanced approach to urban mobil-
ity with viable travel choices for users. The investment 
projects include major investments in a modernized, 
clean urban bus and trolleybus fleet to provide a cost 
benchmark to the private sector. Finally, an integrated 
e-ticketing system operated under a build-operate-
transfer concession will be implemented across all 
public transport services to allow for network benefits 
(that is, increased ridership spurred by free transport 
modal transfers) to accrue to the operators.
The EBRD’s policy dialogue will focus on institu-
tional development of the sector in Almaty and will 
include, among other activities, design and imple-
mentation of a robust regulatory approach through 
creation of a new urban transport authority; improve-
ments in the contractual agreements to enable financ-
ing investments by private operators; and introduc-
tion of an integrated electronic fare collection system. 
In parallel, the EBRD’s efforts will be complemented 
by assistance from the World Bank and the United 
Nations Development Programme to support the city 
in developing a computer-based traffic model, a new 
comprehensive route scheme, and carbon emission 
reduction assessment methodologies for the sector, 
all of which will help to improve the functioning of 
and benefits produced by the transport sector. It is 
expected that the EBRD’s activities in urban trans-
port in Almaty, in close collaboration with other 
international financial institutions, will contribute to 
creating efficient and effective market mechanisms in 
this sector and help mitigate negative consequences of 
urbanization in Almaty.
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strengthen the regulatory and institutional 
framework (box 3A.2). 
Inter-American Development 
Bank
The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) established an Emerging and Sustain-
able  Cities Initiative (ESCI) in 2011, since 
urbanization is taking place at a very fast 
pace in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Urbanization in the region rose from 62 per-
cent in 1980 to 81 percent in 2011, making 
it the second most urbanized region in the 
world. If this trend continues, in 20 years 
90 percent or more of the region’s popula-
tion will be living in cities. Although mega-
cities are more prevalent in Latin America 
than in developing countries in other regions, 
it is now intermediate-size cities that are 
growing the fastest (Lora 2010). This pace of 
urbanization is creating daunting challenges 
for intermediate and emerging cities in the 
region.5
These emerging cities are still character-
ized by unacceptably high proportions of 
the population living in poverty, with lim-
ited governance and an enduring scarcity 
of resources. The challenges are multiplied 
when considering the efforts of cities to cope 
and adapt with the adverse effects of climate 
change. Events such as flooding and storm 
surge increasingly impact cities in the region, 
generating significant economic losses. Politi-
cal decentralization has advanced substan-
tially in the region over the last two decades. 
Local governments have assumed greater 
responsibilities for the provision of social 
services. However, fiscal decentralization 
has not kept pace, and most municipalities 
are not fiscally independent and do not man-
age their fiscal affairs well. They have very 
limited fiscal space to accommodate neces-
sary investments in sustainability, and in 
most cases are not creditworthy partners to 
the private sector (PPPs transactions). Their 
capacities to improve the quality of life of 
their citizens are limited. 
Emerging and Sustainable Cities 
Initiative
The first phase of the Emerging and Sus-
tainable Cities Initiative (ESCI), launched 
in 2011, was a pilot test to develop ESCI’s 
methodology and its application in five cities: 
Goiania in Brazil; Santa Ana in El Salvador; 
Trujillo in Peru; Port-of-Spain in Trinidad 
and Tobago; and Montevideo in Uruguay.  
In February 2012, the Bank’s Board of 
Directors approved the second phase of the 
ESCI, which includes scaling up of the pro-
gram to a total of 26 cities in the region 
between 2012 and 2015. The purpose of 
the Initiative is to improve the sustainability 
and quality of life in emerging cities in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The Initiative 
provides a set of tools that intermediate cit-
ies can use to identify key bottlenecks they 
may face in their path toward sustainability; 
weigh and prioritize the identified problems 
to guide investment decisions in the sectors 
that may generate more positive impacts; 
find specific solutions according to their cost-
benefit that would pave the way toward sus-
tainability (“prioritized interventions”); and 
follow up on progress in closing gaps and 
reaching goals. 
The Init iat ive works in three key 
dimensions:
•   The environmental and climate change 
dimension is concerned with environmen-
tal management and local pollution control 
issues (including air and water contamina-
tion, solid waste management, and disas-
ter prevention), climate change mitigation 
(through energy efficiency and other mea-
sures), and climate vulnerability reduction 
and adaptation measures. 
•   The urban development dimension refers 
to the effects of the city’s design and foot-
print (or its ability to control its growth 
through effective planning and land use 
control), social inequality and uneven dis-
tribution of urban services, efficiency of its 
urban transportation network, economic 
competitiveness, and the level of public 
safety. 
•   The  fiscal  sustainability  dimension  is 
related to the ability of local governments 
to prioritize and finance needed invest-
ments, fund and maintain their urban and 
social services, control adequately their 
expenditures and debt, and make decisions 
in a transparent manner. 
ESCI’s methodology 
Deployment of the Initiative in cities con-
sists of two distinct stages. The first stage 
involves the development of an action plan, 
which begins with data collection, analysis 
and diagnosis, and prioritization through the 
application of different filters (environmental, 
economic, public opinion, expert opinion). 
The IDB ensures support for generation of 
expertise and diffusion of innovative experi-
ences among the cities’ governments. 
The IDB, together with McKinsey & 
Company, has developed a rapid assessment 
diagnostic tool that analyzes 150 indicators 
BOX 3A.2 The EBRD’s integrated approach to transition challenges in Almaty’s urban 
transport sector
Fueled by a number of factors, including economic, 
social, and structural changes in Kazakhstan over the 
past decade, the population of Almaty, the country’s 
largest city, has been steadily growing. This growth is 
in large part a result of internal migration of the work-
force from rural areas. The population of Almaty is 
expected to reach 1.6 million before 2015, up from 1.1 
million in 2000. In the urban transport sector, popu-
lation growth has been punctuated by a steady rise in 
private car usage, which subsequently led to a change 
in Almaty’s transport pattern. The car fleet in circula-
tion increased from 218,000 in 2003 to 560,000 in 
2011. Greater reliance on cars has increased road con-
gestion, and air quality in Almaty has been severely 
affected by pollution from traffic, and in particular, 
by emissions resulting from the use of low-quality 
fuel, a badly maintained and outdated private car 
fleet, and ever increasing congestion compounded by 
insufficient road management. In general, there has 
been an underinvestment in public transport solutions 
and traffic and parking management; institutional 
weaknesses and deficiencies in regulatory frameworks 
have also been identified as issues detrimental to the 
effective development of urban transport. 
To address these complex challenges, the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) is pursuing an integrated approach to the 
urban transport sector in Almaty involving invest-
ments in target projects coupled with extensive 
technical cooperation and policy dialogue activities. 
Together, these activities aim at setting new standards 
for service quality in public transport, establishing a 
solid foundation for the introduction of a new regula-
tory framework in the sector, and integrating private 
operators into a single client-oriented system with sig-
nificantly improved service standards. To address the 
growing traffic problems and increasing dependence 
on private car usage, the EBRD’s investments aim at 
increasing the capacity and standards of public trans-
port services as an alternative to car usage and pro-
viding an overall balanced approach to urban mobil-
ity with viable travel choices for users. The investment 
projects include major investments in a modernized, 
clean urban bus and trolleybus fleet to provide a cost 
benchmark to the private sector. Finally, an integrated 
e-ticketing system operated under a build-operate-
transfer concession will be implemented across all 
public transport services to allow for network benefits 
(that is, increased ridership spurred by free transport 
modal transfers) to accrue to the operators.
The EBRD’s policy dialogue will focus on institu-
tional development of the sector in Almaty and will 
include, among other activities, design and imple-
mentation of a robust regulatory approach through 
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ments in the contractual agreements to enable financ-
ing investments by private operators; and introduc-
tion of an integrated electronic fare collection system. 
In parallel, the EBRD’s efforts will be complemented 
by assistance from the World Bank and the United 
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reduction assessment methodologies for the sector, 
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expected that the EBRD’s activities in urban trans-
port in Almaty, in close collaboration with other 
international financial institutions, will contribute to 
creating efficient and effective market mechanisms in 
this sector and help mitigate negative consequences of 
urbanization in Almaty.
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and provides, in a period of six months, a 
comprehensive diagnostic of a city’s situation 
with regard to the three dimensions of inter-
est. The diagnostic is followed by a prioriti-
zation process that includes extensive consul-
tation with civil society, academia, and local 
government as well as a public survey among 
citizens. This exercise leads to the develop-
ment of an Action Plan, including key strate-
gic interventions. 
Once the action plan is developed and 
agreed among local stakeholders, the second 
stage—execution of the plan—begins. The 
Initiative assists in the design and develop-
ment of the pre-investment components of 
at least one priority intervention as well as 
in the mobilization of financing from differ-
ent sources (such as the public sector bud-
get, private sector capital through PPPs, and 
commercial bank financing). The execution 
phase also includes the implementation of 
a monitoring system through the participa-
tion of local nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), the private sector, and academia. 
The IDB has established a Special Fund 
($25 million) to support provision of non-
reimbursable technical assistance to cities 
adopting the ESCI methodology. The fund-
ing covers the development of all the phases 
in the ESCI methodology. 
The World Bank
The World Bank has maintained a large 
presence in the area of rural and urban 
development. Recently, it has scaled up its 
knowledge-based services regarding urban-
ization, in particular through the Urbaniza-
tion Knowledge Platform, which focuses on 
collaboratively building the evidence base for 
sustainable urban development.
Effectively managing the rapid change 
associated with urbanization is no easy task. 
And the risks are high, because many of the 
decisions that city leaders make today may 
lock cities onto a path of development that 
proves unsustainable. To help cities avoid this 
fate and harness urbanization for sustainable 
and inclusive growth, institutions like the 
World Bank must be more than producers of 
knowledge—they must also be customizers, 
connecters, and catalysts for knowledge. That 
means translating global evidence and best 
practices into local solutions. It means con-
necting cities with one another to exchange 
best practices and learn from one another. 
And it means catalyzing new research by 
making data openly available to the public, 
so that others can validate conclusions, build 
from the findings, and contribute to develop-
ment solutions.
To put this approach into action for cities, 
the World Bank launched a global knowledge 
partnership around the transformational 
topic of urbanization in 2011. The Urbaniza-
tion Knowledge Platform (UKP) seeks to con-
vene and connect city leaders, national policy 
makers, academia, the private and third-
party sector, and development agencies from 
around the world to co-create and customize 
new insights on the most pressing challenges 
and opportunities faced by cities. Its mission 
is to put the world’s best knowledge and data 
in the hands of policy makers so that they 
can better harness urban growth for sustain-
able and inclusive development.
The UKP began its activities by convening 
and cohosting more than 20 high-level policy 
consultations and knowledge exchanges in 
partnership with local think tanks, regional 
teams, and policy makers in 14 countries 
on 5 continents. Collectively, these events 
consulted more than 800 city leaders and 
4,000 other stakeholders to facilitate exten-
sive South-to-South knowledge exchange, 
convene regional stakeholders around com-
mon challenges, and lay the groundwork for 
future partnerships to jointly fill knowledge 
gaps. For instance, the platform facilitated 
regional knowledge exchanges among may-
ors for shared learning, including forming a 
community of city leaders from 8 countries 
in South Asia for unprecedented city-to-city 
learning that sidestepped inactive coopera-
tion at national levels. And it nurtured global 
PPPs of more than 60 organizations to help 
harness the promise of “smart city” and 
“smart climate” innovations tailored to the 
needs of low-income countries. 
Crucially, these global exchanges also led 
to the identification of the most pressing chal-
lenges and opportunities facing cities. The 
city leaders consulted through the Platform 
asked the World Bank: What must be done to 
create jobs? What must be done to improve 
living conditions in slums and hazard-prone 
areas and to bridge the social divide? What 
must be done to expand the coverage and 
quality of basic services? 
So what has been learned to date? First, 
there are no straightforward answers to these 
questions, and the evidence base on many of 
these issues is filled with critical knowledge 
gaps. But the UKP’s discussions with hun-
dreds of city leaders from around the world 
also taught that, while all cities are unique, 
the challenges they face are remarkably simi-
lar, even across stages of development—with 
shared issues ranging from climate change 
to social inclusion. That means that “know 
how” and solutions are transferable—that 
the lessons learned from one city can, and 
should, inform the choices of cities on the 
other side of the planet. In other words, while 
there is no single blueprint for success, it is 
the case that some countries and cities have 
been more successful than others. There is 
a need, therefore, for new and expanding cit-
ies of today to learn what worked and what 
did not from those that have gone before 
and to collaborate on common solutions to 
shared problems informed by the evidence. 
Such shared learning and collaboration has 
been obstructed by a lack of facilitating 
global public goods (such as forums, knowl-
edge platforms, and open data). The World 
Bank through the UKP aims to help fill this 
gap and to play the role of knowledge broker.
Second, most cities face not just a single 
bottleneck to sustainable development but 
a wide range of challenges that require inte-
grated solutions and tight policy coordination 
across multiple agencies, jurisdictions, and 
disciplines that do not always have a natu-
ral incentive to collaborate. Most obviously, 
rapid urbanization has caused urban centers 
to spread beyond city boundaries and across 
disparate local governments that often fail 
to coordinate their actions, making it diffi-
cult to take a strategic approach to manag-
ing urban growth. A lack of sufficient policy 
coordination similarly hinders progress on 
several other aspects of urban development. 
For instance, UKP-led discussions and follow-
on research by Professors Paul Collier and 
Tony Venables on the persistence of informal 
settlements demonstrate that no single root 
cause explains the failure to deliver afford-
able housing. Rather, a number of inter-
related impediments need to be addressed 
through integrated action across disparate 
policy domains—from financing to housing 
regulations to the cost of construction mate-
rials—because isolated progress on any one 
bottleneck will be of limited impact if the oth-
ers continue to bind. For urban knowledge 
generators and development practitioners to 
help, they must lead by example by leveraging 
platforms like the UKP to collaborate across 
disciplines and sectors to build integrated 
solutions to urban challenges.
Third, the number one obstacle to provid-
ing city leaders with a fact-based understand-
ing of their challenges and opportunities is 
the poor quality and tremendous fragmen-
tation of city-level data. In fact, while many 
policy decisions are made and implemented 
at the local level, most statistical information 
is collected at the national level. As a result, 
more reliable data are available today on, 
say, the island-nation of Fiji—with a popu-
lation of 860,000—than for the megacities 
of Delhi, Rio de Janeiro, or Shanghai, which 
each have populations in excess of 10 million. 
This imbalance creates an enormous mis-
match between the scale at which informa-
tion is available and the level at which urban 
development is conducted, and significantly 
constrains the growth of cumulative urban 
knowledge generation across countries, 
regions, and disciplines. To address this issue 
and respond to the overwhelming demand of 
its members and participants, the UKP has 
partnered with the Swiss government to, for 
the first time, systematically bring together 
and visualize data on cities for global bench-
marking and evidence-based decision mak-
ing. The goal is to work with cities and part-
ners to harmonize, standardize, consolidate, 
and open-source city data to form a robust 
global evidence base on the challenges and 
opportunities faced by cities.
The World Bank through the UKP is com-
mitted to facilitating this shared learning 
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and provides, in a period of six months, a 
comprehensive diagnostic of a city’s situation 
with regard to the three dimensions of inter-
est. The diagnostic is followed by a prioriti-
zation process that includes extensive consul-
tation with civil society, academia, and local 
government as well as a public survey among 
citizens. This exercise leads to the develop-
ment of an Action Plan, including key strate-
gic interventions. 
Once the action plan is developed and 
agreed among local stakeholders, the second 
stage—execution of the plan—begins. The 
Initiative assists in the design and develop-
ment of the pre-investment components of 
at least one priority intervention as well as 
in the mobilization of financing from differ-
ent sources (such as the public sector bud-
get, private sector capital through PPPs, and 
commercial bank financing). The execution 
phase also includes the implementation of 
a monitoring system through the participa-
tion of local nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), the private sector, and academia. 
The IDB has established a Special Fund 
($25 million) to support provision of non-
reimbursable technical assistance to cities 
adopting the ESCI methodology. The fund-
ing covers the development of all the phases 
in the ESCI methodology. 
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ization, in particular through the Urbaniza-
tion Knowledge Platform, which focuses on 
collaboratively building the evidence base for 
sustainable urban development.
Effectively managing the rapid change 
associated with urbanization is no easy task. 
And the risks are high, because many of the 
decisions that city leaders make today may 
lock cities onto a path of development that 
proves unsustainable. To help cities avoid this 
fate and harness urbanization for sustainable 
and inclusive growth, institutions like the 
World Bank must be more than producers of 
knowledge—they must also be customizers, 
connecters, and catalysts for knowledge. That 
means translating global evidence and best 
practices into local solutions. It means con-
necting cities with one another to exchange 
best practices and learn from one another. 
And it means catalyzing new research by 
making data openly available to the public, 
so that others can validate conclusions, build 
from the findings, and contribute to develop-
ment solutions.
To put this approach into action for cities, 
the World Bank launched a global knowledge 
partnership around the transformational 
topic of urbanization in 2011. The Urbaniza-
tion Knowledge Platform (UKP) seeks to con-
vene and connect city leaders, national policy 
makers, academia, the private and third-
party sector, and development agencies from 
around the world to co-create and customize 
new insights on the most pressing challenges 
and opportunities faced by cities. Its mission 
is to put the world’s best knowledge and data 
in the hands of policy makers so that they 
can better harness urban growth for sustain-
able and inclusive development.
The UKP began its activities by convening 
and cohosting more than 20 high-level policy 
consultations and knowledge exchanges in 
partnership with local think tanks, regional 
teams, and policy makers in 14 countries 
on 5 continents. Collectively, these events 
consulted more than 800 city leaders and 
4,000 other stakeholders to facilitate exten-
sive South-to-South knowledge exchange, 
convene regional stakeholders around com-
mon challenges, and lay the groundwork for 
future partnerships to jointly fill knowledge 
gaps. For instance, the platform facilitated 
regional knowledge exchanges among may-
ors for shared learning, including forming a 
community of city leaders from 8 countries 
in South Asia for unprecedented city-to-city 
learning that sidestepped inactive coopera-
tion at national levels. And it nurtured global 
PPPs of more than 60 organizations to help 
harness the promise of “smart city” and 
“smart climate” innovations tailored to the 
needs of low-income countries. 
Crucially, these global exchanges also led 
to the identification of the most pressing chal-
lenges and opportunities facing cities. The 
city leaders consulted through the Platform 
asked the World Bank: What must be done to 
create jobs? What must be done to improve 
living conditions in slums and hazard-prone 
areas and to bridge the social divide? What 
must be done to expand the coverage and 
quality of basic services? 
So what has been learned to date? First, 
there are no straightforward answers to these 
questions, and the evidence base on many of 
these issues is filled with critical knowledge 
gaps. But the UKP’s discussions with hun-
dreds of city leaders from around the world 
also taught that, while all cities are unique, 
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lar, even across stages of development—with 
shared issues ranging from climate change 
to social inclusion. That means that “know 
how” and solutions are transferable—that 
the lessons learned from one city can, and 
should, inform the choices of cities on the 
other side of the planet. In other words, while 
there is no single blueprint for success, it is 
the case that some countries and cities have 
been more successful than others. There is 
a need, therefore, for new and expanding cit-
ies of today to learn what worked and what 
did not from those that have gone before 
and to collaborate on common solutions to 
shared problems informed by the evidence. 
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been obstructed by a lack of facilitating 
global public goods (such as forums, knowl-
edge platforms, and open data). The World 
Bank through the UKP aims to help fill this 
gap and to play the role of knowledge broker.
Second, most cities face not just a single 
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disciplines that do not always have a natu-
ral incentive to collaborate. Most obviously, 
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to spread beyond city boundaries and across 
disparate local governments that often fail 
to coordinate their actions, making it diffi-
cult to take a strategic approach to manag-
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coordination similarly hinders progress on 
several other aspects of urban development. 
For instance, UKP-led discussions and follow-
on research by Professors Paul Collier and 
Tony Venables on the persistence of informal 
settlements demonstrate that no single root 
cause explains the failure to deliver afford-
able housing. Rather, a number of inter-
related impediments need to be addressed 
through integrated action across disparate 
policy domains—from financing to housing 
regulations to the cost of construction mate-
rials—because isolated progress on any one 
bottleneck will be of limited impact if the oth-
ers continue to bind. For urban knowledge 
generators and development practitioners to 
help, they must lead by example by leveraging 
platforms like the UKP to collaborate across 
disciplines and sectors to build integrated 
solutions to urban challenges.
Third, the number one obstacle to provid-
ing city leaders with a fact-based understand-
ing of their challenges and opportunities is 
the poor quality and tremendous fragmen-
tation of city-level data. In fact, while many 
policy decisions are made and implemented 
at the local level, most statistical information 
is collected at the national level. As a result, 
more reliable data are available today on, 
say, the island-nation of Fiji—with a popu-
lation of 860,000—than for the megacities 
of Delhi, Rio de Janeiro, or Shanghai, which 
each have populations in excess of 10 million. 
This imbalance creates an enormous mis-
match between the scale at which informa-
tion is available and the level at which urban 
development is conducted, and significantly 
constrains the growth of cumulative urban 
knowledge generation across countries, 
regions, and disciplines. To address this issue 
and respond to the overwhelming demand of 
its members and participants, the UKP has 
partnered with the Swiss government to, for 
the first time, systematically bring together 
and visualize data on cities for global bench-
marking and evidence-based decision mak-
ing. The goal is to work with cities and part-
ners to harmonize, standardize, consolidate, 
and open-source city data to form a robust 
global evidence base on the challenges and 
opportunities faced by cities.
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across cities. But the Bank cannot do this 
alone. The key is for the urban community 
to come together to build a global pool of 
experience and evidence that all can draw 
and build from to better inform the tough 
and often irreversible decisions that city lead-
ers need to make to harness urbanization for 
sustainable development. 
Other organizations
Various bilateral agencies and United Nations 
(UN) agencies have also undertaken initia-
tives to assist urbanization. Such efforts 
include several led by the UN Population 
Fund (box A3.3) and a joint effort by various 
bilateral and multilateral institutions, known 
as the Cities Alliance (box A3.4).
Notes
1.  In the United States, transaction taxes are 
around 1–2 percent of property values.






5.  Emerging cities are defined as cities with popu-
lations of 100,000 to 2,500,000 that are grow-
ing—economically and demographically—
faster than the national average. Currently, 
more than 140 cities, with a total population of 
about 70 million inhabitants, fit that definition. 
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BOX 3A.3 UNFPA’s work on urbanization
Urbanization in the BRICS. The United Nations Pop-
ulation Fund (UNFPA) and the International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED) have col-
laborated for the past four years on a wide-ranging 
knowledge-building project focusing on urbanization 
in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa). These five countries provide some inspir-
ing examples of how to seize the opportunities that 
urbanization can provide. All have gone through dif-
ficult periods when they tried to resist the predictable 
movement of people into their cities, or steered people 
or enterprises to inappropriate urban locations. Sev-
eral of the BRICS bear heavy burdens from past fail-
ures to accommodate urban population growth equi-
tably and efficiently. To avoid such burdens, cities and 
nations need to plan proactively for urban growth, 
making use of both markets and planning tools, and 
engaging with all sectors of society, including the eco-
nomically and politically weakest. 
Urbanization and gender dynamics. UNFPA also 
partnered with IIED to develop the conceptual and 
empirical foundations of the links between urban-
ization and gender dynamics. For example, a recent 
working paper highlights the tendency to plan 
against, rather than for, low-income urban residents 
and its implications from a gender perspective. This 
planning does not exclude the urban poor from 
income-generating activities but makes it difficult for 
them to secure decent living conditions. In so doing, 
inadequate urban policies place a disproportionate 
burden on reproduction rather than on production 
activities, and on women rather than men. A gen-
dered understanding of urbanization and urban pov-
erty highlights how urban disadvantage also includes 
limited access to shelter and basic services. 
Urbanization, climate vulnerability, and adaptation 
planning. The UNFPA’s work in this area points to 
the vital role that understanding population dynamics 
and extensively using demographic data has in devel-
oping preemptive and effective adaptation policies 
and practices. It also illuminates who is vulnerable 
and how to help build their resilience.
POPClimate web platform. Spatial analysis of pop-
ulation data is at the core of understanding and 
acting on climate vulnerability, particularly in high-
concentration, high-exposure urban areas where vul-
nerability is dynamic and climate impacts threaten 
the lives and livelihoods of many. The POPClimate 
web platform was developed around UNFPA’s man-
ual on the analysis of census data for climate adapta-
tion planning and was designed to bring together a 
community of data users, climate practitioners, and 
adaptation planners who can develop, share, and 
comment on new approaches for data-driven adap-
tation planning. The website is open to select users 
now and has been launched publicly (http://nijel.org 
/un_popclimate/).
Other UNFPA initiatives on urbanization. UNFPA 
contributed to the development of the World Bank’s 
Urban Risk Assessment methodology, particularly 
focusing on the importance of a dynamic understand-
ing of risk and vulnerability that integrates urban 
growth and change. It is also engaged in with IIED to 
come up with more innovative ways to manage densi-
ties in cities and is conducting joint research in the 
field of urban food security.
Source: UNFPA 2013.
BOX 3A.4 Cities Alliance: A new business model to promote systemic change and scale
The Cities Alliance is a global partnership whose 
members include multilateral and bilateral develop-
ment agencies, donor and developing-country gov-
ernments, international associations of local gov-
ernment, and two international nongovernmental 
organizations, one of which represents slum dwell-
ers. Launched by the World Bank and UN-Habitat in 
1999, the Cities Alliance was immediately successful 
in ensuring that the issue of slums was integrated into 
the international development agenda. Today, work-
ing through its members, the Cities Alliance seeks 
to strengthen and promote the role of cities in pov-
erty reduction and sustainable development, improve 
synergies between and among members and part-
ners, and improve the quality of urban development 
cooperation.
Good urban policies need to be based on solid 
data, the generation of which the Cities Alliance has 
supported: from the sophisticated and comprehensive 
HABISP model in São Paulo,a which provides com-
prehensive information on housing and other socio-
economic conditions of the urban poor, to the Know 
Your City campaign, which sees that slum dwellers 
collaborate with their local governments to find solu-
tions to problems faced by slum dwellers. 
To help its partners better respond to the chal-
lenges of urbanization, the Cities Alliance recently 
completely restructured its organization, adopted a 
new charter, and changed its business model. Moving 
decisively away from single, often ad hoc projects, the 
Cities Alliance used a $15 million grant from the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation to move the fulcrum 
of its work program to longer-term, programmatic 
support in the form of multifaceted country programs.
The combination of multiple activities in support 
of a coherent national program holds very real prom-
ise for the systemic change and scale impacts that the 
Cities Alliance is seeking to support. In Uganda, for 
example, that support is focused on all 14 secondary 
cities, which is not only where the bulk of urbaniza-
tion is taking place, but also where capacity con-
straints, infrastructure backlogs, and affordability 
challenges are most extreme. 
With the support of Cities Alliance members, 
including both the World Bank and Slum Dwellers 
International, the government of Uganda is draft-
ing a national urban policy. In small cities like Arua, 
Jinja, and Mbarara, slum dwellers are forming sav-
ings groups and carrying out slum enumerations. 
Slum dwellers and local governments are now talking 
to each other, land is being made available, and basic 
services are being provided. A $130 million World 
Bank loan will soon start to provide much needed 
critical infrastructure in these secondary cities.
a. www.habisp.inf.br.
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across cities. But the Bank cannot do this 
alone. The key is for the urban community 
to come together to build a global pool of 
experience and evidence that all can draw 
and build from to better inform the tough 
and often irreversible decisions that city lead-
ers need to make to harness urbanization for 
sustainable development. 
Other organizations
Various bilateral agencies and United Nations 
(UN) agencies have also undertaken initia-
tives to assist urbanization. Such efforts 
include several led by the UN Population 
Fund (box A3.3) and a joint effort by various 
bilateral and multilateral institutions, known 
as the Cities Alliance (box A3.4).
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against, rather than for, low-income urban residents 
and its implications from a gender perspective. This 
planning does not exclude the urban poor from 
income-generating activities but makes it difficult for 
them to secure decent living conditions. In so doing, 
inadequate urban policies place a disproportionate 
burden on reproduction rather than on production 
activities, and on women rather than men. A gen-
dered understanding of urbanization and urban pov-
erty highlights how urban disadvantage also includes 
limited access to shelter and basic services. 
Urbanization, climate vulnerability, and adaptation 
planning. The UNFPA’s work in this area points to 
the vital role that understanding population dynamics 
and extensively using demographic data has in devel-
oping preemptive and effective adaptation policies 
and practices. It also illuminates who is vulnerable 
and how to help build their resilience.
POPClimate web platform. Spatial analysis of pop-
ulation data is at the core of understanding and 
acting on climate vulnerability, particularly in high-
concentration, high-exposure urban areas where vul-
nerability is dynamic and climate impacts threaten 
the lives and livelihoods of many. The POPClimate 
web platform was developed around UNFPA’s man-
ual on the analysis of census data for climate adapta-
tion planning and was designed to bring together a 
community of data users, climate practitioners, and 
adaptation planners who can develop, share, and 
comment on new approaches for data-driven adap-
tation planning. The website is open to select users 
now and has been launched publicly (http://nijel.org 
/un_popclimate/).
Other UNFPA initiatives on urbanization. UNFPA 
contributed to the development of the World Bank’s 
Urban Risk Assessment methodology, particularly 
focusing on the importance of a dynamic understand-
ing of risk and vulnerability that integrates urban 
growth and change. It is also engaged in with IIED to 
come up with more innovative ways to manage densi-
ties in cities and is conducting joint research in the 
field of urban food security.
Source: UNFPA 2013.
BOX 3A.4 Cities Alliance: A new business model to promote systemic change and scale
The Cities Alliance is a global partnership whose 
members include multilateral and bilateral develop-
ment agencies, donor and developing-country gov-
ernments, international associations of local gov-
ernment, and two international nongovernmental 
organizations, one of which represents slum dwell-
ers. Launched by the World Bank and UN-Habitat in 
1999, the Cities Alliance was immediately successful 
in ensuring that the issue of slums was integrated into 
the international development agenda. Today, work-
ing through its members, the Cities Alliance seeks 
to strengthen and promote the role of cities in pov-
erty reduction and sustainable development, improve 
synergies between and among members and part-
ners, and improve the quality of urban development 
cooperation.
Good urban policies need to be based on solid 
data, the generation of which the Cities Alliance has 
supported: from the sophisticated and comprehensive 
HABISP model in São Paulo,a which provides com-
prehensive information on housing and other socio-
economic conditions of the urban poor, to the Know 
Your City campaign, which sees that slum dwellers 
collaborate with their local governments to find solu-
tions to problems faced by slum dwellers. 
To help its partners better respond to the chal-
lenges of urbanization, the Cities Alliance recently 
completely restructured its organization, adopted a 
new charter, and changed its business model. Moving 
decisively away from single, often ad hoc projects, the 
Cities Alliance used a $15 million grant from the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation to move the fulcrum 
of its work program to longer-term, programmatic 
support in the form of multifaceted country programs.
The combination of multiple activities in support 
of a coherent national program holds very real prom-
ise for the systemic change and scale impacts that the 
Cities Alliance is seeking to support. In Uganda, for 
example, that support is focused on all 14 secondary 
cities, which is not only where the bulk of urbaniza-
tion is taking place, but also where capacity con-
straints, infrastructure backlogs, and affordability 
challenges are most extreme. 
With the support of Cities Alliance members, 
including both the World Bank and Slum Dwellers 
International, the government of Uganda is draft-
ing a national urban policy. In small cities like Arua, 
Jinja, and Mbarara, slum dwellers are forming sav-
ings groups and carrying out slum enumerations. 
Slum dwellers and local governments are now talking 
to each other, land is being made available, and basic 
services are being provided. A $130 million World 
Bank loan will soon start to provide much needed 
critical infrastructure in these secondary cities.
a. www.habisp.inf.br.
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Albania LMC   Grenadines UMC Gambia, The LIC Spain
Armenia LMC Suriname UMC Ghana LMC Sweden
Azerbaijan UMC Uruguay UMC Guinea LIC Switzerland
Belarus UMC Venezuela, RB UMC Guinea-Bissau LIC United Kingdom
Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC  Kenya LIC United States
Bulgaria UMC Lesotho LMC  
Georgia LMC Middle East and North Africa  Liberia LIC Other high-income economies
Kazakhstan UMC Algeria UMC Madagascar LIC Andorra
Kosovo LMC Djibouti LMC Malawi LIC Aruba
Kyrgyz Republic LIC Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC Mali LIC Bahamas, The
Latvia UMC Iran, Islamic Rep. UMC Mauritania LMC Bahrain
Lithuania UMC Iraq LMC Mauritius UMC Barbados
Macedonia, FYR UMC Jordan UMC Mozambique LIC Bermuda
Moldova LMC Lebanon UMC Namibia UMC Brunei Darussalam
Montenegro UMC Libya UMC Niger LIC Cayman Islands
Romania UMC Morocco LMC Nigeria LMC Channel Islands
Russian Federation UMC Syrian Arab Republic LMC Rwanda LIC Croatia
Serbia UMC Tunisia UMC São Tomé and Principe LMC Curaçao
Tajikistan LIC West Bank and Gaza LMC Senegal LMC Cyprus
Turkey UMC Yemen, Rep. LMC Seychelles UMC Equatorial Guinea
Turkmenistan UMC   Sierra Leone LIC Faeroe Islands
Ukraine LMC   Somalia LIC French Polynesia
Uzbekistan LMC  South Africa UMC Greenland
   South Sudan LMC Guam
   Sudan LMC Hong Kong SAR, China
   Swaziland LMC Isle of Man
   Tanzania LIC Kuwait
   Togo LIC Liechtenstein
   Uganda LIC Macao SAR, China
   Zambia LMC Malta
   Zimbabwe LIC Monaco
   New Caledonia
   Northern Mariana Islands
   Oman
   Puerto Rico
   Qatar
   San Marino
   Saudi Arabia
   Singapore
   Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
   St. Kitts and Nevis
   St. Martin (French part)
   Trinidad and Tobago
   Turks and Caicos Islands
   United Arab Emirates
   Virgin Islands (U.S.)
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Note: This table classifies all World Bank member economies, and all other economies with populations of more than 30,000. For operational and analytical purposes, 
economies are divided among income groups according to 2011 gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups 
are: low-income countries (LIC), $1,025 or less; lower-middle-income countries (LMC), $1,026–4,035; upper-middle-income countries (UMC), $4,036–12,475; and high-
income countries, $12,476 or more. Other analytical groups based on geographic regions are also used. The names of countries and economies in this table comply 
with the World Bank’s official listing.
East Asia and Pacific   Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia   High-income OECD economies
American Samoa UMC Antigua and Barbuda UMC Afghanistan LIC Australia
Cambodia LIC Argentina UMC Bangladesh LIC Austria
China UMC Belize LMC Bhutan LMC Belgium
Fiji LMC Bolivia LMC India LMC Canada
Indonesia LMC Brazil UMC Maldives UMC Czech Republic
Kiribati LMC Chile UMC Nepal LIC Denmark
Korea, Dem. Rep. LIC Colombia UMC Pakistan LMC Estonia
Lao PDR LMC Costa Rica UMC Sri Lanka LMC Finland
Malaysia UMC Cuba UMC  France
Marshall Islands LMC Dominica UMC Sub-Saharan Africa  Germany
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. LMC Dominican Republic UMC Angola UMC Greece
Mongolia LMC Ecuador UMC Benin LIC Hungary
Myanmar LIC El Salvador LMC Botswana UMC Iceland
Palau UMC Grenada UMC Burkina Faso LIC Ireland
Papua New Guinea LMC Guatemala LMC Burundi LIC Israel
Philippines LMC Guyana LMC Cameroon LMC Italy
Samoa LMC Haiti LIC Cape Verde LMC Japan
Solomon Islands LMC Honduras LMC Central African Republic LIC Korea, Rep.
Thailand UMC Jamaica UMC Chad LIC Luxembourg
Timor-Leste LMC Mexico UMC Comoros LIC Netherlands
Tonga LMC Nicaragua LMC Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC New Zealand
Tuvalu UMC Panama UMC Congo, Rep. LMC Norway
Vanuatu LMC Paraguay LMC Côte d'Ivoire LMC Poland
Vietnam LMC Peru UMC Eritrea LIC Portugal
 St. Lucia UMC Ethiopia LIC Slovak Republic
Europe and Central Asia  St. Vincent and the  Gabon UMC Slovenia
Albania LMC   Grenadines UMC Gambia, The LIC Spain
Armenia LMC Suriname UMC Ghana LMC Sweden
Azerbaijan UMC Uruguay UMC Guinea LIC Switzerland
Belarus UMC Venezuela, RB UMC Guinea-Bissau LIC United Kingdom
Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC  Kenya LIC United States
Bulgaria UMC Lesotho LMC  
Georgia LMC Middle East and North Africa  Liberia LIC Other high-income economies
Kazakhstan UMC Algeria UMC Madagascar LIC Andorra
Kosovo LMC Djibouti LMC Malawi LIC Aruba
Kyrgyz Republic LIC Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC Mali LIC Bahamas, The
Latvia UMC Iran, Islamic Rep. UMC Mauritania LMC Bahrain
Lithuania UMC Iraq LMC Mauritius UMC Barbados
Macedonia, FYR UMC Jordan UMC Mozambique LIC Bermuda
Moldova LMC Lebanon UMC Namibia UMC Brunei Darussalam
Montenegro UMC Libya UMC Niger LIC Cayman Islands
Romania UMC Morocco LMC Nigeria LMC Channel Islands
Russian Federation UMC Syrian Arab Republic LMC Rwanda LIC Croatia
Serbia UMC Tunisia UMC São Tomé and Principe LMC Curaçao
Tajikistan LIC West Bank and Gaza LMC Senegal LMC Cyprus
Turkey UMC Yemen, Rep. LMC Seychelles UMC Equatorial Guinea
Turkmenistan UMC   Sierra Leone LIC Faeroe Islands
Ukraine LMC   Somalia LIC French Polynesia
Uzbekistan LMC  South Africa UMC Greenland
   South Sudan LMC Guam
   Sudan LMC Hong Kong SAR, China
   Swaziland LMC Isle of Man
   Tanzania LIC Kuwait
   Togo LIC Liechtenstein
   Uganda LIC Macao SAR, China
   Zambia LMC Malta
   Zimbabwe LIC Monaco
   New Caledonia
   Northern Mariana Islands
   Oman
   Puerto Rico
   Qatar
   San Marino
   Saudi Arabia
   Singapore
   Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
   St. Kitts and Nevis
   St. Martin (French part)
   Trinidad and Tobago
   Turks and Caicos Islands
   United Arab Emirates
   Virgin Islands (U.S.)
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Table A1.2 Country classifications in IMF’s World Economic Outlook, 2013
Advanced Economiesa
Australia France Korea, Republic of Slovak Republic
Austria Germany Luxembourg Slovenia
Belgium Greece Malta Spain
Canada Hong Kong SAR Netherlands Sweden
Cyprus Iceland New Zealand Switzerland
Czech Republic Ireland Norway Taiwan Province of China
Denmark Israel Portugal United Kingdom
Estonia Italy San Marino United States
Finland Japan Singapore
Emerging Market and Developing Countriesa  
  
Central and Eastern Europeb Sub-Saharan Africab  
Albania Lithuania  Angola* Lesotho
Bosnia and Herzegovina* FYR Macedonia  Benin Liberia*
Bulgaria Montenegro  Botswana Madagascar
Croatia Poland  Burkina Faso Malawi
Hungary Romania  Burundi* Mali
Kosovo* Serbia  Cameroon Mauritius
Latvia Turkey  Cape Verde Mozambique
Central African Republic* Namibia
Developing Asiab  Chad* Niger
Bangladesh Myanmar*  Comoros* Nigeria
Bhutan Nepal*  Congo, Dem. Rep. of* Rwanda
Brunei Darussalam Palau  Congo, Rep. of* São Tomé and Príncipe
Cambodia Papua New Guinea  Côte d’Ivoire* Senegal
China Philippines  Equatorial Guinea Seychelles
Fiji Samoa  Eritrea* Sierra Leone*
India Solomon Islands*  Ethiopia South Africa
Indonesia Sri Lanka  Gabon South Sudan*
Kiribati* Thailand  Gambia, The Swaziland
Lao People’s Democratic Republic Timor-Leste*  Ghana Tanzania
Malaysia Tonga  Guinea* Togo*
Maldives Tuvalu*  Guinea-Bissau* Uganda
Marshall Islands* Vanuatu  Kenya Zambia
Micronesia, Federated States of* Vietnam  Zimbabwe*
Mongolia  
   
Middle East and  
North Africab
Commonwealth of  
Independent Statesb
 
Latin America and the Caribbeanb
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of* Armenia  Antigua and Barbuda Guyana
Algeria Azerbaijan  Argentina Haiti*
Bahrain Belarus  Bahamas, The Honduras
Djibouti Georgiac  Barbados Jamaica
Egypt Kazakhstan  Belize Mexico
Iran, Islamic Republic of Kyrgyz Republic  Bolivia Nicaragua
Iraq* Moldova  Brazil Panama
Jordan Russian Federation  Chile Paraguay
Kuwait Tajikistan  Colombia Peru
Lebanon Turkmenistan  Costa Rica St. Kitts and Nevis
Libya* Ukraine  Dominica St. Lucia
Mauritania Uzbekistan  Dominican Republic St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Morocco  Ecuador Suriname
Oman  El Salvador Trinidad and Tobago
Pakistan  Grenada Uruguay
Qatar  Guatemala Venezuela
Saudi Arabia   
Sudan*   
Syrian Arab Republic*   
Tunisia   
United Arab Emirates   
Yemen, Republic of *
Note:  The names of countries and economies in this table comply with the IMF’s official listing.
a. As used here, the terms “country” and “economy” do not always refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. Some 
territorial entities included here are not states, although their statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
b. Countries in bold typeface are low-income developing countries eligible for financial assistance under IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. Countries with 
an asterisk are included in the World Bank’s list of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.
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